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2
C is a registered trademark of Philips Semiconductors
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Signal Descriptions
External Bus Interface and Memory Map
Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit
Arc Four Execution Unit
Message Digest Authentication Unit
Public Key Execution Unit
Random Number Generator
Hardware Parameters
9-7Determination of Cycle Types......................................................................................9-4
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MPC180E Security Processor User’s Manual
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Chapter 1
Overview
This chapter gives an overview of the MPC180E security processor, including the key
features, typical system architecture, and MPC180E architecture.
1.1 Features
The MPC180E is designed to work with Motorola’ s Po werQUICC™ family of processors.
The MPC180E interfaces gluelessly to both the PowerQUICC and PowerQUICC II™,
accelerating the performance of computationally-intensive security functions, such as key
generation and exchange, authentication, and bulk encryption. Support for 66MHz bus
frequencies enables maximum utilization of the MPC8260 local bus as well as enhanced
versions of the MPC8xx system bus.
The MPC180E is optimized to quickly process all the algorithms associated with IPSec,
WTLS/WAP, SSL/TLS, and IKE, including RSA, RSA signature, Diffie-Hellman, Elliptic
Curve Cryptography, DES, 3DES, SHA-1, MD4, MD5, and Arc Four.
hashed message of 128 bits
hashed message of 128 bits
160 bits
•Random Number Generator
•Glueless MPC8xx/82xx interface—50 and 66 MHz
•DMA hardware handshaking signals
•4-Kbit input and output FIFOs
•1.8-V Vdd, 3.3 V I/O
•100-pin LQFP package
1.2 System Architecture
The MPC180E works in load/store, memory-mapped systems. Figure 1-2 and Figure 1-2
show example system architectures. An external processor may execute application code
from its ROM and RAM, using RAM and optional non volatile memory (such as EEPR OM)
for storing data. The MPC180E resides in the processor memory map; therefore, an
application requiring cryptographic functions simply writes to and reads from the
appropriate memory location.
The MPC180E interfaces to the MPC8xx system bus or to the local buss of the MPC8260.
1-2
EEPROM
MPC860
SDRAM
I/O or Network
Interface
MPC180E
System Bus
Figure 1-1. Typical MPC8xx System Example
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Architectural Overview
EEPROM
SDRAM
DIMMs
60x Bus
MPC8260
SDRAM
I/O or Network
Interface
MPC180E
Local Bus
SDRAM
Figure 1-2. Typical MPC8260 System Example
1.3 Architectural Overview
Figure 1-3 shows a simplified block diagram of MPC180E internal architecture. The
External Bus Interface (EBI) module is designed to interface gluelessly to the
PowerQUICC and PowerQUICC II and to translate the processor core bus timing to a
simple read/write interface for the execution units (EU). The EBI also decodes the
addresses to select the appropriate EU. The EBI contains a 4096 bit input buffer and a 4096
bit output buffer. These FIFOs are used to maximize throughput and reduce the data
management required by the host processor. MPC180E functions are utilized using two
modes: open address mode or FIFO mode.
•Open address mode—Any address in the MPC180E address map is available for use
by the host processor. This mode is used for direct writes to set up the MPC180E
control registers and can be used for data transfers to and from the MPC180E.
•FIFO mode—The MPC180E will accept large data transfers into the input buffer
and return burst data through the output buf fer . Up to 4Kb data transfers are possible
through the use of the FIFOs. The MPC180E manages data movement from the
Input FIFO through the execution Units and out to the Output FIFO without host
CPU intervention.
Figure 1-3 shows a simplified block diagram of the MPC180E’s internal architecture.
Chapter 1. Overview
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1-3
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Architectural Overview
DMA Request
8xx/6xx
I/F
(Slave)
External Bus Interface
DMA Request
INPUT
4K bit
FIFO
Controller
OUTPUT
4K bit
FIFO
DMA
Logic
DMA
Logic
RSA
ECC
SHA-1
MD 5
DES/
3DES
ARC4
RNG
Figure 1-3. MPC180E Architectural Block Diagram
1.3.1 Public Key Execution Unit (PKEU)
The PKEU is capable of performing many advanced mathematical functions to support
both RSA and ECC public key cryptographic algorithms. ECC is supported in both F
(polynomial-basis) and F
modes. This execution unit supports all levels of functions to
p
assist the host microprocessor to perform its desired cryptographic function. For example,
at the highest level, the PKEU performs modular exponentiations to support RSA and
performs point multiplies to support ECC. At the lower levels, the PKEU can perform
simple operations such as modular multiplies.
