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TT 51 SERIES
1.1 Field of application
The TT 51 C is a universal, isolated, dual-input temperature transmitter for RTD and
thermocouple sensors. It’s primarily intended to be mounted in a DIN-B housing.
TT 51 R is the rail mounted version of the TT 51 series.
TT 51 C Ex and TT 51 R Ex are the intrinsically safe versions of the TT 51 series. An S is added for
the SIL versions, e.g. TT 51 C ExS.
The TT 51 temperature transmitter utilizes a modular design in hardware as well as in software
to ensure the quality and reliability of the transmitter signal output to meet the special safety
requirements according to IEC 61508-2.
1.2 User benefits
• This intelligent HART® temperature transmitter is designed to perform temperature
measurements of solids, fluids and gases up to SIL2 according to special safety requirements
of IEC 61508-2 (see exida FMEDA report KROHNE 09/12-72 R011).
• Remote configuration with process control system, PC or HART
possible in combination with SIL activation to prevent unintended changes, only read-out of
parameters from the unit is possible via HART
function the software ConSoft and USB-kit ICON must be used.
• Continuous measurement
• Easy commissioning
INTRODUCTION 1
®
hand terminal is not
®
. To change settings or deactivate the SIL
not
notnot
SIL2 requirements are based on the standards current at the time of certification.
The TT 51 S certification involves the HW assessment of the TT 51 S products with an FMEDA.
1.3 Manufacturer’s safety instructions
The measuring device has been built and tested in accordance with the current state of the art,
and complies with the relevant safety standards.
However, dangers may arise from improper use or use for other than intended purpose.
For this reason, observe all the safety instructions in this document carefully.
INFORMATION!
This "Safety manual" is a complement to the regular handbook.
In addition to the safety rules in this documentation, national and regional safety rules and
industrial safety regulations must also be observed.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.4 Relevant standards / Literature
•[N1]• IEC 61508 part 2 - Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic
safety-related systems;
• Part 2: Requirements for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safetyrelated systems
•[N2]• IEC 61326-3-1:2008 - Immunity requirements for safety-related systems and for
equipment intended to perform safety-related functions (functional safety) - General
industrial applications
•[N3]• Namur NE 21 - Electromagnetic compatibility of industrial process and laboratory
control equipment
•[N4]• Namur NE 32 - Data retention in the event of a power failure in field and control
instruments with microprocessors
•[N5]• Namur NE 43 - Standardization of the signal level for the failure information of digital
transmitters
•[N6]• Namur NE 53 - Software of field devices and signal processing devices with digital
electronics
•[N7]• Namur NE 79 - Microprocessor equipped devices for safety instrumented systems
•[N8]• Namur NE 89 - Temperature transmitter with digital signal processing
•[N9]• Namur NE 107 - Self-monitoring and diagnosis of field devices
•[N10]• EN 60079-0:2006 - Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres;
• Part 0: General requirements
•[N11]• EN 60079-11:2007 - Explosive atmospheres;
• Equipment protection by intrinsic safety "i"
•[N12]• EN 60079-15:2005 - Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres
• Part 15: Construction, test and marking of type of protection "n" electrical apparatus
•[N13]• EN 60079-26:2007 - Explosive atmospheres
• Part 26: Equipment with equipment protection level (EPL) Ga
TT 51 SERIES
4
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TT 51 SERIES
Used abbreviations
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 2
DC
D
FIT
FMEAFailure Modes Effects Analysis is a structured qualitative analysis of a system,
FMEDAFailure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis adds a qualitative failure data for all
HFTHardware Fault Tolerance
Low demand mode Mode, where the frequency of demand for operation made on a safety-related
High demand
mode
MTBFMean Time Between Failure is average time between failure occurrences.
MTTRMean Time To Restoration is average time needed to restore normal operation after
PFD
AVG
PFHProbability of Failure per Hour is the probability of a system to have a dangerous
SFFSafe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failure, which lead to a safe state
SIFSafety Instrumented Function
SILSafety Integrity Level
Type A component"Non-complex" subsystem (all failure modes are well defined);
Type B component"Complex" subsystem (at least one failure mode are not well defined);
T[Proof]Proof Test Interval
Diagnostic Coverage of dangerous failures.
