A Guide to World War II Armored Combat for Players of Panzer Elite
By Christopher S. Keeling
Contents
1. The History of Tank Warfare----------------------------------5
World War I
Between the Wars
World War II
2. Tank Academy----------------------------------13
Tank Basics
Firepower
Protection
Mobility
Other factors
3. Tanks in Battle----------------------------------21
Tanks in the Offensive
Tanks in the Defensive
Tank against Tank
Tank against Infantry
Antitank Warfare
4. The Campaigns----------------------------------34
North Africa
Italy
Normandy
5. The Wehrmacht----------------------------------38
German Tactics
German Artillery
German Unit Options
German Armaments
German Units
6. The U.S. Army----------------------------------85
American Tactics
American Artillery
American Unit Options
American Armaments
American Units
7. Glossary and Abbreviations----------------------------------118
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HOW TO USE THIS BOOK
This book is designed as both a historical reference for the armored warfare enthusiasts among us, and as a
primer for the novice. The history and development of the tank, covered in the first chapter, is provided in
order to give some background on the state of armored vehicle technology in World War II. The second
chapter gives much more specific information on the “current” technologies and how they were used in
combat. Chapter three covers the tactics associated with armored fighting vehicles in different roles and
against different types of targets. Chapter four is a supplement to the overall historical guide, detailing the
historical campaigns included with the game (for in-depth data on the specific scenarios, see the Gameplay
Manual, chapter seven). Reference data for all of the units in Panzer Elite is provided in chapters five and
six. Finally, a glossary of armored vehicle terminology and abbreviations is given in chapter seven. Before you
begin play, we recommend that you should at least read chapters two and three.
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1. THE HISTORY OF TANK WARFARE
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Armored fighting vehicles are a relatively recent development of military capability. Superceding the horse
cavalry shortly after the First World War, new theories on armored warfare slowly displaced the age-old
concepts of infantry and cavalry driven offensive battle by the eve of the Second World War. The history of
armored warfare, like any other technological advancements designed for the military, have suffered at the
hands of politicians, languished on the books of economists and been compromised by the higher echelons of
command. Fortunately, for the armor theorists, their ideas were eventually proven sound and the tank took
its place as a major battlefield component, forging the way for maneuver warfare and the further
development of combined arms theory.
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WORLD WAR I
Although the tank first came into use during the First World War, the basic principles of armored warfare
had been used for hundreds, even thousands, of years. The notion of a heavily armed and armored mobile
force which could strike deep into enemy territory was first embodied by the heavy cavalry and chariot units
of ancient times, as well as by the infantry tactic known as the “tortoise” which was used to assault fortified
installations. However the need for a self-propelled armored vehicle was recognized much earlier in history.
The Spanish used horse-towed sleds with small cannons mounted on them to provide close artillery support
for their troops in the field. The famous inventor and artist Leonardo de Vinci recognized the need for a
heavily armored and mobile engine of war and drew up plans accordingly. In World War I, the need became
apparent for a vehicle that could resist the machinegun, a weapon that had completely dominated the fleshand-blood battlefield of man and horse. At first, the use of simple armored cars was common, however, it
was soon obvious that these vehicles, based on the limited suspensions of the current automobile and truck,
were impractical on a battlefield which was covered with bomb craters, trenches, and barbed wire. A new
solution was needed and, thanks to the invention of the caterpillar track, the tank was born.
The First Tanks. The British were the first to recognize the need for an armored vehicle capable of
traversing the battlefield. Their first design, ordered by Winston Churchill (then First Lord of the
Admiralty), called the No. 1 Lincoln machine, was built in 1915 and subsequently modified through the
addition of superior tracks to become the ‘Little Willie’. This vehicle could easily cross a five-foot (1.52 m)
trench and climb up a four-and-a-half foot (1.37 m) obstacle. For performance and armament, it had a top
speed of 3.5 MPH (5.6 km/h), light armor, and fittings for a 40mm gun in a small turret. This early design
was superceded by Big Willie, a now-familiar design utilizing the rhomboidal-shaped chassis and tread system
with guns mounted on the hull sides instead of in a turret. The frontal armor was only 10mm thick, with a
crew of eight men, a top speed of 4 MPH (6.4 km/h), two 57mm guns in hull sponsons, and four pivoting
machineguns. This basic vehicle was tested in early 1916 and ordered into production in two versions; the
“male” version, mounting the twin 57mm guns, and the “female” version which replaced the two cannons
with two more machineguns. Although used mainly for local testing, the British armies first major use of
tanks in combat took place on November 20, 1917, at the Battle of Cambrai, where the British used 400
tanks to penetrate almost ten kilometers into German lines.
The German Army had their own tank in development, the A7V, which had a maximum of 30mm of
armor, a 57mm gun in the hull front, six machineguns, and a crew of 18 men. The A7V was unwieldy, with
generally poor performance, and a requirement for an enormous crew of 18 men. As a result, less than 35
were actually produced. The French, also seeing the need for such a vehicle early in the war, had produced
several heavy tank designs and one exceptional light tank design, the Renault FT-17. This tank, along with
the British Mk.VI, a late-war version of the Big Willie, was adopted by the US Expeditionary Forces, which
did not come up with an indigenous design until after the war ended in 1918. The FT-17 was the first
“modern-style” tank design, mounted with a 37mm gun in a small, one-man turret, with the hull suspended
between low tracks, and the engine situated in a rear compartment. The crew consisted of a muchoverworked commander/gunner/loader and a driver. Italy had also produced an improved version of this
vehicle known as the Fiat Tipo 3000 Modello 1921, which did not enter service until after the war.
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The First Tankers. Nearly every major nation had its own outspoken supporter of the tank during this
critical period of armor development. Colonel Ernest Swinton was the most outspoken advocate of armored
warfare in Great Britain, and was heavily supported by future Prime Minister Winston Churchill, as well as
Major J. F. C. Fuller, who later invented and refined many of the early tactics and techniques of armored
warfare. It was largely due to Swinton’s efforts that the British tank design program was initiated in 1915.
General Elles, the commander of the successful British armored attack at Cambrai, was also one of the early
pioneers. Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton, Jr., who was later to become famous as commander of the
Third Armored Division in World War II, was also an early supporter, and one of the first American tank
officers to fight in September, 1918. The first American armored warfare school, located in Pennsylvania,
was established by another officer whose experiences would heavily influence the outcome of WWII: Captain
Dwight D. Eisenhower. Among the French, it was Colonel Jean Baptiste Estienne who managed to convince
his commander, General Joffre, of the need for armored fighting vehicles. It was he who envisioned the first
successful light tank, the Renault FT-17, and obtained the authority to have them designed and built. It was
not until after the war had ended and the effectiveness of the tank in action tested, that Germany and the
Soviet Union, the two major proponents and innovators in armored warfare in World War II, took
an interest.
BETWEEN THE WARS
The results of the First World War proved the initial usefulness of the concept of armored warfare, however,
the war was over before the technical and tactical aspects of armored warfare could be completely worked
out. In the years immediately following the war, the world fooled itself into believing that The Great War
had also been The War to End all Wars, and like most immediate responses to peace after a prolonged
conflict, most countries drastically cut all military recruiting, research and production. The horse cavalry
once again moved to the fore, and the advancement of the airplane and antitank rifle, also used in combat for
the first time during World War I, were seen as doom for the tank. Never the less, every army contained diehard advocates of armored vehicles, and they continued preparing for the next war, even amid the taunts and
ridicule of their compatriots in the more “traditional” military branches.
The Enlightenment. J. F. C. “Boney” Fuller was one of the first British armor theorists to advocate the
concept of combined-arms warfare; a melding of tactics utilizing armored units, infantry, artillery, and
aircraft (although he later modified his concepts to include only different types of tanks). Apparently, only
the German and Soviet armies paid attention to the ideas of this British officer! While J. Walter Christie, an
American engineer, had designed a more advanced suspension system for armored vehicles, he was unable to
convince the US government of the usefulness of a more reliable armored vehicle. The Soviet Union,
however, took his research to heart and went on to produce one of the best tanks of the Second World War;
the T34. Adna R. Chaffee was the prime promoter of mechanization in the United States, and eventually
went on to command the first American mechanized cavalry brigade. In France, Charles de Gaulle, later to
become famous as the leader of the Free French in World War II, advocated the need for armored fighting
vehicles in the French army. He was so successful in his advocacy, that when Germany did attack France
early in the Second World War, France actually maintained an armored force, both more numerous and of
higher quality, than that of Germanys. Unfortunately, these units were ineffectively utilized in the field,
being commanded by “Old Heads”, who had not thought much beyond the tactics of the man, the horse
and the artillery tube. Heinz Guderian was the German visionary who successfully organized, with Hitler’s
support, the concepts of the German Panzer Division and Corps. His grasp of armor tactics, first espoused
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by Fuller, but further expanded to combine all units of the Wehrmacht, including the Luftwaffe, was made
clear long before the first Panzer crossed the border into Poland in 1939. Many of these units were secretly
trained in the Soviet Union, where Misha Tukhachevski and Kliment Voroshilov had built up the Soviet
armored force during the 1920s and ‘30s. The Soviets and Germans learned a great deal from each other
during this period, with the Germans specializing in tactics and vehicle quality, while the Soviets
concentrated on vehicle simplicity and mobility. These lessons, learned and applied by Guderian during the
buildup and training of the German Panzer Corps, culminated in one of Hitler’s most effective military tools,
the Blitzkrieg, or ‘Lightning War’. Guderian’s book, Achtung! Panzer!, which was published in 1937, outlined
this armored warfare concept, and should have been proof enough and a warning to the world that
Germany’s military might was sleeping restlessly.
Tank Designs. Due to the short-sighted expectations of a lasting peace by many nations’ governments and
people’s desire for an end to the bloodshed, armored forces were generally not supported after the First World
War. Advancements made during this time in armored vehicle development were made at a much slower
“peacetime” pace, leading to some unusual (and mostly useless) vehicles that, luckily, didn’t reach much
further than the prototype stages of development. Britain, for example, fielded a large number of one and
two-man tankettes. These small, open-topped vehicles were armed with light infantry weapons, usually only
a machinegun. Thinly armored, but highly mobile, these vehicles were adopted as an economizing measure
by many countries that could not afford real tanks. Vickers Arms also developed a light tank, and with the
manufacturing license for the design being sold around the world, formed for many nations the foundation
of their experimentation with domestic tank production. In the US, this design was the basis for the T1
tank, in Poland, for the 7TP, and in the Soviet Union for the T26. These tanks were usually armed only with
machineguns or light (37mm-40mm) cannon, and had frontal armor ranging from 15mm to 40mm thick.
The majority of these early armored forces were divided into light, fast vehicles used for reconnaissance and
penetration, taking on the traditional role of the cavalry, and the slower tanks with heavier armor designed to
closely support the infantry during their attacks. These vehicles often had 50mm-80mm of frontal armor,
and were also armed with machineguns and a light cannon although these were occasionally replaced by a
mortar or light howitzer for more mobile indirect support. The final tank concept that evolved between the
wars, was that of the heavy “breakthrough” tank. Although this circuitous development cycle culminated in
such sound designs as the German Tiger tank and the Soviet KV-1, the process of development also included
the construction of what have become known as “land battleships” by several nations. These slow, heavy
tanks were designed to engage massed enemy formations and fortifications, pushing forward against any
resistance to allow the deployment of the infantry and light tanks in their wake. These vehicles were huge,
often larger than some of the First World War behemoths, and mounted several machineguns and multiple
cannon, often in several turrets or half-turrets surrounding an elevated central turret. The Soviets were
especially fond of this type of vehicle, and produced several models (the T-28, T-35, T-100, and SMK), some
of which were actually used in the Second World War until replaced by the superior and more operationally
effective KV series.
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WORLD WAR II
Armored warfare, as a professional branch of military service and a tool for battlefield dominance in modern
times, culminated within the crucible of the Second World War. No conflict, before or since, has seen such
extensive development and use of the tank in combat, either in numbers, time, or variants. This
developmental explosion had such a profound influence on later concepts of armored vehicle design and their
tactical application, that land combat would never be the same again. From the earliest Blitzkrieg into
Poland until the final assault on Berlin, no other conflict has seen such a rapid evolution of what was and still
is, considered by many to be the decisive arm of battle. An infantryman will usually go into great detail
concerning their indispensable role in holding a piece of real estate, once it’s been won. What they often
forget to mention is that the armored vehicle is what got them there in the first place.
A short overview of the war in Europe is provided in the following synopsis.
Blitzkrieg. Prior to 1939 and the Invasion of Poland, the early German victories of WWII had been
predominantly bloodless. This included the annexation of the Sudetenland, the occupation of
Czechoslovakia and Austria, and the expulsion of occupation forces from the Ruhr. Although Britain and
France had been wary of German expansion, they did not declare war on Germany until she invaded Poland
on September 1, 1939. By offering half of Poland, as well as the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia to the Soviet Union, Germany managed to secure a measure of security to the east. This agreement,
based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was the culmination of many years of military co-operation between
the two nations. This agreement included allowances for Guderian’s training of German tank forces in the
Soviet Union when it was still illegal for Germany, under the Versailles Treaty (which ended the First World
War), to develop and field any armed forces other than a 100,000 man army. This ban also precluded the
development of a standing German air force, which was developed in secret, paralleling the armor forces as a
second major component of Guderian’s Blitzkrieg. Of the 62 divisions making up the two German Army
groups that took part in the invasion, six of the divisions were tank units and ten were mechanized infantry
divisions. The entire Polish army, at that time, was composed of only 40 divisions, none of them armored
units, and all of their equipment was inferior in both quality and quantity to that of the invading Germans.
The battle was over in a few short weeks, to be followed by several months of inactivity from both sides
(known as the “Phoney war” to the British and as “Sitzkrieg” in Germany).
Hitler then turned to Scandinavia, which he invaded on April 9th, 1940, taking both Denmark, which fell
without a fight, and Norway, which resisted bitterly for just over a month. On May 10th, the Wehrmacht
invaded France through Belgium and the Netherlands, which fell before a concentrated attack of armor,
airpower, airborne engineers and infantrymen who demolished fortifications and secured bridges all along
their attack routes. This northern thrust was flanked by a southern thrust through the Ardennes, terrain that
had been considered impassable to tanks due to its thick woods and rough hills. Both of these offensives
neatly bypassed the heavily fortified Maginot Line, upon which the French had come to rely for defense
against German aggression. A combination of excellent planning and training by the veteran German forces
and poor operational techniques and low morale among the green French and British forces allowed the
Wehrmacht to capture France in only six weeks. In the fighting for France’s defense, the French army
counted their losses at nearly 90,000, while the British army was decimated, (even though much of its
manpower was rescued at Dunkirk, it was forced to abandon or destroy much of its equipment on the
docks). Throughout the entire operational move west through France, the German army only lost
approximately 27,000 of its number. England stood alone.
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Italy, meanwhile, as Germany’s ally, had annexed Albania and subsequently invaded Greece, where
Mussolini’s forces were still stalled, as they were in North Africa. In order to save the Italian forces, and to
secure the mineral-rich Balkans prior to the upcoming attack on the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht invaded
Yugoslavia from Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria, all of whom were now members of the Tripartite
Pact, commonly known as the Axis. From the outset of the battle on April 6, 1941, the 31 Yugoslavian
divisions were outclassed. Hostilities against Greece were also opened on this date from Bulgaria. The entire
Balkan campaign lasted less than three weeks, and eliminated the last ally of the British in the region.
Finally, the Greek island of Crete was captured in a battle initiated by large airborne drops. Starting on May
20th, the operation lasted just over a week and inflicted horrendous losses on the attacking German
paratroopers. The campaign ended just in time for the majority of the German troops involved to be
transferred to the east, where they would participate in the invasion of the Soviet Union, commencing
in June.
The Desert War. Once again coming to the aid of an ally, Germany sent the Afrika Korps to Libya in an
attempt to support the failed advances of the Italian forces there against the British and Free French. General
(later Fieldmarshall) Erwin Rommel, a hero of the First World War and winner of the Pour le Merite, or
“Blue Max,” arrived in Tripoli with two divisions on February 12, 1941. By the 11th of April, Rommel had
recaptured all of the territory lost to the British offensive of four months prior, and Tobruk was under siege.
After a series of abortive counterattacks in 1941, Rommel withdrew. He resumed the offensive on January
21, 1942 and chased the British back into Egypt. By October, he had exhausted most of his supplies, which
had been arriving only occasionally since the domination of the Mediterranean by the British Navy. The
British counterattack in October, combined with Anglo-American landings in French North Africa on
November 8, 1942, forced Rommel back to Tunisia. The last German forces in Tunis surrendered on
May 13, 1943.
The Eastern Front. Having conquered or intimidated nearly every major nation in Europe, Hitler decided
to move east, into the open country of the Soviet Union. Although Stalin, General-Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its de facto leader, had known there would be a clash eventually,
he had hoped it would come later, and with the Soviets on the offensive. Operation Barbarossa, as the
invasion was codenamed, therefore came as a surprise to the Soviet forces. It involved the use of nearly the
entire Wehrmacht: almost 4 million soldiers in 180 divisions, over 3,000 tanks, 7,000 artillery pieces, and
2,000 aircraft, plus more than 20 allied divisions. On June 22, 1941, the first day of the attack, over 1,200
aircraft of the Soviet air forces were destroyed on the ground and in the air. In the first two weeks, 89 Soviet
divisions were eliminated, with 300,000 prisoners captured, and 2,500 tanks and 1,400 artillery pieces seized
in just the central region. By July 20, another 310,000 prisoners, 3,200 tanks, and 3,100 artillery pieces had
been captured in Smolensk alone. Although Soviet industry was producing 1,000 tanks and 1,800 planes
every month, their losses were even higher. Three months into the engagement, German troops had taken
the remains of Poland, conquered Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the majority of the Ukraine, and had
moved the front to a line with Leningrad at its northern tip and the Crimea at its southern end.
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The German Heer, however, was unprepared for the Russian winter. Since they expected that the fighting
would end before the frosts began, the German High Command had not thought to issue winter clothing
and equipment to the Wehrmacht. By December 6, 1941, the German forces had penetrated as far towards
Moscow as they would ever reach. Some German reconnaissance units had even scouted the suburbs of the
city before the first Soviet counterattack of the war struck in the area around Moscow. Leningrad was under
siege. German offensives were halted until the following summer.
