Improving safety compliance
and cost-effectiveness of
Burner Management Systems
Abstract
Regardless of the industry, safety must be a foremost concern wherever fuel
is burned – furnaces, ovens, kilns, dryers, boilers and other kinds of facilities.
Explosions can be deadly, costly and disruptive. 2015 revisions in U.S. National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards raised burner safety minimums.
At the same time, integrations of safety PLCs into burner management
systems – at nearly the same cost as regular PLCs – have boosted safety levels
even further to meet SIL 2 and SIL 3 requirements. In addition, these advanced
systems can offer improved operating efficiency, plus visibility via data feeds to
higher-level DCS systems and easy-to-use, human-machine interfaces (HMIs),
accessed remotely via tablets and even smartphones. These are among the key
benefits upgrading to these systems can provide.
Author
Ron Sustich
Automation Consultant (BMS)
Siemens Industry, Inc.
usa.siemens.com/safety
White paper | Safety Compliance and Cost-effectiveness
Burner Management Systems:
An introduction
prevent accidents, operating
conditions must be monitored at
all times. If a malfunction does occur,
One of the most widespread process
safety applications used throughout
the chemical, petrochemical and oil
and gas industries is a burner
management system (BMS). These
systems are used in all boiler designs –
water-tubes, fire-tubes and flex-tubes –
operators need quick, safe and reliable
ways to shut down the furnace or
boiler operation. Then they must
have the means to diagnose and fix
problems as quickly as possible, in
order to minimize process, production
or heating disruptions.
and in furnaces, ovens and kilns as well
as flares. Wherever a flame is present
in an industrial environment, safety
standards today require a BMS.
The purpose of a BMS is to prevent
explosions and to control the
combustion process in a productive,
cost-effective and safe manner.
Compared to older systems, an
advanced BMS will provide operators
and maintenance personnel with a
great deal of relevant information
about operating conditions and
diagnostics. Newer systems also
provide higher levels of safety and
system security as well as traceability.
According to research from the AIS
Forensic Testing Laboratory, Inc., the
top three causes of boiler accidents
are, in order: maintenance (61.2%);
operations (22.4%); and design (8.2%).
What these data suggest is that
accidents can be avoided if these
facilities are properly operated and
maintained, assuming the BMS is
designed properly in the first
place. Advanced BMS designs will
incorporate safety PLCs, which, along
with built-in safety features, can
provide a wide range of operating data,
including predictive maintenance.
Safety PLCs will be covered in greater
detail in the next few pages.
In 2015 the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) released its fire
safety standard, NFPA 86, that covers
furnaces and allows the use of safety
PLCs. Related to NFPA 86 are two other
standards: NFPA 85 for boilers;
and NFPA 87 for thermal fluid heaters.
Burner management vs. combustion
control. What’s the difference between
burner and combustion controls?
Burner management control monitors
the safety devices, such as pressure
switches, low gas pressure, high gas
pressure, water level and so on, and
controls the safety shut-off valves like
the pilot valves, main gas valves and
oil valves. Combustion controls, on
the other hand, manage the fuel and
air mixture controls as well as the
water controls in the case of boilers.
A brief history of Burner
Management Systems
Early BMSs were called “Light, Observe
Wherever a flame is present in an industrial
environment, safety standards today require a
BMS. Examples include boilers – water-tubes,
fire-tubes and flex tubes – and furnaces, ovens
and kilns as well as flares.
Top three causes of boiler accidents.
BMS safety is paramount because, in
many ways, furnace and boiler fires
are explosions waiting to happen. To
and Pray” systems. That meant an
operator would light a torch, put it in
the furnace to light the fire and then
everyone prayed that all should go well.
Not surprisingly, explosions and related
injuries were common in those days.
Next came BMSs with flame scanners.
These early systems used relays and
timers. They were simple systems and
provided very little information
regarding system shutdowns or
troubleshooting information. Fireye
and Honeywell were among the first
branded types of these systems.
Early BMSs were called “Light, Observe and
Pray” systems.
The next generation of systems were
microprocessor-based systems. These
systems include basic single- or twoline operator displays. Their displays,
however, only provided limited
amounts of operating information
and not the diagnostics available with
today’s human-machine interfaces
(HMIs) or even some of the three-line
or multi-line displays. They used simple
burner management logic and had
limited capability and flexibility.
