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Microsoft® Combat Flight Simulator 3.0
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
UNDERSTANDING THE TACTICAL AIR WAR
handbook
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Subject: CONTENTS
Contents
Welcome to the
Tactical Air War! ... 1
Events and People in
the Tactical Air
War ................. 7
Key Players in the
Tactical Air War:
The CFS3 Hall of
Fame ............... 21
Acknowledgements...... 30
REMEMBER: OUR MEN AND MACHINES
ON THE GROUND LOOK A LOT LIKE
THEIRS.
RAIL CARS AFTER A POUNDING BY
ALLIED FIGHTER BOMBERS.
National Archives and Records Administration Photo
A B-26 MARAUDER FLIES OVER THE
NORMANDY INVASION FLEET.
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
Recommended Reading... 32
Glossary.............. 36
* * *
Authorized licensees of this game
may print (or have printed at their
expense) a single copy of this
manual for their personal home use
in conjunction with the play and
use of the game on this CD.
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Subject: TACTICAL AIR WAR
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Welcome to the Tactical Air War!
“Schlachtfliegerei”
Schlacht means slaugh-
ter. Schlachtfliegerei
means ground attack, the
most dangerous and least
glamorous part of wartime
flying. There is no room
here for romantic illusion,
no pretense of chivalry;
one is down on the deck
where the targets (people,
vehicles, installations,
and fortifications) may be
clearly seen. The ground
attack pilot is exposed to
every bit of flak, every
machine gun, every rifle,
every pistol. Denied him
is the acclaim accorded
fighter pilots. The chances
of winning fame as a
Schlachtflieger are as slim
as those of survival....
--From Jay P. Spenser,
Focke-Wulf 190: Workhorse
of the Luftwaffe
So you thought you were going to be
a “knight of the air,” jousting high in
the clean blue sky, far above the clouds
and even farther from the mud and squalor of the war on the ground.
Instead you nd yourself in a ghter
bomber, scraping over hostile territory
at 200 feet with the terrain rising to
meet you. You’re ying down the muzzles
of massed antiaircraft guns and dodging
small arms re to attack enemy air elds,
trains, tanks, trucks, and troops.
Performing masthead-level attacks on
enemy shipping adds its own thrills and
threats. Some of your targets have more
and bigger guns than a whole formation
of bombers. If enemy re doesn’t get
you, the blast and debris from your own
low-level bombing and stra ng can bring
you down. In this kind of war there’s
more danger and less glory for everyone.
Welcome to the tactical air war,
pal!
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
“WE TOOK A BIT OF A BEATING ON
THE GROUND BUT BOY DID WE DISH
IT OUT IN THE AIR.”
--General Elwood “Pete” Quesada
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Subject: TACTICAL AIR WAR
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: The lowdown on the tactical air war
BY MID-1943 THE AIR WAR IN EUROPE HAD SETTLED
INTO A DEADLY PATTERN FOR FIGHTER PILOTS ON BOTH
SIDES. MOST WERE INVOLVED IN THE STRATEGIC AIR WAR;
ESCORTING OR ATTACKING BOMBERS WAS THEIR PRIMARY ROLE,
AND COMBAT IN THE FRIGID SKIES AT 20,000 TO 30,000
FEET WAS THE NORM.
AS THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ALLIED INVASION OF
THE CONTINENT TOOK ON GROWING CERTAINTY, THE TACTI
CAL AIR WAR IN THE WEST HEATED UP AND EMPHASIZED A
DIFFERENT PILOT ROLE--FLYING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. THIS
ROLE PUT WOULD-BE HIGH FLYERS DOWN ON THE DECK FOR A
DIFFERENT KIND OF WARFARE BASED ON AIR-GROUND TEAM
WORK. FIGHTER-BOMBER PILOTS WERE PART OF THE ARMY
TEAM, WITH DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY TO ASSIST THE ADVANCE
OF FRIENDLY FORCES ON THE GROUND, WHILE KEEPING ENEMY
TROOPS AND SUPPLY LINES REELING UNDER BULLETS, BOMBS,
AND ROCKETS.
THE GERMAN ARMY HAD ALWAYS VIEWED AIR POWER AS
SUBORDINATE TO THE FORCES ON THE GROUND. CLOSE AIR
SUPPORT, USING AIRCRAFT TO ASSIST THE ADVANCE OF
TROOPS AND MOBILE FORCES ON THE GROUND, WAS A CEN
TRAL PART OF THE BLITZKRIEG ACROSS EUROPE BETWEEN 1939
AND 1940. IT WAS ALSO A BASIC FEATURE OF COMBAT IN
THE CAULDRON OF THE EASTERN FRONT. AS THE WAR IN THE
WEST INTENSIFIED, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE ALLIED INVA
SION OF FRANCE COMMENCED IN JUNE 1944, THE GERMANS
PRESSED MORE AND MORE AIRCRAFT INTO TACTICAL SER
VICE EVEN AS THE STRATEGIC BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST
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GERMANY INCREASED THE LUFTWAFFE’S NEED FOR HIGH-ALTI
TUDE INTERCEPTORS. BF 109 AND FW 190 PILOTS HAD TO
STRAFE AND DIVE BOMB TO STOP OR SLOW THE FLOOD OF
MEN AND MATERIEL OF THE INVADING ARMIES. JU 88 MEDIUM
BOMBERS SWOOPED DOWN FROM NORMAL BOMBING ALTITUDE
TO PLACE THEIR ORDNANCE WHERE IT WOULD DO THE MOST
GOOD: RIGHT IN THE LAPS OF THE ENEMY. EVEN THE NEW
GERMAN JETS SAW SOME SERVICE IN THE TACTICAL AIR WAR.
THE ALLIES TOOK LONGER TO FULLY EMBRACE THE
POTENTIAL OF A TACTICAL ROLE FOR COMBAT AIRCRAFT,
BUT PERFECTED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT BETWEEN 1943 AND 1945
BY ADDING NEW TECHNOLOGICAL VARIATIONS TO THE TAC
TICAL THEME. ALLIED PILOTS (BEING DIRECTED BY AIR
FORCE LIAISON OFFICERS ON THE GROUND TO ENEMY GROUND
TARGETS, FRIENDLY FORMATIONS IN NEED OF ESCORT,
OR INCOMING BANDITS) CARRIED OUT A BLITZKRIEG OF
THEIR OWN AGAINST ANYTHING THAT MOVED IN THE ENEMY
SECTOR. THUNDERBOLTS, LIGHTNINGS, MUSTANGS, TYPHOONS,
TEMPESTS, AND SPITFIRES FLEW FIGHTER BOMBER DUTY
TO SUPPORT THE WAR ON THE GROUND, WHILE MITCHELL,
MARAUDER, AND MOSQUITO BOMBERS ADDED THE FORMIDABLE
STRAFING POWER OF MULTIPLE GUNS AND CANNON TO THE
DESTRUCTIVE FORCE OF THEIR BOMBS.
FOR BOTH SIDES, DETERMINING THE PRECISE LINE
BETWEEN FRIENDLY AND ENEMY TERRITORY IN A FLUID AND
CLOSE-FOUGHT SITUATION ADDED TO THE DIFFICULTIES TAC
TICAL PILOTS ALREADY FACED.
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Subject: TACTICAL AIR WAR
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Altitude is still your friend...but
you’ve got less of it to work with!
From a tactical pilot’s point of
view, you’ve got one strike against
you as soon as you leave your base and
head into enemy territory--you’re ying
close to the deck without the luxury of
altitude. Altitude is life to a ghter
pilot, providing the high ground from
which to attack enemy aircraft, as
well as room in which to dive away from
attackers. Flying ve or six miles above
the ground provides plenty of room for
maneuvering, attacking, and evading.
“The Mission of the
Tactical Air Force”
MISSIONS--The mission
of the tactical air force
consists of three phases of
operations in the following
order of priority:
First priority--To gain
the necessary degree of
air superiority. This will
be accomplished by attacks
against aircraft in the
air and on the ground, and
against those enemy installations that he requires
for the application of air
power.
Second priority--To pre-
vent the movement of hostile troops and supplies
into the theater of operations or within the theater.
Third priority--To
participate in the combined effort of the air
and ground forces, in the
battle area, to gain objectives on the immediate
front of the ground forces.
--From War Department
Field Manual FM 100-20:
Command and Employment of
Air Power (21 July 1943)
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
For a ghter bomber pilot altitude is still your friend, but you’ve
got a lot less of it to work with since
most missions are own at 12,000 feet
or lower (usually much lower), right
on down to the deck.
USAF Museum Photo Archives
A THUNDERBOLT CARRIES THE COM-
PLETE GROUND ATTACK ARSENAL:
GUNS, BOMBS, AND ROCKETS.
DOUGLAS A-20 MEDIUM BOMBER IN
LOW-LEVEL ATTACK ON CHERBOURG
PENINSULA.
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Subject: TACTICAL AIR WAR
A few additional worries
In addition to reduced altitude
and the hail of ak and small arms re
coming up at you as you approach targets
on the ground, you have a few additional
worries as a ghter-bomber pilot:
- Encountering aireld defenses. If you
and your buddies swoop down to beat
up an enemy aireld, the guy who ies
through rst is the lucky one, because
he might catch the antiaircraft
defenses off guard. By the time the
rest of you approach the target those
gunners are wide awake and lling the
air with ak.
- Pulling up in time. Diving a heavy,
powerful aircraft from low altitude makes for a thrilling pullout,
if you’re lucky. If you’re not both
attentive and lucky, you may xate
on the target until it’s too late
to pull out.
- Identifying appropriate targets--now!
While you’re thinking about the
target, the ak, and the need to pull
out before you become part of the
landscape, you also need to make
sure that the target you’re attacking belongs to the enemy. Skimming
along at low altitude and high speed
over a crowded battleeld doesn’t give
you a lot of time to make vital decisions. Are those enemy troops? Are you
sure the squat form of a heavy tank
glimpsed through foliage is an appropriate target? You may never know for
sure whose cause will prot from the
bombs you just dropped.
- And nally, getting caught in your
own explosions. When you attack surface targets from low altitude you
risk getting caught in explosions of
your own making. Trains and motorized transport full of fuel and ammo,
the volatile contents of fuel and
ordnance dumps, and even locomotives
with a boiler full of high-pressure
steam--all of these targets can blow
up in a big way, lling a once empty
piece of sky with pinwheeling chunks
of shrapnel. Even the roadway beneath
enemy vehicles can be hazardous, as
bomb blasts can heave hunks of pavement into the same airspace you’re
occupying.
Three Critical Factors
for Fighter Bomber
Pilots
...strafing passes...
bring out three critical
factors in a fighter bomber
pilot’s war.... One, any
misjudgment, target fixation, or too-late attempts
at aiming corrections will
send the airplane into the
target, ground, or nearby
trees or other obstructions. Two, if the target
is a load of ammunition or other explosives,
it can--and very likely
will--explode right in the
pilot’s face, sending up
a fireball, truck parts,
slabs of highway, stillto-explode ammo, and other
debris right into the path
of the airplane. Three, if
a pilot is seriously hit by
flak in [a] low-altitude
attack, his chances of ever
reaching enough altitude
to allow a bailout are slim
indeed....
--From Bill Colgan,
War II Fighter Bomber Pilot
World
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Subject: TACTICAL AIR WAR
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Another little problem: Enemy fighters
While you’re concentrating on the
enemy below, don’t forget the most dangerous and persistent threat any combat
pilot faces: enemy ghters attacking
from superior altitude. Getting bounced
from above while going after ground targets is an ever-present danger, so you
and your buddies have got to take turns
ying combat air patrol over the target
area to keep the opposition busy while
the rest of the team beats up targets
on the ground.
Now this kind of teamwork is what
you joined up to do, right? Not quite.
You’ll be craning your neck and straining your eyes to spot incoming bandits,
mixing it up with enemy ghters as you
match your skills against skilled adversaries, but remember, this is dog ghting with a difference. Even if you’re
ying a relatively light and nimble
ghter, your plane’s ordnance load makes
it heavier and less responsive; you can
drop like a rock in a dive. Power and
gravity combine to eat up altitude in
a hurry, and the ground is never very
far away.
If you’re ying one of the heavyweights in your air force’s inventory,
the ground can reach up and grab you.
In a P-47 Thunderbolt or a Do 335 Arrow,
or even a big German jet, you’ve got
to juggle the need to get the target
in your sights against the need to pull
out in time. If you cut it too ne,
you can haul back on the stick to point
the nose up at what appears to be the
last moment and discover that your
plane simply won’t cooperate. With all
its weight and power, it will continue
to sink despite your best efforts and
“mush” right into the ground.
“I don’t believe in all this divebombing [stuff], it ain’t natural.”