In the summer of 1942, the Wehrmacht attacked into the Caucasus region, hoping to capture that oil and
mineral-rich region and deny its resources to the Soviets. Although this thrust gave some impressive successes
at the outset, it culminated in the loss of Feldmarshall von Paulus and his 6th Army at Stalingrad in the
winter of 1942-43. After this battle, the Red Army of Workers and Peasants took the offensive, and the
Wehrmacht was forced to retreat. On July 5th, 1943, the German army conducted its last major offensive in
the area around Kursk. This operation, codenamed Citadel, was known to the Soviets through their
intelligence network, and was prepared for. Their defenses included around 10,000 artillery pieces, including
anti-tank guns and multiple-rocket launchers, and 60 divisions. An average of 3,000 mines were laid along
each kilometer of the front. 300,000 civilians labored to create a defensive network of eight separate
defensive lines, the farthest being almost 150 kilometers behind the front lines. The attackers brought about
2,700 tanks and 1,800 aircraft in 34 divisions into the battle. Such was their strength, that Stalin was forced
to make early counterattacks on August 3rd. This was the most decisive battle on the Eastern Front, and
after this the Wehrmacht would never again be allowed to take the strategic offensive. In the south, the
Soviets advanced through the Ukraine, Romania, and Hungary in 1944. In the north, they recaptured the
Baltic states, and moved into Poland and East Prussia. In early 1945, the Red Army invaded Germany and
captured Berlin, which fell on May 2, 1945, just ahead of the combined US and British advances, pushing
back the struggling Wehrmacht in its final defense of Germany.
The Western Front. The Second Front, which had been promised to Stalin by Churchill and Roosevelt in
order to effectively split Germany’s concentration of troops, did not materialize as promised in 1942. It did
not even take place in 1943. As a concession for the delay, however, the Western Allies decided to invade the
Third Reich’s “soft underbelly” in Italy. On July 10, 1943, an Allied landing codenamed Operation Husky
took place on the southern beaches of Sicily. This attack, unexpected by the Wehrmacht, also had the side
effect of precipitating a rebellion among Mussolini’s Italian generals, who had him arrested. They
immediately began to negotiate their surrender to the Allies. By the end of August, Sicily had been secured.
The “boot” of Italy was invaded beginning on September 3rd, the day Italy officially surrendered to the
Allies. German occupation forces quickly disarmed the remaining Italian forces, and stubbornly resisted the
Allied advances up both sides of the Italian peninsula. By the end of 1943, the Allied advance had only just
reached the heavily defended Gustav Line, just south of Rome. Difficulties in overcoming the stiff German
resistance, compounded by friction between the Allies, enabled the German forces to hold Rome until just
two days before the Normandy invasion. They moved quickly northwards through the summer, but were
stopped again at the Gothic Line, across the top of the Italian peninsula at Florence. This line held until the
beginning of 1945, but by the end of hostilities in May, the entire country had been occupied by the
Allied forces.
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Operation Overlord, the famous landings on the beaches of Normandy in northern France, was the largest
campaign of the Western Allies and the long-awaited opening of the Second Front in Europe. The invasion
fleet numbered nearly 6,500 vessels, of which about 4,000 were actual landing craft. Of 12,000 aircraft
flown into the battle by the Allies, over 5,000 were fighters. More than 10,000 tons of bombs were dropped
on or near the landing beaches the night of June 5th, along with three airborne divisions, which were
dropped on the flanks of the invasion beaches. Five American, British, and Canadian divisions were landed
on the morning of the 6th of June. Although the landing was difficult, the subsequent breakout from the
beachhead was more costly. The Cotentin peninsula with the valuable port of Cherbourg was captured
quickly, however, nearly two months after the landings, the Allies were still being kept on the peninsula and
mostly within 30 kilometers of the invasion beaches. This stalemate was broken when Patton’s Third Army
broke through the German left flank at Avranches, pouring two infantry and two armored divisions through
a narrow corridor in less than 24 hours. This maneuver outflanked the defending German Fifth Panzer and
Seventh Armies, and opened northern France up to continued Allied advances. With the exception of the
short-lived German attempt to capture the port of Antwerp from the Ardennes shortly before Christmas, the
Germans were being pushed back at every turn. This slow, but steady rate of advance held until the Western
Allies joined-up with the Soviet forces at the Elbe river in May. The last holdouts of the Wehrmacht
surrendered on May 11th, 1945 and the war in Europe, for the Allies, was won.
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2. TANK ACADEMY
13
Essential Qualities of an
Armoured Commander
(British Royal Armoured Corps)
It is essential that a tank crewman understand how his tank is built,
the reasoning behind the design and how these factors will influence
the tactics used in the field. The commander of an armored unit,
regardless of its size and force composition, must also become familiar
with the all the tactics and techniques of tank warfare and how they
are applied in practice.
TANK BASICS
Tanks are made up of three primary facets: Firepower, Protection, and
Mobility, all of which are explained in detail below. In addition to
these three basics, there are several other factors that can heavily
influence the capabilities of individual tanks and their functions in
relation to other military units. These include training, crew
positions, visibility, optics, communications, ammunition stowage,
vulnerabilities, and size.
FIREPOWER
The cannon on a tank is essentially a giant gun barrel. The longer the
barrel, the more accurate and powerful the tank cannon is. The
cannon barrel can have a smooth bore, like a shotgun, or rifling
grooves engraved along its length which impart spin (and therefore
greater accuracy) to the shell in its flight. However, most W.W.II
cannon used some degree of spin-stabilization. An additional feature
which affects the accuracy of the tank gun is the use of a muzzle
brake, also called “muzzle whip”, which reduces the movement of the
barrel during firing, as well as reducing the recoil and its effects on the
tanks structure and crew. The accuracy of the shell is also affected by
several other factors, which together are called the “ballistics” of the
weapon. These factors include the rate of spin, wind resistance and
crosswind. Gravity, range, and the duration of the shell’s flight will
also affect the accuracy of the shell. The ammunition used in tank
guns is generally of the “fixed” type, which means that the powder
charge is fully enclosed and attached to the shell, like a rifle cartridge.
Some of the larger cannon, especially howitzers and most large naval
guns, may use separate-loading ammunition, which means that the
shell is inserted into the breech, then individual bags of powder are
forced in behind it.
a. Sense of Awareness. The
armoured commander must be
tactically aware. He will look
outwards at what the enemy
and other friendly forces are
doing. If he becomes obsessed
with the detailed actions of his
crew or sub-unit, he will miss
opportunities for destroying
enemy and fail in his task.
b. Grip and Leadership. Every
leader has his own style, and
this is right and proper.
However, an armoured
commander must lead from the
front, must be clear and concise
in his actions and orders, and
must not accept second best
from those under him.
c. Speed of Reaction and
Anticipation. A commander
without a flexible attitude of
mind and a sense of urgency
will get left behind in armoured
warfare. Quick reaction,
initiative and the ability to
anticipate are vital.
d. Knowledge. A commander
must know his enemy, his men
and his equipment. Modern
warfare is complex and he must
also understand the procedures
and capabilities of the other
arms with whom he may be
grouped if he is to cooperate
effectively with them.
e. Commonsense. Commonsense
tempers the more volatile
qualities and prevents mistakes.
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As the armor used on armored vehicles grew thicker and more advanced, it became obvious that smaller guns
were incapable of penetrating it. At first, this meant that the production of smaller guns ceased and the
production of larger guns increased. When the development of armor quickly outstripped the capabilities of
even the largest of the currently produced guns, new ammunition was designed to increase the penetrating
power of the guns already in use. Initially, the ordinary solid shot, or armor piercing (AP) round, was used
against tanks, while an ordinary high explosive (HE) shell was used against infantry and other ‘soft’ targets.
The problem with solid shot was that its penetrating power could only be increased through greater weight
that created an increase in the caliber of the gun, higher muzzle velocities, or increase in the chamber pressure
or barrel length. A ballistic cap (APCBC) could also be mounted in order to keep the shot from shattering
against thick armor. This problem was solved first by the Germans. By utilising a shell with a heavy
tungsten-carbide core, (APCR), surrounded with a softer metal and fired through a barrel which tapered as it
reached the muzzle, the softer metal would be squeezed from around the shot and as the barrel pressure
increased, so did the muzzle velocity of the round. An unfortunate side effect was a rapid drop-off in
velocity, which reduced the long-range performance of the round. A simplified version of this, called
discarding-sabot (APDS), used a lightweight collar that fitted around the tungsten carbide core, and dropped
off when fired. This had the advantage that it could be fired out of ordinary barrels and did not require a
tapering bore to maintain the higher barrel pressure.
For low velocity guns and rockets, another technological advance was required. This appeared in the form of
the shaped charge (HEAT), in which the explosive filler was moulded so as to leave a cone-shaped space in
the end facing the target. When the charge detonated, the concentration of explosive forces in that coneshaped cavity created a solid jet of plasma (known as the Monroe Effect) capable of punching through armor.
This generally required a large warhead (at least 75mm) for good effect, but since the round was not
dependent on higher velocity for penetrating power, it could penetrate the same amount of armor at 1,000
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meters that it could at 10 meters. A shaped charge round mounted on the end of a stick and muzzle-loaded
into the 37mm antitank gun was even developed by the Germans! Other types of ammunition, such as
smoke producing shells, was also produced, but was reserved mainly for signalling and for screening troops,
not for fighting. As a final note, ammunition and barrel qualities, due mainly to materials quality and
workmanship, were also a limiting factor in main gun accuracy and effectiveness. These arguments go a long
way towards explaining why the significantly larger 122mm cannons of the Soviet Union were inferior to the
German 88mm and the American 90mm guns at the end of the war.
PROTECTION
The primary feature of a tank is its use of thick armor specifically designed to protect the crew and the
internal components from harm. Tanks were originally outfitted with just enough armor to protect them
from rifles, machineguns, and artillery fragments. It soon became obvious that the armor needed to
withstand attacks from antitank rifles and other tank guns. As these weapons were improved, the armor of
the tank was required to follow or become obsolete and vulnerable. Some weaknesses could be found in
every tank, including places where transmission or exhaust systems passed through the armor, the connecting
ring of the turret to the hull, hatches and viewports, suspension and tracks, and anywhere else that the armor
tended to be thin. These disadvantages were learned by every tanker in an effort to increase his life
expectancy on the battlefield and shorten that of his opponent.
Metallurgical developments prior to World War II included the development of face-hardened armor. This
involved taking a piece of ordinary “homogeneous” plate armor, and heating the front face to a higher
hardness than that of plain steel (normally compounded with nickel) alone. Although it was possible to
harden the entire thickness, it was soon discovered that this caused the armor to become brittle, and
shattered when struck by a solid shot of the same diameter as the armor thickness. Face-hardening allowed
for a harder, but more brittle, front face, which was backed up by a more pliable, easily worked softer plate.
As the war progressed, tanks were outfitted with thicker and thicker plates of face-hardened armor. A
sufficient thickness of face-hardened plate could also cause the solid shot of smaller guns to shatter on
impact, leading to further experimentation in ammunition design.
Tank designers in some countries, most notably the Soviet Union, realized that by making the armor steeply
angled or rounded it was possible to increase the apparent thickness. This had the additional effect of
increasing the likelihood that a solid shot would ricochet off of the hull, and reduced the amount of metal
required to obtain the same apparent thickness, thus decreasing overall weight and increasing mobility.
Rounded armor, especially for turrets, was often made by casting, which was cheaper and faster than welding
or bolting. Bolt-on armor was abandoned early in the war, when it was discovered that following an impact
the bolts flew off and bounced around the inside of the tank killing the crew. Welded armor was often used
when flat plates of angled armor were fastened together, particularly in vehicle hulls. The Germans also
tended to use this method to build their distinctively angled turrets and hulls. When they discovered the
inherent weakness of welded armor seams, they compensated for this by fitting the armor pieces together
using interlocking pieces, like a jigsaw puzzle. The angling of armor was also related to the discovery of “shot
traps.” These were places where the armor could unintentionally cause an enemy shell to ricochet into
another part of the vehicle, and were most often found around the turret. When this caused a ricochet into
the thinner armor of the upper hull, it could allow a relatively weak gun to destroy a very well
armored vehicle.
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As new types of ammunition were developed, tank armor was forced to keep pace. Alternatives to extremely
thick armor were developed. At first, it was simply a matter of making the frontal armor thicker and the rear
armor thinner, since an attack from the rear was less likely. Later, supplemental armor plates were attached
over weak spots. In the field, crews often supplemented their armor with sandbags and spare track links.
Late in the war, wood and cement were used to disrupt the effects of the shaped-charge ammunition used by
low-velocity guns and antitank rockets, and also to protect the hull from magnetic mines and grenades. The
Germans were the first to attach stand-off armor, called Schuerzen, to their tanks. These thin steel plates
were attached to the sides of the turret and the hull by brackets that left a gap between the armor and the
hull. This dissipated the effects of shaped-charge ammunition and also interfered with the flight of ordinary
solid shot, reducing its effectiveness.
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MOBILITY
Most tanks are heavy, slow, and have tracks instead of wheels. Combined with the unusual controls and poor
visibility for the driver, World War II tanks were difficult to drive well. Most tanks were steered by two
levers, each one controlling the speed of one of the tracks. This enabled the driver to turn the tank by
slowing the track in the direction of the turn and speeding up the track on the opposite side. One advantage
of this method of steering was the “neutral steer,” in which one track was moved forward and the other left in
neutral or reverse. This enabled a stationary tank to swivel quickly and this was often combined with, or
used in place of, turning the turret to bring the main gun on to a target as quickly as possible. A large diesel
or gasoline engine provided power.
Tank mobility was dependent upon several interrelated functions, and had to be considered both by its
tactical and strategic implications. These included the power of the engine, its fuel consumption, the weight
of the vehicle, ground pressure, and the expected life of the tracks, roadwheels, suspension, transmission, and
engine. The power of the engine compared to the weight of the vehicle determined the top speed of the
tank. An underpowered vehicle was susceptible to breakdown due to excessive wear on the engine
components. Too powerful an engine could cause excessive wear to the tracks and drivetrain, as well as using
a large quantity of fuel. A large fuel requirement and excess weight, making it difficult to transport or cross
smaller bridges could easily hamper tanks strategic mobility. The ground pressure of the vehicle was one of
the most important tactical considerations, as a vehicle with a low ground pressure could still be mobile in
wet or sandy terrain. The ground pressure could be found by dividing the kg weight of the vehicle by the
number of square centimeters of track on the ground at any given moment, resulting in an expression of
ground pressure as kg/cm2. The lower this number is the greater the area over which the tanks weight is
distributed, preventing it from becoming easily stuck in mud or sand, sliding down hills, and bogging down
in streams or swampy terrain.
Early in World War II, tanks were light, did not require as much power to maintain a good tactical speed,
could be transported easily, and had a low ground pressure even with fairly narrow tracks. This included
such tanks as the German PzKpfw I, II, III, and IV, the American Stuart, Lee and Grant, the British
Crusader, Comet, and Churchill, and the Soviet BT7, T60, and T70. Later, as heavier armor and guns were
introduced, it became necessary to increase the engine power and it was soon discovered that the greater
stress brought on by these developments required wider and stronger tracks and suspension systems. Wide
track pioneers included the German Tiger and Panther tanks and the Soviet T34 series. These tanks were
more maneuverable than tanks of equivalent weight with thinner tracks, and even more maneuverable than
many lighter tanks, including the American Sherman. In an attempt to improve the maneuverability of the
Sherman, American engineers made a set of adapters that were clipped to the existing tracks to spread the
weight out farther. Known as “duckbills” these were not very effective, and wider tracks were eventually
made standard.
The two main types of suspension used were the supported or “roller” type and the unsupported or
“Christie” type. Supported suspensions used smaller roadwheels and included small return rollers on the top
of the track to guide it to the drive wheel. Examples of this type of suspension include the German PzKpfw
I, early PzKpfw II, and PzKpfw II and IV tanks, and the American Stuart, Grant, Lee, and Sherman tanks.
Unsupported suspensions used large roadwheels, with the track riding along the top of the wheel on its
return movement. This type of suspension was pioneered by an American named J. Walter Christie, and had
the advantage that the track could be removed and the tank run on the roadwheels alone in an emergency.
Examples of this type of suspension include the German Panther and Tiger tanks, the British Crusader and
Cromwell tanks, and the Soviet T34 series.
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OTHER FACTORS
A tank could have a powerful gun, thick armor, and excellent maneuverability, and still be unable to beat
inferior tanks in combat if several other factors were not addressed. The Afrika Korps was able to fight while
heavily outnumbered, with older equipment, and hold out for long periods against fresh Allied units due to
their attention to these other factors.
Training. Crew training and experience were probably the most decisive factors of tank warfare. Individual
knowledge of friendly and enemy vehicles, how to use terrain effectively, and crew cohesion and morale were
all results of excellent crew training programs. Because of the experience gained in the early invasions of
Spain, Poland, France, Scandinavia, and the Balkans, backed by long periods of intense basic armor training,
the Wehrmacht had the best trained and most experienced crews. Soviet tank crews did not survive long
enough to gain any battle experience, and were often thrown into action with minimal training. This
problem was compounded by the Soviet penchant for centralized command, a lack of initiative among junior
officers and their adherence to outdated tactics and techniques. By mid-war, however, these problems had
been addressed and the quality of Soviet tank crews increased dramatically. British tankers, having received
some experience in the North African campaign, proved to be quick learners and fought well despite their
often outmatched vehicles. American tank crews suffered heavily at the outset of the North African
campaign, and the unexpected requirement for new replacement crews further diluted the experience levels of
the veterans until well into the French and Italian campaigns. The problems with inexperienced crews
became so troublesome that by the time the Germans began fielding the Panther tank, official policy
recommended that one German tank should be dispatched by no less than five Shermans! By the time of the
invasion of Normandy, German tank crews had often experienced three to five years of combat, while
American crews rarely had more than a year in action, and the majority even less, or none at all.
Crew positions. The crew lived in their tank during combat, and cramped and uncomfortable positions
were made more difficult by poor design. It was quickly discovered that small one or two-man turrets
quickly overburdened the commander, who was often responsible not only for directing the crew and firing,
but loading as well. Early light tanks such as the German PzKpfw I and II, American M3 Stuart, Soviet T26, T-40A, T-60, and T-70, and the French D1B and S35 all suffered from this problem. Interim solutions,
such as raising the commander’s position or giving him a smaller turret of his own gave rise to problems in
his vulnerability as well as increasing the visible height of the vehicle. Difficulties with hatches, especially
with the turretless assault guns, often led to difficulties in mounting and dismounting the vehicle, leaving it
vulnerable for precious seconds while the crew was feverishly trying to get in or out. The cramped positions
also made it difficult to adopt another crewman’s position in the case of casualties. Compared to the earlier
PzKpfw III and IV and the Lee and Grant series tanks, the later Panther and Sherman tanks were spacious.