Diagnostic coverage is the ratio of the detected failure rate to the total failure rate.
Failure In Time (1x10-9 failures per hour)
subsystem, process, design or function to identify potential failure modes, their
causes and their effects on (system) operation.
components being analyzed and ability of the system to detect internal failures via
automatic on-line diagnostics parts to FMEA.
system is not greater than one per year and not greater than twice the proof-test
frequency.
Mode, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related
system is greater than one per year and greater than twice the proof-check
frequency.
a failure has occurred.
Probability of Failure on Demand is the average probability of a system to fail to
perform its design function on demand.
failure occur per hour.
and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead
to a defined safety action.
for details see 7.4.3.1.2 of IEC 61508-2.
for details see 7.4.3.1.3 of IEC 61508-2.
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3 DESCRIPTION OF THE SUBSYSTEM
3.1 Functional principle
The TT 51 series supports up to two sensor channels with general input circuits that may be
configured for RTD and/or thermocouple temperature sensors.
All safety related calculations are based on these connections.
Functional principle of the TT 51 series is based on the analog to digital and back to analog signal
conditioning. The temperature sensors used are either Resistance Temperature Device(s) (RTD)
or thermocouple(s) (T/C). The RTD has a temperature dependent, non-linear, variable resistance
while the T/C generates a low level, highly non-linear, EMF (voltage) that depends on the
temperature difference between opposite ends of the T/C wire pair. Hence the connection end of
the T/C (cold junction) constitutes a temperature reference or base value that has to be
measured in order to determine the temperature at the critical spot (hot junction). This action is
referred to as cold junction compensation (CJC). One or two sensors of the same or different
types may be connected.
The low level analogue signal from temperature sensors is amplified and filtered before
converting it to a digital signal. The digital signal is less prone to electromagnetic interference.
Digital signal processing like sensor linearization, calculation, temperature drift compensation
etc. is controlled by processors, isolated and converted back to analogue 4...20 mA output signal.
TT 51 SERIES
The TT 51 are smart temperature transmitter which improves predicting problems within the
industrial safety instrumented systems – SIS, reducing the manual testing.
The TT 51 is a modular and configurable system with the ability to pre-configure inputs for
measuring sensor(s) and outputs to fault conditions. Configuration of the transmitter is
protected by password.
6
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TT 51 SERIES
4.1 Description of the failure categories
The following definitions of the failure are used during diagnostic calculations:
SAFETY FUNCTION 4
Fail-Safe StateThe fail-safe state is defined as the output reaching the user defined
Fail - SafeA safe failure (S) is defined as a failure that causes the
Fail DangerousA dangerous failure is defined as a failure of the temperature transmitter
Fail Dangerous UndetectedFailure that is dangerous and that is not being diagnosed by internal
Fail Dangerous DetectedFailure that is dangerous but is detected by internal diagnostics and
Fail HighFailure that causes the output signal to go to the maximum output current
Fail LowFailure that causes the output signal to go to the minimum output current
No EffectFailure of a component that is part of the safety function but is neither a
Not partFailures of a component which is not part of the safety function but part of
threshold value.
module/(sub)system to go to the defined fail-safe state without a demand
from the process. Safe failures are divided into safe detected (SD) and safe
undetected (SU) failures.
TT 51 C not responding to a demand from the process, i.e. being unable to
go to the defined fail-safe state, and the output current deviates by more
than 2% of measuring span of the actual temperature measurement
value.
diagnostics.
causes the output signal to go to the predefined alarm state (These
failures may be converted to the selected fail-safe state).
(> 21 mA) acc. to NAMUR NE 43.
(< 3.6 mA) acc. to NAMUR NE 43.
safe failure nor a dangerous failure and has no effect on the safety
function. For the calculation of the SFF it is treated like a safe undetected
failure.
the circuit diagram.
