FLOWSERVE LIMITORQUE PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Flowserve’s proprietary rights are included in the information disclosed herein. Recipient, by accepting this document, agrees that neither this document nor the information disclosed herein nor any part thereof shall be reproduced or transferred to other
documents or used or disclosed to others for manufacturing or for any other purpose except as specifically authorized in writing by Flowserve.
This document is a Safety Manual for the Basic Limitorque™ MXa electronic actuator system with Standard Controls
Package as developed for the Limitorque branded actuators that are manufactured by Flowserve Corporation.
Optional printed circuit boards may be included with the basic actuator as shown in the following table. However,
while the inclusion of those options will not result in a change to the Safety Integrity Level [SIL], their use will result in
a slight reduction in values for some of the safety metrics as shown in sections 6 and 8.
Table 1.1 – Available Functional Options
FunctionPart #
Digital Output (relays)64-825-0043
Analog Output64-825-0155
Network, Modbus (DDC)64-825-0047
Network, Fieldbus H1Profibus PA64-825-0173
Network, Profibus DP64-825-0046
Network, DeviceNet64-825-0097
UPS (24Vdc remote supply interface)64-825-0132
QuikPower (backup Power)64-825-0067
Arctic temperature components to (-60°C)64-825-0157, 64-825-0101-4
This document is intended to provide the necessary information to properly configure and use the Safety Instrumented
Function [SIF] of the device within a Safety Instrument System [SIS] as defined by Standard IEC 61508. It contains
detailed information on installation, commissioning, proof testing and diagnostics.
Approval Certificate without option boards: Exida #FLO 081012 C001, revision 1.1, dated January 13, 2012.
The MXa Electronic Actuator is a smart, double-sealed, multi-turn actuator that employs an absolute encoder for
position and speed feedback.
The MXA motor is designed for high starting torque and low inertia to reduce valve position overshoot. If motor
maintenance is required, it may be removed from the actuator while the actuator’s oil lubricated gear case remains
sealed. The LimiGard™ feature (US patent #5,719,559) continually monitors the motor contactor, control relays,
internal logic circuits, and external command signals to detect possible malfunctions, while warning the user that
the actuator should be examined and repaired. Coupling the LimiGard features with built-in Partial Stroke testing
capability provides users with strong assurance that the Limitorque actuator will be ready for action when called
upon by its configured Safety Instrumented Function.
The double-sealed design provides a termination chamber that is separated and moisture sealed from the control
compartment. The terminal compartment contains provisions for connecting power, earth, and control wiring. Wiring
may be connected without opening the controls compartment, thus protecting the internal controls from exposure to
potentially damaging environmental factors.
The hand wheel provides backup for manual operation. When the declutch lever is placed in its manual operation
position, the output drive is coupled to the hand wheel and the valve position may be changed with it. The actuator
automatically returns to motor operation whenever the motor is energized.
The housing is cast aluminum with a powder-coating that is suitable for many harsh environments.
The following documents form a part of this document to the extent specified herein. Unless otherwise specified, the
issues of documents are those cited in the solicitation or contract.
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For further details, refer to Instruction, Operation & Maintenance [IOM] manual for Limitorque MX Electronic Actuator,
LMENIM2306. The latest version may be found on the Flowserve web site at www.flowserve.com.
Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restrictions on the title page of this document
The international standard IEC 61508 defines four Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) from SIL 1 to SIL 4. Each level provides
an expectation for the probability of a failure on demand for a given safety function. Higher SIL values indicate higher
integrity against random failure probability that a safety function will perform when required (see Table 1 for relative
comparisons) and higher integrity against systemic failures. The achievable SIL based upon random failure protection
has been determined by using the following safety parameters:
2.1 Failure Rates/Failure Modes
2.1.1 Safe, but Detected (λSD)
Rate per hour of failures that will result in a transition to the fail-safe state, but that will be detected and annunciated.
2.1.2 Safe, but Undetected (λSU)
Rate per hour of failures that will result in a transition to the fail-safe state, but that cannot be detected.
2.1.3 Dangerous, but Detected (λDD)
Rate per hour of failures that will prevent a transition to the fail-safe state when a demand occurs, but that will be detected
and annunciated.
2.1.4 Dangerous, but Undetected (λDU)
Rate per hour of failures that will prevent a transition to the fail-safe state when a demand occurs and that is not detected
during normal operation. These failures may be detected by PST.
2.2 Mission Time (T
Expected operating lifetime expressed in hours for device to provide safety function (10, 15 or 20 years).
2.3 Partial Stroke Test (PST) Period
mission
)
Minimum one PST per month ==> 730 hr
Failures can be uncovered during PST.
FLOWSERVE PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restrictions on the title page of this document
Full stroke test at least once per year ==> 8760 hr
Based upon the extent of the proof test, failures undetected during normal operation or during PST may be uncovered
during full proof test.
2.5 Failures in Time (FIT)
Number of failures in time.
2.6 Mean Time to Restoration (MTTR)
Average failure detection time plus average repair time.