Although they complied with safety
codes at that time, those codes were
not so rigorous as they are today.
These systems are used today mostly
in the fire-tube boiler market, but they
are limited in their capabilities. Their
display modules show sequences of
events, indicating their operational
stages, such as the light-off sequence
and current status.
For simple types of boilers and fuelburning systems, these BMS solutions
may be a good approach. However, if
a BMS requires non-standard features,
such as special-limit devices or safety
devices, then pre-packaged systems
are limited in what capabilities they
can provide. For example, they are not
usually appropriate for multi-burner
applications or for redundancy
requirements. They also cannot easily
communicate with other systems such
as building management systems or
manufacturing execution systems.
White paper | Safety Compliance and Cost-effectiveness
Finally, many of the operating
strategies and capabilities required
to accommodate various options that
water-tube boilers need cannot be
accommodated with these types
of BMSs.
Comparison of microprocessor
and PLC-based BMS solutions
Microprocessor-based BMS…
• Provides limited flexibility
• Is not appropriate for multi-burner systems
• Has a single flame scanner
• Yields limited information regarding status
and shutdowns
• Difficult networking communications
PLC-based BMS…
• Provide great flexibility
• Extend communications capabilities
dramatically
• Have both single- and multiple-burner
capability
• Provide diagnostics, if programmed into
the PLC
• Are much easier to troubleshoot
• Allow use of various flame scanners
The rise of the PLC-based BMS
Of all BMS designs, PLC-based systems
offer the most capabilities and
benefits, especially implementation
flexibility. When these systems first
debuted, they replaced relays and
timers, which helped reduce wiring,
and could be programmed. Early PLCbased BMS solutions often came with
panel indicator lights, push-buttons and
selector switches instead of today’s
sophisticated HMIs.
Typically in these early PLC-based BMSs,
if another function was required, then
another indicator light had to be
added to the panel. This meant that
if an application needed many safety
devices or options, then it would have
a multitude of lights and operator
switches. The problem with these
kinds of systems is that operators
have to watch for the indicator lights
to go on or off. If they overlook the
indicators because they’re not present
or distracted, an operating issue can
turn critical, leading to an accident.
Today’s HMIs, in contrast, offer much
more information to operators and
maintenance personnel via specific
software packages or flat-panel
computers whichever they may prefer.
Among the main advantages of a PLCbased BMS is more flexibility, especially
in designing systems for specific
applications. In water-tube boilers,
for example, customers typically
require a wide variety of features and
also want their BMS to connect with
existing systems, such as a building
management system, a manufacturing
execution system, distributed control
system, or to other parts of their plant.
PLC-based BMS solutions can control
single burners or multiple burners,
while providing much more operating
information and diagnostics. For
example, they can indicate whether
a specific damper is not open or not
closed, or if particular valves are
functioning as they should. BMS
designers can choose flame scanners
from any manufacturer. For redundancy,
they can use more than one flame
scanner. As one of the examples,
when coupled with special voting logic
in the PLC, this redundancy can provide
the basis for high integrity systems
that eliminate unnecessary shutdowns
due to faults in an I/O circuit or field
device. Predictive maintenance can
be programmed into the systems, while
diagnostics make them much easier
to troubleshoot.
Safety standards governing
BMS design
Many standards govern BMS design,
among them are the NFPA, ISA,
and TÜV as previously described.
Equipment standards also apply, such
as the Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
that govern the components that are
in such a system, as well as approvals
from FM and IRI organizations. Most
of these standards refer to what is
called “as listed,” a term used frequently.
But what’s not common is a piece
of equipment that’s standards-listed
as a whole. Altogether, many
standards have roles in deciding
BMS safety requirements.
In the U.S., implementation is
governed by the NFPA. NFPA 85
applies to boilers, while NFPA 86
applies to furnaces and ovens. The
2015 revision updated many parts
of these standards. NFPA 85 allows
the use of safety PLCs, when SIL 3
capable, for both BMS and combustion
(process) control in single burner
boilers. It does require that multiburner boilers feature a master
fuel trip (MFT) relay, which is an
electromechanical relay used to trip
all required system components,
including the fuel shutoff valves, in
case of unsafe conditions. It also
mandates that a hard-wired
connection exist between the MFT
relay and a flame safeguard. This can
shut down the boiler’s fuel supply,
if sensors indicate that its flame
has failed.