Many new ghter-bomber pilots
longed for the classic ghterpilot role
they’d read and dreamed about, in which
the ground was for the ground-pounders and the sky above the clouds was
reserved for dashing aviators. This
made for a dif cult adjustment:
...fighter pilots were slow to
appreciate the value of close-support operations. One flyer aptly
summarized the rank-and-file perception of the new task when he
said... “I don’t believe in all
this dive-bombing [stuff], it
ain’t natural.”
--Thomas A. Hughes,
Over Lord:
General Pete Quesada and the
Triumph of Tactical Air Power
in World War II
Results You Can See
“There were times we
could actually see our
troops move forward after
we had knocked out a German
88 or tank that was holding
up the column. We knew we
were making a difference.”
--Veteran fighter bomber
pilot Quentin Aanenson
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
A GERMAN MK IV TANK DESTROYED
BY AERIAL ATTACK.
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Subject: TACTICAL AIR WAR
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The payoff: Unique satisfactions
So given the catalog of dangers, why
would you want to y close air support
missions? Because this job provides some
unique satisfactions:
- Even if you’re a loner--and many
ghter pilots are--there’s a lot to
be said for being part of a team;
especially if it’s a winning team.
Protecting your guys on the ground and
helping them to advance by suppressing enemy troops and weapons adds real
meaning to your part of the struggle.
- There’s also a lot to be said for
instant grati cation--and few things
are as gratifying to a combat pilot as
seeing a tempting target blow up in a
big way.
- Seeing close-up the effect of your
guns, bombs, and rockets on the enemy
does a lot for your con dence and your
feeling that the results are worth the
risks. Flying close air support also
provides a sense of personal power and
effectiveness that is only tempered by
the fact that the “clean blue sky” of
high-altitude plane-to-plane combat is
replaced by distressing glimpses into
the hellish landscape of the war on
the ground.
- Another plus for the tactical pilot
is the knowledge that just being there
over the front lines gives a real
lift to your guys on the ground, while
depressing the spirits of the enemy.
- There’s also plenty of encouragement in knowing that your contribution isn’t just emotional--all armies
understand that close air support
plays an important role in making
progress on the battle eld and in the
theater of operations. Your missions
are a signi cant part of the bigger
picture. What you do or fail to do
every day can contribute to the larger
success or failure of your nation’s
forces in this war.
The “Moral” Effect of
Attack from the Air
Moral Effect--The moral
effect of heavy air attack
against land forces can
hardly be exaggerated.
Not only will air attack
lower the morale of the
enemy, but the sight of
our own aircraft over the
battlefield raises the
morale of our own troops
to a corresponding degree.
Seeing enemy aircraft shot
down has an encouraging
effect.... On the other
hand, the constant appearance of unmolested enemy
aircraft tends to demoralize troops and disorganize plans. Apprehension
of heavy air attack
restricts military activity by ...confining troops
to areas that afford concealment, and by preventing
movement during daylight.
Soldiers are naturally
quick to react to the general air situation in their
neighbourhood....
--
Army/Air Operations
(British War Office, 26/GS
Publications/1127, 1944)
Air Force Historical
Research Agency Photo
A THUNDERBOLT SCORES A DIRECT
HIT ON AN AMMUNITION TRUCK.
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Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
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Events and People in the Tactical Air War
The campaign in CFS3...
As a pilot in Microsoft Combat
Flight Simulator 3, you y in the historical framework of the tactical air
war in northwest Europe starting in
mid-1943, but there’s a signi cant
difference. The skill and perseverance
you and your squadron or Staffel bring
to each battle can alter the tactical situation and the timeline of the
campaign. This open-ended and exible
campaign means you can in uence events,
alter history, and extend the timeline
to add new technology to your arsenal.
How you handle these tactical and technological advantages will determine the
outcome.
Before you take to the sky, it
helps to understand what really happened
during WWII. This will not only give you
something to shoot at--but also something to shoot for.
In CFS3, it’s 1943, and no one
knows what’s going to happen, or how
the war will turn out--but here’s the
way it was.
...and what really happened
The campaign in northwest Europe
during 1943 and 1945 marked a dramatic
high point in the events of WWII and
the fortunes of the warring nations.
It began with the Third Reich in rm
control of “Fortress Europa,” and ended
with Germany--and much of Europe--in
ruins.
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
ACES OF THE 354TH “PIONEER
MUSTANG” FIGHTER GROUP.
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Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
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The situation in mid-1943
In mid-1943 there were no dedicated
tactical air forces operating in northwest Europe. Of course the tactical role
was always part of the Luftwaffe’s mandate, but most of its tactical efforts
were focused against Russia. The Allied
focus was on a strategic goal--using
heavy bomber forces, escorted by ghters, to destroy Germany’s ability
to make war. German day- and night ghter pilots’ rst responsibility was
to attack the bomber formations that
threatened the expanding Reich.
All this began to change as planning for the Allied invasion of Europe
took shape. It became clear to the
Allies that the invasion would never
take place without air power. Air power
techniques worked out in North Africa
and Sicily during 1943 showed how effective tactical air power could be, and
plans were put in motion to use this
weapon to the fullest. Air power would
pave the way for forces on the ground
by providing close air support.
Pre-invasion activities
In 1943 the U.S. Ninth Air Force
moved from Italy to England, and the RAF
created the Second Tactical Air Force
(2TAF). These Allied tactical air forces
faced two daunting pre-invasion tasks:
- To disrupt the German army’s ability
to transport reinforcements and supplies by road, rail, or river.
- To reduce the Luftwaffe’s ability to
seriously impede the planned Allied
invasion.
For its part, the Luftwaffe had to
do its best to resist the mounting tide
of Allied air and land forces, and to
support the German army. Even in reduced
circumstances, the Luftwaffe’s best
efforts remained formidable.
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
BRIDGE AT BULLAY, GERMANY
AFTER ATTACK BY THUNDERBOLT
FIGHTER BOMBERS.
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Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
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The “Mighty Eighth” goes looking for
trouble on the ground
Even before tactical air forces
were in place, ghter pilots of the
strategic U.S. Eighth Air Force (the
Mighty Eighth) assigned to escort the
heavy bombers into Germany were increasingly freed to roam further a eld from
their lumbering charges in search of
enemy ghters. The idea was to nd
trouble before trouble found the bombers. To meet this threat, more Luftwaffe
ghter pilots were ordered to take on
the Allied escorts instead of focusing
entirely on the bombers.
By January 1944, General Jimmy
Doolittle, in charge of the Mighty
Eighth, made destroying the German
ghter force a top priority. To encourage his ghter pilots, Doolittle offered
ace status to those who destroyed ve
aircraft on the ground. Some pilots
who had won aerial victories by out ying their opponents complained that this
was the “easy” way to become an ace, but
ying into a wall of ak and small-arms
re while attacking an air eld didn’t
seem so easy to those who tried it.
In February, the Eighth Air Force
launched its “Big Week” operation with
a series of heavy bomber raids against
the German aircraft industry coordinated
with medium bomber and ghter bomber
attacks on Luftwaffe assets in France,
Belgium, and Holland. Throughout the
spring, German ghter losses in the air
and on the ground mounted; more signi cantly, the Luftwaffe lost half of its
irreplaceable veteran pilots before the
invasion began.
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
B-26G MARAUDER MEDIUM BOMBERS
IN ATTACK FORMATION.
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Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
The tactical air forces join the fray
The U.S. Nineth Air Force and the
RAF’s Second Tactical Air Force soon
joined these efforts and, as winter
turned to spring, the pre-invasion air
campaign intensied. Two Tactical Air
Commands of the U.S. Ninth Air Force
(IX TAC under General Ellwood “Pete”
Quesada and XIX TAC under General O.P.
“Opie” Weyland) combined efforts with
the British Second Tactical Air Force
to smash rail transport, bridges, and
airelds.
Phase 1: Railways. Sixty days
before D-Day (D-60), the Allies’ focus
fell on rail centers, with ghter bombers (as well as medium and heavy bombers) striking marshaling yards and major
rail junctions. The railway phase continued right up to and after the Allied
armies fought their way onto the shores
of France on June 6.
Phase 2: Bridges. At D-46, the
Allies began to isolate the German
troops that occupied the invasion
battleeld from reinforcements and supplies by destroying bridges on the
Seine below Paris and on the Loire below
Orléans. Both medium bombers and ghter
bombers participated in this phase, but
the nimble ghter bombers proved to be
the best tool to achieve the pinpoint
accuracy this task required. Like the
rail phase, this bridge-busting duty
continued on after the Allied invasion
had begun.
Phase 3: Airelds. At D-21, the
Allies added German airelds within
130 miles of the invasion area to
their target list. This phase continued
until D-Day.
Between these attacks and the
demands on German ghter resources
resulting from the Allies’ strategic bombing campaign, by June 6 the
Luftwaffe simply wasn’t a factor in
Normandy. This situation wouldn’t last
for long, as the German ghter force
wasn’t nished yet. Within weeks the
Luftwaffe increased its strength in
Normandy, ying from small, improvised
airstrips to avoid attack by Allied
ghter bombers. Soon, the tactical
air war would reach its furious height
as the American, British, and German
armies engaged in their winner-take-all
struggle for control of Europe.
“If I didn’t have
air superiority,
I wouldn’t be here.”
On June 24, Eisenhower’s
son John, a recent West
Point graduate, rode with
his father to view the
invasion area.
“The roads we traversed
were dusty and crowded.
Vehicles moved slowly,
bumper to bumper. Fresh
out of West Point, with all
its courses in conventional
procedures, I was offended
at this jamming up of traffic. It wasn’t according
to the book. Leaning over
Dad’s shoulder, I remarked,
“You’d never get away with
this if you didn’t have air
supremacy.” I received an
impatient snort:
“If I didn’t have air
supremacy, I wouldn’t be
here.”
--Richard P. Hallion,
Air Power Over the Normandy
Beaches and Beyond
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Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
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The invasion: Off the beaches-and into the bocage
Once the invasion was under way,
the Allied tactical air forces took on
their toughest task: direct participation in the land battle. This included
attacking enemy forces and providing
close air support for friendly troops
and armor on the ground.
On June 6, 1944, 150,000 Allied
troops stormed ashore on the Calvados
coast of Normandy. A cloud of Allied
aircraft, newly adorned in black and
white “invasion stripes” to make their
identity clear to nervous gunners on
the ground, controlled the air over the
beachhead. American and British ghters
ew continuously over the invasion area,
ending their patrols with attacks on
coastal defenses, enemy strong points,
bridges, and rail targets. These attacks
slowed the arrival of German reinforcements, giving the invading armies additional time to consolidate their toehold
on the Continent.
Both invading armies made initial
progress inland, but they soon ground
to a halt as German resistance stiffened. The British were stuck outside
Caen, blocked by the armor of Panzer
Group West. The Americans punched
their way off the beaches, only to nd
themselves stymied north of Saint-Lô
by what General Omar Bradley called
“the damndest country I’ve seen,” the
Norman hedgerow country, or bocage.
This 20-mile swath of small elds
enclosed by towering ancient hedges saw
some of the most vicious infantry combat
of the war. American troops groped their
way into the maze of hedgerows, which
the Germans had already in ltrated,
and came under attack from three sides
in each gloomy enclosure. Every eld
was like a small fortress with preplanned elds of machine gun, mortar,
and artillery re. With no more than a
hundred yards of visibility this determined defense was unnerving. The bocage
had been there for a thousand years,
but nothing in the Allied planning had
addressed ghting through this nightmarish terrain.
General Quesada on the
Hedgerow Stalemate
“We were flabbergasted
by the bocage.... Our
infantry had become paralyzed. It has never been
adequately described how
immobilized they were by
the sound of small-arms
fire among those hedges.”
--General Elwood Quesada,
U.S. IX TAC
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
P-38 LIGHTNING WITH BLACK AND
WHITE “INVASION STRIPES.”
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Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
Ending the impasse
Goals set to be attained within
days by the Allied command remained out
of reach for weeks, and each small gain
of ground came at a staggering cost.
To end this impasse, the Allies once
again turned to air power. Two operations, codenamed GOODWOOD and COBRA,
were intended to break the stalemate on
the ground by pouring ordnance onto the
battleeld from the air.
GOODWOOD was designed to help the
British break out of the stalemate
around Caen and into the open country
to the east, where tanks could operate effectively. The operation began
on July 18 when 4,500 aircraft from
the RAF Bomber Command and the U.S.
Eighth and Ninth Air Forces attacked
the area held by Panzer Group West.
This enormous bombardment, violent
enough to ip 60-ton tanks and drive
hardened combat veterans into hysteria, allowed the British to force their
way onto the Caen-Falaise plain. This
forward movement was supported by the
tactical air forces, which blasted enemy
tanks, suppressed mortar and antitank
re, and delivered ordnance beyond the
range of friendly artillery. However,
within two days the advance lost its
momentum, in part due to this operation’s success in achieving its secondary goal of drawing German armor
away from the American sector, where
Bradley’s forces were stuck in the
bocage.