4.2 Specification of the safety function
The safety function of the TT 51 transmitter is the quality and reliability of the transmitter signal
output, i.e. measurement performance, error detection and error indication in the signalprocessing path of the transmitter.
The valid range of the output signal is between 3.8 mA and 20.5 acc. to NE 43.
The failure information is defined by two selectable alarm levels: Fail Low (Downscale ≤ 3.6 mA)
and Fail High (Upscale ≥ 21 mA).
The configuration of the transmitter is protected by the password in the software ConSoft. The
password is then stored in the transmitter.
The TT 51 checks sensor errors (sensor break or sensor short) for both channels if it is
configured in this manner.
A software SIL-switch is available in the transmitter, handled by the PC-configuration software
ConSoft. It is also password-protected. It can also be changed by HART
password-protected.
®
communication, still
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4 SAFETY FUNCTION
FunctionActive/Not ActiveOutputAlarm level 1
Sensor breakActive4...20 mA / 20...4 mA≤3.6 mA / ≥21.0 mA
Sensor shortActive4...20 mA / 20...4 mA≤3.6 mA / ≥21.0 mA
Low isolationNot active-System error 2Active4...20 mA / 20...4 mA≤3.6 mA / ≥21.0 mA
Sensor drift (dual
sensor needed) 3
1 For some system failures the alarm output will toggle between a high alarm level (≥21.0 mA)
and a low alarm level (≤3.6 mA). For some HW failures the alarm level will be high even though a
low level is configured and for some other HW failures the alarm will go low even though a high
level has been selected.
To prevent a safety system from restart due to the toggling output the system should be setup so
that once an alarm signal has occurred from the safety loop the system shouldn’t go back to
normal run automatically but only manual ("Restart Interlock").
2 System errors = failures in the software or hardware detected by the diagnostics in the
transmitter.
Active/Not Active
selectable
TT 51 SERIES
4...20 mA / 20...4 mA≤3.6 mA / ≥21.0 mA
3 The sensor drift function is valid from SW-versions; IPM-SW 01.01.03 and OPM-SW 01.01.04
and hardware versions 5 and later, implemented in transmitters with serial number 1006.xxxxxx
or later. Serial number 1006.xxxxxx means manufactured week 6 in 2010 and this information is
found on the nameplate or it can be read from the transmitter via ConSoft. The software and
hardware versions can be read from the ConSoft software, tab "Device Information".
4.3 Redundancy
For the following configurations:
• 2 x 2w RTD sensors
• 2 x 3w RTD sensors
• 2 x Thermocouple sensors
• 1x Thermocouple sensor and 1 x 3w RTD sensor
• 1x Thermocouple sensor and 1 x 4w RTD sensor (only valid for TT 51 R)
are either "Sensor drift monitoring" function or "Sensor backup" function selectable at a time.
4.3.1 Sensor drift
If the function "Sensor drift" monitoring is selected, a difference between the sensors of more or
equal to the value stated in the configuration will cause the output to go either "Downscale" or
"Upscale" depending on the user configuration. Maximum temperature difference has to be
specified in °C via ConSoft.
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TT 51 SERIES
4.3.2 Sensor backup
If "Sensor backup" function is activated the sensor chosen as output measuring in the
configuration will reflect the actual measuring value as long as it’s working properly. A sensor
break or a sensor short cause the transmitter to switch over to the other sensor and the output
signal will reflect the measured value of that sensor. A diagnostic message is transmitted via
®
HART
If the "Average" function is activated in the configuration, the output value will reflect the actual
mean measuring value as long as the sensors are working properly. A sensor break or a sensor
short cause the transmitter to switch over to the non-broken sensor and the output signal will
reflect the measured value of that sensor. A diagnostic message is transmitted via HART
PLC.
INFORMATION!
The functions "Sensor backup" and "Average" doesn't give any extra safety according to SIL and
are not used for calculating the system (transmitter + sensor) safety figures.