In contrast, NFPA 86 does not require
an MFT relay, providing for direct
valve control of fuel gas or oil. It also
removes the hard-wired connection
requirement of the flame safeguard.
This allows the use of safety-rated PLCs
in BMS and combustion control system
designs. (NOTE: While this implies that
safety PLCs can only be used on NFPA
86 applications, they can be used
equally well with NFPA 85 and 86. In
fact, we have used them on boilers.)
In NFPA 86-2015, for example, ratings
of the Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) of
an overall system design depend on
the lowest (less safe) SIL level of a
system component – the lowest
common denominator. So, if a system
incorporates a safety PLC with a SIL 3
rating, but the sensors and limit
switches are wired in a way that
achieves a SIL 1 rating, the overall
system will be rated SIL 1.
NFPA 86-2015 specifically defines
key terminology as related to furnace
applications. Most important is the
definition of a flame safeguard. It’s
a safety control device that responds
to flame properties, senses a flame
and indicates if a flame is present in
a burner.
White paper | Safety Compliance and Cost-effectiveness
In prior versions, the flame sensor
directly de-energized the fuel safety
valve in the event of a flame failure.
Now the flame safeguard that senses
the flame only provides an indication
whether a flame exists or has been lost.
It no longer has to be hardwired to the
fuel safety valve. This is of critical
importance, as now the flame safeguard
can be connected to a PLC controller in
lieu of a direct connection to the safety
valve circuit.
Regulations Summary
As BMS systems have evolved, so to have
the standards that govern them and
establish the best practices for their
implementation and use. The National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and
UL have written most of the regulations.
Other guidelines are provided by
factory documentation.
Specifically, NFPA 85 (Boiler and
Combustible Systems Hazard Code) covers
boilers delivering less than 12.5 million
BTU/hr.; NFPA 86 (Standard for Ovens and
Furnaces) covers virtually all applications
other than boilers. UL 795 (Commercial
Industrial Gas Heating Equipment) applies
to systems delivering less than 400,000
BTU/hr., while UL 508 (Industrial Control
Equipment) governs construction standards. Generally accepted design standards
can vary based on the manufacture.
For PLC-based BMSs, implementation is
governed by the NFPA. Implementation
of the PLC logic and other components,
such as timers and relays, is crucial for
safe systemic operation. Importantly,
safety integrity levels (SIL) can be affected
by improper implementation of the hardwired portion of BMS systems, so the BMS
system design is critical.
Other key changes In NFPA 86-2015
include the following:
Safety shutdown – This is now
l
defined as “stopping operations
by means of a safety control or
interlock that shuts off all fuel
and ignition energy in a manner
necessitating manual restart.”
Another definition change is the
“proof-of-closure” switch. While
determining the position of the
valve, whether oil or gas, there is
typically a proof-of-closure switch
that verifies a valve is in a full closed
position. Before, the code said that
this was to be built into the switch
by the manufacturer and be
activated when the valve closed.
NFPA 86-2015 removed the part
that said it was “installed in a safety
shut-off valve by the manufacturer.”
This particular change now allows
the user to maintain the switch,
adjust it and replace it if necessary.
Previously the complete fuel valve
had to be replaced.
lEmergency shutdown valve
– This
manual shutoff valve cuts off a
system’s fuel, oil or gas, in case
of a problem. The fuel typically
resides outside the room where the
equipment is located or outside the
building in case of a small building.
This way, if the whole structure is in
flames, the burner flame can still be
shut off from outside the building.
Safety PLC standards
NFPA 86-2015 section 8.4 covers the
use of PLCs in BMS designs, starting
with section 8.4.1 defines PLCs and
their use. Section 8.4.4 defines the
requirements for application of safety
PLCs new. Because it is independent
from the sections before it, the
standards for conventional PLCs need
not be followed, if a safety PLC is used,
given the accepted safety principles
that are inherent in safety PLCs.
The most important point of this part
of NFPA 86-2015 is that the processor
and I/O will be listed for control reliable
service (not burner-specific) with a SIL
rating of at least 2.
Also, the section states that safety
functions shall be restricted to a
certain area of the PLC. This answers
the question about needing separate
PLCs for combustion control and
burner management, the latter of
which is essentially a safety function.
That is, if a safety PLC can also meet
the code required for combustion
control, one safety PLC can do both.