In the American sector, operation
COBRA beneted from the British breakout effort. Devised by General Omar
Bradley, COBRA began on July 25 with
a massive but botched aerial bombardment that blasted holes in the enemy
lines and sent German forces reeling,
but also killed or wounded hundreds of
U.S. troops. Bradley quickly capitalized
on these gaps; his First Army forces
attacked across a moonscape of bomb
craters in an advance that moved four
armored divisions almost 35 miles--all
the way from the hedgerows around SaintLô to the open country near Avranches.
As the speed of the assault increased,
good weather allowed IX Tactical Air
Command ghter bombers, under the command of General Elwood “Pete” Quesada,
to provide devastating close air support. Guided onto targets by Army Air
Force liaison ofcers riding in command
tanks, Thunderbolts and Mustangs littered the roads with the burning wrecks
of German vehicles. This air-ground
teamwork proved to be a winning combination that would come into its own in
the Allied dash across France and into
Germany.
No Headlines for
Tactical Pilots,
but High Praise from
Omar Bradley
...On June 20, Bradley
asked Quesada to thank
his pilots for “the fine
work they have been doing
and the close cooperation
they have given the ground
troops. Their ability to
disrupt the enemy’s communications, supply, and
movement of troops has been
a vital factor in our rapid
progress in expanding our
beachhead. I realize that
their work may not catch
the headlines any more than
does the work of some of
our foot soldiers, but I
am sure that I express the
feelings of every groundforce commander, from squad
leaders to myself as Army
Commander, when I extend
my congratulations on their
very fine work.”
--Thomas A. Hughes,
Lord: General Pete Quesada
and the Triumph of Tactical
Air Power in World War II
Over
- 12 -
Page 15
Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
The breakout: Air-ground teamwork
and the dash across France
On August 1, with the momentum of
the breakout growing, Bradley activated the Third Army under the command of General George S. Patton. From
now on, Weyland’s XIX TAC would support
the Third Army advance, while Quesada’s
IX TAC was assigned to aid Bradley and
the First Army.
Patton’s forces raced west from
Normandy into Brittany, and then pushed
south into the Loire valley before
swinging east toward Le Mans. Bradley’s
First Army also swung to the east to
provide added pressure on the Germans.
Meanwhile, General Bernard Montgomery
coordinated the advance of his British
and Canadian forces in a drive south
from Caen, catching German General von
Kluge’s Seventh Army between Allied pincers and effectively encircling it.
To support this increasingly rapid
movement, the tactical air commands had
to revise their priorities and methods.
Pre-planned missions didn’t work in a
uid and rapidly changing situation-by the time the ghter bombers arrived
at their objective, friendly forces
might already have taken it. Two types
of impromptu missions proved especially
effective in this environment:
- Flying armed reconnaissance missions,
pilots received radioed updates on
the current location of the “bomb
line” that marked the boundary between
friendly and hostile territory. They
also reported threats on the ground
and hammered enemy troops, tanks, and
guns wherever they found them.
- At the same time, armored column cover
missions coordinated air power with
tanks by radio to protect the advance
of friendly armor while suppressing enemy resistance. With little air
opposition, pilots were often given
permission to sweep the roads up to
30 miles ahead of the columns they
were assigned to protect, clearing
the way for a rapid advance.
The result of using these two
new types of missions was a far more
rapid advance than even the Allies had
anticipated, creating a growing threat
to all German forces west of the Seine.
This threat became reality when the
Germans planned a counterattack.
The Allies intercepted and decrypted
von Kluge’s orders and, combining resistance on the ground with air strikes,
they stopped the German counterattack
at Mortain.
On August 15, the Canadian First
Army took Falaise, and the Allied armies,
converging from the north, south, and
west, squeezed the retreating German
forces into a “pocket” between Falaise
and Argentan. This pocket was less than
15 miles wide and was shrinking rapidly,
with the only exit to the east.
Armored Column Cover
Speeds the Allied
Advance
Four- and eight-ship
flights hovered over the
lead elements of armored
columns, ready to attack on
request, to warn the tanks
of hidden opposition, to
eliminate delaying actions.
These flights never returned
to base until new flights
came to relieve them. With
this airplane cover always
present...obstacles, which
might have taken hours to
surmount, were eliminated
in a few minutes.
--
Air-Ground Teamwork
on the Western Front
(published by Headquarters,
Army Air Forces,
Washington, D.C.)
- 13 -
Page 16
Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
The Falaise “pocket”: Tac air in all
its glory and horror
The next four days demonstrated
the full and terrible potential of
tactical air power. As more and more
German troops and armor were crowded
into the shrinking pocket, British and
U.S. ghter bombers reduced the milling
men and vehicles to a bloody, burning
shambles.
Rocket-ring Typhoons and strang
Spitres, in coordination with Allied
infantry and armor, relentlessly pounded
the packed enemy columns. U.S. Ninth
Air Force pilots ew deep interdiction missions against enemy road, rail,
and bridge targets, as well as aggressive sweeps to maintain air superiority,
swatting down Luftwaffe ghters before
they could get into the air.
Allied tactical pilots stayed on
the job as long as the daylight lasted,
ying as many as ve or six missions a
day, stopping only to refuel and re-arm.
The air over the Falaise pocket was so
crowded with aircraft that coordination
became an issue, and midair collisions
took a toll among pilots focused on
destroying the enemy.
As the Allied advance gained momentum and the carnage reached a crescendo,
one Allied air objective changed signicantly. Instead of destroying bridges
and routes by which German forces and
supplies could enter the area, bridges
were to be left intact for the pursuing
Allied ground forces; the goal now was
to prevent the Germans from escaping and
reforming the remnants of the Seventh
Army to ght another day.
Thus bottled up, 10,000 German soldiers died along a road that came to
be called the le Couloir de la Mort-the “Corridor of Death.” Another 50,000
were taken prisoner. And the remnant of
von Kluge’s army--perhaps 20,000 men-managed to escape to the east only after
abandoning almost all their vehicles
and heavy weapons. Some ghter bomber
pilots who swooped down to strike the
eeing enemy were shocked by the devastation and carnage. What they found
was a hellish scene beneath a blackened sky full of the smoke and stench
of the battleeld. The piled corpses of
men and horses, the shattered and burning remnants of soft-skinned and armored
vehicles, and a litter of abandoned
equipment were all that remained along
the cratered roads near Falaise.
For those who had wondered about
the effectiveness of tactical air power,
Falaise was a gruesome revelation. Even
for those who had counted on its effectiveness, the results, while benecial
to the Allied cause, were disturbing.
Falaise: A Scene
from Dante--or
Hieronymous Bosch
“The battlefield at
Falaise was unquestionably
one of the greatest “killing grounds” of the war.
I encountered scenes which
could be described only by
Dante.”
--Allied Supreme
Commander Dwight Eisenhower
* * *
Perhaps the twisted allegories of Hieronymous Bosch
would have been more fitting a choice, for Dante,
at least, offered hope.
--Air Force Historian
Richard P. Hallion,
Power Over the Normandy
Beaches and Beyond
Air
- 14 -
Page 17
Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
The race toward the Rhine
As the remnants of the shattered
Seventh Army ed eastward, additional
German forces in Normandy swelled the
retreat. However, like all major German
retreats of the war, this was an organized and disciplined process. Despite
hot pursuit by the Allied armies and
continuing harassment by the tactical air forces, 240,000 Germans got
across the Seine in the last dozen days
of August and streamed toward Belgium,
Luxembourg--and Germany. Patton’s army
began its pursuit on August 21 by crossing the Seine, and in the next ten days
pushed almost 200 miles eastward to the
river Meuse. Other British and U.S.
forces liberated Paris on August 25 and
pushed on into Belgium and Luxembourg.
Seeking an opportunity to counterattack, the Germans deployed troops near
the mouth of the river Scheldt, denying the Allies use of the vital port
of Antwerp. This move was part of a
plan (called “Autumn Mist”) to drive
an armored wedge through the Ardennes
forest and across the Meuse to Antwerp,
separating the British in the north
from the Americans in the south. The
resulting struggle, which began with
an assault that bulged and almost broke
the Allied lines, is better known as
the Battle of the Bulge.
The Battle of the Bulge
Like many major actions of the
Second World War, the outcome of the
Battle of the Bulge was decided by air
power. When the Germans began their
last major offensive of the war on
December 16, the dense, heavy cloud
cover over the battle zone made lowlevel ghter bomber patrols difcult
to impossible, temporarily negating
Allied air superiority, but also limiting the effectiveness of the German
tactical aircraft assembled to assist
the offensive.
For this ght all Allied tactical air power--including the U.S. Nineth
Air Force’s IX and XIX Tactical Air
Commands and the British Second Tactical
Air Force--was concentrated under
the command of RAF Air Marshal Arthur
Coningham, who in turn assigned General
“Pete” Quesada of the U.S. IX TAC to control air power on the north side of the
bulge, while the British 2TAF focused on
the south side. There were three Allied
air priorities:
- To achieve and maintain air superior-
ity over the battleeld.
- To cooperate with ground forces in
the destruction of enemy weapons and
transport.
- To interdict enemy supplies by attack-
ing road, rail, and communication
centers.
Jack Stafford Follows
Orders on His First
Mission
“Ready for your first
show, Staff?” asked Woe
Wilson. “Keep up with me.
I’ll be busy enough without looking after you--just
watch my arse.”
We took off for the
French coast. Woe watched
the heading--I watched
Woe’s tail.
When we returned the
intelligence officer asked
if we had encountered much
flak. “Yes, quite a bit,”
said Woe. “Dieppe was the
heaviest but they hosed us
a bit from all the other
ports.”
I stood there, my mouth
open. “Flak! What bloody
flak?” Good-natured laughter rocked the room.
Woe said, “He was watching my arse and doing it
well.” Just then a ground
staff man approached with
a jagged piece of steel in
his hand. “This was just
removed from your aircraft’s spinner, Staff.”
—Veteran fighter pilot
and CFS3 historical advisor
Jack Stafford
- 15 -
Page 18
Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
- 16 -
Strict radio silence had kept the
Germans’ plans from being intercepted,
and the surprise was complete when 24
Wehrmacht
divisions crashed through
the Allied lines. Twenty-four hundred
tactical aircraft had been assembled
to support this thrust, and a 60-milewide breech in the Allied line quickly
became the westward “bulge” that gave
this battle its name. For three days the
Allied air forces fought the Luftwaffe
above the cloud cover, keeping the
German ghters from carrying out their
close-support duties beneath the overcast and claiming 136 victories in
the process. The Luftwaffe pilots were
hampered not only by bad weather, but
also by inadequate training and lack
of experience in tactical air support,
since by this stage of the war their
leadership understandably emphasized
air-to-air combat skills to counter
the tactical bombing campaign that was
reducing German cities to rubble.
The Battle of the Bulge took place
over some of the roughest terrain in
Europe, during the hardest winter in
memory. The weather soon deteriorated
to the point that, for the four days
between December 19th and the 22nd,
Allied and German aircraft alike could
hardly get off the ground. Once again,
the opposing air forces were ghting
on equally unfavorable terms.
To restrict enemy supplies and slow
the German advance, Eisenhower’s strategy required U.S. forces to take and
hold the crossroads at Saint Vith and
Bastogne, an already perilous task that
became practically impossible without
tactical air support. The “bulge” soon
grew to its maximum depth, extending
about 50 miles west of what had been the
American lines. U.S. forces soon evacuated Saint Vith, but the 101st Airborne
Division hung on at Bastogne.
National Archives and Records Administration Photo
U.S. SOLDIERS GET SOME CHOW
IN THE WINTER LANDSCAPE OF THE
“BATTLE OF THE BULGE.”
Page 19
Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
Patton’s “weather prayer” pays off
Chang at the uncooperative weather
that made life miserable for infantryman and airman alike, General George
Patton ordered the Third Army chaplain to devise a “weather prayer” to be
published throughout the Third Army by
December 14, two days before the Battle
of the Bulge began:
“Almighty and most merciful
God, we humbly beseech thee, of
thy great goodness, to restrain
these immoderate rains with which
we have had to contend. Grant us
fair weather for battle. Graciously
hearken to us as soldiers who call
upon thee that, armed with thy
power, we may advance from victory
to victory, and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies,
and establish thy justice among men
and nations. Amen.”
This higher version of “air-ground
teamwork” apparently did the trick,
and on December 23 the murky weather
that had hung over the Ardennes broke,
unleashing Allied air and ground forces
and dooming the last major German offensive of the war to failure.
With massive numbers of American
and British ghter bombers lling the
sky and blasting ground targets at will,
the Luftwaffe could no longer affect the
situation on the ground. Even returning
from a mission was dangerous for German
pilots, as their Allied counterparts
timed aireld attacks to coincide with
the return of ghters low on fuel and
ammunition.