CAUTION!
The possibility to select the function for sensor drift monitoring is implemented in software
revision IPM-SW 01.01.03 and OPM-SW 01.01.04, from serial number 1006.xxxxxx.
to the PLC.
SAFETY FUNCTION 4
®
to the
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5 PROJECT PLANNING
5.1 Applicable device documentation
TT 51 SERIES
[D1]TT 51 series - Technical Datasheet: 2-wire transmitter for temperature, resistance or voltage
[D2]TT 51 series - Handbook: 2-wire transmitter for temperature, resistance or voltage
[D3]exida FMEDA report: KROHNE 09/12-72 R011
measurement
Reference: 08/2010 - 4000869702 - TD TT51 R02 en
measurement
Reference: 08/2010 - 4000754201 - MA TT51 R01 en
5.2 Project planning, behaviour during operation and malfunction
• Under normal conditions the useful operating lifetime is 10 years (8...12 years).
• Requirements made in the handbook have to be kept.
• Repair and inspection intervals are based on safety calculation.
• For repairs or recalibration of the SIL transmitter, use the original or a suitable secure
packing, include a properly filled out return form (see Appendix) and send the device to the
manufacturer for service.
Note: It is of vital importance that all type of failures of the equipment are reported to the
manufacturer in order to make it possible for the company to make corrective actions and
prevent systematic errors.
• The owner of hazardous waste is responsible for disposal of it. However all transmitter
produced by the manufacturer are free from any hazardous materials.
• Modifications made without specifically authorization of the manufacturer are strictly
prohibited.
5.2.1 SIL data
• Measurement accuracy in SIL mode: a hardware error influencing the measured value will
• System Error Detection Time: < 5 min (for a complete software check running in background
• Update times for input signals change, with filter set to default value 4 and SIL-switch on: 1
• Update times for input signals change, with filter set to default value 4 and SIL-switch on: 2
• Minimum supply needed for system safety functions to work properly: ≥ 15 VDC
result in a system error signal if the measured signal deviates more than 2% of selected input
span
when SIL is activated)
input channel: <2s
input channels: < 3 s
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TT 51 SERIES
6.1 Periodic checks
The user of the transmitter is responsible for:
• The set-up, SIL rating and validation of any sensors connected to the transmitter
• Project management and functional testing
• Configuration of the transmitter according to the description in the following chapters.
It is recommended that the user performs regularly proof tests of the sensors used with the SIL
transmitters.
Proof test of the SIL transmitter should be made based on the required PFD depending on the
used sensor. For detailed information refer to
For PFH figures a proof test interval of one year is recommended. The needed frequency of proof
tests necessary for the safety-related system must be found by the customer.
The proof tests should be done by the user at following measures:
• At commissioning of the SIL transmitter
• Replacement of the old connected temperature sensor by new ones
• Reconfiguration of the SIL device
• At need of the SIL transmitter relocation
PERIODIC CHECKS / PROOF TESTS 6
Safety-related characteristics
on page 13.
6.2 Proof tests
The proof tests shall cover SIL safety test requirements. Up to 99% of the internal failures shall
be detected via the proof tests. The input to the SIL transmitter is simulated and tested for the
internal errors in the hardware and the firmware.
Proof test configuration
StepDescription
1Connect transmitter to the PC via USB interface.
2Start ConSoft (Check version: "Help menu → About").
3Identify transmitter by clicking on "Read from transmitter" button.
4Decide the choice of the SIL password (default value is "0000").
5Configure the transmitter by selecting sensors tab in the transmitter window.
5.1The sensor for Channel 1 and the connection for Channel 1.
5.2The sensor for Channel 2 and the connection for Channel 2.
6Choose measuring range for process value by selecting "Function" tab in the transmitter window
6.1Select measuring output mapping (Channel 1; Channel 2; Ch 1 minus Ch 2; Ch 2 minus Ch 1; minimum of Ch
6.2Select output values in mA which correspond to the chosen measuring range.