Note, however, that this does not
apply to boiler BMS designs, which are
governed by NFPA 85-2015. In other
words, while combustion and burner
control can use same safety PLC in
furnaces, these functions must be
separate in boilers. More specifically,
NFPA 86-2015 says that all safety
function sensors and final control
elements shall be independent of
operating sensors and final control
elements shall be independent of
operating sensors and final control
elements. For example, if a limit
switch, a pressure switch or an air
flow transmitter is used in a boiler
BMS design on the safety side of the
system, then the same transmitter
cannot be used on the control side.
Safety PLC-based BMS benefits
• Increased safety at little-to-no added
cost, to lower risk profile and save
insurance costs, not to mention lives
• More security, to protect system integrity
and provide additional peace of mind
• Greater deployment flexibility, to
provide cost-saving placement and
multi-burner/facility options
• Improved operational visibility/ efficiency/flexibility, to lower fuel,
training and labor costs, as well as
faster troubleshooting
• Improved uptime, to reduce costly
downtime, via predictive maintenance
and preemptive diagnostics
• Future-proof, to provide cost-effective
expandability
There are four exceptions to the use of
a safety PLC:
lManual emergency switches,
because a BMS needs to have a
manual way of shutting down,
irrespective of the state of the PLC.
lContinuous vapor controllers must
operate outside of the PLC. This
refers to trying to operate a sensor
or an analyzer must be outside the
PLC to make the decision when the
vapor concentration is too high.
lFlame safeguards must operate
outside the PLC. That is, if a
standard flame detection system
is used that has a contact closure
output, that contact closure can be
wired to a safety-rated input on a
PLC, so the flame sensor becomes
a flame switch. This shows if a
flame exists or not, so the logic
and response can be moved to the
safety PLC.
White paper | Safety Compliance and Cost-effectiveness
lExcess temperature limit
interlocks that use a temperature
controller, wired in series with the
gas valve control signal from the
PLC, so that the limit controller can
shut down the gas valve, even if the
PLC fails or is no longer in service.
Burner Management Systems:
Design best practices
Advancements in PLC technology,
especially safety-rated PLCs, have
revolutionized BMS design. Safety
PLCs are important because safety
is a core goal of a BMS, along with
operational control and efficiency.
Today BMS designers can achieve
these goals cost-effectively with a
safety PLC. With this point in mind,
let’s look at the following four best
practices in BMS system design
and then consider each one in
greater detail:
Meet and exceed NFPA safety-
l
standards, up to SIL 3, plus UL,
FM, IRI and NEMA standards;
lEnsure critical input checking as
well as diagnostics for predictive
maintenance and troubleshooting;
lSimplify burner operation via an
easy-to-use HMI, with remote
accessibility and alarming;
lCommunicate with higher-level
systems, such as building
management systems or DCS
systems for facility- and enterprise wide control;
lMeet and exceed NFPA safety-
standards While the NFPA
standards clearly define the safety
features that BMS solutions require,
many system design generalists –
developers of conveyor systems,
packaging systems and, today, a
BMS – often think that just reading
through the NFPA standards is
sufficient for compliance.
But it’s not quite that simple. To
comply with the NFPA standards
up to SIL 3 and, at the same time,
meet UL, FM and IRI standards,
designers need to properly
implement the system inputs and
outputs in order to dynamically
manage the flame controls and
safety features. While NFPA
standards clearly define the safety
features and requirements of a
burner management system –
developers of conveyor systems,
packaging systems, or other control
systems (companies that might not
regularly engage in designing burner
management systems) need to
know much more information than
just what is contained within the
NFPA standards. Proper design
and implementation of burner
management systems requires
burner knowledge, understanding
of safety devices and valves, and
how all these components and
systems integrate with the boiler
or furnace.
System security is also important.
In many PLC-based BMS solutions,
especially earlier generations,
operators and maintenance
personnel could access and
modify the PLC logic, often without
documenting what they did. In
addition, their modifications might
have accomplished their intended
optimization of one or more BMS
feature or function, but they
unknowingly may have sub-optimized
or even disabled a feature or feature
set – increasing the system’s
accident potential.
With a safety PLC, all the front- and
back-end logic and security comes
built-in, already developed and
tested by the manufacturer, such as
Siemens. If a safety PLC is used and
implemented correctly in a BMS
design, the SIL 3 requirement is met
right from the start. What’s more,
NFPA, FM and IRI requirements will
not only be complied with but also
exceeded. What’s more, system
security is assured and all logic and
data are backed up on a memory
card. Finally, safety PLCs offer a
higher level of security by leaving a
historical trail of any modifications
made to the program.