Now Allied medium bombers joined
in to cut off rail transport into the
area, while U.S. and British ghter
bombers pursued enemy tank columns down
increasingly narrow roads. Once they
hit the lead tank, the immobilized column
could be destroyed in detail, a scene
played out over and over again. German
troop concentrations suffered the same
fate as the tank columns. Thunderbolts
bombed enemy positions just a few hundred yards from friendly forces. German
road and rail trafc fell under the same
hammer blows.
By Christmas Eve, the German advance
ground to a halt. On Christmas day, the
Allies counterattacked, Patton relieved
the 101st Airborne in Bastogne, and
Montgomery’s forces attacked from the
north to cut off a German retreat.
Allied tactical aircraft ruled the skies
over the battleeld, but they would soon
face the Luftwaffe in a decisive air
battle.
The Tactical Air War
from Two Points
of View
“We took a bit of a
beating on the ground but
boy did we dish it out in
the air.”
--General “Pete” Quesada,
IX TAC after the
Battle of the Bulge
* * *
“The Third Reich received
its death blow in the
Ardennes offensive.... The
American fighter bomber
destroyed us.”
--General der Jagdflieger
Adolf Galland
- 17 -
Page 20
Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
- 18 -
The Luftwaffe’s last gamble:
Operation Bodenplatte
With their nal ground offensive collapsing under the intolerable pressure of Allied tactical air
power, the Luftwaffe planned an all-out
air assault on 27 Allied airbases in
Belgium, Holland, and France. The goal
of Operation
Bodenplatte
(“Baseplate”)
was to break the air supremacy of the
Allied ghter force and allow the weakened Luftwaffe to focus on the strategic
bomber threat. Set for early morning on
New Year’s Day--January 1, 1945--it was
a desperate gamble that would cost the
Luftwaffe dearly.
Poor planning, inadequate briefings, a lack of experienced pilots, and
poor coordination with ak gunners on
the ground cost the Luftwaffe a third
of the 900 aircraft it threw into this
large-scale surprise attack. More signi cantly, over 200 pilots, including
almost 80 experienced leaders and commanders, never lived to see more than
the rst day of 1945. About a third of
the aircraft lost fell to “friendly”
antiaircraft gunners, some of whom
remained uninformed about the ight
schedule. In other cases, bad weather
delayed takeoff, putting pilots in the
air over batteries that had expected
them earlier.
The one thing
Bodenplatte
pilots
had going for them was surprise. The
last thing the Allies expected was
a massive attack by an air force they
knew was on the ropes, least of all on
New Year’s morning. Some Allied air elds suffered extremely heavy damage,
while others were visited ineffectually
by very small numbers of ghter bombers.
It took awhile for the Allied air forces
to react, but they were soon ying multiple sorties to blunt or entirely stave
off the low-level attacks.
By the end of the day nearly 500
Allied aircraft had been destroyed,
almost all of them on the ground, with
the heaviest damage falling in the
British sector. This was a weighty blow,
but all of these wrecked aircraft were
replaced within a couple of weeks, while
German losses, especially in pilots, were
irreplaceable. Now the full weight of
the Allied tactical air forces fell on
the German army, making
it impossible to move
troops or supplies
on the ground without
drawing the unwelcome
attentions of freeroaming ghter bombers with their guns,
bombs, and rockets.
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
WRECKED THUNDERBOLT ON U.S.
AIRFIELD AT METZ, FRANCE AFTER
GERMAN ATTACK, JANUARY 1, 1945.
Page 21
Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
- 19 -
By January 18, the Battle of the
Bulge was over. For Germany, the outcome was a double catastrophe: its last
offensive in the west was decisively
defeated on the ground, with the loss
of 100,000 men and 600 tanks, and the
Luftwaffe was nished as an effective
ghting force at a time when Allied
air power had never been greater. With
Russian armies advancing into Germany
from the east and British and American
armies advancing toward the Rhine from
the west, the outlook for the Third
Reich was bleak.
To the Rhine--and beyond
In February, the western Allies
started their push toward the Rhine.
Their goal was to drive the German
armies back into Germany and encircle
them. To achieve this, forces under
Montgomery pushed toward the southeast,
while the U.S. Ninth Army drove northeast. To slow the Allied advance north
of the Rhine, the Germans had ooded
the Ruhr valley (the gateway to the
industrial heart of the Reich), but by
February 23 the waters had subsided.
American armies crossed the Ruhr into
Germany, while to the south, the Allies
pushed through the remnants of
the “West Wall” into west-central Germany. (The West Wall, also
known as the Siegfried Line, was
an array of concrete pillboxes and
antitank defenses stretching 300
miles from Basel to Cleves.)
On March 7, the Americans
achieved a major coup by capturing, intact, the Ludendorff bridge
over the Rhine at Remagen. Allied
troops and vehicles poured across
and soon established a solid
bridgehead east of the Rhine. Over
the next two weeks, U.S. forces
crossed the Rhine and built up
their bridgehead to solidify their position. In the last week of March, the
British crossed the Rhine at several
points north of the Ruhr.
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
EIGHT RAF SPITFIRES ON PATROL.
OUT WITH THE OLD, IN WITH
THE NEW: THE USAAF OCCUPIES A
GERMAN AIRBASE AT FRANKFURT.
Page 22
Subject: EVENTS AND PEOPLE
The situation as it was in the spring
of 1945...
These aggressive Allied moves in
March, supported by tactical and strategic air power, clinched the encirclement
of German Army Group B and opened the
way for the Allied drive eastward to the
Elbe River. On April 25, U.S. and Russian forces linked up at Torgau on the
Elbe, effectively splitting Germany in
two and ending organized German resistance. With the fall of Berlin to the
Russians and the suicide of Hitler on
April 30, control of the crumbling Reich
fell to the Führer’s chosen successor,
Admiral Doenitz. A cascade of regional
surrenders--in Italy, Holland, Denmark,
and Germany--culminated in the unconditional surrender of all German forces,
signed for Doenitz by General Alfred
Jodl, on May 7, 1945.
...and the flexible timeframe and
tactical situation in CFS3
While the tactical air campaign
in CFS3 is rooted in the historical
events described in this Handbook, as
a CFS3 pilot, you have more opportunity to inuence short- and long-term
events and outcomes than any pilot on
either side enjoyed between 1943 and
1945. Your own performance and persistence can alter the tactical situation
and the timeline at every major turning point in this long and grueling
struggle--in the pre-invasion battle
to control transport routes in north-
west France, in the Normandy campaign and
the Allied breakout, in the battle for
France, in the Battle of the Bulge, in
the ght for the Rhine and the Ruhr, and
in the nal run to victory or defeat.
Along the way you can increase your
advantage by earning the privilege of
ying advanced aircraft that would have
remained out of reach in a strictly historical scenario. While you may be able
to take advantage of assets, including
personal skill and advanced technology
to take lesser objectives or even the
enemy capital, one major aspect of the
tactical air war as it really happened
remains: No matter how good you and your
squadmates are, no matter how awesome
your aircraft and weapons may be, the
grim realities of your job as a tactical
pilot never change. Flying at low altitude over masses of enemy troops, guns,
and vehicles leaves no room for romantic illusions about the glamour of war.
Danger is ever-present, and glory is hard
to come by.
The Nighttime Air War
Adds Extra Dangers
“In 1942 I flew 40 missions for the RAF. Piloting
a Wellington bomber on
night missions was the most
hair-raising duty I ever
did. Everyone was trying
to put you out of action-enemy night fighters,
antiaircraft guns, searchlights, mid-air collisions,
and weather all teamed up
to make it miserable and
hazardous.
In 1943 I transferred
to the USAAF, flying 48
night missions in P-61
Black Widows. To locate
and destroy targets such
as trains, vehicles, and
airfields, we would enter
enemy territory at low
altitude--200 to 500 feet.
We used radar and the radio
altimeter to avoid obstacles and the terrain, and
followed the rail lines and
highways until sighting a
target, which was difficult unless the moon was
out. Then we would use our
bombs, cannon, and machine
guns.”
--Veteran combat pilot
and CFS3 historical advisor
Al Jones
- 20 -
Page 23
Subject: LEADERS IN THE TACTICAL AIR WAR
Key Players in the Tactical Air War: The CFS3 Hall of Fame
The tactical air war didn’t grab a
lot of headlines, and didn’t produce many
aces. Like the foot soldiers who formed
the other side of the air-ground team,
tactical pilots had a rough job to do,
and faced many dangers without much
chance of winning individual fame. For
that reason this “Hall of Fame” focuses
primarily on leaders of the tactical air
war, individuals who formulated doctrine on the use of tactical air power
and then put that doctrine into practice
in the air over Europe. The pilots who
translated doctrine into combat reality
are represented by our three historical advisors, men who stepped up to the
dangerous job of teaming with the guys
on the ground during the momentous events
of WWII, and then returned to their
lives as veterans who put those events
behind them.
About Leadership and
Pilot Initiative
A look at the leaders on both sides
who were instrumental in forming tactical
air doctrine in WWII reveals an interesting difference of approach, a difference with important implications for the
pilots who had to transform doctrine into
ordnance on the battleeld.
Germany took an early lead in developing the collaboration of air and ground
forces, and used the Spanish Civil War of
1936-1939 as a proving ground for new
weapons and techniques. This experience
paved the way for the
to 1940, when Germany stunned the world
by rapidly defeating Poland, France,
Belgium, Holland, and Denmark with coordinated attacks by armor, air power,
and mobile infantry. Throughout the war
Germany used this combination of forces
wherever possible. However, the Luftwaffe
leadership failed to rene its use of
air power, while the Allies embraced new
technologies and techniques that made
their tactical air forces into sharper,
more focused and effective weapons.
This failure put German pilots at
a double disadvantage. As Allied material superiority grew to an overwhelming
ood of military power directed against
Germany, the problem was compounded by
leaders preoccupied with maintaining
favor and casting blame instead of assuming responsibility for the success of
their pilots.
What made the Luftwaffe a formidable weapon as the war went on was the
dedication, skill, and perseverance of
its pilots. The often murky nature of
combat in the air low over the battleeld
always demanded a high degree of pilot
initiative for all nationalities, but
for German pilots that initiative took
on greater importance, given decreasing
direction from above.
Blitzkrieg
of 1939
- 21 -
Page 24
Subject: LEADERS IN THE TACTICAL AIR WAR
- 22 -
dismay of naval of cers who saw
the battleship as the ultimate
expression of military power,
Mitchell led Army bombers in
trials that sank a variety of
vessels, including a submarine, a destroyer, a cruiser,
and nally the captured German
battleship Ostfriesland. This
earned him enemies in high
places, as did his criticism of
government policies and de ance
of the military leadership.
In 1924, after a visit to
Japan, Mitchell wrote a report
that warned of Japanese ambitions
in the Paci c. He foresaw a war
with Japan that he said would
begin with an aerial attack on
American naval and air facilities
at Pearl Harbor, starting with
bombardment of the base on Ford
Island at 7:30 a.m., to be followed by an attack on Clark Field
in the Philippines.
In 1925, after accusing Army leadership of criminal negligence in the
loss of the airship Shenandoah, he was
court-martialed for insubordination and
resigned from the service. Mitchell died
in 1936, before he could see air power
triumphant in World War II. In 1941 Lee
Atwood, vice president and chief engineer of North American Aviation, proposed naming the new B-25 medium bomber
“Billy” Mitchell was an air power
pioneer, visionary, and evangelist. He
was also an irritant to American military commanders who lacked his vision
and enthusiasm. As commander of American
combat squadrons in World War I Mitchell
was one of the rst to show what the airplane could do to advance the war on the
ground, proving it to be a potent weapon
against enemy positions and surface targets on land or sea.
Mitchell joined the U.S. Army
in 1898 and showed an early interest
in technology, rst as a telegrapher
in the Signal Corps. When the Signal
Corps formed its Aeronautical Division,
Mitchell bought his own ight lessons.
By 1913 he informed a congressional committee that America was falling behind
in what he saw as a vital new technology. In 1917 he was sent to observe air
operations in Europe, and, with America’s
entry into the war, he was soon in charge
of ghting units and promoted to Brigadier General.
In September 1918 Mitchell planned
and led a bombing attack on the Germanheld St.-Mihiel salient in which almost
1,500 aircraft dropped their bombs on
German positions in coordination with
an infantry assault on the ground.
After the war, Mitchell tirelessly
advocated an independent Air Service and
sought every opportunity to demonstrate
what air power could do. In 1921, to the
GENERAL WILLIAM “BILLY” MITCHELL (1879-1936)
Hulton Archive/Getty Images
“BILLY” MITCHELL: IN THE 1920S
HE SHOWED THE SKEPTICS WHAT
AIR POWER COULD DO.
Page 25
Subject: LEADERS IN THE TACTICAL AIR WAR
- 23 -
in honor of Billy Mitchell, and although
it was unusual to name aircraft for real
people living or dead, the Army Air Corps
agreed. No one could have devised a more
appropriate honor, as the B-25 Mitchell
went on to prove its worth as a potent
weapon in all theaters of operation, from
Doolittle’s Tokyo Raid in 1942 through
the end of the air war in Europe.