6.3Select filtering level and line frequency rejection.
7In the error monitoring tab select check box for sensor break. Select upscale (≥21 mA) value.
7.1Select check box for sensor short circuit. Select upscale (≥21 mA) value.
1 and Ch 2; maximum of Ch 1 and Ch 2; Average of Ch 1 and Ch 2).
Select desired resistance limit; default: 300 kΩ
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6 PERIODIC CHECKS / PROOF TESTS
StepDescription
8Select device information tab. Specify a mounting date in tag field.
8.1Describe the proof test in the description field and date of the test.
8.2Specify any other information in the message field.
Proof test check points
StepDescriptionYesNoComments
TT 51 SERIES
1Connect the selected sensors on Ch 1 and Ch 2 and
2Simulate sensor break for each single wire and check
3Simulate sensor short between 1...5 terminals and
4Simulate sensor break or sensor short (one error at a
check for the output range values.
the output value (≥21 mA).
check the output value (≥21 mA).
time) for sensor connected on Ch 1. Check if the
transmitter will switch automatically over to
measuring on Ch 2.
• Repeat configurations points 7...8.2 of the proof test configuration and change to down scale
error value (≤3.6 mA).
• Repeat all check points (to be sure the transmitter is not stuck in some of conditions).
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TT 51 SERIES
7.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions have been made during the Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic
Analysis of the HART
• Failure rates are constant, wear out mechanisms are not included.
• Propagation of failures is not relevant.
• External power failure rates are not included.
• The mean time to restoration (MTTR) after safe failure is 24 hours.
• For safety applications only the 4..20 mA output was considered. The HART
TT 51 C&R is only used for setup and diagnostic purpose, not during safety operation mode.
• The failure rates of the electronic components used in this analysis are obtained from a
collection of industrial databases.
• The temperature transmitters with 4..20 mA output are considered to be type B subsystems
with a hardware fault tolerance of 0.
• The failure rates do not include failures resulting from incorrect use of the equipment.
• The HART
safety operation mode.
SAFETY-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS 7
®
temperature transmitter TT 51 C&R SIL.
®
protocol at
®
protocol is only used for setup, calibration and diagnostics purpose, not during
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7 SAFETY-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS
7.2 Specific safety-related characteristics
According to table 2 of IEC 61508-1 the average PFD for systems operating in low demand mode
-3
has to be ≥10
high demand mode of operation the PFH value has to be ≥10
table 3 of IEC 61508-1. A generally accepted distribution of PFD
the sensor part, logic solver part, and final element part assumes that 35% of the total SIF
PFD
value is caused by the sensor part (including the transmitter).
avg
to ≤10-2 for SIL 2 Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs). For systems operating in
TT 51 SERIES
-7
to ≤10-6 for SIL 2 SIFs according to
and PFH values of a SIF over
avg
For a SIL 2 application operating in low demand
smaller than 1.00E-02, hence the maximum allowable PFD
low demand mode the total PFD
low demandlow demand
value for the sensor part would
avg
value of the SIF should be
avg
then be 3.50E-03.
For a SIL 2 application operating in high demand
high demand mode the total PFH value for the SIF should be
high demandhigh demand
smaller than 1.00E-06 1/h, hence the maximum allowable PFH value for the sensor part would
be 3.50E-07 1/h.
For type B components with a hardware fault tolerance of 0 the SFF shall be > 90% for SIL 2 SIFs
according to table 3 of IEC 61508-2.
λSD:Fail safe detected
λSU:Fail safe undetected
λDD:Fail dangerous detected
λDU:Fail dangerous undetected
FIT:Failure rate [1/h]
SFF:The number listed is for reference only. The SFF, PFD
the complete subsystem.
PFD
:The PFD
avg
T[Proof]:It is assumed that proof testing is performed with a proof test coverage of 99%.