2.7 SFF
Safe failure fraction.
2.8 PFD
The average probability of failure on demand for a safety function (approximate).
avg
2.9 RRF
Risk reduction factor.
2.10 SIL vs PFD
Table 1 is based upon “low-demand Mode,” i.e., the safety function is required to be operated no more frequently than
twice the proof test period (see 2.4 ).
Table 2.1 - SIL vs PFD
SILPFDavgRFF
410-5 … < 10
310-4 … < 10
210-3 … < 10
110-2 … < 10
avg
vs RFF
avg
-4
-3
-2
-1
10,000 to 100,000
1,000 to 10,000
100 to 1000
10 to 100
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Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restrictions on the title page of this document
Any operating mode or self-detected system failure that could prevent the actuator from performing its Safety
Instrumented Function on demand from the Safety Instrumented System shall cause the actuator’s monitor relay to
de-energize, thus providing indication to the user via the alarm contacts on the monitor relay that the actuator may need
to be serviced.
Operating modes Local and Stop shall force the monitor relay to de-energize (indicates that the actuator is not available
for demands from remote control wiring).
Loss of power at the actuator terminals shall force the monitor relay to de-energize.
Built-in diagnostic scans shall be automatically performed by the actuator no less frequently than once every 10
seconds.
3.2 Local Control Knobs Sensors
Sensors for local control knobs shall be redundant such that a single sensor failure can be detected by the actuator’s
Built-In Self-Test [BIST] system. Self-detected hardware failures of the local control knobs shall force the monitor relay
to de-energize. However, while such failures shall be indicated by the monitor relay, the actuator shall be configured
such that a demand from the ESD input shall ignore any hardware failures at the local control knobs and shall respond
to SIF demands from the SIS.
3.3 ESD Override for Knobs
The actuator should be configured such that ESD demand signals will take priority over local control knob “STOP” and
“LOCAL” operating modes.
3.4 The LCD Display May Also Indicate Warnings and Alarms
NOTE: Because the LCD and its drive components may fail, the user must rely solely on the state of the monitor relay
for accurate SIF availability status.
3.5 Partial Stroke Test Interval
User should perform the partial stroke test sequence at least once per month during the mission life of the actuator.
FLOWSERVE PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restrictions on the title page of this document
User should perform a full stroke proof test sequence at least once per year during the mission life of the actuator.
3.7 Basic Safety Configuration Requirements
Actuator should be configured and wired for emergency operation and partial stroke testing as shown in section 9.4 of
this document.
3.8 Optional Emergency Overrides
The user may choose to disable certain actuator protection features such that the actuator may sacrifice itself in order
to attempt to achieve the demanded safe state during an emergency.
See “ESD (Emergency Shutdown) Overrides” in the IOM.
NOTE: The actuator warranty shall be voided if any of these protection features are disabled.
3.9 Labeling
Actuators that have been approved for operation in Safety Instrumented Systems shall have a label affixed that indicates
its SIL rating.
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Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restrictions on the title page of this document
1 0001 Invali d STOP Yes
2 0010 LOCA LYes
3 0011 Invali d STOP Yes
4 0100 LOCA LYes
5 0101 Invali d STOP Yes
6 0110 Invali d STOP Yes
7 0111 STOPYes
8 1000 Invali d STOP Yes
9 1001 REMOTENo
10 1010 Inval id ST OP Ye s
11 1011 Inval id ST OP Ye s
12 1100 REMOTENo
13 1101 Inval id ST OP Ye s
14 1110 Inval id ST OP Ye s
15 1111 Inval id ST OP Ye s
FLOWSERVE PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restrictions on the title page of this document
MonitorRelay
De‐energises?
Case A‐B‐C‐D Meaning Action
1 0001 In vali d STOP Ye s
2 0010 CLOSENo
3 0011 In vali d STOP Ye s
4 0100 CLOSENo
5 0101 In vali d STOP Ye s
6 0110 In vali d STOP Ye s
7 0111 S TOPNo
8 1000 In vali d STOP Ye s
9 1001 OP ENNo
10 1010 I nval id STOP Yes
11 1011 I nval id STOP Yes
12 1100 O PENNo
13 1101 I nval id STOP Yes
14 1110 I nval id STOP Yes
15 1111 I nval id STOP Yes
LimiGard™ is at the heart of the design for safety that is integral to every Limitorque MXa and QX commercial and/or
SIL-rated electric actuator.
LimiGard is a patented digital command and monitoring system that employs coded signals throughout and automatically monitors the health of each signal to ensure that no component failure in the signal path can cause the actuator to
move unexpectedly.
Motor control signals are redundant in that two healthy signals must be present before the motor will be able to move.
Both the enable signal and the direction signals (CW or CCW) must be present and healthy so that the motor will
respond to the command. All command signals must also meet the waveform shape specifications to be considered
healthy. If the command signal waveform does not meet the frequency and duty cycle specification, or fails to high or
low DC voltage values, then no charge can be pumped through the charge pump and the command signal will not be
passed to its target contactor coil.