Although his court-martial was never
reversed, Mitchell was honored posthumously in 1946 with a unique Special
Congressional Medal of Honor featuring a likeness of Mitchell in aviator’s
helmet and goggles.
Billy Mitchell
on the Tasks of
Tactical Air Power
Billy Mitchell’s definition of the air objectives
of the St.-Mihiel offensive
was one of the first systematic statements about
the role of what would
become tactical air power:
“We had three
tasks to accomplish:
one, to provide
accurate information
for the infantry and
adjustment of fire
for the artillery of
the ground troops;
second, to hold off
the enemy air forces
from interfering
with either our air
or ground troops;
and third, to bomb
the back areas so as
to stop the supplies
from the enemy and
hold up any movement
along the roads.”
--Alan F. Wilt,
Coming of Age: XIX TAC’s
Roles During the 1944
Dash Across France
.S
. Air
F
orce
Mu
seum
hoto p
r
ovided c
ourtesy
.S
. Air
F
orce
Mu
seum
“Billy” Mitchell’s special
Congressional Medal
of Honor, awarded
posthumously in 1946.
Page 26
Subject: LEADERS IN THE TACTICAL AIR WAR
- 24 -
GENERAL ELWOOD “PETE” QUESADA (1904-1993)
ters in Normandy on D-Day+1,
and moved it constantly to keep
up with the rapidly advancing
front lines.
Under Quesada’s leadership, IX TAC provided close
air support for the American
invasion forces. He was quick
to appreciate the command-andcontrol possibilities of radar
and radio coordination, and
originated the idea of enhancing air-ground cooperation by
sending Army Air Force liaison of cers
with ground forces, often in the lead
tank of a moving column. One of his biggest challenges was to convince “seat
of the pants” pilots to put their trust
in “newfangled gadgets.” His leadership
in directing IX TAC’s air campaign, his
support of General Omar Bradley’s First
Army after the breakout in Normandy, and
his leadership of American tactical air
power in the Battle of the Bulge were
major contributions to the Allied success
in Europe.
Promoted to the rank of Lt. General
in 1947, Quesada retired from the Air
Force in 1951 and was named rst head
of the Federal Aviation Administration
in 1959. He died in 1993.
A year after General Billy Mitchell
was ejected from the U.S. Army Air Corps,
21-year-old Elwood “Pete” Quesada won his
wings as a ying cadet. In WWII he would
gain fame as head of the IX Tactical Air
Command, a role in which he was both an
active leader and an innovator, adopting new technologies to re ne and perfect
air-ground teamwork.
The son of a Spanish businessman
and an Irish-American mother, Quesada
was born in Washington, D.C. in 1904.
As part of the crew of an Army Fokker
monoplane called the Question Mark, he
helped set a sustained ight record in
1929 by remaining aloft for over 150
hours, during which the plane was refueled in the air 42 times. In 1934 he
was chief pilot on the Army’s New YorkCleveland airmail route.
Quesada’s career moved rapidly once
WWII began. Promoted to Brigadier General
at the end of 1942, within months he led
the XII Fighter Command in North Africa
and ew combat missions in Tunisia,
Sicily, Corsica, and Italy.
In 1943 he was sent to England as
head of the IX Fighter Command to prepare for the Allied invasion of Normandy.
His primary responsibility was to teach
what he had learned in tactical operations in Italy. At the end of 1943, he
was put in charge of the IX Tactical
Air Command and directed its operations
in the eld. He set up his headquar-
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
General Elwood “Pete” Quesada, head of
the U.S. IX Tactical Air Command.
Page 27
Subject: LEADERS IN THE TACTICAL AIR WAR
- 25 -
GENERAL OTTO PAUL WEYLAND (1902-1979)
for a pounding by the tactical air commands. The port of Brest fell in part
due to the relentless assault of XIX TAC
on shipping and port facilities, and by
the end of December, Weyland’s ghter
bombers were attacking the enemy near
the German border.
Patton called Weyland “the best
damn general in the Air Corps,” and
offered this commendation for the
unwavering support of XIX TAC:
The superior efficiency and cooperation afforded this army by the
forces under your command is the
best example of the combined use of
air and ground troops I have ever
witnessed.
Due to the tireless efforts of
your flyers, large numbers of hostile vehicles and troop concentrations ahead of our advancing columns
have been harassed or obliterated.
The information passed directly to
the head of the columns from the air
has saved time and lives.
I am voicing the opinion of all
the officers and men in this army
when I express to you our admiration
and appreciation of your magnificent
efforts.
As head of the XIX Tactical Air
Command from 1944 to 1945, O.P. “Opie”
Weyland provided the perfect partner in
the air to George S. Patton’s hard-driving Third Army on the ground. Together
they made history during Patton’s dash
across France and into Germany after
the Normandy invasion. This was the high
point in a long and distinguished career
that began with a commission in the U.S.
Army Air Service in 1923 and culminated
with Weyland’s appointment as commanding
general of the United States Air Force’s
Tactical Air Command in 1954.
Weyland arrived in Europe as a new
brigadier general in November, 1943, and
four months later was assigned to head
XIX TAC. Under his leadership XIX TAC
wrote new chapters on the possibilities
of air-ground teamwork, becoming a fastmoving and hard-hitting force that kept
pace with and protected Patton’s armored
columns and lines of supply as the Third
army surged forward, at times covering
20 miles a day. Once the Allied armies
managed to break out of the invasion
beachhead, XIX TAC set records for mobility, moving its headquarters ve times
during the month of August.
In conjunction with General “Pete”
Quesada’s IX TAC, Weyland’s XIX TAC
pilots ew three, four, or even ve missions a day, bombarding road and rail
transport and bridges. German tanks,
trucks, guns, and troops all came in
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
DYNAMIC DUO: GENERAL O.P.
WEYLAND (RIGHT) WITH GENERAL
GEORGE S. PATTON.
Page 28
Subject: LEADERS IN THE TACTICAL AIR WAR
- 26 -
SIR TRAFFORD LEIGH-MALLORY (1892-1944)
In November 1944 Leigh-Mallory
was assigned to head Allied air
forces in Southeast Asia, but died
in a plane crash before he could
assume command.
Trafford Leigh-Mallory fought on
the ground in WWI until 1916, when he
transferred to the Royal Flying Corps.
By 1918 he commanded a squadron, and
by 1938 had risen to the rank of Air
Vice-Marshal. During the Battle of
Britain from 1940 to 1941, he led RAF
Fighter Command’s No. 12 Group in the
English Midlands.
In 1942 Leigh-Mallory became head
of RAF Fighter Command, and in 1943 he
was knighted and made Chief Air Marshal.
In 1944 he was named commander-in-chief
of the U.S. and British units that formed
the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces,
which included the U.S. Ninth Air Force
and the British Second Tactical Air
Force. In this role he was responsible
for the air component of air-ground
teamwork in the invasion of Europe. One
of his major achievements in this period
was the “Transportation Plan,” to devastate rail transport and facilities vital
to the German resupply effort. His collaboration with Allied leaders, including Bradley and Montgomery, provided some
high points in the Anglo-American military alliance.
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
TRAFFORD LEIGH-MALLORY
BRIEFS RAF PILOTS IN FRANCE,
SEPTEMBER 1944.
Page 29
Subject: LEADERS IN THE TACTICAL AIR WAR
- 27 -
SIR ARTHUR “MARY” CONINGHAM (1895-1948)
Arthur “Mary” Coningham was born
in Australia and educated in New Zealand.
This New Zealand connection earned him
the nickname “Maori,” which over the
years became “Mary.” He served with the
New Zealand Expeditionary Force in WWI
before transferring to the Royal Flying
Corps in 1916. Assigned to a squadron in
1917, by the end of the war he had scored
14 aerial victories and won numerous
decorations for gallantry.
Early in WWII Coningham led RAF
forces in support of Montgomery’s campaign in North Africa, and developed an
approach to air power ultimately adopted
by Eisenhower in Europe. He called for
the concentration of air power against
key objectives, under the command of
air of cers. His most successful application of this doctrine came in 1944 when,
as commander of the RAF’s Second Tactical
Air Force (2TAF) and the Advanced Allied
Expeditionary Air Force (AAEAF), he
unleashed 2TAF on German forces from
Normandy to the Battle of the Bulge and
beyond. In cooperation with the U.S. IX
and XIX TAC, Coningham’s airmen made
signi cant contributions to the success
of the Normandy invasion and Allied
victory.
In 1945 Coningham took
charge of the RAF Flying
Training Command. He retired
in 1947; the following year his
aircraft disappeared while on
a commercial ight to Bermuda.
Sir Arthur “Mary” Coningham.
Imperial War Museum Photo
Page 30
Subject: LEADERS IN THE TACTICAL AIR WAR
- 28 -
REICHSMARSCHALL HERMANN GÖRING (1893-1946)
With the collapse of the Reich,
Göring surrendered to American forces.
Ever ingratiating when it served his
purpose, he sang the praises of the
USAAF, while ignoring the dogged sixyear contribution of the RAF:
“The Allies must thank the
American Air Force for winning the
war. If it were not for the American
Air Force the invasion would not
have succeeded. Even if it had succeeded it could not have advanced
without the American Air Force.
Further, without the American Air
Force Von Rundstedt would not have
been stopped in the Ardennes. And
who knows but that the war would
still be going on.”
--Hermann Göring,
in Thomas A. Hughes,
Over Lord:
General Pete Quesada and the
Triumph of Tactical Air Power
in World War II
Göring’s career as an airman got
off to an impressive start in the First
World War, in which he amassed 22 aerial
victories and won his nation’s highest
decoration, the Pour le Mérite, popularly
called the “Blue Max.” He nished the
war in charge of the squadron formerly
led by WWI’s ace of aces, Manfred von
Richthofen, the “Red Baron.”
In postwar Germany Göring became
second only to Hitler in the hierarchy
of the Third Reich, and in 1935 was put
in charge of the resurgent Luftwaffe.
Early successes in Spain and during the
Blitzkrieg of 1939 to 1940 showed the
world what air power could do, but his
leadership had reached its pinnacle.
In the Luftwaffe, Göring had created
a magni cent ghting machine, but squandered it by refusing to adapt to changing circumstances. His management of the
Battle of Britain during 1940 and 1941
was a debacle of miscalculation for which
he blamed his own pilots. This pattern
continued as Germany’s military situation deteriorated and pilots came to view
the grandiose Reichsmarschall with contempt. Given this leadership vacuum at
the top, the responsibility for using the
air weapon with any degree of effectiveness fell to the eld commanders who had
to lead from the cockpit, and pilots who
were willing to push themselves to the
limit to achieve some success against
the enemy.
Hermann Göring.
Bettmann/Corbis
Page 31
Subject: LEADERS IN THE TACTICAL AIR WAR
- 29 -
FELDMARSCHALL WOLFRAM VON RICHTHOFEN (1895-1945)
A cousin of Germany’s “Red Baron,”
Wolfram von Richthofen became an early
exponent and practitioner of close air
support in Europe in the 1930s and in
WWII. He served in the Imperial army
until 1917, and then transferred to
the Flying Service. He won eight victories as a pilot in Jagdgeschwader
Richthofen, the ghter squadron named
for his famous cousin. After the war
he earned an engineering doctorate, and
returned to the newly reformed Luftwaffe
as a technical expert in 1933.
In 1936, von Richthofen became commander of a small air force sent to
Spain on behalf of the Fascists under
Francisco Franco. In 1938 he was sent
back to Spain in charge of the much
larger Legion Kondor, a force that tested
dive-bombing and other close air support
techniques that would later be part of
Germany’s Blitzkrieg, the “Lightning War”
of mobile forces.
Once WWII began, von Richthofen
served in the Polish, French, Balkan,
Greek, and Russian campaigns as commander of Fliegerkorps VIII. In this role
he became a foremost promoter and practitioner of close air support using the
dive-bombing capabilities of the Junkers
Ju 87 Stuka.
During the siege of Stalingrad von
Richthofen was tasked with supplying
the encircled Sixth Army. By 1942 he rose
to command the nearly 2,000 aircraft of
a Luft otte (“Air Fleet”), and, early
in 1943, Hitler made him the youngest eld marshal in the German army.
He assumed command of Luft otte 2 in
the Mediterranean, but in 1944 was diagnosed with a brain tumor, and ended his
active service late that year. He died in
July, 1945.
Wolfram von Richthofen.
Imperial War Museum Photo
Page 32
Subject: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Acknowledgements
As always, a lot of diligent
research has provided the realistic underpinnings for this latest
version of Microsoft Combat Flight
Simulator. In addition to reviewing some of the huge volume of
published materials documenting
the WWII air war (see Recommended
Reading in this handbook for a
sampling), we visited archive
and museum venues to conduct
research, ensuring that Combat
Flight Simulator remains “as real
as it gets.” We thank the following
organizations and people for their
assistance.