PFH:= λDU (Fail dangerous undetected)
SIL AC:SIL AC (architectural constraints) means that the calculated values are within the range for
considered in combination with PFD
Function (SIF) in order to determine suitability for a specific Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
For SIL 1 applications, the PFD
For SIL 2 applications, the PFD
hardware architectural constraints for the corresponding SIL level
was calculated for profile 2 using Markov modeling. The results must be
avg
avg
avg
values of other devices of the Safety Instrumented
avg
value needs to be < 10-1 for the SIF.
value needs to be < 10-2 for the SIF.
and PFH must be determined for
avg
14
Under the assumptions described in the chapter before and the definitions given in chapter
"Desription of the failure categories" the following table show the failure rates according to
IEC 61508.
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TT 51 SERIES
Single RTD 2/3w sensor
SAFETY-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS 7
Close
coupled low
stress
Close
coupled high
stress
Extension
wires low
stress
Extension
wires high
stress
The boxes marked in light grey in the following tables mean that the calculated PFD
PFH values are within the allowed range for SIL 2 according to table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1 but do not
fulfill the requirement to not claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to
3.50E-03 respectively 3.50E-07 1/h.
The boxes marked in medium grey mean that the calculated PFD
allowed range for SIL 2 according to table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1 and do fulfill the requirement to not
claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 3.50E-03 respectively
3.50E-07 1/h.
The boxes marked in dark grey indicate that the PFD
the requirements for SIL 2 of table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1.
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7 SAFETY-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS
Single RTD 4w sensor
TT 51 SERIES
Close
coupled low
stress
Close
coupled high
stress
Extension
wires low
stress
Extension
wires high
stress
The boxes marked in light grey in the following tables mean that the calculated PFD
PFH values are within the allowed range for SIL 2 according to table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1 but do not
fulfill the requirement to not claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to
3.50E-03 respectively 3.50E-07 1/h.
The boxes marked in medium grey mean that the calculated PFD
allowed range for SIL 2 according to table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1 and do fulfill the requirement to not
claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 3.50E-03 respectively
3.50E-07 1/h.
The boxes marked in dark grey indicate that the PFD
the requirements for SIL 2 of table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1.
Dual RTD 4w sensor with activated sensor drift monitoring (only for TT 51 R SIL versions); in
preparation
Close
coupled low
stress
Close
coupled high
stress
Extension
wires low
stress
Extension
wires high
stress
Failure categorySFFPFD
λSDλSUλ
DDλDU
[FIT][%]1 year2 years5 years10 years
0
0
0
0
avg
at T
=PFHSIL AC
proof
16
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TT 51 SERIES
Single TC sensor
SAFETY-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS 7
Close
coupled low
stress
Close
coupled high
stress
Extension
wires low
stress
Extension
wires high
stress
The boxes marked in light grey in the following tables mean that the calculated PFD
PFH values are within the allowed range for SIL 2 according to table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1 but do not
fulfill the requirement to not claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to
3.50E-03 respectively 3.50E-07 1/h.
The boxes marked in medium grey mean that the calculated PFD
allowed range for SIL 2 according to table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1 and do fulfill the requirement to not
claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 3.50E-03 respectively
3.50E-07 1/h.
The boxes marked in dark grey indicate that the PFD
the requirements for SIL 2 of table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1.
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7 SAFETY-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS
Single TC + Single RTD 2/3w
TT 51 SERIES
Close
coupled low
stress
Close
coupled high
stress
Extension
wires low
stress
Extension
wires high
stress
The boxes marked in light grey in the following tables mean that the calculated PFD
PFH values are within the allowed range for SIL 2 according to table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1 but do not
fulfill the requirement to not claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to
3.50E-03 respectively 3.50E-07 1/h.
The boxes marked in medium grey mean that the calculated PFD
allowed range for SIL 2 according to table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1 and do fulfill the requirement to not
claim more than 35% of this range, i.e. to be better than or equal to 3.50E-03 respectively
3.50E-07 1/h.
The boxes marked in dark grey indicate that the PFD
the requirements for SIL 2 of table 2 / 3 of IEC 61508-1.