Visibility. The ability of the crew to see outside of their tank was a very limiting factor in armored combat.
Most commanders and drivers left their hatches open for better vision, and some chose to remain exposed
even during combat. This was due to the restricted view from each position. As the design of tanks became
more important and information was received from crews using them in battle, vision ports and periscopes
were introduced and improved. These usually consisted of glass prisms or blocks through which the
crewmember could look while all of the hatches were “buttoned up”. These changes also influenced
improvements in hatch design. Some tanks, such as the Panther, had comparatively excellent visibility, while
others, such as the Stuart, were at a severe disadvantage with the hatches closed.
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Optics. The quality of a tank’s optics affected not only how well the crew could see out of the vehicle, but
also the accuracy and usefulness of the rangefinder and optical targeting systems. Poor quality Soviet optics
reduced the overall accuracy of their tanks. American and British optics were better than the Soviets but
German glass quality, optical designs and workmanship were the best throughout the war, although they
occasionally suffered from complexity. The utility of an optical system in viewing and determining range
improved the speed and accuracy of the main gun, while its consistent alignment to the bore was critical to
hitting any target. Different methods of gauging range were used. The most common, however, was to
include a simple mil scale on the gunner’s reticule, enabling him to quickly estimate range by the size of the
target vehicle in the sight. As a general conversion, one mil is equal to one meter of width at 1,000 meters,
thus a four meter wide tank covering only two mils on the scale is at 2,000 meters range.
Communications. By the end of the Second World War, nearly every tank had a two-way radio set. At the
beginning of the war, only the German army had realized the need for two-way communications for all
vehicles. The Soviets learned late, and often suffered horrendous casualties due to a lack of communications.
Even the Sherman was initially equipped with a receiving set, in order to allow the platoon and company
commanders to send orders down. This problem was taken care of quickly, however, unlike the Soviet radio
problem, which lasted well into the war. All armies also produced special command, artillery, and
communication vehicles with multiple radios and versions with greater power. These were used to
communicate with higher command, call for and control artillery and airstrikes, and provide reconnaissance
information from far behind enemy lines.
Ammunition stowage. All tanks face the problem of ammunition stowage. Larger supplies for the main
gun means the tank needs to resupply less often, but also leads to a higher risk of crew death by explosion.
The need for ammunition to be readily available to the loader is offset by the need to stow it safely and
securely. Improper ammunition stowage often led to disaster. Sherman crews stored several loose rounds on
the floor of the turret basket. This led to the vehicle receiving the nickname “Ronson” from the British, after
a cigarette lighter which advertised that it always lit on the first try. It also led to the development of wet
stowage, whereby the ammunition was stored in a solution of water, antifreeze, and a rust inhibitor, which
reduced the likelihood of a fire reaching the ammunition before the crew could bail out.
Vulnerabilities. Every tank has its vulnerable points, and experienced tankers knew this and protected their
own, while taking advantage of the enemy’s. Shot traps, usually caused by an angled piece of armor
deflecting shot into a weaker piece of armor (normally from the turret into the superstructure roof) could be
taken advantage of at close range. Weak spots, such as where air exhaust or intakes passed through the armor
or welded joints where face-hardening was weakest, were favorite targets, as were the thinner sides and rear
areas of any tank, gun and vision ports, tracks and roadwheels, and the gap between the turret and the hull.
Additional armor, such as the one-inch plates welded onto many American Shermans and the Schuerzen
armor skirts on many later German tanks helped a great deal, especially against HEAT rounds. Field
modifications and improvised armor, such as boards, sandbags, and spare track sections were often added as
well. This measure of added protection sometimes caused additional problems due to the extra weight and
bulk. Some of the add-on armor welded to the Sherman hull and turret sides was even used as a targeting
aid by German tank crews who knew that the armor was weaker there, effectively negating its value.
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Size. The larger the vehicle, the easier it is to spot and hit. This gave some advantage to the assault guns
with their lower chassis (since they had no turret). A smaller vehicle also requires less armor to cover its
smaller exposed area. Some vehicles, such as the German Tiger, could ignore their large size since their armor
was sufficient to repel almost any attack. Other vehicles, such as the American Sherman, were simply too
large for their weight, trading greater size off against adequate armour protection. The size of some vehicles
was due, in part, to the size of the gun mounted in the turret. Larger guns require larger-diameter turret
rings, which consequently require a wider hull. The larger-caliber ammunition also takes up more room in
the hull, meaning that the vehicle storage capacity for ammunition must be increased, or the number of
shells carried must be reduced. This design trend must continue further, as a larger powerplant and
transmission will be required to move this heavier vehicle at a decent speed.
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3. TANKS IN BATTLE
The armor tactics of World War II were developed
between the wars, primarily in Germany. These tactics
were innovative in concept, considering the armor
branch a weapon of decision and breakthrough. The
majority of other nations distributed slow and heavily
armored tanks among and in support of the “poor
bloody infantry.” The Germans concentrated their light,
fast tank forces together, in an effort to smash the enemy
at one decisive point. Combined with superior training
and excellent co-operation between the tanks and the
supporting air and artillery forces, this technique of
“Blitzkrieg” was soon proven to be sound. The German
tactics were tested in Spain during their Civil War, and
victory gave food for thought to the opposition there,
which included both American and Soviet volunteers.
As other nations recognized the advantages to these
tactics and slowly began their modernization programs,
the Germans swiftly invaded Poland, France, and the
Low Countries, then turned around and swept through
Yugoslavia and Greece, finally turning their sights on the
Soviet Union. By this time, every other modern nation
had begun a crash program to put these new tactics into
practice, and to provide new tanks that could implement
them.
This brings us to the five major roles of the tank in
modern conflict: offensive, defensive, against tanks,
against infantry, and in antitank warfare. Each of these
roles is described below, with an examination of some of
the tactics that have proven effective in that role. Keep
in mind, always, that although aggression in combat is
one of the keys to tank warfare success, as a commander
you must be decisive and flexible, and understand not
only how to fight, but also where and when to fight.
Tank Tips (Lt Col. Ernest D. Swinton, 1916)
Remember your orders.
Shoot quick.
Shoot low. A miss which throws dust in the
enemy’s eyes is better than one which whistles
in his ear.
Shoot cunning.
Shoot the enemy while they are rubbing their
eyes. Economise ammunition and don’t kill a
man three times.
Remember that trenches are curly and dugouts
deep – look round corners.
Watch the progress of the fight and your
neighbouring tanks.
Watch your infantry whom you are helping.
Remember the position of your own line.
Shell out the enemy’s machineguns and other
small guns and kill them first with your
6 pdrs.
You will not see them for they will be
cunningly hidden.
You must ferret out where they are, judging by
the following signs: Sound, Dust, Smoke.
A shadow in a parapet.
A hole in a wall, haystack, rubbish heap,
woodstack, pile of bricks.
They will be usually placed to fire slantways
across the front and to shoot along the wire.
One 6 pdr shell that hits the loophole of a
MG emplacement will do it in.
Use the 6 pdr with care; shoot to hit not to
make a noise.
Never have any gun, even when unloaded,
pointing at your own infantry, or a 6 pdr gun
pointed at another tank.
It is the unloaded gun that kills the
fool’s friends.
Never mind the heat.
Never mind the noise.
Never mind the dust.
Think of your pals in the infantry.
Thank God you are bulletproof and can help
the infantry, who are not.
Have your mask always handy.
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TANKS IN THE OFFENSIVE
The concept of armored warfare is inherently offensive. Tanks are designed to drive through enemy
positions, destroying or bypassing any enemy forces they meet, and pushing deep into enemy rear areas, in
order to wreak havoc on their command, control, communications, and supply systems. They excel in the
capacity to take on all kinds of enemy forces and survive. Offensive armor tactics are founded on the
concepts of speed, surprise, and breakthrough. Moving too quickly for the enemy to react, the armored unit
hits the enemy where they least expect it, then moves through the breach it has created and towards the soft
and complacent supporting units.
Individual tank movement. While
tanks are capable of dealing with very
rugged terrain, drivers must use certain
landscape features to their
own advantage.
Some basic assumptions that underlie
tank driving.
The driver must be careful of obstacles of
all kinds, as these may render the gun or
drive train inoperable.
Water obstacles, including mud, are very
difficult to judge, and should be avoided
whenever possible.
Care should be taken when driving
alongside rivers and streams.
Steep slopes are often impossible for a
tank to climb. Traversing a hill can be
dangerous as the tank may flip over on its
back. It is not recommended in combat
for other reasons, mainly because it
presents a
predictable target.
All of this must be kept in mind while
using the terrain to its best tactical
advantage. Roads should only be used
for travel behind friendly lines, as they are
likely spots for ambush. Thick woods
and villages should also be avoided for
the same reason. Driving across or along
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the top of a hill or ridge is a good way to get spotted. To keep from being silhouetted against the sky, tanks
should be driven below the crest of the hill, on the opposite side from the enemy. Obvious choke points,
such as narrow roads through forests, bridges, fords, road intersections, and mountain passes should be
avoided if at all possible.
Finally, the vehicle itself must be taken into consideration. Some vehicles are more prone to tipping than
others, while the ground pressure of others means that they may be more or less affected by mud. Care
should be taken to avoid too much driving in reverse or pivoting, as these maneuvers, especially on rough
ground, tend to wear the tracks or cause them to come off of their rollers. The engine must be maintained as
well. Naturally, there are times when the most possible power will be needed in combat. Redlining the
engine, however, may result in a blown engine rather than a quick escape. To avoid redlining, try to keep the
engine running at only about 70% of maximum on roads, and 50% of maximum when driving off-road
(lower in extremely hot environments). This will reduce the likelihood of overheating the engine enough to
blow it.
Movement as part of a Platoon. Formation control within an armored unit is as critical a component of
armored combat as the vehicles’ weapons or the ammo that feeds them. Each of the following formations
provide both tactical advantages and disadvantages, usually governed by terrain, battlefield placement and
unit positions. These formations, while not rigid in their spacing or positioning, allow increased tactical
flexibility on the battlefield.
• Column. Column formations allow for the fastest movement of an armor unit along a route, especially if a
unit is passing through restricted terrain. Firepower in the forward and rear arcs of the unit is limited to a
single vehicle each, but is alternately good to the flanks of the unit, where each alternating vehicle in the
column covers each side of the unit with large, overlapping fields of fire. This also allows for heightened
response times to the unit’s flanks by reducing the search area to be covered by each tank.
• Line. Units formed up along a Line or ‘abreast’ formation cover the largest horizontal area of any
formation, while maximizing the unit’s frontal firepower and overlapping fields of fire. The main drawback to
this is severely reduced rear and flank fire coverage and protection. The use of this formation in an assault
should be limited to areas where tactical overwatch can cover the restricted areas of the unit during its
movement or as a defensive formation within prepared positions where other units are positioned to
both flanks.
• Echelon Left and Echelon Right. The diagonal placement of vehicles in a Right or Left Echelon
formation allows the unit to maximize its firing and search arcs from their axis of advance around to include
overlapping cover for their flank. Optimum deployment of a unit in an echelon formation would be along
the edge of a larger unit formation in an advance or defensive position. This allows for added protection or as
a springboard for an encirclement maneuver. This placing, in a defensive action, allows increased flank
protection to prevent an enemy from gaining access to an area to the rear of the main battle line.
• Wedge. The Wedge allows a unit both flanks enjoying good coverage and overlap of firepower as well as
good forward firepower. This formation is best deployed in situations where the threat axis is mainly forward,
but there are possibilities of attempted flanking maneuvers. The Wedge is also good for providing overwatch
for other units and where a unit must cover many others or large areas of open ground. In an attack posture,
the Wedge should only be employed when operating in open or rolling terrain, allowing for good visibility in
all quarters or under the guns of an overwatch.
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• Reverse Wedge. In a Reverse Wedge or ‘Vee’ formation, the tactical concerns of the commander are on
control of the unit. It allows for good fields of fire to the flanks and rear, but severely restricts the forward fire
arcs. This formation also allows a unit the ability to provide self-overwatch capabilities. (Not currently
available to the TC in PE).
• Diamond. If a unit is alone, tactically, or is in a halted state where a threat might come from any direction
and require a perimeter-type defense in 360 degrees, then a good option for the unit commander would be
the Diamond or ‘Coil’ formation. If a unit requires a movement formation to maintain security and good
fields of fire, then another formation would probably be best. (Not currently available to a TC in PE)
Movement as part of a Company. In general, the objectives you are given as a platoon reflect and support
the greater objectives of the company as a whole. The other platoons will also be assigned similar objectives.
While one platoon may be assigned to take a bridge, another may be guarding a convoy which needs to cross
the bridge, while another may be holding a defensive position, and yet another attacking enemy positions as
a feint, in order to draw off his forces. Each of these platoon objectives is essential to the success of the
overall company mission, which, in this case, is to move a convoy safely over a bridge. Knowing where the
rest of the company is supposed to be is of primary importance when engaging distant targets, so as to avoid
accidentally firing on friendly troops. This is especially important when two or more of the platoons in a
company have been given the same objective (usually approaching from different sides). Knowing the
difference in appearance between friendly and enemy units is extremely important in this case.
Another concept of movement within a larger formation, is that of an ‘overwatch’. When there is a
requirement for a unit to safely advance into potentially hostile areas, there is also a need for mutual support
from other units within the larger division. If two or more units have objectives in the same area, one unit
will be able to cover the other as it advances and vice-versa. Each unit will move from one position of relative
safety (such as a hull-down position from one hill to the crest of the next) along the line of the units advance
while the second unit provides direct fire support. Once the first unit is able to traverse the area in question,
it will set itself up in a viable position to cover the second units advance, and so on. A ‘leapfrog’ series of
movements will develop with each unit moving safely under the guns of the other. This continuing sequence
of movements will allow both units to cover more ground, with a higher safety factor, than if both had
covered either alone or as one large force.
Movement as part of a Tank-Infantry team. Infantry units are slower and weaker than armored units.
This means that extra care must be taken to maintain contact with assisting infantry, provide them the
benefit of full (and close) armor support, and avoid becoming separated. In open terrain, this means
advancing in front of the infantry and using searching fire (firing at likely places where the enemy could be
hiding) as needed. In close terrain, especially towns and villages, the infantry should precede the tanks to
flush out enemy antitank teams. Mechanized infantry operations give commanders more tactical flexibility
and mobility in various situations. Infantry that can disembark also allows them to perform as separate unit
in cases where enemy infantry is dug in and would be difficult for armor alone to dispatch them. This type of
force combination presents the opportunity for the half-track or other APC to provide its own direct fire
support for its dismounted troops.
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Concentration of force. Whenever possible, the maximum amount of force should be used to secure an
objective or engage enemy forces. This enables the platoon or company to engage quickly and with
overwhelming force, in order to be immediately ready for an enemy counterattack. This will also help keep a
force from being pinned in place (and becoming an artillery target), and allow it to sustain fewer losses than
if the unit had been engaged piecemeal. In general, this means using a platoon to engage lone enemy units,
and a company to engage enemy platoons. Artillery can also be used as a force multiplier, to distract,
damage, and pin enemy troops. Although concentration of force is one of the primary ingredients of a
successful engagement, it is not necessary, or desirable, for all of the friendly forces to be bunched together.
As a rule of thumb, about half of the unit should engage the enemy unit directly, while the other half moves
around one flank or the other to make contact from the enemy side or rear. Friendly forces should be spread
out far enough to avoid suffering great casualties during an artillery attack or from an unexpected
counterattack, yet still be close enough to see one another, provide mutual support, and still be able to target
the enemy unit that is being engaged.
Breakthrough techniques. By using overwhelming force at a single location, preferably a spot where enemy
forces are known or suspected to be weak, it is possible to break through enemy lines, giving a considerable
advantage to the attacker. Artillery can be used to soften up the enemy positions and use smoke rounds to
obscure friendly movements and prevent the enemy from being able to effectively reinforce the breach. Once
the breakthrough is made, a small force (usually, a force which has sustained losses in the initial attack) is left
behind to keep the breach open, while stronger forces, often made up of fresh reserves, moves deep into
enemy territory. One of the advantages of a breakthrough is the capability to overrun enemy supply bases,
headquarters, and artillery positions. This will disrupt his communications and supply systems, often causing
great confusion among both front and rear echelon units. This, however, requires a very deep penetration
and a force capable of throwing off local counterattacks. More common is the local breakthrough, which is
used to provide a tactical, rather than strategic or operational, advantage. In this case, the breakthrough force
is used to attack the enemy front lines in the flanks and rear, often creating confusion and causing troops to
withdraw from their positions. Local penetrations can also be used to seize objectives such as bridges, road
intersections, hills, and villages. These objectives can then be held against enemy counterattack, while fresh
reserves are brought through the breach to reinforce and expand these positions behind enemy lines. By
maintaining a fast operational tempo and high mobility, exploiting even a small breach in the enemy lines
can serve to force the enemy forces to spread out and often to throw their reserves into the battle, thus
weakening their front lines and possibly enabling further breakthroughs.
Reserves on the offensive. Reserves are an essential part of any offensive, even if they are small. On a
platoon or company scale, half of the unit can be used to engage the enemy, while the other half serves as a
maneuver element and is capable of reacting to unexpected events, such as enemy counterattacks or
exploiting a sudden breach in enemy lines. When engaging using superior forces, reserves provide a layer of
protection against this kind of event. Reserve units can also be used to relieve weaker units at the front, thus
preventing a rout or by providing fresh troops for a breakthrough. A company should keep a full platoon in
reserve whenever possible, while a platoon should hold back one or two tanks. These reserve forces should be
kept close enough that they can easily be moved forward to engage the enemy, yet stay far enough back to
avoid contact with forward enemy units and be free to move around to engage their flanks or protect the rear
of forward friendly units. One technique often used by platoons is to engage an enemy with the main body,
then send the reserve tanks to attack the enemy in the flank or rear. Once they have begun their attack, the
main body then becomes the reserves, and moves up behind the rest of the platoon, with the platoon leader
normally joining up with the new main body and continuing the offensive pressure to the maximum
extent possible.
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TANKS IN THE DEFENSIVE
Originally designed to seize and hold the initiative by taking the offensive, tanks can also be very useful on
the defensive. Properly prepared, tanks can provide fire support from a position that is nearly invulnerable to
enemy fire, and still be able to make a tactical withdrawal to previously established positions in the rear.
They can be used as mobile support, to reinforce wherever the fighting is worst. Best of all, once the
defensive operations have destroyed the enemy’s will to fight, these same tanks can then be used to initiate
counter offensive operations against those same battle-weary troops.