These systems are compatible
with other PLC systems, too, so if
there are other ones in the plant
with which the BMS needs to
communicate, it can be done easily.
Last, BMS designs can incorporate
safety PLCs for not much more cost
than a standard PLC – but with
much more functionality, safety
and value.
lEnsure critical input checking
Critical input checking refers to
the continuous and automatic
assessment by a safety PLC that its
inputs are working. If a BMS does
not use a safety PLC, then the
NFPA mandates that the system
designer needs to develop and
implement a strategy to verify that
these inputs are not failing in an
“on-state.” Safety PLCs monitor their
outputs to ensure they do not fail in
an “on” state. This same capability is
not built into a standard PLC, which
otherwise required that layers of
redundancy be built into the system
design. Also, the NFPA requires
redundancy on output fuel valve
circuits. For example, some BMS
designs have three relays, all of
which have to open in an on-state
to shut off the safety valve.
BMS boiler designs must include a
watchdog timer. This is used to
detect and shutdown the burner(s)
in case of a PLC timing fault. During
normal operation, the PLC will
regularly send a continuous pulse
to the watchdog timer to keep it
from timing out. Then, should a
hardware or software malfunction
occur the watch dog timer will trip
the burner. Safety PLCs utilize many
more safety algorithms, which
either eliminate or minimize the
need for a watchdog timer.
Good BMS designs provide fail-safe
shutdown of the fuel and ignition
sources. The systems should notify
the operator and maintenance
personnel of the cause of the
shutdown, and the system may even
offer corrective advice to trouble
shoot the cause of the shutdown.
White paper | Safety Compliance and Cost-effectiveness
If problems do occur, these built-in
diagnostics will enable faster
troubleshooting and help to
minimize operational disruptions.
Good system designs will also
include trending and historical
recording of operating parameters,
which help troubleshooting and
are useful for analyzing operating
efficiency. With historical data,
operators can quickly tell what
safety switch might have tripped
repeatedly during the night and fix
that particular switch, rather than
having to stand by and wait for a
system fault, then figure out which
switch caused it. Historical alarming
and trending can prove to be useful
troubleshooting and predictive
maintenance tools that will improve
reliability and reduce downtime.
lSimplify burner operations via
an easy-to-use HMI Today’s HMI
(Human-Machine Interface) has
progressed far beyond yesterday’s
indicator lights, MFTs and e-stop
buttons. Advanced HMIs, such as
the Siemens SIMATIC HMI Comfort
Panel, incorporate all these
elements and are designed to be
operator-friendly – that is, easy
to learn and to use. These new HMIs
coupled with operator prompting
messaging and alarming, provide
for easier operation making the
transition from a maintenance
technician to an operator
much easier.
With a BMS using a Siemens HMI,
operator information is readily
available and alarms are
annunciated right on the HMI, so
operators can walk up and quickly
see all the operating conditions.
The typical boiler screen shows the
operator the status of fuel valve(s),
with color changes, all recent
alarms, and easy navigation to
other operator screens providing
additional operating information.
It can also show gas and air flows
for combustion control, animated
damper movements and position,
and the status information for all
other burner management and
other related equipment. The
HMI enables easy viewing of all
operating information.
Other HMI screens provide
additional information such
as boiler pressures, flows, valve
positions, valve open/closed status
and the ability to change the
operating set points as well as
auto/manual control. Combustion
control set up screens provide for
one person setting of the fuel air
curves eliminating the need for both
a burner service engineer and a PLC
expert. The HMIs can also provide
push-button access to schematic
wiring drawings, piping and
instrument drawings, as well as
drawings for the furnace, oven or
boiler. For example, all drawings
can be accessedwith a simple PDF
viewer, operators and maintenance
personnel don’t have documentation
is available at the touch of a button.