* * *
Air Force Historical Research
Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, USA.
Located on Maxwell Air Force
Base in Montgomery, Alabama, the
Air Force Historical Research
Agency (AFHRA) is the primary
repository of Air Force historical
materials. This archive contains
some 70,000,000 pages of original
Air Force documents dating back to
1918, including WWII-era unit histories, combat reports, and period
photos. The AFHRA also authors and
translates historical studies on
many aspects of military aviation,
including the WWII air war.
Archivists Lynn Gamma, Ronald
Myers, Dennis Case, Joe Caver,
and Milton Steele provided invaluable assistance in guiding us to
documents and photos that have
made a signicant contribution to
the depth, realism, and atmosphere
of CFS3.
* * *
The Me 262 Project, Everett,
Washington, USA.
We had the rare opportunity to
see, photograph, and record the rst
of the Me 262 Project’s newly built
replicas of this historic aircraft.
Our thanks to Jim Byron, and Bob
Hammer, and Chief Pilot Wolfgang
Czaia for providing access and
information that helped us model our
own simulated Me 262 for CFS3.
* * *
Kalamazoo Aviation History Museum,
Kalamazoo, Michigan, USA.
This museum is currently
restoring one of the Curtiss XP-55
Ascender prototypes. Registrar
Bill Painter and Executive Director
Robert Ellis provided some rare
reference material on this exotic
aircraft, including copies of the
original ight and erection manual
and maintenance manuals. Their help
has made our modeling of the Curtiss
XP-55 Ascender more accurate than it
otherwise could have been.
* * *
Pima Air and Space Museum, Tucson,
Arizona, USA.
The Pima Air and Space museum
maintains an enormous eet of aircraft and related documentation,
including an international archive
of data on the B-26 Marauder.
Archivist Stephanie Mitchell has
been extremely helpful in providing
access to copies of Marauder wind
tunnel and ight test data, the B-26
erection and maintenance manual,
pilot reports, and other details
that help make our Marauder “as real
as it gets” in CFS3.
* * *
Museum of Flight, Seattle,
Washington, USA.
Craig Spencer, Jennifer
Hawkins, and the Restoration Staff
of the Museum of Flight have provided access to their archive, and
have put us in touch with a number
of veteran pilots, including members of “Pappy” Boyington’s “Black
Sheep.” Information and input from
these resources have been instrumental in our efforts to accurately
model WWII aircraft and their ight
characteristics.
* * *
- 30 -
Page 33
Subject: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
- 31 -
Our Historical Advisors
No WWII ight simulation can be
complete without input from those
who ew the real thing, and we have
been fortunate to recruit the following two veteran aviators as historical advisors.
* * *
Jack Stafford left his native
New Zealand in January 1943, and
was assigned to the RAF’s 486 (New
Zealand) squadron as a Sergeant
Pilot in November. Based at
Tangmere, he ew Hawker Typhoons
in dive-bombing and ground-attack
operations. In 1944 he ew Hawker
Tempests on ghter sweeps, shipping strikes, and ground-attack
missions before D-Day. He shot down
eight V1 “buzz bombs” over southern England between June 19 and
August 29, 1944, including two
on the 4th of July. In September
1944 Jack ew ghter cover for
the airborne attack to capture
the Arnhem and Nijmegen bridges
in the Netherlands. As part of the
RAF Second Tactical Air Force in
Belgium, he attacked locomotives
in the campaign against enemy rail
transport. On Christmas Day 1944
he shot down a German Me 262 when
his squadron intercepted two of the
jets. He also shot down a Bf 109
south of Munster, one of a group
of seven orbiting over a group
of American P-47 Thunderbolts.
And on April 12, 1945 he shot down
a long-nosed Fw 190D. For these
achievements he was awarded the
Distinguished Flying Cross. Retired
but still vigorous, Jack lives
in Rotorua, New Zealand, where he
enjoys boating, water skiing, and
an occasional ight (now as a passenger) with local pilots.
* * *
American pilot Al Jones’ war
started early, when he became a
volunteer in the Royal Canadian Air
Force in 1940. He was assigned to
a squadron in England, then went to
North Africa where he ew 40 missions in RAF Wellington bombers.
In 1943 Al transferred to the USAAF
and was assigned to a night ghter
squadron, ying Bristol Beau ghters
before switching to the P-61 Black
Widow. He ew night intruder missions in Italy in 1944 (during the
German retreat up the Italian boot)
and in Belgium early in 1945. His
primary missions were to intercept
German nocturnal air activity, and
to stop road and rail movement of
enemy troops and equipment. After
the war Al became a test pilot with
Boeing and rose to become Chief
Pilot of Flight Crew Training.
* * *
J. Seal Photo
RNZAF Flight
Lieutenant Jack
Stafford, 1944..
Jack Stafford on Anzac
Day, 2000.
Photo courtesy Jack Stafford
Photo courtesy Al Jones
Photo courtesy Al Jones
USAAF night fighter
pilot Al Jones, 1944.
Al Jones on the Boeing
747 simulator.
Page 34
Subject: RECOMMENDED READING
- 32 -
Recommended Reading
into the life of a Thunderbolt
ghter-bomber pilot in the thick
of the European campaign, from D-Day
to the end of the war. What makes
Aanenson’s account so compelling
is its modest, yet resolute tone
in narrating dramatic and dangerous events. His humanity and his
sense of duty combined to make this
thoughtful man a veteran who still
struggles with some of his wartime experiences. For more information on Aanenson, or to acquire a
copy of this documentary, see http:
//pages.prodigy.com/ ghterpilot/
.
* * *
Air-Ground Teamwork on the Western
Front: The Role of the XIX Tactical
Air Command During August 1944
.
(An Interim Report Published by
Headquarters, Army Air Forces,
Washington, D.C., Office of the
Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Intelligence.)
This Army Air Force study provides a lucid overview of the hectic
and pivotal events in the tactical
air war during August, 1944, when
cooperation between American ground
and air forces de ned the modern
concept of tactical air power.
* * *
Army/Air Operations (1) General
Principles and Organization
(British
War Office, 26/GS Publications/
1127, 1944).
This wartime publication summarizes the British view of airground teamwork, and provides a
clear understanding of tactical air
objectives, especially when read
in conjunction with its American
counterpart,
War Department Field
Manual FM 100-20: Command and
Employment of Air Power (21 July
1943)
, described below.
* * *
Case Studies in the Development
of Close Air Support
, ed. Benjamin
Franklin Cooling. Washington, D.C.:
Office of Air Force History, United
States Air Force, 1990.
This Air Force University publication contains a series of studies on the evolution and techniques
of close air support. Its chapters
on Sicily and Italy and the battle
for France during WWII provide a
short but comprehensive view of the
tactics and techniques that made
close air support a vital ingredient
of the Allied victory.
* * *
Aanenson, Quentin,
A Fighter Pilot’s
Story
. Produced in association with
WETA-TV, Washington, D.C.
This 1994 PBS documentary pro-
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
German Junkers Ju 88 medium bomber.
Little schlepper, big gun.
Air Force Historical
Research Agency Photo
Page 35
Subject: RECOMMENDED READING
- 33 -
Colgan, Bill,
World War II
Fighter-Bomber Pilot
. Manhattan,
KS: Sunflower Press, 1988.
Colgan’s account of a
Thunderbolt ghter-bomber pilot’s
duties in Italy and Southern France
dramatically depicts the special
dangers of ying close air support.
* * *
Galland, Adolf,
The First and the
Last: The Rise and Fall of the
German Fighter Forces, 1938-1945
.
New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1954.
Galland’s history of the German
ghter forces gives a glimpse into
the workings of the Luftwaffe ghter
force during its best and worst
times. It also chronicles, in highly
readable fashion, the career of this
104-victory ace, who survived many a
scrape and lived to tell the tale.
* * *
Girbig, Werner,
Six Months to
Oblivion: The Defeat of the
Luftwaffe Fighter Force Over the
Western Front, 1944/1945
. Atglen,
PA: Schiffer Publishing, Ltd., 1991.
Girbig’s history of the
Luftwaffe’s nal months in WWII
throws a dramatic light on pilots
who fought on against all odds,
culminating with an exhaustive
account of the disastrous Operation
Bodenplatte on New Year’s Day, 1945.
* * *
Hallion, Richard P.,
Strike from the
Sky: The History of Battlefield Air
Attack, 1911-1945
. Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989.
Hallion’s study of battle eld
air attack puts the tactical air war
world of CFS3 into historical perspective. Starting with the earliest examples of the tactical use of
aircraft, it traces the development
of this technique from its beginnings as a novelty and sideshow to
its WWII high point as an essential
and war-winning component of the
air-ground team.
* * *
Hughes, Thomas A.,
Over Lord:
General Pete Quesada and the
Triumph of Tactical Air Power
in World War II
. New York: Crown
Press, 1995.
Hughes’ biography of General
“Pete” Quesada provides a detailed
analysis of the contribution his
IX Tactical Air Command made to
Allied victory. Its account of the
momentous events of 1944 and 1945
and the role of tactical air power
in shaping those events provides a
helpful perspective on the workings
of the Allied air-ground team.
* * *
Rust, Kenn C.,
The 9th Air Force in
World War II
. Fallbrook, CA: Aero
Publishers, 1967.
Rust provides a comprehensive
look at the workings of this key
tactical air force and its participation in the battle for France.
* * *
Shaw, Robert L.,
Fighter Combat
Tactics and Maneuvering
. Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1985.
Many consider Shaw’s textbook
on ghter tactics to be the bible
for those who seek combat success
in aircraft, either real or simulated.
* * *
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
Wrecked P-38 Lightning.
Page 36
Subject: RECOMMENDED READING
- 34 -
Sortehaug, Paul,
The Wild Winds: The
History of Number 486 RNZAF Fighter
Squadron with the RAF
. Dunedin, NZ:
Otago University Press, 1998.
Through interviews and photographs Sortehaug brings to life
the history of this aggressive team
of New Zealand Tempest pilots and
their contribution to Allied success
in the air war over Europe. Jack
Stafford, one of our Combat Flight
Simulator historical advisors, ew
Hawker Tempests in 486 Squadron, and
some of his most colorful experiences are narrated here.
* * *
Spick, Mike,
The Ace Factor: Air
Combat and the Role of Situational
Awareness
. Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1988.
In this study Mike Spick
focuses on a key factor for ghter
pilot success: maintaining a constant awareness of an ever-changing situation and reacting to the
threats and opportunities of the
moment.
* * *
Spick, Mike,
Allied Fighter Aces
of World War II: The Air Combat
Tactics and Techniques of World War
II
. London: Greenhill Books, and
Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books,
1997.
Spick, Mike,
Luftwaffe Fighter Aces:
The Jagdflieger and Their Combat
Tactics and Techniques
. London:
Greenhill Books, 1996.
In these two volumes Spick
demysti es the tactics and techniques of combat pilots. His discussion of the aircraft and the men
who ew them, and his description of
air combat maneuvers all contribute
to this excellent overview of the
ghter pilot’s job in WWII.
* * *
War Department Field Manual
FM 100-20: Command and Employment
of Air Power (U.S. War Department,
21 July 1943)
.
This document sums up what the
U.S. Army Air Force had learned
about air power and its application
up to the middle of WWII. It provides an invaluable understanding
of USAAF objectives and the techniques used to attain them.
* * *
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
Heavy bomber contrails mark the way to
Germany.
German patrol boat with triple 20-mm
antiaircraft guns.
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
Page 37
Subject: RECOMMENDED READING
- 35 -
Wilt, Dr. Alan F.,
Coming of Age:
XIX TAC’s Roles During the 1944
Dash Across France
. http://www.air
power.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/
aureview/1985/mar-apr/wilt.html
Dr. Wilt prepared this study
for the Air War College, Maxwell
AFB, Alabama. Focusing on Patton’s
dash across France, supported by
Gen. O.P. Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air
Command, it clari es the missions
and doctrines that de ned the historic success of XIX in the crucial
months of August and September,
1944.
* * *
Smith, J.R. and Kay, A.L.,
German
Aircraft of the Second World War
.
Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation
Publishing Company of America, 1972.
Swanborough, F.G. and Bowers, P.,
United States Military Aircraft
Since 1909
. Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989.
Thetford, Owen,
Aircraft of
the Royal Air Force Since 1918
.
Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation
Publishing Company of America, 1988.
These three volumes cover aircraft own by the Luftwaffe, U.S.
forces, and the RAF in admirable
detail. Their drawings, photos, and
comprehensive text make them excellent, in-depth research tools.
* * *
The “Osprey Aircraft of the
Aces” series, which includes the
following volumes:
Morgan, Hugh, and Weal, John,
German
Jet Aces of World War 2
(Osprey
Aircraft of the Aces, vol. 17).
London: Osprey Publishing, 1998.
Price, Alfred,
Late Marque Spitfire
Aces 1942-45
(Osprey Aircraft of
the Aces, vol. 5). London: Osprey
Publishing, 1995.