Fighting positions. Tanks, like infantry, can and should take advantage of cover. By siting a tank properly
in a “hull-down” position, it is possible to protect the tank hull from enemy fire and provide a smaller target
to the enemy. This can be done by driving up to the crest of a hill, even a small one, and stopping just short
of the top, but high enough so that the main gun can be depressed to fire over it. This allows the
commander to see and the gunner to shoot at enemy vehicles without exposing the entire tank. This works
best when there are trees or buildings to the rear, so that the silhouette of the tank turret is not so obvious. A
platoon of tanks on a hill in hull-down positions is a very difficult target and a very effective antitank
position, and one from which it is relatively easy to withdraw. Trees also make good cover. Whenever
possible, move the tanks deeper into the woods and destroy the trees to the front of the vehicle, creating a
lane of fire down which the tank can see to attack enemy troops as they expose themselves through the gap.
This method is also easy to retreat from, and gives the enemy great difficulty as your tank is completely
hidden in the woods. The only problems with this method are that it takes time to prepare, including
ensuring that there is a way out of the woods, and that enemy infantry may infiltrate the forest and conduct
close assaults on the tanks, unless friendly infantry can provide flank security. Finally, buildings make good
cover for tanks on the defensive. Tanks parked inside buildings are very difficult to see, and may observe and
fire from windows and over broken sections of wall. The building itself also provides some protection, and
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retreat is easy, as buildings are inevitably connected to other buildings by roads. If you want to have the
tanks fall back to other buildings after they are engaged (to avoid artillery and infantry attacks), do not forget
to have infantry units protecting their flanks from close assaults, especially in urban areas where the
movements of enemy infantry may be difficult to detect.
Defensive formations. Unlike the offensive formations, which are based on a moving platoon (and are often
used on the defensive when conducting a mobile defense or counterattack), the positions of tanks in a
defending tank platoon are often dictated by the availability of good positions. Most often, the platoon is
brought on line, allowing the entire section to bring its guns to bear on any target that comes in range. This
is especially useful when the platoon is in a hull-down position firing over the crest of a hill or ridge, or
concealed in the treeline. When using terrain features such as buildings and craters for cover, each tank
should be positioned so as to make the best use of its individual cover. Additionally, each tank should be
placed so that it can provide covering fire to at least one other vehicle in the platoon. This will enable it to
assist in the event that the other tank is forced to move to the rear, thereby preventing enemy tanks from
moving in for a flank or rear shot.
Defense in depth. When the enemy is strong and he is very likely to penetrate friendly lines, a defense in
depth can be constructed to withstand this attack. This can only be done successfully if there are enough
troops on hand to fill these defenses. The use of restrictive or difficult terrain and the careful siting of
friendly forces may make this task easier. A thin line of infantry mixed with light antitank guns will slow the
enemy down, yet allow him to penetrate the first defensive line. The second line should be right behind the
first, and made up of more infantry and heavier antitank guns, which should stop him and make him
vulnerable to attacks from front and rear. Finally, the third line should be immediately behind the second
line and made up of infantry and tanks in a supporting role, which can be used to stop the enemy if the
second line is penetrated or counterattack if his attack stalls. If the enemy attack penetrates to the third
defensive line, the first and second lines should then be pulled out of action and used to establish new
defensive lines to the rear of the third line, but farther back to allow the third wave time to break off the
attack if necessary. When the first and second lines have been moved and new lines successfully set up,
artillery can be called onto their old positions to prevent the further advance of enemy forces, and smoke can
be used to allow the third echelon to break contact and re-establish their third line behind the new first and
second lines of defense. This process can be maintained until the enemy is destroyed or there are insufficient
friendly units to hold the lines.
Mobile defense. When the enemy is strong and defending forces are weak, static troops (such as antitank
guns) should be placed into positions wherever they can do as much damage as possible to the enemy.
Infantry units should be placed so as to screen the antitank guns and occupy the most difficult terrain,
making them harder to dislodge. Tanks and other armored fighting vehicles should be spread out in
positions from which they can maneuver freely across the rear of the friendly defensive line, as dictated by
terrain and the enemy forces. Although the screening forces are weak, they will be most effective if they can
hold in place for as long as possible. Local breakthroughs can then be stemmed by local counterattacks as
necessary from the mobile forces held in reserve. Once the breakthroughs have been eliminated, some of
these reserves will have to close the gap in the lines, leaving fewer and fewer reserves as more and more
breakthroughs take place. Wait until the last of the reserves have been committed before retreating, and use
them as a covering force for the remaining units. Hopefully, the enemy attack will have been blunted and he
will be too tired and disorganized to press the attack. Artillery and smoke can be used to cover this
movement and also to further confuse the enemy units.
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Counterattack. When the enemy forces are insufficient to penetrate friendly lines or friendly infantry and
antitank forces are weak but tank forces are strong, a counterattack can often be staged to inflict the
maximum amount of damage on the enemy. This can be done by creating a thin defensive line, as with the
mobile defense. The mobile forces are then consolidated on one flank, immediately behind friendly lines.
The area where this formation can be most effective will be dictated by the enemy positions and the terrain
available. Once the enemy has initiated the attack and become bogged down among the friendly defenses,
but before he has successfully broken through the lines, this mobile force should advance around the enemy
flank, striking as deep as possible into his lines. By engaging the enemy lines at an angle to the attacking
forces, this will cause them to be drawn off the front lines to stem the counterattack and will make his lines
of supply and communication vulnerable. If done properly and with enough force, this can cause him to go
on the defensive and recall his attacking forces, or use up his reserves, thus enabling the defenders to push
forward and rout him. Vital objectives behind his lines can be seized and held by this method, forcing the
enemy to fight on two local fronts and dividing his forces. Once he has been contained in the “cauldron,”
artillery and smoke can be used to further damage and demoralize his forces.
Reserves in the defensive. Each of the methods of defense presented include the use of a mobile reserve
force. It is essential to have such a force, particularly on the defensive, to provide some elasticity to the
defense and to maintain the defender’s advantage of being able to rapidly move from one firefight to another.
These reinforcements should never be distributed in small amounts, but used in large formations, so as to
enable them to destroy the enemy quickly and be ready to immediately go to another fight. On the other
hand, all of the reserves should not be committed at once. This would allow the enemy to flank friendly
forces or penetrate unopposed in the location of his choice. If necessary, artillery can be used to temporarily
halt an enemy breakthrough until reserves can be freed up. If reinforcements become available during the
battle, they can be used as a fresh reserve force, allowing the current reserves to make local counterattacks and
reinforce weak positions. When attacking, be wary of the enemy’s defensive reserves and try to engage them
so that they lose their ability to react elsewhere, then attack in force on the opposite flank or through a
weakly held section of the line.
TANK AGAINST TANK
Unlike the tanks of the last war, modern tanks were designed from the start to fight other tanks. Light tanks
move quickly behind enemy tanks to get at their vulnerable rear armor. Heavy tanks move directly towards
enemy tank forces, counting on their superior armor to protect them. When fighting superior tanks,
armored forces know to advance quickly, taking advantage of all available cover and concealment, in order to
get that close-range shot which is sure to penetrate even heavy armor. When fighting inferior forces, armored
units rapidly engage and destroy enemy tanks, paving the way for the following infantry and supporting
forces to seize objectives. Above all, every tanker must know the weaknesses and strengths of enemy vehicles,
so that he can make a rapid and accurate assessment of the tactical situation as it develops and then utilize it
to his best advantage.
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Know your enemy. One of the most important concepts in the art of armored warfare is to know and
understand your enemy - his mindset, motivations, tactics and equipment. Being able to recognize friendly
units is important for the obvious reason that this will prevent ‘friendly fire’ episodes. For the individual
tank commander, knowing the strengths and weaknesses of other friendly units can best allow him to
estimate where and when the enemy is likely to attack, and what he is likely to attack with, thus allowing
him to better prepare, mentally and tactically, for that eventuality. Knowing the appearance and technical
specifications of enemy vehicles will allow the commander to recognize when he is outgunned, and take
appropriate measures, such as calling for artillery fire or moving around for a flanking shot. It will also
enable him to know when he has an advantage over enemy vehicles, so he can press that advantage home.
Finally, an understanding of enemy tactics and motivations will help the commander to understand what the
enemy is doing or planning to do, enabling him to find potential weaknesses in enemy plans and positions,
and to lead the enemy into ambushes or difficult terrain.
Closing techniques. When attacking a weak enemy tank unit it is often advisable to simply stop and engage
with whatever long-range weaponry, either direct or indirect fire support, that the friendly force has at its
disposal. This prevents friendly force vehicles from coming within the effective range of enemy guns, and
keeps the friendly units from running into hidden ambush or antitank positions. Once the enemy unit has
been eliminated, the attacking force should move to another position to avoid possible artillery fire and
counterattack by enemy troops. Units utilizing this form of attack, even while they are stopped to either fire
directly or co-ordinate indirect fire should always maintain a forward momentum once the enemy positions
are cleared. Remember that movement is simply another weapon for a commander to use. When engaged by
smoke or artillery, the unit should move immediately to avoid being outflanked and to keep the attack from
bogging down.
When facing the prospect of a stronger enemy or one that is too distant from friendly tanks for effective
engagement, it is necessary to close on the enemy forces and engage them from a direction that they least
expect. By ‘prepping’ an enemy position with smoke and artillery volleys to distract and suppress the enemy
vehicles and to keep them from spotting the advancing units, the friendly tanks can then maneuver around
into the enemy’s flank. While watching carefully for additional enemy troops trying to enter the fray, this will
allow the friendly units to strike the enemy tanks from a closer range where the friendly guns will be more
effective against the weaker side and rear armor of the enemy vehicles. In this way the enemy will be most
vulnerable shortly after the barrage of supporting fire.
Using supporting units against tanks. Although the infantry is not at its best when fighting directly
against enemy armor, it is possible for friendly infantry to destroy enemy units when they attack friendly
positions in restricted terrain, such as woods and urban areas where the armored units cannot easily
maneuver. Infantry units, armed with light antitank weapons, can be used to ambush enemy tanks once they
have penetrated into the forest or town. Care must be taken by a unit commander not to initiate an attack
too early or at too great a range, as this will allow them time to maneuver away from the kill zone, and
escape. It is also best to move additional antitank troops in behind the enemy unit after they have moved
into the area, thus preventing it from retreating successfully. Smoke can also be used to further confuse the
vehicles once they have come under attack, and to help screen the movements of the assaulting infantry.
Artillery and air support units can also be used effectively to engage lightly armored units and tank destroyers
when they are in the open or to force an enemy commander into an area where a kill zone for other
supporting units has been prepared.
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TANK AGAINST INFANTRY
Although modern tanks were designed mainly with the goal of eliminating enemy armored forces, they are
often used to provide direct support to advancing infantry, especially when they are forced to cross open
ground or fight against fortified enemy positions. This is one of the gravest situations an armored unit can
face, as it is likely to expose the slow-moving tank to the many types of antitank defences. Most importantly,
tankers must not let themselves get separated from their supporting infantry, become bogged down in small
fights against local infantry units, or be pushed or lured into an antitank ambush. Particularly in areas with
limited visibility, such as in heavy woods or built-up areas, tanks must keep a sharp lookout for traps.
Overruns and close assaults. Although these two events are similar in nature, they often come about due to
two completely different events. An overrun occurs when a tank is used to assault enemy infantry. This is a
very dangerous tactic, and should only be attempted in the gravest emergencies when infantry support is not
available. The tank must remain buttoned up, move quickly among the enemy infantry, fire the
machineguns without stopping, and quickly move out of the area before the infantry can recover their wits
and conduct a close assault. The close assault may result from a botched overrun, or it may take place when
an infantry unit attacks from a concealed position in close terrain (such as woods or buildings). In this case,
it is the infantry who are assaulting the tank with grenades, mines, and light antitank weapons. Since the
tank is very vulnerable to a close assault, it is imperative that it break from the engagement and reposition
immediately if possible. This may take the form of charging forward. This may, however, result in the vehicle
running into another antitank position and becoming trapped. It is often better to retreat to a nearby open
area and either wait for the infantry to advance to your position, or bypass the difficult terrain and engage
the enemy infantry with direct fire or artillery or air support, while at range. Smoke and artillery can also be
used to distract and destroy the infantry, as well as providing cover while the exposed tank retreats.
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Using supporting units against infantry. When fighting enemy infantry in difficult terrain, it is best to let
friendly infantry attack. In order to make this as easy as possible for the advancing friendly units, it is a good
idea to soften up the target with artillery fire if it is available and there is sufficient time available to wait for
the artillery strike. If friendly forces are already engaged, the use of artillery may be too dangerous to friendly
troops. In this case, tanks may provide supporting fires by firing high explosive shells into the area where the
enemy infantry is taking cover. This may cause the enemy infantry to flee, leaving them exposed to further
attacks. It may also deny them their cover and keep them from firing, allowing friendly forces to approach
unmolested until they can effectively assault the enemy positions. Smoke screens, placed between the
advancing troops and the waiting enemy forces, can also be used to protect units forced to move across
open terrain.
ANTITANK WARFARE
Everyone, it seems, wants to destroy tanks. The infantry have their rocket launchers, flamethrowers, antitank
rifles, antitank grenades, mines, and even Molotov cocktails, which they employ against tanks whenever they
get a chance. The artillery has developed large and small-bore cannon for use against tanks, and sometimes
even presses field guns, howitzers, and antiaircraft guns into that role. Finally, even tankers themselves have
come up with specially built self-propelled antitank guns called tank destroyers. All of these forces combine
to make the battlefield a deadly place for even the most heavily armed and well-protected tank.
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Infantry antitank teams. Effective antitank weapons, particularly the ‘HEAT’ warhead, were developed due
to the need for a capable antitank weapon that could be carried by individual infantrymen. This warhead,
unlike traditional armor-piercing rounds, was not dependent on kinetic energy for its penetrating effects.
Relying on chemical means, it could be fired from low-velocity guns or used for rockets. Germany developed
the first practical antitank rocket, called the Panzerfaust, which was used throughout the war, with successive
models being improvements of the basic launcher and warhead. Although its range was short, it had an
excellent warhead capable of penetrating up to 200mm of armor (on the later models) and was lightweight,
reliable, and disposable. The American rocket launcher, known unofficially as the ‘’Bazooka’ (due to its
resemblance to a musical instrument used by comedian Bob Burns), and officially as the Launcher, Rocket,
AT, M1, was developed as a tube for launching stabilized rifle grenades. Its penetrating power was not as
good as the Panzerfaust, but it did have a longer range and could be reloaded. Captured Bazookas were
copied by the Germans to form the basis for the Panzerschreck rocket launcher.
Some other weapons used in an antitank role included; hand and rifle grenades, antitank rifles,
flamethrowers, mines, satchel charges, and improvised antitank weapons such as the Molotov cocktail and the
‘Gammon’ bomb (a brick of raw explosives with a detonator inserted). These close quarters weapons make it
wise to employ friendly infantry units, when available, against enemy infantry, or to defeat them from a
distance with artillery or long-range HE bombardment.
Antitank guns and tank destroyers. Antitank guns are basically field artillery pieces capable of firing at and
destroying tanks. The development of these weapons often parallels the development of tank guns, however,
antitank guns have their own pros and cons. Antitank gun emplacements are often well camouflaged and
dug-in, making them difficult to strike at, and their low-cost makes it easy to deploy many antitank guns
where they are most effective. However antitank guns and their crews are vulnerable to artillery and infantry
attacks, since the only crew protection usually consisted of armor plating mounted in place just aft of the gun
barrel and in front of the breech on the carriage.
Tank destroyers are an interesting compromise of the tank and an antitank gun. Mounting a fixed, forward
firing antitank gun, housed in an open-topped and lightly armored cupola or superstructure, the tank
destroyers were usually based on old, obsolete tank chassis and hull. This concept allowed for a lower-cost,
mobile weapon that allowed large amounts of firepower to be brought to bear on the enemy. American tank
destroyers preferred to mount their guns in an open-topped hull, such as in the case of the M10 series, while
Germans guns and crew were completely enclosed, allowing for more protection, but slightly reduced
mobility and visibility. The outstanding StuG and JagdPanther designs were fine examples of this potent
component of the German armored Corps.
Artillery. Indirect fire artillery differs from direct-fire artillery (which includes tank guns, antitank guns, and
antiaircraft artillery) in that the units which fire are so far from the battle that their fire may take two or three
minutes to organize, direct, and arrive on the battlefield. Because of this, the tank commander must be
careful not to drive into a targeted area until after the artillery has struck and the barrage is completed.
Various types of artillery may be available to the commander, depending on the assets of the unit to which he
is attached. This may include mortars, field guns, and howitzers. Mortars are lightweight, simple artillery
pieces that fire in a very high ballistic arc and are usually found immediately behind the attacking or
defending tanks and infantry forces. Although they are not as powerful as larger caliber guns, their ubiquity
means that they are more likely to be available, and their proximity to the front means that they are likely to
respond swiftly. It’s important to note, however, that several very large caliber mortars were created and
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utilized by both sides in the Second World War. Most of these were restricted to use as siege weapons and
were not often seen, or luckily, felt, on the open battlefield in support of troops, due to their cumbersome
size and nature. The ‘Karl’ series of heavy mortar is an excellent example. Field and infantry guns are the
medium to large-caliber (usually 75mm - 150mm) and medium to long-range artillery normally assigned to
support companies and battalions, with infantry guns being especially light and mobile. While not as
powerful as howitzers, they are more likely to be made available to the lower-echelon commander. Howitzers
are large-caliber (100mm – 200mm), long-range guns generally used to support the regiment or brigade in
the attack or defense. While their power makes them desirable, their distance from the front means fire
missions take longer to prepare and execute.
Other types of indirect fire support may include naval artillery, rocket artillery and close air support. Naval
artillery is essentially the same as regular artillery, except guns are mounted on a fighting ship and strikes may
be called only near a port or amphibious landing zone. Naval artillery also tends to be more powerful, often
ranging from 125mm to 800mm in caliber. Rocket artillery is also different from regular artillery, although
it is used much the same way. Instead of cannons, rockets are launched from tube or railed launchers, usually
firing from five to ten rockets per salvo in one massive strike. Although highly destructive, these attacks tend
to be less accurate than regular “tube” artillery, and take a long time to ready for the next salvo. Close air
support by fighter-bomber air force or naval units can significantly increase the amount of firepower placed
on call for higher command level use, usually at the company level and above. Payloads can include multiple
weights of free-fall HE bombs, rockets, both HE and AP and small caliber cannon and machinegun bullets
for the strafing of lightly armored targets and infantry, all possibly aiding or disrupting a coordinated
armored operation. During the Blitzkrieg and under the direction of Heinz Guderian, the German army
pioneered the effective tactical application of close air support in combined arms operations.