Remote accessibility and alarming
are big conveniences that modern
HMIs provide, tied into a safety
PLC-based BMS. Now, operators and
maintenance personnel can securely
connect with a BMS from anywhere
in a plant facility, via its wireless
network, or, via the Internet, from
anywhere in the world. They can use
their smartphones and tablets to
check in on a BMS and alarms can
be sent to them. This can free them
from being physically present to
take care of operating issues, so they
can attend to more important work.
lCommunicate with higher-level
DCS systems
Another big feature of an advanced
HMI – and one that best-practice
BMS design should incorporate –
is the ability to communicate with
other PLCs, higher-level building
automation and plant control
systems, like a manufacturing
execution system (MES). Of
course, external communication
requirements for a BMS will vary,
depending on the facility, but plant
operators, environmental managers
and management today want to
know more – like what the operating
issues are; what fuel consumption
is; how many run-time hours; and
other data – so they can have
greater visibility into overall
performance to ensure maximum
safety and efficiency. HMIs now
feature integrated USB interfaces
for simple archiving via a USB flash
drive as well as for communicating
via field bus or Ethernet protocols.
Siemens offers two safety PLC-based
BMS solutions:
1. A basic, economical BMS based on the
Siemens SIMATIC 1200F safety PLC.
2. A mid-range BMS based on the
Siemens SIMATIC 1500F safety PLC.
White paper | Safety Compliance and Cost-effectiveness
Conclusion
A major benefit of a safety PLC-based
BMS with an integrated HMI is ease
of operation coupled with the
availability of operator status and
alarm information both locally and
remotely. Unlike traditional hard-wired
systems that employ lights and an
alarm annunciator, an HMI can
display and track the status of all
variables and alarm points in a
concise, easy-to-understand way.
Start-up and trip issues are clearly
displayed for operator attention
making troubleshooting easier.
In all, safety PLCs in a BMS solution
increase safety and system availability
via built-in safety checks and standards
compliance. They are easy to program,
easy to configure and easy to use, with
integrated diagnostics, clear displays
of critical safety information on the
HMI, remote operator access and
maintenance flexibility.
Safety PLC-based BMS systems can
efficiently respond to critical events
based on a variety of highly robust
controls and sensors. For integration
with standard control schemes, these
same PLCs can communicate with
almost any third-party control or
monitoring systems via a variety of
industrial networking protocols.
Finally, all this offers operators much
less risk and complexity, along with
compliance to all industry standards.
At the same time, it provides a flexible
design configuration that can save
costs and boost productivity.
For burner installations and furnace
solutions (continuous furnaces or boiler
melting furnaces), new function blocks
are at your disposal. On the one hand,
the burner application example for TIA
Portal supports all national and international standards EN 746-2, EN 676,
EN 298, ISO 13577, NFPA 85/86, etc.
and, on the other hand, all relevant and
important functions such as:
Control of ignition/gas or oil burners
l
lPerforming a (pre) purge of the
combustion chamber
lCleaning/blowing out an oil burner
lPerforming a tightness test on
gas valves
lControl and monitoring of air
dampers (or actuators with discrete
position feedback)
lControl and monitoring of analog
actuators
lFunction for fail-safe evaluation of
standard AI values
The function blocks are additionally
prepared for realization of an electronic
ratio control. To receive this burner
application example at no charge by
email, please send an email to
amps.automation@siemens.com
: First and Last Name, contact number,
Company and Company email address,
with the email subject “Request for
Burner Application Example”
The Burner application example will
be sent to you, as a ZIP-file (@ 5 Mbyte)
by email. It includes: Burner Library
blocks for the PLCs S7-1200F,
S7-1500F, Burner Library blocks for
the PLC S7-300F and detailed
Documentation. The (archived) library
must be integrated into the TIA Portal
(Extras>Global Libraries>Retrieve
Library…) and will then be available in
the tab “Libraries”.
Disclaimer
The products and information,
described herein were developed for
the assumption of safety-oriented
functions as part of an overall system
or machine. A complete safetyoriented system generally comprises
sensors, evaluation units, signaling
devices and concepts for safe
disconnection.
The assurance of a system‘s or
machine‘s correct overall functioning
shall lie in the area of responsibility
of the respective system or machine
manufacturer. Siemens AG, including
its subsidiaries and affiliated
companies (hereinafter referred to as
“Siemens”), is not able to guarantee
all characteristics of an overall system
or machine not designed by Siemens.
Moreover, Siemens cannot be held
liable for any recommendations
made or implied by the following
descriptions. No new guarantee,
warranty or liability claims beyond
the general Siemens delivery
conditions can be derived from the
following descriptions.
*NFPA: For details and proper guidance
on NFPA standards & codes, please visit
www.nfpa.org to consult with them or
to purchase the relevant standards.