Scutts, Jerry,
Mustang Aces of the
Ninth & Fifteenth Air Forces & the
RAF
(Osprey Aircraft of the Aces,
vol. 7). London: Osprey Publishing,
1998.
Scutts, Jerry,
P-47 Thunderbolt Aces
of the ETO/MTO
. (Osprey Aircraft of
the Aces, vol. 24). London: Osprey
Publishing, 1998.
Scutts, Jerry,
P-47 Thunderbolt
Aces of the Ninth and Fifteenth
Air Forces
. (Osprey Aircraft of
the Aces, vol. 30). London: Osprey
Publishing, 1999.
Stanaway, John, P-38 Lightning Aces
of the ETO/MTO. (Osprey Aircraft of
the Aces, vol. 19). London: Osprey
Publishing, 1998.
Thomas, Chris,
Typhoon and Tempest
Aces of World War 2
. (Osprey
Aircraft of the Aces, vol. 27).
London: Osprey Publishing, 1999.
Weal, John,
Bf 109 F/G/K Aces on
the Western Front
. (Osprey Aircraft
of the Aces, vol. 29). London:
Osprey Publishing, 1999.
Weal, John,
Focke-Wulf Fw 190
Aces of the Western Front
(Osprey
Aircraft of the Aces, vol. 9).
London: Osprey Publishing, 1996.
This series, published by
London-based Osprey Publishing,
includes a volume on the aces
who ew every major ghter aircraft in each theater of WWII.
The authors are leading experts
who have published numerous titles,
and each volume includes excellent drawings, photos, and color
plates of the unique aircraft
own by individual aces. These are
great reference books, except that
they lack an index, so expect your
copies to become well-thumbed as
you discover, and rediscover, key
information.
* * *
Two B-26 medium bombers with “invasion stripes”
to discourage fire from nervous Allied gunners.
Air Force Historical
Research Agency Photo
Page 38
Subject: GLOSSARY
- 36 -
Glossary
airspeed: The rate at which an air-
craft moves through the surrounding
air. Pilots use several types of
airspeed during ight. For example,
indicated airspeed (IAS) is the
speed shown on the airspeed indicator (usually in knots). Pilots
use IAS to control an aircraft and
manage its performance. Calibrated
airspeed (CAS) is IAS corrected for
instrument and installation error.
True airspeed (TAS) is IAS corrected
for changes in atmospheric temperature and pressure. Pilots use TAS
to solve navigation problems.
A
AA, AAA: Antiaircraft re, antiair-
craft artillery.
abschuss: (German) A ghter victory;
literally a “shoot down.”
Abschwung: (Luftwaffe) An evasion
maneuver allowing a pilot under
attack to reverse direction, trading altitude for speed. Consists of
a half-roll followed by a half loop.
(USAAF) Split-S. (RAF) Half-roll.
Can also be used to attack an aircraft ying in the opposite direction at a lower altitude.
ace: Since WWI, a pilot who has shot
down at least ve enemy aircraft.
aerodrome: (RAF) An air eld or air-
base; includes air eld and related
facilities. From the French, but
adopted into English and sometimes
(later) called an “airdrome.”
ailerons: Movable control surfaces
on the outer trailing edge of an
aircraft’s wings that cause it to
bank or roll left or right.
air force: (USAAF) A ghter unit
consisting of 16 ghter groups, ~768
aircraft.
airspeed indicator: The instrument
that displays an aircraft’s speed
relative to the air in which it is
moving.
altimeter: A highly sensitive
barometer which shows an aircraft’s
altitude above mean sea level by
measuring atmospheric pressure.
angle of attack: The angle between
the wing and the oncoming air ow-the relative wind. The angle of
attack is related to the direction
in which an aircraft is moving, not
to the angle the wing makes with
the horizon. As angle of attack
increases, so does the amount of
lift a wing produces.
Ami: (German) Slang for American.
angels: Altitude expressed in thou-
sands of feet.
Anzac: (British Commonwealth) A
military man from Australia or New
Zealand (originally a WWI acronym
for the Australian and New Zealand
Army Corps).
API: (U.S.) Armor-Piercing
Incendiary ammunition.
Ascender: A Curtiss XP-55 rear-
engine ghter with pusher propeller.
ASP: Antisubmarine patrol.
ASW: Antisubmarine warfare.
augered in: Crashed.
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
Ground crew attaches a fuel drop tank to a
P-47 Thunderbolt.
Page 39
Subject: GLOSSARY
- 37 -
B
B-25: A North American Mitchell
twin-engine medium bomber.
B-26: A Martin Marauder twin-engine
medium bomber.
bail out: To parachute out of an
aircraft.
bandit: (USAAF) Enemy ghter.
bank: The minor rotation of an air-
craft about its longitudinal (nose
to tail) axis, causing one wing or
the other to dip or rise; controlled
by the ailerons; see roll.
Bf 109: A single-engine ghter
designed for the Bayerische
Flugzeugwerke by Willy
Messerschmitt.
bingo: (U.S.) The point in a mission
at which remaining fuel dictates an
immediate return to base.
Blitzkrieg: (German) “Lightning
war”--the highly mobile form of warfare used most successfully by the
Wehrmacht between 1939 and 1941.
bocage: The Norman hedgerow coun-
try, a 20-mile swath of small elds
enclosed by towering ancient hedges
south of the D-Day invasion beaches.
bogey: (USAAF) Slang for an uniden-
ti ed aircraft.
Bomphoon: RAF pilot slang for a
bomb-carrying Hawker Typhoon.
boresight: The aligning of guns and
gunsights. Having a target in perfect ring position is “boresighting
him.”
“bought the farm”: Crashed.
Originated when USAAF pilots were
obliged to pay for damages incurred
after crashing on private property.
bounce: To attack unsuspecting enemy
aircraft, usually from above and
behind.
break!: A warning to friendly ghter
aircraft that they are under attack
and must break formation to take
immediate evasive action.
bunk ying: Hashing over (discuss-
ing) a mission in the barracks.
buster: (U.S. terminology) To pro-
ceed at best-sustained speed.
C
CAP: Combat Air Patrol (over/in the
vicinity of friendly forces).
CAVU: The weather term for Ceiling
and Visibility Unlimited.
Chandelle: This evasive maneuver
is simply an abrupt climbing turn
almost to the point of stalling.
It allows the pilot to quickly gain
altitude while changing direction.
chattanooga: (USAAF) Air-to-ground
attacks on rail targets.
circus: (USAAF, RAF) A ruse, using
many ghters and few or no bombers,
to decoy enemy ghters.
close air support: The air objec-
tive in air-ground teamwork;
low-level operations to remove
obstacles (such as enemy tanks,
troops, and guns) from the path of
friendly troops on the ground.
close escort: A ghter mission in
which the ghters must remain in
close contact with the bombers they
are escorting, not searching for or
pursuing enemy ghters.
CO: Commanding Of cer.
Air Force Historical
Research Agency Photo
German halftrack mounts a 37 mm
antiaircraft gun.
Page 40
Subject: GLOSSARY
combat box: (USAAF) A large, mutu-
ally defensive heavy bomber formation, generally consisting of 18,
27, 36, or 54 aircraft; devised by
Curtis LeMay.
crate: (USAAF) Slang for plane.
D
D-Day: (USAAF, before the Allied
invasion of Europe 6/6/44) The
planned day on which a major
operation was to be launched (at
“H-Hour”). After the successful invasion, D-Day came to mean
the famous Sixth of June, when the
Allies landed in France.
dead reckoning: The navigation of
an airplane solely by computations
based on airspeed, course, heading,
wind direction and speed, ground
speed, and elapsed time. The term
derives from “deduced” reckoning.
Also known as “ded reckoning.”
deadstick: A powerless landing.
“the deck”: Ground (or sea) level;
the surface over which you are
ying.
deection: The angle of a target
aircraft relative to the aircraft
shooting at it.
dicke Autos: The Luftwaffe code word
for Allied heavy bombers; literally,
“fat cars.”
division: (USAAF) 16 aircraft (two
eight-plane sections).
Do 335: A Dornier “Pfeil” twin-
engine ghter.
dumbo: An air-sea rescue aircraft.
E
element: (USAAF) A two-plane for-
mation; equivalent of the German
Rotte.
elevators: Movable control sur-
faces on an aircraft’s horizontal
tail surface that control its pitch
(nose-up or nose-down attitude).
ETA: Estimated Time of Arrival.
ETD: Estimated Time of Departure.
ETO: European Theater of Operations.
F
feathering: Aligning stopped propel-
ler blades with ight path to reduce
drag and stop rotation.
ghter group: (RAF) A ghter orga-
nization consisting of ~350 ghter
aircraft, about 20 squadrons.
(USAAF) 48 ghter aircraft.
ghter sweep: (RAF) An offensive
sortie without escort responsibilities. (USAAF) Rodeo. (Luftwaffe)
Freie Jagd (“free chase”).
nger four: (RAF) A four-aircraft
formation. (Luftwaffe) Schwarm.
(USAAF) Flight.
rewall: The partition immedi-
ately aft of the engine. Opening
the throttle to maximum position is
“going to the rewall.”
“sh”: (U.S.) Slang for a torpedo.
ak: Antiaircraft re; acronym from
the German FlugAbwehrKanonen. Light
ak batteries might consist of multiple 20- to 40-mm cannon. Heavy
ak guns ranged from 75 to 150 mm,
throwing shells that exploded above
20,000 feet, spraying out 15-30
pounds of steel shrapnel.
aps: Movable control surfaces
on the inner trailing edge of an
aircraft’s wings that increase lift
when deployed, usually for takeoff
or landing.
are: To pull back on the stick
just prior to landing. Flaring
bleeds off airspeed and makes sure
your rear wheel touches rst. In
carrier landings, aring also helps
put your tail hook low enough to
catch the cable.
“at-hatting”: (U.S.) Making very
low, spectacular, unauthorized
ights; showing off.
ight: (USAAF) A unit consisting of
four aircraft (two two-plane elements); also called a division.
- 38 -
Page 41
Subject: GLOSSARY
- 39 -
ipper turn: (U.S.) A sharp, steeply
banked turn.
Fw 190: Focke-Wulf “Würger” single
engine ghter.
free chase: (RAF) An offensive
ghter sweep without escort responsibilities, used to draw up enemy
ghters.
freie Jagd: (German) Literally
“free chase”--an offensive ghter
sweep without escort responsibilities, used to draw up enemy ghters.
(USAAF) Rodeo.
full bore: Maximum engine power.
fuselage: The body of an airplane
that holds the crew and passengers
or cargo. From the French fuselé,
for “spindle-shaped.”
G
Gs: A measurement of the load
factor, or apparent gravity, experienced by an aircraft during ight.
One G represents the force of gravity exerted on a body at rest.
When an aircraft climbs, turns,
or changes speed, it experiences
G forces. For example, a level turn
with a 60-degree bank imposes a 2G
load on an airplane and its occupants.
Go 229: A Gotha twin-engine jet
ghter bomber, designed by the
Horten brothers as the Ho IX
and manufactured by the Gothaer
Waggonfabrik; thus assigned the
of cial designation Go 229.
group: A ghter unit consisting of
(USAAF) 48 aircraft or (RAF) up to
350 aircraft.
Gruppe: (Luftwaffe) A ghter unit
consisting of 30-40 aircraft.
Gustav: Luftwaffe slang for the “G”
model of the Messerschmitt Bf 109
ghter (the E and F models were
called “Emil” and “Franz”).
H
half-roll: (RAF): An evasion
maneuver allowing a pilot under
attack to reverse direction, trading altitude for speed. Consists
of a half-roll followed by a half
loop. (USAAF) Split-S. (Luftwaffe)
Abschwung. Can also be used to
attack an aircraft ying in the
opposite direction at a lower altitude.
hangar ying: Pilots comparing
ideas and impressions about ying
speci c aircraft. (See also bunk
ying.)
heading: The direction in which the
aircraft is pointed, usually referenced to magnetic north.
“hit the silk”: Parachuting; bail-
ing out.
“Holy Moses”: U.S. pilot slang for
the ve-inch High-Velocity Aircraft
Rocket (HVAR), re ecting its
destructive power and pilot enthusiasm.
homeplate: (U.S. slang.) A pilot’s
“home” air eld.
Horrido!: (Luftwaffe) Fighter code
word: “I’ve shot down an enemy aircraft!”
Hun: (RAF, USAAF) Slang for
Germans.
HVAR: (U.S.) High-Velocity Aircraft
Rockets ( ve-inch diameter); slang
name “Holy Moses.”
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
Bad news for Allied aircraft: a German
88 mm Flak gun and crew.
Page 42
Subject: GLOSSARY
- 40 -
I
IFF: Identi cation, Friend or Foe;
an electronic system for identifying
friendly or hostile aircraft.