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4. THE CAMPAIGNS
These three campaigns represent the majority of conflict between American and German armored forces in
World War II. Each involves different units, equipment, and terrain. From the deserts of Africa, to the
mountains of Italy and the bocage country of France; all of the major battlefields upon which these forces
met are represented. The historical background and major units and commanders involved in these
campaigns are covered in more detail below.
NORTH AFRICA
Operation Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of Morocco and Algeria, allowed American and German
troops to meet in combat for the first time in a major action. Fresh American soldiers with new equipment
met up with the battle-weary veterans of Rommel’s Afrika Korps shortly after the landings on November 8,
1942. In order to counter the strength of the US First Army under General Eisenhower, Hitler sent
reinforcements, which began to arrive on November 16th. They included the veteran 10th Panzer division,
Hermann Göring Panzer Parachute division, and the 334th Infantry division, as well as the Fifth Panzer
Army, which were all posted to the German western flank in order to counter the Americans. By the time
they reached their positions, US forces had occupied all of the coastal areas of Morocco and Algeria, and were
moving into Tunisia. Similarly, the recently reinforced British Eighth Army had pushed Rommel and his
“original” Afrika Corps, weakened by a crucial lack of supplies, as far west as southern Tunisia.
While the British and Commonwealth forces advanced steadily from the east, the US Army maintained their
offensive pressure on the Germans from the west. Although the German forces were almost always
outnumbered, they were rarely outfought. These force dispositions led to some very difficult battles for the
key passes through the Western Dorsal Mountains as well as coastal airfields and villages in December. Due
to the position of the German forces and their hasty reinforcement, as well as the uncertainty and
inexperience of the American troops and commanders, these actions were mostly local in nature. It was not
until Rommel was pushed into northern Tunisia and given command over all German and Italian forces in
the region (the late-arrived reinforcements were commanded by General von Arnim of the Fifth Panzer
Army) that a co-ordinated offensive was mounted. The Afrika Korps attack threw the American forces,
including the 1st Armored division and most of the US II Corps, back from their positions at Faid and Gafsa
to the Kasserine Pass. There the US forces managed to put up a stiff resistance until reinforcements arrived in
the form of the US 9th Infantry division. After a short pause for reinforcement and reorganization, the Allies
closed in from both east and west, forcing the surrender of some 125,000 German and 115,000 Italian
troops by May 13th, 1943.
ITALY
On July 10, 1943, an Allied landing, codenamed Operation Husky, took place on the southern beaches of
Sicily. As the British Eighth Army landed on the southeast coast, the US Seventh Army, under General
George S. Patton, landed on the southwest coast. The American force included the 1st, 9th and 45th
Infantry divisions, the 82nd Airborne division, 2nd Armored division, and several mixed infantry and
armored brigades and regiments, including two battalions of Rangers. This force was relatively lightly
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opposed, and easily overpowered the weak German and Italian forces deployed along the west coast. After
seizing Gela and Licata, the US forces moved up the coast through Agrigento, Ribera, and Castelvetrano
during the remainder of July. Meanwhile, the Axis forces were reinforced by General Hube’s Fourteenth
Panzer Corps and the Hermann Göring Panzer division from Italy into northeastern Sicily. With the nearly
bloodless capture of Palermo in the north, the western half of the island had been captured. Patton’s Seventh
Army then moved east to relieve pressure on the British forces, which were being held up at Mount Etna by
Hube’s Panzers, by occupying Falcone in early August. This force continued its advance, crossing the Termini
River to attack Messina the following week. By the end of August, Messina had fallen, and Sicily had been
secured, although about 100,000 German and Italian troops had escaped over the Strait of Messina to Italy.
The surviving Axis troops were quickly reorganized and reinforced, then placed in position to defend against
the expected attack on mainland Italy. This attack, mounted on September 3rd, coincided with the day Italy
officially surrendered to the Allies. German occupation forces quickly disarmed the remaining Italian forces,
while the Luftwaffe damaged the Italian fleet and while both forces stubbornly resisted the parallel Allied
advances up the sides of the Italian peninsula. On September 9th, General Mark Clark led the US Fifth
Army, including the 36th and 45th Infantry divisions and the British X Corps, ashore at Salerno. Salerno
was defended by the German LXXVI Panzer Corps, which included the 16th and Hermann Göring Panzer
divisions, as well as the 3rd, 15th and 29th Panzer Grenadier divisions. This amphibious attack caused
German forces in the “boot” to withdraw northwards, allowing the Allies to make rapid progress until they
reached the Germans’ “Viktor Line,” north of Naples, on October 3rd. Here, German reinforcements, which
were arriving from northern Italy, southern France, Austria, and Sardinia, held back the Allied advance long
enough for the “Gustav Line” to be prepared farther north, along the Sangro and Garigliano Rivers.
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It took the Allies all of October and most of November to advance to the Gustav Line. This was mainly due
to poor weather and rugged terrain combined with some of the most experienced defenders in the
Wehrmacht. These steadfast and dogged units included: I Fallschirmjäger Corps, 26th, 16th, and Hermann
Göring Panzer divisions, and 334th, 305th, 94th, 65th, 44th, and 5th (Mountain) Infantry divisions.
Matched to counter this force was the US 3rd, 34th, 36th, and 45th Infantry divisions, as well as seven
British and Commonwealth Infantry divisions and one British Armored division. Weaknesses within the
German force, exploited by the US commanders, allowed the US troops of the 1st Armored division and the
3rd, 34th, and 45th Infantry divisions to advance into Anzio. This position put the US forces well behind
the Gustav Line, near Rome, by January 22nd 1944. The 34th and 45th Infantry Divisions were pulled out
of the line south of Cassino to compound on the US advances. The German forces defending Anzio and
along their retreating route to Rome included the Lehr, 3rd, 4th, 26th, 29th, 114th, 362nd, and 715th
Infantry divisions, the 16th SS division, and the I Fallschirmjäger Corps, which was pulled back to defend
Rome along with the 65th Infantry division.
The area around Monte Cassino was finally taken in the Spring after intense fighting between the US 36th
Infantry division, and three New Zealand, two Polish, and two Indian Infantry Divisions, against the
German 44th and 71st Infantry divisions, 1st Fallschirmjäger division, and 90th Panzer Grenadier division.
The penetration of the Gustav Line at Cassino and elsewhere allowed the southern Allied forces, now
reinforced by the bulk of the Free French and Free Polish armies, to advance northward to relieve the
battered defenders of Anzio in May. This combined force managed to take Rome on June 4th, after heavy
fighting, and continued to slowly push the remains of the German forces in Italy northwards until the end of
the war.
NORMANDY
Having established a successful beachhead in Normandy on June 6, 1944, the Allies continued to press
inland. German reinforcements, including several of their best armored divisions, were rushed to prevent the
Allied armies from moving south. Operations Epsom and Goodwood, launched by the British and
Commonwealth forces, were repulsed by these fresh units on the eastern side of the beachhead during their
attempt to seize Caen. Meanwhile, American forces were advancing slowly, their primary goal the occupation
of the Cotentin Peninsula with its important port of Cherbourg, which was held by the German 9th, 77th,
79th, 243rd, and 709th Infantry divisions. The US units included the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th, 29th, and 90th
Infantry divisions, the 2nd Armored division, and the 101st and 82nd Airborne divisions. After Cherbourg
fell on 26 June, the US built up its reserves and secured the peninsula by taking St. Lo, Marigny, and La
Haye-du-Puits, which prevented further German reinforcements from moving into the area. This area was
occupied by the German 265th, 275th, and 352nd Infantry divisions, the 3rd Fallschirmjäger division, and
17th SS division.
On July 25th, US forces staged a breakout, codenamed Operation Cobra. It began on the farthest eastern
part of the beachhead, with General Patton’s Third Army. The spearhead of the attack consisted of 3rd, 4th,
and 6th Armored divisions and 1st Infantry division. Using XIX and V Corps at St. Lo as a lynchpin, the
VII and VIII Corps under Patton’s army broke through at Lessay, moving south along the coast to Avranches
and Mortain. The German defenders included the II Fallschirmjäger Corps, XLVII Panzer Corps, 363rd
Infantry division, and 2nd and 116th Panzer divisions. Thanks to Allied planning, as well as superiority in
quantities of tanks, planes, and personnel, the German forces were surrounded except for a small escape route
through Argentan.
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While local attacks kept the German forces pinned, the Allies squeezed the area, known as the Falais Pocket,
tighter. British and Canadian forces applied pressure along the northern flank, while the US Third Army was
responsible for the south. By August 12th, the German forces were in a general state of retreat throughout
France, as American forces swept south and then east, crossing the Loire River on August 11th, and
threatening Paris. The besieged Germans, including Fifth Panzer Army under Obergruppenführer Sepp
Dietrich and Seventh Army under General Hausser, attempted to fight an orderly retreat as they moved their
units through the shrinking gap at Argentan. Their forces included I and II SS Panzer Corps, LXXIV and
LXXXIV Corps, LVIII and XLVII Panzer Corps, and II Fallschirmjäger Corps, however, they were all short
of supplies, especially fuel, and many of their vehicles were destroyed or abandoned. Still, through bitter
fighting, they managed to hold the area around Argentan for over a week, long enough for the majority of
German troops to escape eastward, where they would be reorganized and resupplied for the Ardennes
offensive in the Winter. On the 20th of August, American and Canadian forces linked up, closing the Falaise
Pocket, and the German forces left behind capitulated.
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38
5. THE WEHRMACHT
At the beginning of World War II, the Wehrmacht (the ground forces of the Heer, the air forces of the
Luftwaffe and the naval forces of the Kriegsmarine as well) seemed to be an unstoppable juggernaut. Its
forces were far superior in quality, and only rarely in quantity, to those of its opponents. When American
troops first encountered German troops, they were engaging a force that had been fighting for three years,
and were equipped with some of the most advanced tanks and weapons in the world. Learning painful
lessons, the Americans improved quickly, while the German economy could not hope to match the output of
American industry. Due to constant interruption by allied air and ground interdiction, supply lines back to
Germany faltered. Finally, recruit quality began to fall after 1943, and coupled with mounting veteran losses
effectively ended the German advantage in training, experience, and leadership.
German tanks were technically and technologically superior to most Allied tanks throughout the war
although they were often over-engineered. This led to difficulties in armored vehicle production and repair.
The German armaments industry was incapable of meeting the demand for these new vehicles in useful
quantities, and certainly not in the quantities in which American and Russian tanks were being produced
(German production levels equalled the Soviets only late in the war). During the entire war, only 80,000
armored vehicles of all types were produced in Germany, while the United States alone produced over 50,000
Sherman tanks! This was partly made up for by the high quality of German tank crews coupled with thick,
high-quality armor, powerful guns, and greater manoeuvrability provided by wider track designs. The official
American estimate of the cost of each Panther tank was five Sherman tanks!
The following tables of organization and equipment represent the bulk of German ground forces during the
Second World War. As a side note, difficulties in production, supply and reinforcement meant that nearly
every unit had its own differences from the standard force levels, particularly among elite units and those not
strictly belonging to the army (such as the Luftwaffe field divisions).
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39
• The German Panzer Battalion of 1942-1943 was made up of three tank companies (usually two PzKpfw III
and one PzKpfw IV), organized into three platoons of five tanks each (a number only reached by elite units,
with ordinary units making do with four tanks per platoon), a platoon of four or five light tanks, and a
headquarters section of two tanks. This was supported by a headquarters platoon with three command
tanks, and a support company with an engineer platoon (with trucks), signals platoon (with trucks),
reconnaissance platoon (four or five light tanks), and an antiaircraft platoon (eight 20mm on four halftracks).
• The German Panzer Battalion of 1944-1945 was made up of three tank companies, organized into three or
four platoons of four or five tanks each, with a headquarters section of two tanks. This was supported by a
headquarters platoon with three command tanks and a support company with an engineer platoon (with
halftracks), signals platoon (with trucks), reconnaissance platoon (with four or five PzKpfw IV), and an
antiaircraft platoon (3 vehicles).
• The German Heavy Panzer Battalion of 1942-1943 was made up of two companies, organized into two
platoons of four heavy tanks (Tigers) and two platoons of four or five medium tanks, with one command
tank for the company headquarters. This was supported by a headquarters section with two tanks and a
support company with an engineer platoon (with trucks), a reconnaissance platoon (with three or four
tanks), and an antiaircraft platoon (three halftracks with four 20mmeach).
• The German Heavy Panzer Battalion of 1944-1945 was made up of three companies, organized into three
platoons of four heavy tanks (Tigers) and two command tanks for the company headquarters. This was
supported by a headquarters section with three command tanks and a support company with an engineer
platoon (with trucks), an antiaircraft platoon (four or five Wirbelwind), and a recovery vehicle platoon (with
five Bergepanther).
• The German Panzer Grenadier Battalion was made up of three companies, organized into three platoons of
three halftracks (sometimes trucks were substituted, especially early in the war) and one command halftrack,
a headquarters platoon of three halftracks, and a combat support platoon of a machinegun section (with
three halftracks), an antiaircraft section (two halftracks with 20mm), and a mortar section (two halftracks
with 81mm mortars). This would normally be supported by a headquarters section with three or four
halftracks and a support company with a machinegun section (with three or four halftracks), a heavy mortar
platoon (with five halftracks and four 120mm mortars), and a mortar platoon (with seven halftracks and six
81mm mortars). To allow for greater anti-armor protection/offensive capability, a platoon of StuG or tank
destroyers was often attached.
• The German Infantry Battalion of 1939-1942 was made up of three companies, organized into three
platoons of three ten-man squads and a headquarters section each, a company headquarters platoon, and a
combat support platoon with a section of three 50mm mortars and a section of three MG34 or MG42 on
tripods. This was supported by a headquarters platoon and a combat support company with a headquarters
platoon, a machinegun platoon (with six machineguns), and a mortar platoon (with six 81mm mortars).
• The German Infantry Battalion of 1943-1945 was made up of three companies, organized into three
platoons of three eight-man squads and a headquarters section each, a company headquarters section, and a
combat support platoon with a section of two 81mm mortars and a section of three MG34 or MG42 on
tripods. This was supported by a headquarters platoon and a combat support company with a headquarters
section, a machinegun platoon (with six machineguns), and a mortar platoon (with four 120mm mortars).
Page 39
German Attack Order
and Fire Plan
[Used by the commander to
organize his offensive plan]
1. Estimate of the situation
(disposition of friendly and
enemy troops).
2. Mission.
3. Assembly areas for the forward
companies; objectives; sector
boundaries; orders for the
continuation of combat
reconnaissance.
4. Instructions for the preparation
of the heavy-weapons fire
support, especially for
massed fire.
5. Orders to the artillery for fire
preparation and coordination.
6. Assembly areas for the reserves.
7. Time of attack.
8. Instructions for rear services
(medical services and supply).
9. Location of command posts.
10. Miscellaneous.
[The Fire Plan is used to pre-plot
artillery and heavy weapons]
1. Assignment of combat missions.
2. Distribution of observation
sectors and fields of fire for the
infantry and the artillery.
3. An estimate of capabilities of the
artillery for effective execution of
the combat mission.
4. Orders for the commencement of
fire and fire schedules.
5. Orders for the preparation of
massed fires.
6. Instructions for
ammunition supply.
40
GERMAN TACTICS
German military tradition has always emphasised the need for
aggression and surprise in all operations. Defensive operations were
felt to be akin to retreat! The use of armor in large formations
combined with bold leadership and initiative at all levels
characterised the German Wehrmacht as a flexible fighting
machine. Although air and artillery support of the advancing
troops had been advocated and used efficiently early in the war, the
supremacy of Allied airpower later in the war negated this
advantage and forced German ground forces to rely more heavily
on locally available artillery assets. In preparation for each
operation, detailed and systematic reconnaissance of the area under
attack was made, which maintained a high state of situational
awareness for the unit commanders. As the attack preparations
were completed, the bulk of forces available were massed at the
Schwerpunkt, the main point of the attack, and all efforts were
made to support the primary attack. Once the commander has
selected his tactics, whether to envelop, penetrate, encircle, or
attack on the flanks or front of the enemy, he issues an Attack
Order and a Fire Plan. Individual platoons then meet in the
assembly areas, adopt one of the basic formations, and then begin
to attack in waves. Panzer Grenadiers, the armored infantry of the
Wehrmacht, follow the tanks into action. Tanks often advanced
rapidly and waited for the infantry to catch up, rather than moving
at the speed of the infantry. Special battlegroups were formed of
tanks and infantry teams, often supported by assault guns, to mop
up defensive pockets or eliminate fortifications. Once enemy lines
were penetrated, units were assigned tasks to complete
the objective.
When German units meet enemy units by accident, they are always
told to attack immediately, and to pursue and annihilate the
retreating enemy forces. On the defensive, aggressive and violent
counterattacks are called for whenever possible. Static defensive
postures were adopted only when sufficient reserves were not
available to allow for a swift, decisive counterattack. Advance
outposts were established to provide intelligence and to call for and
observe artillery fire. Strongpoints were created in difficult terrain
and established to take the maximum advantage of cover and
concealment. Finally, retreat is always the last choice, but it is
carefully conducted so that the smallest unit possible is sacrificed in
order to cover the retreat of the main force.
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GERMAN ARTILLERY
The German war machine used many different types of artillery, several of which are available to the German
player as “on-call” indirect fire, using high explosive and smoke ammunition. The following types of artillery
barrages may be available, depending on the scenario:
81mm Mortar: This was the most commonly available artillery for the company-level commander. It was
often used to drive infantry from cover, harass enemy armored vehicles, or provide a smoke screen. Because
it was attached at a lower echelon, the 81mm mortar was also quicker to respond than the conventional
artillery, which was only attached at battalion and higher level. The heavy weapons company of each
infantry battalion had two sections made up of three schwere Grenatwerfer sGW 34 each. This weapon
could fire its 3.5 kg high explosive shell up to 2,400 meters.
75mm Infantry Gun: This common short-barrelled weapon was made in several variations, including the
leichtes Infanteriegeschütz leIG 18 and the Infanteriegeschütz IG 37 and IG 42. Each of these guns weighed
less than half a ton and was ordinarily towed by a horse and cart. They were used primarily to provide
smoke and HE support, although HEAT rounds were sometimes provided for self-defence against armor
attacks. These guns had a maximum range of between 4,000 and 5,000 meters with a 6 kg shell. They were
organised into batteries of various sizes, depending on what unit they were assigned to, with a typical battery
consisting of two sections of four guns each, or one section of six guns. According to pre-war structure, a
third section was to have been added during wartime from the reserves (Ersatzheer), however, these sections
were generally used to bring new units up to strength instead (this actually applies to all of the regular
artillery batteries).