The LimiGard feature also employs a function that can detect when a single output switch is “on.” Normally, zero
switches are on when the motor is idle, and two switches are on when the motor is active. Whenever a single switch is
on, the LimiGard feature detects that as a fault and alerts the user.
Operating mode signals from the knobs on the local control compartment are also redundant in the sense that there
are four sensors to detect three valid knob positions. Each valid knob position requires signals from two of the four
sensors. There are only five valid combinations out of the 16 possible sensor signal combinations that will be accepted
as valid signals. All other combinations will be detected and reported as “Hardware Fault / Knobs.”
The absolute encoder position sensor also rests within the scope of LimiGard protection. The encoder includes several
BIST features for which patents are pending. In particular, each data bit that comprises the resulting position value has
been validated by the encoder to ensure that each bit signal transmitter and receiver is healthy. Whenever any data bit is
determined to be unreliable or failed, the LimiGard feature alerts the user.
While most LimiGard alerts will be displayed on the digital screen in the window on the control compartment, some
failures, such as power loss, CPU failure or LCD failure will make it impossible to show details of the failure on the
digital display screen. The user should always rely on the state of the monitor relay, which will always de-energize
whenever the actuator is not available to respond to remote demand signals.
Note: Although “Local” and “Stop” operating modes are not failures, the actuator will not normally respond to remote
demand signals when it is in one of those modes. Therefore, the monitor relay will de-energize when the actuator is in
one of those modes.
Note: For emergency operation, many users will want the actuator to respond to emergency shutdown demand signals,
even if the operating mode is Local or Stop, or if some protective feature has been asserted by the actuator (e.g., motor
over temperature, hardware fault/knob, hardware fault/encoder). Many such protection features can be overridden by
the ESD function. However, by choosing to override the protection features to achieve a safety function at the expense
of sacrificing the actuator will void factory warranty.
4.2 Optional Safety Add-ons
4.2.1 Fire Protection
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A self-sacrificing, fire-resistant coating may be applied to the actuator that will allow the actuator to continue functioning for 30 minutes while immersed in flame.
Fire protection has not been included in the calculations for SIL rating of the basic actuator.
Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restrictions on the title page of this document
The LimiGard concept can be extended to user wiring as shown in Safety Block Diagram - Enhanced User Wiring
(Figure 4.2 below) and configuring the actuator in accordance with subsection 10.5, Custom Input Mode - Momentary
ESD/PSESD (Optional).
NOTE: With enhanced PST/ESD configuration, a momentary ESD demand signal will be honored by the actuator, even if
user wiring is subsequently destroyed during the emergency event.
Figure 4.2 - Safety Block Diagram - Enhanced User Wiring
Case A‐B‐C‐D Meaning A ction
1 0001 Invali d STOP Yes
2 0010 LOCA LYes
3 0011 Invali d STOP Yes
4 0100 LOCA LYes
5 0101 Invali d STOP Yes
6 0110 Invali d STOP Yes
7 0111 STOPYes
8 1000 Invali d STOP Yes
9 1001 REMOTENo
10 1010 Inval id ST OP Ye s
11 1011 Inval id ST OP Ye s
12 1100 REMOTENo
13 1101 Inval id ST OP Ye s
14 1110 Inval id ST OP Ye s
15 1111 Inval id ST OP Ye s
FLOWSERVE PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restrictions on the title page of this document
MonitorRelay
De‐energises?
Case A‐B‐C‐D Meaning Action
1 0001 In vali d STO P Yes
2 0010 CLOSENo
3 0011 In vali d STO P Yes
4 0100 CLOSENo
5 0101 In vali d STO P Yes
6 0110 In vali d STO P Yes
7 0111 S TOPNo
8 1000 In vali d STO P Yes
9 1001 OP ENNo
10 1010 I nval id S TOP Yes
11 1011 I nval id S TOP Yes
12 1100 O PENNo
13 1101 I nval id S TOP Yes
14 1110 I nval id S TOP Yes
15 1111 I nval id S TOP Yes
A remote, external ESD signal may be applied to the actuator to move the valve to the OPEN position through predetermined, user-configured shutdown position, overriding existing control signals.
5.2 Emergency Shutdown Close (ESD-Close)
A remote, external ESD signal may be applied to the actuator to move the valve to the CLOSE position through predetermined, user-configured shutdown position, overriding existing control signals.
5.3 Emergency Shutdown ‘Move To’ (ESD-Position)
A remote, external ESD signal may be applied to the actuator to move the valve to a target position through predetermined, user-configured target position, overriding existing control signals.
5.4 Emergency Shutdown Stop (ESD-Stop)
A remote, external ESD signal may be applied to the actuator to stop in place, overriding existing control signals.
5.5 Emergency Shutdown Ignore (ESD-Ignore)
A remote, external ESD signal may be applied to the actuator to ignore, thus remaining responsive to any other existing
control signals.
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Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restrictions on the title page of this document
FLOWSERVE PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
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