Immelmann: An aerobatic maneuver
in which an airplane reverses its
direction while gaining altitude
(said to have been invented by WWI
ace Max Immelmann). The maneuver
begins with a half loop, at the top
of which the pilot rolls the plane
upright.
Indianer: (German) Fighter slang
for American ghters; literally
“Indians.”
intruder mission: An offensive,
small-scale sortie over enemy territory to destroy enemy aircraft
near their own air elds while they
are taking off or landing. A secondary aim is to dislocate the enemy
defense. Mostly, but not always,
own at night.
J
Jabo: (German) A ghter bomber, from
Jagdbomber.
jackpot: (USAAF) Air-to-ground
attacks on German air elds.
Jagd ieger: (German) A ghter pilot.
Jagdgeschwader: (German) A ghter
unit consisting of ~120 aircraft.
Jagdstaffel: (German) A ghter
squadron consisting of 10-12 aircraft.
Jagdwaffe: (German) A Luftwaffe
ghter force, consisting of singleengine ghters and twin-engine
Me 110 and Ju 86 “destroyers.”
Jim Crow: (RAF) Reconnaissance
ights over the English Channel
in search of shipping targets for
attack by ghters and ghter bombers.
Ju 88: A Junkers twin-engine medium
bomber.
“Jug”: (U.S.) The nickname for the
Republic P-47 Thunderbolt ghter,
due either to the plane’s resemblance to a milk jug, or as a commentary about its squat, blunt-nosed
appearance. The British believed
it to be an abbreviation for
“Juggernaut” because of the P-47’s
massive power, size, and weight.
K
Katschmarek: (German) Slang for
wingman, the pilot of the trailing aircraft in a two-plane Rotte
who is required to stick with his
leader (i.e., following his lead).
Literally, “a dim-witted recruit.”
Kette: (German) A v-shaped three-
plane formation. (RAF) A “Vic.”
An airshow formation used early in
the Battle of Britain and replaced
by the “Finger Four” or Schwarm
formation.
KIA: Killed in Action.
kite: (RAF) Slang for plane.
knot: Short for nautical miles per
hour. One nautical mile (nm or NM)
= 6,076 ft (1,852 m) or about 1.15
statute miles per hour. Therefore
100 knots equals about 115 mph
(185 km/h), 150 knots equals about
172 mph (278 km/h), and 200 knots
equals about 230 mph (370 km/h).
Note that “knots” by de nition
assumes “per hour.”
Air Force Historical
Research Agency Photo
German halftrack with four-barreled 20 mm
Flakvierling can ruin a pilot’s day.
Page 43
Subject: GLOSSARY
L
landing gear: The wheels, struts,
and other equipment that an aircraft
uses to land or maneuver on the
ground.
LCI: Landing Craft, Infantry.
LCT: Landing Craft, Tank.
lift: The upward force produced by
an airfoil such as a wing interacting with the air. Lift acts at right
angles to the relative wind or the
aircraft’s ight path. Lift, one
of the four fundamental forces in
ight, is opposed by weight.
Lightning: A Lockheed P-38 twin-
engine ghter.
loop: An aerobatic maneuver in
which an aircraft ies in a complete
vertical circle. An outside loop,
begun at the top of the circle, is
considerably more difcult to perform, because the pilot encounters
negative G-forces throughout the
maneuver.
LST: Landing Ship, Tank.
Lufbery: A (WWI) defensive maneu-
ver in which several ghters circle
for mutual protection. Because of
the power, speed and repower of
WWII aircraft, this maneuver was not
very successfully employed in either
theater.
Luftotte: (German) An air eet,
consisting of ~350 ghter aircraft
and ~1,500 bombers.
Luftwaffe: The German air force.
LVT: Landing Vehicle, Tracked.
M
magneto: A device that creates
an electric current by rotating a
magnet. The crankshaft turns the
magnetos, which provide the electrical energy to re the spark
plugs. This arrangement ensures
that the spark plugs re even if the
aircraft’s battery and electrical
system fail.
Marauder: A Martin B-26 twin-engine
medium bomber.
Marsden Matting: Pierced Steel
Planking (also called “PSP”) used to
create temporary airstrips; notoriously slick in wet conditions.
meatwagon: Slang for ambulance.
Me 262: A Messerschmitt “Schwalbe”
twin-engine jet ghter (also built
as the “Sturmvogel” ghter bomber).
MIA: Missing in Action.
Mitchell: A North American B-25
twin-engine medium bomber.
“Mossie”: (RAF) A nickname for the
de Havilland Mosquito bomber, also
called the “Wooden Wonder” for its
plywood construction.
“mush”: The tendency for a diving
aircraft to keep losing altitude
despite being pulled into a “noseup” attitude.
Mustang: A North American P-51
ghter.
N
noball: Missions against V 1 and
V 2 rocket sites.
nose-over: To rapidly lower the
nose relative to the horizon;
decrease pitch. On the ground, nose
over refers to an aircraft tipping
forward or doing a somersault.
O
ops: Shorthand for “Operations.”
“Fighter ops” refers to ghter
operations in general. Each mission
is called a Fighter Operation, or
“F.O.”
orbit: (RAF) To circle a given
point or present position.
P
P-38: A Lockheed Lightning twin-
engine ghter.
P-47: A Republic single-engine
Thunderbolt ghter.
P-51: A North American Mustang
single-engine ghter.
P-80: A Lockheed Shooting Star
single-engine jet ghter.
pancake: The radio code for “land
immediately.”
- 41 -
Page 44
Subject: GLOSSARY
- 42 -
pauke-pauke: (German) The ghter
code word for “Attack!” Literally,
“rat-a-tat.”
Pfeil: (German) “Arrow”; the Dornier
Do 335 twin-engine ghter.
pitch: An aircraft’s rotation about
its lateral (wing tip to wing tip)
axis, determining its nose-up or
nose-down attitude; controlled by
the elevators.
pitot tube: A small metal probe,
usually attached to an aircraft’s
wing, that measures ram air pressure. This data is used to calculate aircraft speed. The pitot tube
usually has a heater to prevent ice
from blocking the device. (Named
after Henri Pitot (1695-1771),
a French scientist.)
POW: Prisoner of War.
PSP: Pierced Steel Planking, also
known as Marsden Matting--used to
create airstrips; notoriously slick
in wet conditions.
PTO: Paci c Theater of Operations.
R
R.A.F.: Britain’s Royal Air Force.
ramrod: (USAAF, RAF) A bomber-escort
mission.
ranger: Operations of squadron or
wing strength (12-36 aircraft),
as free-lance intrusions over enemy
territory, the main aim being to
wear down the enemy ghter force.
razorback: Describes early ver-
sions of the P-47 and P-51 ghters in which the aft fuselage deck
rises behind the pilot’s head and
the canopy can provide only limited
rearward vision. Eventually these
were replaced by “bubble canopy”
versions in which the aft fuselage
deck was cut down to the level of
the pilot’s shoulders.
relative wind: The speed and direc-
tion of air striking an airfoil;
that is, the air ow caused by
an aircraft or airfoil’s movement
through the air.
revetment: A horseshoe-shaped
embankment used for protecting
parked aircraft against bomb blasts.
rhubarb: (USAAF, RAF) A small-scale
harassing ghter operation against
ground targets.
roadstead: Operations by ghters,
or bombers escorted by ghters, to
attack by dive-bombing or low-level
bombing attacks on ships at sea or
in harbor.
rockoon: RAF pilot slang for a
rocket- ring Hawker Typhoon.
rodeo: (USAAF) Offensive sortie
without escort responsibilities,
used to draw up enemy ghters.
(RAF) Fighter sweep. (German) Freie
Jagd (“free chase”).
roll: An aircraft’s rotation about
its longitudinal (nose to tail)
axis, controlled by the ailerons.
See also: bank.
Rotte: (German) A minimum ghting
unit of two aircraft; leader and
wingman.
rudder: The movable control sur-
face on the vertical portion of an
aircraft’s tail (attached to the
xed portion, or n); controls the
aircraft’s yaw, causing the plane
to skid left or right.
RV: Rendezvous.
Air Force Historical Research Agency Photo
German troop carrier with 37 mm antiaircraft
gun.
Page 45
Subject: GLOSSARY
- 43 -
S
“saddle, in the”: (U.S.) Being imme-
diately behind a target aircraft and
ready to attack.
sandwich: A tactic by which two
ghters turn to keep an attacking ghter between them, making
the would-be attacker the target.
saunter: (RAF) Minimum cruising
speed.
Schwalbe: “Swallow”; a Messerschmitt
Me 262 twin-engine jet ghter (also
built as the “Sturmvogel” ghter
bomber).
Schwarm: (German) A four-aircraft
formation consisting of two Rotten
(see Rotte).
scramble: (RAF) To jump up, run to
the aircraft, and take off in the
shortest possible time.
section: (USAAF) A unit consisting
of eight aircraft (two four-plane
ights).
Shooting Star: A Lockheed P-80 jet
ghter.
Skytrain: (U.S.) The military (C-47)
version of the Douglas DC-3 transport.
slewing: In Microsoft® Combat Flight
Simulator and Flight Simulator, a
method of rapidly changing aircraft
position, direction, location, or
altitude without ying there in
real time.
sortie: A combat mission; originally
an armed attack made from a place
surrounded by enemy forces.
Spit re: A supermarine single-engine
ghter.
splash: (U.S. slang) Enemy aircraft
shot down into the water.
Split-S: (USAAF) An evasion maneu-
ver allowing a pilot under attack to
reverse direction, trading altitude
for speed. Consists of a half-roll
followed by a half loop. (RAF) halfroll. (Luftwaffe) Abschwung. Can
also be used to attack an aircraft
ying in the opposite direction at
a lower altitude.
squadron: A British or American
ghter unit consisting of 12 (sometimes 16) aircraft.
Staffel: (German) A squadron of
10-12 aircraft.
stra ng: (RAF/USAAF) To attack a
position or troops on the ground
with machine gun or cannon re from
a low- ying aircraft. Adapted into
English from a WWI German slogan,
“Gott strafe England” (“God punish
England”).
strike: Combat ight against ground
or sea targets.
stud: (USAAF) A dive-bombing mis-
sion.
Stuka: A dive bomber (speci cally,
the famous Junkers Ju 87 dive
bomber); from Sturzkampf ugzeug.
Sturmbock: (German) A specially
armed and armored version of the
Focke-Wulf Fw 190 ghter carrying 30 mm cannon and 21 cm rockets.
Literally, “battering-ram.”
Sturmvogel: “Stormbird”; the ghter
bomber version of the Messerschmitt
Me 262 twin-engine jet ghter.
sweep: An offensive formation ight
of ghters or ghter bombers, made
with the object of drawing the
enemy ghter force into combat.
Air Force Historical
Research Agency Photo
Watch out for this one: a Panzer IV tank
chassis with quadruple 20 mm flak guns.
Page 46
Subject: GLOSSARY
- 44 -
T
TAC: (USAAF) Tactical Air Command
(as in IX TAC and XIX TAC).
TAF: The British Tactical Air Force
(as in 2TAF).
Tail End Charlie: The last plane in
a formation.
Tallyho!: (RAF) Am about to attack
(or have sighted enemy).
Tempest: A Hawker single-engine
ghter bomber, successor to the
Typhoon.
Thunderbolt: A Republic P-47 ghter.
Tommy: (German) Slang for
Englishman.
Typhoon: A Hawker single-engine
ghter bomber.
U
USAAF: The United States Army Air
Forces; until 1947 the Air Force was
part of the U.S. Army, not a separate service branch.
V
Valhalla: (German) A large formation
of aircraft.
VE Day: “Victory in Europe” day,
5/8/45, when the Germans surrendered
unconditionally to the Allies.
Vampire: A de Havilland single-
engine jet ghter.
vector: (RAF) The course the pilot
is following.
Vic: A basic British three-plane
formation, in the shape of a “V.”
Vmax: Sustained top speed in level
ight.
W
WAFS: (U.S.) Women’s Auxiliary
Ferrying Squadron.
WASPs: (U.S.) Women Airforce Service
Pilots.
waveoff: A signal from the landing
signal of cer not to land aboard
the carrier, but to go around for
another try.
Wehrmacht: The German army.
WIA: Wounded in Action.
windmilling: The action of a freely
rotating propeller on a dead or
stalled engine.
wing: (RAF) A ghter unit consisting
of three squadrons (36 aircraft).
(USAAF) A unit consisting of several
48-plane groups.
wingman: (RAF, USAAF) The pilot of
the trailing aircraft in a two-plane
element; required to stick with his
leader (i.e., following his lead).
Würger: “Shrike”; A Focke-Wulf
Fw 190 single-engine ghter.
X
XP-55: A Curtiss Ascender rear-
engine ghter with a pusher propeller.
Y
yaw: An aircraft’s rotation in the
horizontal plane, about its vertical axis (turning left or right);
controlled by the rudder.
P-38 Lightning.
Air Force Historical
Research Agency Photo
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