105mm Howitzer/Field Gun: This heading represents several 105mm guns, including the leichte
Feldhaubitze leFH 18, leFH 18/39, leFH 18/40, the schwere Kanone sK 18, and the Kanone K 17. These
were medium towed artillery, usually organised into two or three batteries of three to four guns each or two
batteries of six guns each. Self-propelled models were organised into sections of six vehicles each. The
howitzers had a maximum range of 10,000 to 12,000 meters with a 14 kg shell, while the field guns were
capable of ranges of 16,000 to 19,000 meters with a 15 to 18 kg shell.
150mm Infantry Gun/Howitzer: These weapons were the mainstays of the heavy artillery arm of the
German forces. This heading includes several similar variants, such as the schweres Infanteriegeschütz sIG 33
infantry gun and the schwere Feldhaubitze sFH 18, sFH 36, and sFH 18/40. All of these were towed heavy
artillery, organised into three batteries of three or four guns each, which utilised separate-loading
ammunition. Self-propelled versions were organised into sections of six vehicles each. The range of the
infantry gun was about 5,000 meters with a 38 kg shell, while that of the howitzers varied from 13,000 to
15,000 meters with a 43.5 kg shell.
170mm Field Gun: This is the excellent Kanone K 18 Matterhorn mounted on a heavy mortar carriage.
Because the weapon was so heavy, it was split into two loads for transport. It was capable of firing its 68 kg
high explosive shell out to a 28 km range, or a lighter 63 kg shell out to 30 km. It was organised into
batteries of two sections of two guns each.
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42
15cm Nebelwerfer: The Nebelwerfer (“Smoke thrower”) series of rocket launchers were both light in weight
and heavy in firepower. The 15cm version fired six rockets simultaneously, and each battery normally
consisted of six launchers, thus placing 36 rockets onto the target at once. Mobile versions were also
manufactured, and mounted in racks of ten on Opel Maultier halftracks, which were assigned three to five
vehicles per battery (for a 30 to 50 rocket salvo). Unfortunately, the weapon was not very accurate, however,
its power and range (over 6,000 meters), combined with the effectiveness of such a large salvo, was felt to
make up the difference.
21cm Nebelwerfer: Identical to the 15cm Nebelwerfer but featuring a larger rocket and a reduced number of
tubes on each launcher (five) due to a requirement to be able to use the same mount as the smaller rocket
launcher. The range of this weapon was also reduced to around 4,000 meters. Mobile versions of this
weapon were not produced.
28cm Nebelwerfer: The 28cm version of the Nebelwerfer was mounted on the ubiquitous SdKfz 251/1 and
called the Wurfrahmen 40. This weapon fired six of these enormous rockets to a range of two kilometers.
Incendiary rockets with a 32cm diameter could also be fired, but were not often carried. A battery of three
to five of these vehicles could fire their barrage of 18 to 30 rockets in less than ten seconds.
GERMAN UNIT OPTIONS
The following options may be available to some German armored units:
• Additional mantlet armor: An additional 20mm layer of face-hardened steel armor plate was mounted on
the front of the mantlet on some models of PzKpfw III, giving extra protection to the gun and crew.
• Additional superstructure armor: An additional 20mm layer of face-hardened steel armor plate was
mounted on the front of the superstructure on some models of PzKpfw III, giving extra protection to
the crew.
• Heavy Schuerzen armor skirts: Similar to regular Schuerzen, this was a thicker model designed for heavier
tanks and used primarily on the Panther series. It was capable of stopping explosive rounds and
occasionally deflecting smaller armor-piercing rounds that struck at a steep angle.
• Saukopfblende mantlet: This type of mantlet was optional on some tanks and self-propelled guns. It was
much thicker and more rounded than the ordinary mantlet, giving far superior protection.
• Schuerzen armor skirts: These were thin metal skirts attached to the sides of the superstructure and turret
in such a way as to protect the vulnerable suspension and the turret. Although too thin to stop any round,
explosive rounds, including HEAT rounds (e.g., from the Bazooka), would often be detonated a harmless
distance from the main armor of the tank.
• Zimmerit antimagnetic mine coating: This device was actually several hundred pounds of cement pasted
onto the hull and turret of the tank, and was thick enough so that magnetic mines placed by enemy
soldiers would not stick. Unfortunately, it was a wasted effort as the German army was the only major user
of such mines.
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GERMAN ARMAMENTS
The following charts give the nomenclature for the German ammunition penetration, in millimeters, of
non-face-hardened armor plate at the ranges shown for the weapons mounted on German vehicles and those
provided as antitank weapons. The lack of penetration data for the APCR round at 2,000 meters represents
the fact that it was not common practice for German gunners to fire this type of ammunition at this range as
the AP/APCBC round was often equal or superior to this round at long range, and stocks of tungsten were
so low that few of these rounds were issued. In addition to these types of ammunition, high explosive and
smoke ammunition was also provided for many weapons. Hand-held antitank weapon capabilities are given
for comparison.
WeaponShell WeightMuzzleThickness of armor penetrated at 30° angle at
Velocity100m 500m 1000m 1500m 2000m
7.92mm MG0.0115 kg (MG)785 m/s83--20mm L/55, L/1120.148 kg (AP)780 m/s20149--
0.1 kg (APCR)1,050 m/s4920---
37mm L/450.685 kg (AP)762 m/s50362219-
0.368 kg (APCR) 1,030 m/s6840---
8.63 kg (HEAT)110 m/s180180--37mm L/600.685 kg (AP)770 m/s3528211750mm L/422.25 kg (APCBC) 685 m/s5446362822
0.85 kg (APCR)1,060 m/s9658--50mm L/602.25 kg (APCBC) 823 m/s6761503426
0.85 kg (APCR)1,198 m/s1308655--
8.2 kg (HEAT)110 m/s180180--75mm L/246.8 kg (APCBC)385 m/s4139353330
4.65 kg (HEAT)450 m/s10010010010075mm L/436.8 kg (APCBC)740 m/s9891827263
3.18 kg (APCR)920 m/s1261088769-
4.65 kg (HEAT)450 m/s10010010010075mm L/46, L/486.8 kg (APCBC)792 m/s120104897664
3.18 kg (APCR)990 m/s1351159680-
4.65 kg (HEAT)450 m/s10010010010075mm L/706.8 kg (APCBC)925 m/s1381241119989
4.75 kg (APCR)1,120 m/s194174149127106
88mm L/5610.2 kg (APCBC) 773 m/s1201101009184
7.3 kg (APCR)930 m/s171156138123110
7.2 kg (HEAT)820 m/s16516516516588mm L/7110.4 kg (APCBC) 1,000 m/s203182167153139
7.3 kg (APCR)1,130 m/s237226192162136
105mm L/2815.7 kg (APCBC) 390 m/s6356524946
12.3 kg (HEAT)495 m/s70707070150mm L/1225.0 kg (HEAT)280 m/s160160160160-
Panzerfaust 1002.9 kg (HEAT)(Rocket
launcher)200----
Panzerschreck3.25 kg (HEAT)(Rocket
launcher)160---Tellermine-429.4 kg (HE)(Mine)100 (At 0 meters)-AT Hand Grenade3.0 kg (HEAT)(Grenade)150 (At 0 meters)-AT Rifle Grenade1.0 kg (HEAT)(Grenade)80 (AT rifle grenade)--
The PanzerKampfwagen IIF was the last of the PzKpfw I and PzKpfw II series of tanks to be produced in
quantity and used on the Western Front. By 1942, this vehicle was already obsolete, and was therefore used
only in a reconnaissance role. In the invasions of Poland, France, Norway, Yugoslavia, and Greece, the
PzKpfw II series had distinguished itself as the mainstay of German armored forces, however, it was realized
even in those early battles that its armament was too weak and its armor too thin to engage enemy medium
tanks. Only 524 PzKpfw IIF were produced (compared to 1,256 of all prior PzKpfw II variants), with
manufacture ending in late 1942. The chassis of the PzKpfw II was used for the Marder II tank destroyer,
and many of the chassis from older PzKpfw II were converted to this use.
The PanzerKampfwagen IIIH (which includes the upgunned models of the PzKpfw IIIG with 50mm L/42
gun) was the first German production tank with a 50mm gun. Although it was originally intended to mount
the 50mm L/60, the 50mm L/42 was used in the interim. This gun was far superior to the original 37mm
L/46.5. In 1941, when this version was first introduced, it had comparatively good armor as well as a good
gun. Although later versions increased its lethality, it proved to be too light to be a good medium tank, and
it was quickly outclassed by Soviet tanks on the Eastern Front. 908 of the PzKpfw III G and H series were
built by April 1941, when production ceased, compared to 601 vehicles of all previous PzKpfw III models
put together.
The Panzerkampfwagen IIIJ improved on the interim upgrade of the armor as provided on the PzKpfw III
H, and also incorporated several minor modifications to the hull and superstructure. Additional plates of
armor were also available to increase this armor as it later became outclassed by enemy guns. 1,549 of the
PzKpfw IIIJ model were produced with the 50mm L/42 gun, and a further 1,067 with the 50mm L/60 gun,
with earlier models being upgraded as quickly as possible. Production of this model was halted in mid-1942
in favor of the N-model with its short-barrelled 75mm gun.
The PanzerKampfwagen IIIN was the final vehicle of the PzKpfw III series, and was mechanically almost
identical to the PzKpfw IIIJ. The 50mm L/60 gun, which had become ineffective against more modern
medium tanks, was replaced by the 75mm L/24 gun, which was capable of firing both high-explosive shells,
in the infantry support role, and high-explosive antitank shells (HEAT) with greater armor penetrating
capability than the 50mm gun. Due to increased weight of the 75mm gun, additional mantlet armor was
not available, however, this was made up for in part by the addition of Schuerzen armor skirts. Only 663 of
this variant of the PzKpfw III were produced, and 37 converted from older models, before production ceased
in mid-1943.
The PanzerKampfwagen IVE was typical of the early models in this series, with 223 E-type and 640 of all
earlier types being manufactured before production was stopped in favor of the later variants of this series. It
shared a weakness of armor in common with its smaller brother, the PzKpfw III, and was outfitted from the
start with a short-barrelled 75mm L/24 gun. This gun was intended to be used against enemy infantry, not
tanks, and did not gain any real tank-fighting capability until the introduction of the high-explosive antitank
round. By this time, the PzKpfw IV series had been fitted with larger guns with the ability to fire armorpiercing rounds. Although the PzKpfw IVE was manufactured until early 1941, it was out of the inventory
by early 1944.
The PanzerKampfwagen IVE was replaced by the PzKpfw IVF series, of which the F1 was simply an E-type
with the addition of thicker armor and wider tracks. The PzKpfw IVF2 had not only these improvements, but
also a 75mm L/43 gun, enabling it to fight the better-armored Soviet and British tanks on equal, if not superior,
terms. 175 PzKpfw IVF2 were built, and 25 more converted from F1-types, before production was halted in
July, 1942, in favor of the PzKpfw IV G and H series vehicles.
The PanzerKampfwagen IVH differed from the PzKpfw IVG only in minor features, and late model PzKpfw
IVG tanks are nearly identical with early H-type models. 1,687 PzKpfw IVG and 3,774 PzKpfw IVH were
produced between Spring, 1942, and Summer, 1944. These tanks were superior in both armor protection and
firepower to the earlier models of this series as a result of an increased thickness of interlocked armor and the
installation of a more powerful 75mm L/48 gun. The PzKpfw IVH was replaced in service by the PzKpfw IVJ,
which was the culmination of the series.
The PanzerKampfwagen IVJ was manufactured right up until the end of the war and was the final version of
the PzKpfw IV series to be built. Most of the changes on this vehicle were intended to speed production,
however, armor thickness and close-range defenses were improved as well as the exhaust and fuel systems. 1,758
PzKpfw IVJ were built, bringing the total number of PzKpfw IV series tanks to 8,744, not including command
vehicles and other vehicles which used the PzKpfw IV chassis.
Although designated the PanzerKampfwagen VD, this was the first model of the famous Panther tank to be
manufactured (possibly taking its Ausführung designator from Daimler-Benz, its manufacturer). The Panther
was loosely based on the Soviet T-34 tank, with the addition of some newer German technologies and along
more traditional German lines. Mechanical performance was poor on this first model, but combat performance
was excellent, even against the newest Allied tanks. The effective 75mm L/70 gun and thick, steeply-sloped
armor combined with the wide tracks and powerful engine came to epitomize German tank production during
World War II. 850 of this type were produced between January and September 1943, when production was
stopped in favor of the PzKpfw VA.
The PanzerKampfwagen VA was simply a performance-improved model of the PzKpfw VD, with modifications
to the engine, transmission, and exhaust systems. A new machinegun mount for the hull MG and a new cupola
for the vehicle commander were also added. When production ceased in May, 1944, 2,000 PzKpfw VA had
been built. The vehicle was subsequently replaced by the PzKpfw VG.
The PanzerKampfwagen VG Panther was the peak of the Panther series and was produced right up until the
end of the war, with 3,126 being built altogether. Armor thickness was improved, shot traps eliminated, and
even a heater for the crew compartment was installed. The Panther was the peak of German armored vehicle
design, and influenced tank design around the world for several years.
The PanzerKampfwagen VIE was originally designed as a heavy breakthrough tank, for making a hole in enemy
lines for the lighter tanks and reserves to move through into the enemy rear areas. For nearly the entire war, it
was one of the most powerful tanks on the battlefield. Although slow, it had wide tracks for greater
maneuverability. Although its armor was not sloped, it had some of the thickest armor of any tank, with at
least 100mm on all frontal surfaces. Its gun, the famous 88mm L/56 was capable of knocking out any enemy
tank right up until the end of the war. Issued to special heavy tank battalions, this vehicle was so feared that
most Allied soldiers on the Western Front misidentified almost any German tank as a Tiger! A total of 1,354
Tiger tanks of both the early and late production model were built between the Summers of 1942 and 1944.
The late model of the PanzerKampfwagen VIE Tiger tank was distinguishable from the earlier models only by
improvements in the viewports and hatches, with performance being enhanced by the installation of a new
engine and a suspension system with steel wheels, and combat capabilities improved by the installation of the
Nahverteidigungswaffe close-defense system.
The PanzerKampfwagen VIB was the ultimate expression of the heavy tank to appear in the Second World War.
Although the Americans had a gun which was as powerful as its 88mm L/71, and the Soviets had tanks with
thicker armor, the quality and design of this vehicle left it with capabilities which outclassed any Allied tank of
its time. With a gun that could penetrate over 9” of armor at point-blank range, and over 7” of frontal turret
armor, its low speed was an insignificant problem for an army fighting mostly defensive battles. In all, 489
PzKpfw VIB were produced from early 1944 until the end of the war.
The Sturmgeshütze IIIG was the successor to a long line of assault guns based on the PzKpfw III chassis. The
first vehicles of the series were armed with the 75mm L/24 gun, and later versions armed with the 75mm L/43
or L/48 gun. 1,365 StuG III of earlier vehicles were produced, plus 7,720 of the StuG IIIG. The low silhouette
of the vehicle combined with its good ballistic shape and thick armor (80mm in front) gave it excellent
protection, while its powerful 75mm L/48 gun could deal with nearly any Allied tanks. It was cheaper and
easier to produce than regular tanks, its only drawback being the lack of a turret, which limited its usefulness
to open terrain and improved fighting positions.
The Sturmhaubitze 42 was designed to give the StuG units some integral artillery support. It had the same
chassis, size, and shape as the StuG III series vehicles, but was armed with a lower-velocity 105mm L/28
howitzer for use against infantry, light vehicles, and emplacements. Between late 1942 and early 1945, 1,211
StuH 42 were built.
The Sturmpanzer IV was built on the chassis of the PzKpfw IV tank. It was designed as a heavily armored
assault gun to supplement the armored forces in the artillery role, although its 150mm L/12 gun could
demolish a tank if it was lucky enough to hit it! Between the Springs of 1943 and 1945, 298 StuPz IV
were manufactured.
The PanzerJäger 38(t) Marder III was designed as an improvement on the earlier Marder II series vehicles,
which used the PzKpfw II chassis and a 75mm L/40 gun. The original Marder III vehicles mounted captured
Soviet 76.2mm L/51.5 guns, however, these were soon replaced with the newer German antitank guns. The
chassis for this vehicle was that of the Czech PanzerKampfwagen 38(t) tank, which had been adopted by the
German army in great numbers during the occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938, but was phased out of
service early in the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. 975 Marder III were manufactured or converted
between Spring 1943 and Spring 1944, when the vehicle was replaced in service by the Hetzer. 1,431 of earlier
versions, including Marder II and versions armed with captured guns, were built or converted during the
war as well.
The JagdPanzer III and IV were identical vehicles, their sole difference lying in the chassis upon which their
superstructure was built (PzKpfw III for the Hornisse, PzKpfw IV for the Nashorn). The lightly armored
superstructure housed one of the most powerful antitank guns of the entire war, the 88mm L/71 (the same gun
used on the King Tiger heavy tank). Although highly effective against enemy tanks, it was necessary to conceal
these vehicles carefully and screen them with infantry due to their large size and thin armor. 494 of both types
were manufactured between early 1943 and early 1945.
The Jagdpanzer 38(t) Hetzer was another vehicle built on the chassis of the outdated Czech PanzerKampfwagen
38(t), however, unlike the Marder III, this vehicle was small and low, with thicker armor, and a more powerful
gun. Its design was new, although based on that of an experimental Romanian tank destroyer, and so effective
that 2,584 were built in the last year of the war.
The JagdPanzer IV was built to replace the StuG III, StuG IV, and JgdPz IV series vehicles, although
production of all of these vehicles continued nearly to the end of the war. The JgdPz IV was typical of the later
German assault gun/tank destroyers in that it used a proven chassis and drive train (in this case that of the
PzKpfw IV tank) and had thick, well-sloped armor surrounding a powerful antitank gun. The 75mm L/70 gun
was similar to that used on the Panther series tanks, and was probably the best gun in its class of the war. 930
were produced between August 1944 and March 1945, supplementing the 1,139 StuG IV and 769 JgdPz IV
it was supposed to replace.
The JagdPanther was a large and extremely potent tank hunter, based on earlier designs which used PzKpw III
and IV series chassis, but using the heavier Panther chassis and mounting an 88mm L/71 gun (similar to that
used in the King Tiger heavy tank). The armor was reasonably thick, and steeply sloped, and an advanced
Nahverteidigungswaffe close-defense weapon was built-in. 392 JagdPanther were produced between early 1944
and the end of the war.
The Elefant (originally called the Ferdinand) was a heavy antitank gun mounted in a very heavily armored
cupola mounted on a Tiger chassis (with two Maybach engines). Only 90 vehicles were built in the Spring of
1943, however, these were so powerful that they lasted through use on both the Eastern Front and in Italy. Just
over half of these vehicles actually mounted the hull machinegun, with the rest (the original Ferdinands)
remaining defenseless against infantry attacks.
The Schutzenpanzerwagen SdKfz 250/1 was a later model of the SdKfz 50 halftrack, and the foundation of all
of the specialized SdKfz 250-series vehicles. Its main purpose was to carry a half-squad into combat, although
the many variants also had additional capabilities. 4,250 were produced from mid-1941 to late 1943, with an
additional 2,378 of a simplified version produced until the end of the war (this included all of the SPW 250
variants). Although the SPW 250/1 mounted a forward-firing MG34, the half-squad’s MG34 (if it had one)
could be placed in an AA mount on the rear of the vehicle. Unarmed versions of this vehicle were also used as
munitions carriers, command posts, and observation vehicles.
This model of the Schutzenpanzerwagen SdKfz 250/1 had the 75mm L/24 gun, which was mounted on the
early PzKpfw IV and late PzKpfw III series tanks. This gun was mounted to fire over the front of the vehicle,
and was used primarily to provide direct-fire artillery support to advancing infantry. Because of the size of the
gun and the requirement for ammunition storage, no infantry could be carried.
This variant of the Schutzenpanzerwagen SdKfz 250/1 had the turret of the SdKfz 222 (with a 20mm L/55
gun) mounted on an armor plate over the passenger compartment. Needless to say, this variant did not carry
any infantrymen. It was primarily used for reconnaissance by the Panzergrenadier units to whom it was issued.
This variant of the Schutzenpanzerwagen SdKfz 250/1 did not carry an infantry half-squad. Instead, it
mounted a 37mm L/45 antitank gun in a fixed position firing over the front of the vehicle. This vehicle was
normally issued to platoon leaders as an integral light antitank section for the platoon.
The Schutzenpanzerwagen SdKfz 251/1 was the basis for all of the specialized SdKfz 251-series vehicles, as well
as the first armored halftrack to be issued to special-purpose infantry units. Its main purpose was to carry an
infantry squad into combat, although there were many variants with additional capabilities. 15,252 of all
Ausfuhrung (A, B, C, and D) were produced from mid-1939 to early 1945, including all of the SPW 251
variants. Other versions of this vehicle which were also used included munitions carriers, searchlight vehicles,
command posts, night-fighting vehicles, rocket launchers, and observation vehicles.
Options: None.
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SPW 251/1 sMG
Type:HalftrackMaximum Vertical:0.3 meters
Availability:Jun 40 – May 45Top Speed:65 KPH (53 off-road)
Playability:AI onlyRedline:
Main Armament:NoneArmor:
Depression/Elevation:-Hull Front:14.5mm
Secondary Armament:Hull MG, AA MG,Hull Sides:8mm
The Schutzenpanzerwagen 251/9 Stummel is similar to the SPW 250/8 in that it carries a 75mm L/24 gun
mounted in a fixed position to fire over the front of the vehicle. Although it could not carry an infantry squad,
it provided much needed direct-fire artillery support to the Panzergrenadier units.
The Schutzenpanzerwagen 251/10 was similar to the SPW 250/10 in that it carried the 37mm L/45 gun in a
fixed mounting designed to fire over the front of the vehicle. It was normally used by the platoon leader as his
command vehicle, and could also carry a half-squad of infantry.
The Panzerspähwagen 222 was designed in the 1930s as the fast reconnaissance vehicle of the Wehrmacht
armored forces. 989 were manufactured between 1936 and 1943, when production was halted in favor of the
larger and more heavily armed and armored eight-wheeled armored cars. One of the features of this vehicle
(which also, unfortunately, required the turret top to be left open) was the ability of the 20mm gun to engage
aircraft. Metal screens were mounted on the turret roof, which split when the gun raised, to keep out
thrown grenades.
The Panzerspähwagen 232 eight-wheeled armored car was manufactured from 1936 to 1943, with 607 being
produced. It was replaced, like all of the armored cars built up to that point, by the PSW 234 series of eightwheeled armored cars. Although it had the same armament as the PSW 222, this was mounted in a fullyarmored turret rather than an open-topped cupola, and suffered a corresponding loss in ability to fire at aircraft.
One of the interesting features of this vehicle was the inclusion of a complete set of controls in the rear, enabling
it to be driven backwards. Later models also had additional armor plates added to increase the frontal armor
to 30mm on the superstructure, hull, and turret.
The Panzerspähwagen 233 eight-wheeled armored car was a modified version of the PSW 232 with the turret
removed and a 75mm L/24 gun mounted in a fixed position which enabled it to fire over the front of the
vehicle. 109 of these vehicles were built and 10 more converted from PSW 232 between late 1942 and late
1943. This vehicle provided some direct-fire artillery support to the reconnaissance units of the Wehrmacht,
being issued to the reconnaissance battalions in platoons of six vehicles each.
The Panzerspähwagen 234/1 eight-wheeled armored car replaced the previous PSW 222 and PSW 232 in
service as the Wehrmacht’s primary reconnaissance vehicle. 200 were built between mid-1944 and early 1945,
and these were issued to reconnaisance battalions. This vehicle mounted a turret similar to that of the PSW
222 and SPW 250/9. Like the PSW 232, this vehicle could be driven in reverse (6 gears).
The Panzerspähwagen 234/2 Puma eight-wheeled armored car used the same hull and chassis as the PSW
234/1, however, it carried a full turret with the 50mm L/60 gun made famous on the mid-production PzKpfw
III series tanks and slightly heavier armor than most other armored cars, including a Saukopfblende mantlet.
101 Puma were produced between Fall 1943 and Fall 1944. Due to the outclassing of the 50mm gun by enemy
armor, the Puma was replaced by the PSW 234/4. Companies of 25 Puma were attached to four Panzer
divisions as heavy reconnaissance units.
The Sonderkraftfahrzeug 7/1 was a self-propelled antiaircraft gun mounted on the heavy SdKfz 7 8-ton
halftrack. This vehicle carried four 20mm L/112.6 guns on an open, rotating platform. Although capable of
depressing enough to hit ground targets, the lack of any decent armor on the vehicle made this a dangerous
proposition. 319 were built between 1943 and 1944.
The Opel Blitz was one of many similar light trucks used by the Wehrmacht to transport personnel and supplies
(up to 3 tons) in all theaters of the war. Unfortunately, it was hampered by poor traction and low power, and
often failed entirely off-road, especially in muddy weather. During the war, 429,000 light trucks of all types
were manufactured for the Wehrmacht, including about 95,000 Opel Blitz in both two- and four-wheel
drive models.
The Sonderkraftfahrzeug 7 was a heavy halftrack capable of carrying eight tons. It was used as the prime mover
for several artillery weapons, most notably the 88mm FlaK 18. It was also used as the basis for the SdKfz 7/1
self-propelled antiaircraft gun. It was somewhat slow and lacked any armor until 1943, when the cab was given
8mm of armor. A total of 10,257 8-ton SdKfz 7 were built during and before the Second World War.
The early Heer infantry squad consisted of two half-squads, normally a regular infantry half-squad and a
machinegun team. The soldiers were armed primarily with the Mauser Kar98k bolt-action rifle, a 7.92mm rifle
with a 5-round internal magazine fed through the top by stripper clips. The squad leader usually carried an
MP-40 9mm submachinegun and spare 32-round magazines. All of the soldiers carried the Stielhandgranate
24, the infamous “potato masher” hand grenade.
The late Heer infantry squad consisted of two half-squads, normally a regular infantry half-squad and a
machinegun team or antitank team (either Panzerfaust or Panzerschreck). The soldiers were armed primarily
with the Mauser Kar43 semiautomatic rifle, a 7.92mm rifle with a 10-round detachable magazine. The squad
leader usually carried an MP-40 9mm submachinegun and spare 32-round magazines. All of the soldiers
carried the Stielhandgranate 24 stick-type or Eihandgranate egg-type hand grenades.
The Fallschirmjäger infantry squad consisted of two half-squads, normally a regular infantry half-squad and a
machinegun team or antitank team (either Panzerfaust or Panzerschreck). The soldiers were armed primarily
with the Rheinmetall FG 42 automatic rifle, a 7.92mm rifle with a 20-round detachable magazine, and a builtin bayonet and bipod. The squad leader usually carried an MP-40 9mm submachinegun and spare 32-round
magazines or an FG 42 of his own. All of the soldiers carried the Eihandgranate egg-type hand grenade as well.
The assault infantry squad consisted of two half-squads, normally a regular infantry half-squad and a
machinegun team or antitank team (either Panzerfaust or Panzerschreck). The soldiers were armed primarily
with the Sturmgewehr 44 assault rifle, a 7.92mm rifle with a 30-round detachable magazine. The squad leader
usually carried an MP-40 9mm submachinegun and spare 32-round magazines or a StG 44 of his own. All of
the soldiers carried the Stielhandgranate 24 stick-type or Eihandgranate egg-type hand grenades.
Options: None.
Machinegun Team
Type:Infantry HSWeaponry:MP40
Availability:Sep 39 – May 45Secondary Weaponry:MG34, Hand grenades
Playability:AI onlyAmmunition:1200 (SMG), 2000 (MG)
Target Size:Very smallSmoke:Yes
The Heer machinegun team consisted of a half-squad, normally attached to a regular infantry half-squad or to
another machinegun team or antitank team (either Panzerfaust or Panzerschreck). The soldiers were armed
primarily with the Mauser Kar98k bolt-action rifle, a 7.92mm rifle with a 5-round internal magazine. One
team member carried the squad’s MG 34 or MG 42 general-purpose machinegun. This 7.92mm automatic
weapon was belt-fed and capable of firing 900-1200 rounds per minute. Either weapon could be carried ready
with a 50- or 75-round drum, used immediately in the belt-fed role from the bipod, or quickly setup onto a
tripod mount, which was carried by the machinegunner’s assistant. In addition to their small arms, the soldiers
carried the Stielhandgranate 24 stick-type or Eihandgranate egg-type hand grenades.
Options: None.
Panzerfaust Team
Type:Infantry HSWeaponry:Panzerfaust
Availability:Oct 44 – May 45Secondary Weaponry:Kar98k, Hand grenades
Playability:AI onlyAmmunition:600 (Rifle), 10 (PzF)
Target Size:Very smallSmoke:Yes
The Heer Panzerfaust team consisted of a half-squad, normally supplementing a regular infantry, antitank, or
machinegun half-squad to form a full squad. The soldiers were armed primarily with the Mauser Kar98k boltaction rifle, a 7.92mm rifle with a 5-round internal magazine. All of the soldiers carried the Sprengbüchse 24
seven-head stick-type antitank hand grenade or the Gewehrpanzergranate 46 antitank rifle grenade, as well as
the Panzerfaust 100 disposable antitank rocket launcher. This weapon was capable of destroying any enemy
tank (its 150mm shaped-charge warhead could penetrate up to 200mm of armor) and had a range of almost
100 meters. Earlier versions had less range and lower penetration. A special fragmenting sleeve was also
available for the warhead which increased its lethality against troops.
Options: None.
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Panzerschreck Team
Type:Infantry HSWeaponry:Panzerschreck
Availability:Oct 43 – May 45Secondary Weaponry:Kar98k, Hand grenades
Playability:AI onlyAmmunition:600 (Rifle), 10 (PzS)
Target Size:Very smallSmoke:Yes
The Heer Panzerschreck team consisted of a half-squad, normally supplementing a regular infantry, antitank,
or machinegun half-squad to form a full squad. The soldiers were armed primarily with the Mauser Kar98k
bolt-action rifle, a 7.92mm rifle with a 5-round internal magazine. All of the soldiers carried Sprengbüchse 24
seven-head stick-type antitank hand grenade or the Gewehrpanzergranate 46 antitank rifle grenade, and one
carried the 88mm Panzerschreck (Raketenpanzerbüchse 54) antitank rocket launcher. This weapon was capable
of destroying most enemy tanks (its shaped-charge warhead could penetrate up to 160mm of armor) and had
a range of about 150 meters. Unlike the Panzerfaust, the Panzerschreck was reloadable. It was also more
accurate, and very much an improvement over the 2.36” (60mm) Bazooka from which it was developed.
The sniper team was an infantry half-squad armed with specially configured Mauser Kar98k bolt-action rifles
(later in the war, Mauser Kar43 semiautomatic rifles were used, and the Fallschirmjäger used modified FG 42
rifles). The sniper’s rifle was modified by the inclusion of a telescopic sight, and his rifle was handpicked at the
factory for exceptional accuracy. This enabled him to select individual targets (such as exposed armored vehicle
commanders) at ranges up to 600 meters. The sniper’s assistants usually carried an MP-40 9mm
submachinegun and spare 32-round magazines for security. All of the soldiers carried the Stielhandgranate 24
stick-type or Eihandgranate egg-type hand grenades.
The Panzerabwehrkanone 35/36 37mm L/45 was developed in the early 1930’s by Rheinmetall and was first
field tested in the Spanish Civil War in 1936. It normally had a crew of two or three men. It was bought or
copied by many nations, including the United States. By the time Germany invaded the Soviet Union in mid1941, this gun had been outclassed by developments in armor, and earned the nickname “Hitler’s
Doorknocker.” The special ammunition developed for this gun and the 50mm PaK 38, called the Stielgranate
41, consisted of a large shaped-charge warhead attached to a rod with fins on external bars. This was slipped
over the barrel of the PaK 35/36 and fired by a powder cartridge. Although it was capable of excellent
penetration, its short range and poor accuracy limited its usefulness.
The Panzerabwehrkanone 38 50mm L/60 was designed to replace the 37mm PaK 35/36. It had a crew of four
or five men, and was capable of fighting enemy tanks when first introduced, but was quickly outclassed. It had
a muzzle brake (which necessitated a redesign of the Stielgranate 41 round) and a semi-automatic breech. Like
the PaK 35/36, this weapon could be towed by a horsecart or light truck, and manhandled in action by
the crew.
The Panzerabwehrkanone 40 75mm L/46 was designed in anticipation of the next generation of tanks which
German designers thought would appear on the battlefield. This model was essentially an enlarged PaK 38,
and became the standard German antitank gun for the rest of the war. Because of its weight, a truck or tractor
was required for towing, and a crew of five or six soldiers was needed for effective operations. This weapon,
like most German antitank weapons, was provided with both AP and APCR ammunition, as well as a high
explosive round for defense against infantry. A shaped charge round, the G 39 H1, was also issued, gaining
importance once supplies of the tungsten needed for the APCR round were lost.
The Panzerabwehrkanone 43 88mm L/71 grew out of a need for a heavy antitank gun and the impressive
reputation of the 88mm L/56 guns. Like the FlaK 18, this gun was mounted on a wheeled carriage and towed
into combat by a heavy truck or halftrack, and used a four-legged mount to enable rapid turning and stability.
The crew was generally less than half the size of that of the FlaK 18, and the extra cargo capacity was often
taken up by spare ammunition. The breech was semiautomatic in design, and the barrel was longer to increase
the accuracy and velocity of the shell. Although large and heavy, it was not as cumbersome as the FlaK 18, and
so much more deadly to tanks that it was chosen for mounting in the Jagdpanther and the King Tiger.
Options: None.
Page 84
6. THE U.S. ARMY
85
American units, especially early in the war, could not match German units in troop and equipment quality or
tactics. These differences became balanced as American forces gained more experience, and German forces were
forced to use more new recruits while deploying their best troops on the Eastern Front. By the end of the war,
American troops had a better level of experience in general, and a great deal more equipment. American
infantry equipment and light vehicles were generally superior to their German equivalents, with some notable
exceptions among machineguns and small arms, and American equipment was also more readily available.
American tanks and other armored fighting vehicles lagged qualitatively behind their German counterparts
until nearly the end of the war, with the American vehicles suffering not only with less powerful guns and
thinner armor, but inferior manoeuvrability as well. The late introduction of more powerful vehicles, combined
with the tremendous numerical output of US military vehicle production, redressed these deficiencies by the
end of the war, albeit at a great cost in crews.
At the beginning of the Second World War, the American army was the smallest of any of the major powers on
both sides. It expanded over 4500% over the course of the war, finally becoming the second-largest force at the
end of World War II. American tactical doctrine was still influenced initially by the lessons of the First World
War, however, the late introduction of US forces into the war allowed for some time to introduce both new
training techniques, tactics, and equipment. At the lower levels, leadership training was generally neglected
throughout the war, leading to a weakness in junior officers, which lasted far beyond the end of World War II.
The rapid rate of promotions due to the expansion of the force led to poor leadership and doctrine at all levels
until mid-war.
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The following tables of organization and equipment are fairly accurate for U.S. forces throughout the later part
of the Second World War. Due to an excellent logistical system of replacements, parts and reinforcements, the
industrial might of US industry provided materials in a timely manner and helped keep the deployed units at
operational strength.
•The American Tank Battalion was made up of one company of light tanks, organized into three five-tank
platoons and a headquarters section of two tanks, and three companies of medium tanks, each organized
into three five-tank platoons with a headquarters section of two tanks. The battalion headquarters
company included two medium and three support tanks, as well as numerous jeeps, trucks, and halftracks,
and could be supplemented by a reconnaissance platoon of six armored cars.
•The American Tank Destroyer Battalion was made up of one reconnaissance company, organized into
three platoons of two armored cars (one of which may be replaced by a platoon of light tanks) and several
jeeps and a headquarters section of two halftracks and two jeeps. There were three tank destroyer
companies, each organized into three platoons of four tank destroyers and two armored cars, with a
headquarters section of two halftracks and two jeeps. The battalion headquarters platoon included two
halftracks or armored cars and one jeep.
•The American Mechanized Infantry Battalion was made up of three mechanized infantry companies,
organized into three platoons of four halftracks (each carrying a squad of twelve men), a weapons platoon
with four halftracks mounting 60mm mortars and machineguns, a headquarters section with two
halftracks, two jeeps and several bazooka teams. This was supported by an antitank battery with one jeep
and three halftracks towing three antitank guns, a headquarters platoon, and a combat support company
with a heavy machinegun platoon, an 81mm mortar platoon, a reconnaissance platoon with four armored
cars and a battery of three self-propelled howitzers.
•The American Infantry Battalion was made up of three infantry companies, organized into three platoons
of three squads of twelve men and a platoon headquarters jeep each, a headquarters section with two jeeps,
and a weapons platoon with a machinegun section, a mortar section, and a platoon headquarters jeep.
These units were further supported by an antitank battery made up of three or four towed antitank guns,
trucks or halftracks, a combat support company with an 81mm mortar battery, a machinegun platoon, a
heavy machinegun section, a bazooka section, and a headquarters platoon with two jeeps, and a
headquarters platoon (for the battalion) with three or four jeeps and several bazooka teams.
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AMERICAN TACTICS
American infantry tactics were of two major types. The
first was that of divided sections of each squad
providing covering fire for each other as they moved
from one piece of cover to another. By always posting
the BAR gunner with the supporting squad, it was
hoped that his firepower, combined with the
semiautomatic rifles (either M1 Garands or M1
carbines) of the rest of the squad would enable the
manoeuvring squad to move forward to a better
position. Although this technique was taught in
training, it was often replaced in combat by a technique
known as “marching fire,” in which all personnel
advanced and fired on the move, usually in the form of
a skirmish line rather than by squads. This proved to
be a superior tactic in open terrain or when advancing
down a slope. It required the close support of heavy
weapons to be a success.
Combined arms tactics were emphasised, including the
close co-ordination of artillery, infantry, and armor.
Artillery was to be used to neutralise enemy artillery,
including antitank guns, as well as their forward
observers and observation posts. The infantry were to
lead when an attack was going up against antitank
guns, crossing rivers, or in thick terrain and towns.
Tanks led in open terrain, and the need to fire into
every piece of cover that could be used to hide enemy
vehicles or antitank guns when in hostile terrain was
noted. Machineguns could often be used to drive
hidden enemy infantry or gun crews from their
positions. Smoke shells were often used to blind enemy
tanks so that American forces could manoeuvre around
to get a better shot, while avoiding the more powerful
German guns. Finally, the need for aggression by
armored forces was often accentuated by planners, who
often told tankers not to stop except to shoot, and to
move around stalled friendly units in order to attack
the flanks and rear of the enemy who was holding
them back.
Fighting Principles
(General George S. Patton, Jr., 1944)
COMMAND
Leadership.
(1) Full Duty. Each, in his appropriate sphere, will
lead in person. Any commander who fails to obtain
his objective, and who is not dead or severely
wounded, has not done his full duty.
(2) Visits to the front. The Commanding General or
his Chief of Staff (never both at once) and one
member of the general staff sections, the signal,
medical, ordnance, engineer and quartermaster
sections should visit the front daily. . . . The function
of these staff officers is to observe, not to meddle . . .
your primary mission as a leader is to see with your
own eyes and to be seen by the troops.
Execution.In carrying out a mission, the
promulgation of the order represents not over 10% of
your responsibility. The remaining 90% consists of
assuring, by means of personal supervision on the
ground, by yourself and your staff, proper and
vigorous execution.
Rest Periods.Staff personnel, commissioned and
enlisted, who do not rest, do not last. . . . When the
need arises, everyone must work all the time, but these
emergencies are not frequent; unfatigued men last
longer and work better under high pressure.
Location of command posts. The farther forward the
CPs are located the less time is wasted in driving to
and from the front. . . .
COMBAT PROCEDURE.
Maps. We are too prone to believe that we acquire
merit solely through the study of maps in the safe
seclusion of a Command Post. . . .
Plans. Plans must be simple and flexible. . . They
should be made by the people who are going to
execute them. . . .
Reconnaissance. You can never have too much
reconnaissance. Use every means available before,
during and after battle. Reports must be facts, not
opinions; negative as well as positive. . . . information
is like eggs: the fresher the better.
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AMERICAN ARTILLERY
The US Army used many different types of artillery, several of which are available to the American player as
“on-call” indirect fire, using high explosive or smoke ammunition. The following types of artillery barrages may
be available, depending on the scenario:
81mm Mortar: The US M1 81mm mortar was essentially a copy of the German mortar of the same caliber.
It was also used much the same way, being allocated to support companies and battalions. This weapon could
fire its 3.1 kg shell out to about 3,000 meters. The battalion mortar battery normally included three sections
with two mortars each.
107mm Mortar: This mortar was originally designed to fire smoke and chemical rounds, but was quickly
adapted to fire high explosive ammunition as well. It could launch its 12.3 kg shell out to 5,500 meters. The
heavy mortar battery usually consisted of four 107mm mortars.
75mm Field Gun/Howitzer: This heading includes several weapons, such as the M1916, M1917, and M2A2
field guns and the M1 and M1A1 howitzers, the majority of which also served in World War I. The field guns
fired a 6.1 to 6.8 kg high explosive round out to 12,000 to 14,000 meters. The howitzers projected their 6.8
kg shell out to 9,000 meters. The howitzers were the very lightest models, designed for transportation by horse
and cart and use in the mountains, where their crews often manhandled guns into position. All of these guns
were organised into batteries of three sections of three guns each.
105mm Howitzer: The 105mm howitzers used by the American forces in World War II were generally
designed shortly before the war and put into production only in 1939, and were therefore more modern than
their smaller 75mm cousins. This includes the M2A1 howitzer as well as the M3 howitzer, which was designed
as a lightweight gun for airborne units but was also adopted by the regular infantry in North Africa due to a
shortage of guns. Both of these weapons fired a 15 kg shell, the M2A1 projecting it out to over 11,000 meters,
while the M3 fired it out to 7,500 meters. These guns were normally organised into batteries of three sections
of three or four guns each, or one section of six guns (for self-propelled guns and regimental artillery).
155mm Howitzer/Field Gun: The mainstay of the US heavy artillery was the 155mm howitzer M1 and the
Gun M1. The howitzer M1 fired a 43.1 kg high explosive shell out to 15,000 meters. This weapon had a
reputation for excellent accuracy, due in part to the innovative fire control techniques pioneered by American
forces during the Second World War. The Gun M1 fired the same 43.1 kg shell out to a maximum range of
23,200 meters. Both utilised separate-loading ammunition. These guns were generally organised into batteries
of three sections of two guns each.
207mm Howitzer/Field Gun: This heading represents both the 8-inch howitzer M1 and the less common 8inch Gun M1. Both were designed shortly after World War I, and both were pressed into service during World
War II, although the Gun M1 did not see action until nearly the end of the war. The howitzer M1 fired a 90.7
kg high explosive shell out to 17,000 meters. The Gun M1 projected its 108.8 kg shell out to 32,500 meters.
They were usually organised into batteries of three sections of two guns each.
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89
5” Naval Gun: The 5” naval gun
was normally mounted as primary
armament on destroyers and as
secondary armament on larger
ships such as cruisers. They were
usually mounted singly in turrets,
although occasionally two were
mounted together. A destroyer
might have four or five, while a
capital ship generally had up to
twenty such turrets, with the larger
vessels also mounting larger guns
as well.
12” Naval Gun: The 12” naval
gun was normally mounted as
primary armament on heavy
cruisers and pocket battleships.
Depending on the model, it could
fire a 442.5 to 485 kg high
explosive shell out to 12,000 to
17,000 yards. These guns were
ordinarily mounted two to three
per turret, with three to four
turrets on one ship.
16” Naval Gun: These were the
heaviest naval guns and were only
mounted on the heaviest
battleships used by the American
forces during the Second World
War. Depending on the model of
gun mounted, this weapon could
fire a 1,016 to 1,089 kg shell out to
a maximum range of 25,000 to
45,000 meters. The 16” gun was
mounted in a turret that held three
guns. Normally, three such turrets
were carried, in addition to any
secondary armament. Barrages
from these guns during the
Normandy campaign literally
flipped over Tiger VIE tanks or
buried them in so many tons of
dirt that they had to be dug out.
American Field Order
[The field order is used by the commander to organize his mission
planning and is accompanied by maps as needed]
FIELD ORDER
1. Information: Include appropriate information covering:
a. Enemy: Composition, disposition, location,
movements,strength, identification, capabilities.
Refer to intelligence summary of report when issued.
b. Friendly forces: Missions or operations, and location
of next higher and adjacent units, same for covering
forces or elements of the command in contact, support to be
provided by other forces.
2. Decision or Mission: Decision or mission, details of the plan
applicable to the command as a whole and necessary
for coordination.
TROOPS
3. Tactical Missions for Subordinate Units: Specific tasks assigned
to each element of the command charged with execution of tactical
duties, which are not matters of routine or covered by standard
operating procedure. A separate lettered subparagraph for each
element to which instructions are given. Instructions applicable to
two or more units or elements or to the entire command, which
are necessary for coordination but do not properly belong in
another subparagraph.
4. Administrative Matters: Instruction to tactical units concerning
supply, evacuation, and traffic details which are required for the
operation (unless covered by standard operating or administrative
orders; in the latter case, reference will be made to the
administrative order).
5. Signal Communication
a. Orders for employment of means of signal
communication not covered in standard operating procedure.
Refer to signal annex or signal operation instructions, if issued.
b. Command posts and axes of signal communication:
Initial locations for units and next subordinate units, time of
opening, tentative and subsequent locations
when appropriate. Other places to which messages may be sent.
Page 89
90
AMERICAN UNIT OPTIONS
The following options may be available to some American armor units:
• Additional superstructure armor: This was a 30mm plate welded to the sides of the superstructure to
cover weak spots. This plate was often used as a target by German tank and antitank gunners due to
its position.
• Additional turret armor: This was a 30mm plate welded to the outside of the turret to cover weak spots.
This plate was often used as a target by German tank and antitank gunners due to its position.
• Hedgehog plow: This plow was attached to the underside of the hull on the front of the tank, enabling
it to plow through thick brush and hedgerows without exposing its belly to enemy fire.
• Antiaircraft machinegun: A Browning .30 caliber machinegun on a central pintle mount is optional.
• Radio: Some early vehicles did not include a two-way radio (although they did have a receiver set). This
option allows the vehicle to have a two-way radio.
• Turret umbrella: This “field improvised” modification consisted of mounting a large cafe-style umbrella
over the open turret, which provided some protection from the elements as well as allowing hand grenades
to roll off, however, it was very large and consequently difficult to hide.
• Wet ammo stowage: This was designed in response to complaints that Sherman tanks would often catch
on fire when struck, and was simply a storage system for main gun ammunition which was filled with a
mixture of water, antifreeze, and a rust inhibitor.
Page 90
91
AMERICAN ARMAMENTS
The following charts give the nomenclature for the American ammunition, penetration, in millimeters, of nonface-hardened (homogeneous) armor plate at the ranges shown for the weapons mounted on American vehicles
and those provided as antitank weapons. In addition to these types of ammunition, high explosive and smoke
ammunition was also provided for many weapons. Hand-held antitank weapon capabilities are given
for comparison.
American Ammunition Designations
NameAbbreviationType of Ammunition
.30-06 Ball.30 MGMachinegun ammunition [For Browning M1919 machinegun]
.50 M2.50 HMGHeavy machinegun ammunition [For Browning M2HB machinegun]
APAPArmor Piercing (AP)
APCBCAPCBCArmor Piercing Capped, Ballistic Cap (APCBC)
APCRAPCRArmor Piercing Composite Rigid (APCR)
HEHEHigh Explosive (HE)
HEATHEATHigh Explosive Antitank (HEAT)
M1 HEM1 HEHigh Explosive (HE) [For the 105mm L/22 gun]
M42A1 HEM42A1 HEHigh Explosive (HE) [For the 76mm guns]
M48 HEM48 HEHigh Explosive (HE) [For the 75mm L/28 and L/37 guns]
M51 APM51 APArmor Piercing Capped, Ballistic Cap (APCBC) [For the 37mm guns]
M61 APM61 APArmor Piercing Capped, Ballistic Cap (APCBC) [For the 75mm L/37 gun]
M62 APM62 APArmor Piercing Capped, Ballistic Cap (APCBC) [For the 76mm guns]
M63 APM63 APArmor Piercing (AP) [For the 37mm guns]
M67 HEATM67 HEATHigh Explosive Antitank (HEAT) [For the 105mm L/22 gun]
M72 APM72 APArmor Piercing (AP) [For the 75mm L/28 and L/37 guns]
M74 HEM74 HEHigh Explosive (HE) [For the 37mm guns]
M79 APM79 APArmor Piercing (AP) [For the 76mm guns]
M89 WPM89 WPSmoke [For the 75mm L/37 gun]
M93 HVAPM93 HVAPArmor Piercing Composite Rigid (APCR) [For the 76mm guns]
SmokeSmokeSmoke
Turret Sides:38mm
Maximum Slope:25°Turret Rear:20mm
Maximum Vertical:0.61 metersTurret Top:10mm
The M3A1 light tank (called the “Stuart” by the British, whose habit of naming American tanks after American
generals was eventually adopted by the US Army as official policy) was an improvement on the earlier M2
series, and was officially adopted in 1941. By 1942, this vehicle was already obsolete, 5,811 M3A1 having been
manufactured before production was halted in the Summer of 1942 in favor of the M3A3 model. Although
the commander also acted as the loader in this tank, due to the two-man turret configuration, the light weight
of the 37mm shells made this a relatively easy chore. Early models of this vehicle mounted five machineguns,
the additional two being mounted in the front corners and controlled by the driver. This tank was widely used
in the deserts of North Africa, and could also be found in some numbers in every theater of the war. Despite
its relatively weak gun and thin armor, the total production of all variants of the M3 series totaled 13,859 tanks,
although the vehicle was often consigned to reconnaissance and rear-echelon units after the introduction of the
M5 light tank.
The M5A1 light tank was designed as the successor to the M3 series of light tanks in 1942, and actually
mounted the same turret as the M3A3 version. The armor thickness was increased on this vehicle, and the hull
and engine were modified to boost performance as well. Fuel capacity was increased, and the frontal armor
angle was increased to provide better protection. 8,884 M5 series tanks were manufactured, including 6,810
M5A1, before manufacture ceased in October, 1944. This vehicle was used until the end of the war, although
it was superceded by the M24 Chaffee light tank in late 1944. The chassis of the M5 also provided the basis
for the M8 GMC.
Options: Hedgehog plow.
2
Turret Sides:38mm
Page 94
95
M3 Lee
Type:TankTop Speed:40 KPH (30 off-road)
Availability:Nov 42 – May 45Redline:2400 RPM (1800 average)
Playability:AI onlyArmor:
Main Armament:M2 75mm L/28,Hull Front:51mm
Late in 1941 the US tank designers, realizing that the current M2 and M2A1 medium tanks were outclassed
by recently developed German tanks, decided to devise a new series of medium tanks for the American forces.
It was to have a 75mm gun housed in a central turret, and the concept led to the production of the M4
Sherman series. In the interim, they decided to make the M3 medium tank. This was an upgrade of the M2
with thicker armor and a 75mm M2 gun mounted in the right side of the hull in a sponson. It retained the
37mm gun of the M2 in a turret atop the main superstructure, along with a secondary turret for the
commander above the primary (with a .30 MG). The two bow MGs were mounted and linked together and
fixed to fire forward, under the control of the driver. 6,258 M3 were built, along with 1,334 M3A1 to M3A5.
The remaining vehicles were declared obsolete in March, 1944, and were quickly removed from service, to be
replaced by the M4 Sherman.
This was the first version of the famous Sherman tank to enter production, and all other models of the Sherman
were variations on its basic design. Oddly though, it was not the first model to reach the troops (the M4A1
holds that distinction). The Sherman was America’s answer to the German PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV series
tanks, and it matched the earlier models of these tanks in performance and protection, while exceeding them
in firepower. Unfortunately, by the time the Sherman began to be used in large numbers, the later models of
these tanks, as well as the newer PzKpfw V Panther and several versions of assault guns, were in German service,
which were superior to the Sherman in every respect. This led to several upgraded versions of the Sherman,
some with improvised armor plates welded to the hull, and finally a more powerful 76mm gun. This version
of the Sherman could be identified easily by the hull nose, which was a three-piece bolted assembly. It had a
Continental R975-EC2 engine (originally designed by Wright), and a total of 674 were built before production
ceased in favor of later models. The first tanks had only a receiving radio (that is, they could not send any
messages) and mounted twin fixed .30 machineguns in the hull under the driver’s control, however, few tanks
in this configuration actually saw combat. Because of weak spots in the armor, a common field modification
consisted of welded steel plates over these thinner areas, in particular over ammunition storage areas. In total,
49,234 Sherman tanks of all types and models were built during the Second World War, making it the most
common tank among the Western Allies.
The M4A1 was the first Sherman model to actually be issued, and varied from the basic Sherman in several
minor features. The hull and superstructure on this variant were cast, rather than welded, and the suspension
and track system was identical to the M3 Lee tank, rather than being of the Sherman type. Early production
versions of this tank also mounted the twin .30 machineguns for the driver, had no radio, and carried the M2
75mm gun instead of the later (and better) M3 model. Few of these models saw action, and most were
upgraded to the M4A1 standard before they were sent to combat units. Altogether, 6,281 of the Sherman
M4A1 model were built.
This model of the Sherman was identical to the later models of the M4 Sherman standard model with the
welded hull and superstructure (that is, with two-way radio and no driver machineguns), except that the engine
was replaced by two GM 6-71 diesel engines. 8,053 of this model were built before production was stopped
in favor of later models.
This variant of the basic M4A3 Sherman was designed as an assault tank, and was issued as an intermediate
design while production began on the M26 Pershing heavy tank. It mounted the standard 75mm M3 gun in
a specially-designed heavy turret and had additional armor welded to the hull. Permanent grousers, known as
“duckbills,” were attached to the ends of the track links to improve cross-country performance. Only 254 of
these tanks were built in the Summer of 1944, however, they proved to be very effective in battle. Armored
sideskirts were developed for this vehicle to provide additional protection to the tracks and suspension but were
never issued due to similarities to the German Schuerzen armored skirts.
This model of the M4A3 was the first to introduce wet ammo stowage, and it proved so successful that it was
standardized on the Shermans which mounted the 76mm gun M1. 100 rounds of ammunition were carried
in the floor of the tank (instead of the vulnerable side compartments used previously) in special containers
which held the ammo in a solution of Ammudamp rust preventive compound, ethylene glycol antifreeze, and
water. Four rounds were carried in the turret “ready rack.” This also necessitated the removal of part of the
turret basket to allow access to the flooring. Later models removed the turret basket entirely. 3,071
M4A3(75)W were manufactured.
2
Turret Sides:51mm
Options: Hedgehog plow, Wet ammo stowage.
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