2
m
1.3.2 Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit (DEU)
The DEU is used to perform bulk data encryption and decryption in compliance with the
Data Encryption Standard algorithm (ANSI X3.92). The DEU can also compute 3DES, an
extension of the DES algorithm in which each 64-bit input block is processed three times.
The MPC180E supports two key (K1 = K3) or three key 3DES.
The DEU operates by permuting 64-bit data blocks with a shared 56-bit session key and an
initialization vector. The MPC180E supports two modes of Initialization Vector operation:
•ECB (Electronic Code Book)
•CBC (Cipher Block Chaining)
1-4
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Architectural Overview
1.3.3 Arc Four Execution Unit (AFEU)
The AFEU accelerates an algorithm compatible with the RC4 stream cipher from RSA
Security , Inc. The algorithm is byte-oriented, which means a byte of plaintext is encrypted
with a key to produce a byte of ciphertext. The key is variable length, and the AFEU
supports key lengths from 40 bits to 128 bits (in byte increments), providing a wide range
of security strengths. RC4 is a symmetric algorithm, which means each of the two
communicating parties share the same key.
The AFEU module accepts data in 32-bit words per write cycle and produces 4 bytes of
ciphertext for every 4 bytes of plaintext. Key material is first written to the AFEU module
which performs the initial permutation on the key, after which processing on 32-bit words
can begin.
1.3.4 Message Digest Execution Unit (MDEU)
The MDEU is capable of performing MD4, MD5, and SHA-1, three of the most popular
public message digest algorithms. At its most basic level of operation, the MDEU receives
16 32-bit words containing a message or partial message, computes for 48, 64, or 80 cycles
(depending on the algorithm selected), and produces a hashed message of 128 bits for
MD4/MD5 and 160 bits for SHA-1. The MDEU also includes circuitry to automate the
process of generating a Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) as specified by
RFC 2104. The HMAC can be built upon any of the hash functions supported by the
MDEU.
1.3.5 Random Number Generator (RNG)
The RNG is a digital integrated circuit capable of generating 32-bit random numbers. It is
designed to comply with FIPS-140 standards for randomness and non-determinism.
Because many cryptographic algorithms use random numbers as a source for generating a
secret value, it is desirable to have a pri v ate RNG for use by the MPC180E. The anonymity
of each random number must be maintained as well as the unpredictability of the next
random number. The private RNG allows the system to develop random challenges or
random secret keys. The secret key can thus remain hidden from even the high-level
application code, providing an added measure of physical security.
1.3.6 Interrupt Controller (IRQ)
The Interrupt Controller manages hardware interrupts generated by individual execution
units into a maskable interrupt, IRQ
to create a single, non-prioritized interrupt output for the processor. The controller lets the
host read unmasked interrupt source status as well as the request status of masked interrupt
sources. This allows a given unmasked interrupt source to generate an interrupt request to
the processor.
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. Multiple internal interrupt sources are logically ORed
Chapter 1. Overview
1-5
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Architectural Overview
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Chapter 2
Signal Descriptions
This chapter provides a pinout diagram and signal descriptions for the MPC180E security
processor.
2.1 Signal Descriptions
Table 2-1 groups pins by functionality.
Table 2-1. Pin Descriptions
Signal
name
A[18:29]62, 64, 66,
D[0:31]1, 2, 4, 6,
TS
R/W
B
URST55IBurst Transaction: active low signal that indicates when the current
53ITransfer Start: transfer start pin for control port. This signal is asserted by
54IRead/Write: read/write line
56IChip Select: active low signal that indicates when a data transfer is in
Signal
type
Signal pins
IAddress: address bus from the processor core. These bits are decoded in
I/OData: bidirectional data bus. This bus is connected directly to the processor
the EBI to produce the individual module select lines to the EUs. Note that
the processor address bus might be 32 bits wide, while the MPC180E
address bus is only 12 bits wide. An example mapping of the processor bus
to the MPC180E bus is shown later in the functional description.
msb = bit 0
lsb = bit 31
core.
msb = bit 0
lsb = bit 31
the bus master to indicate the start of a bus cycle that transfers data to or
from the MPC180E.
1 = read cycle
0 = write cycle
read/write is a burst transfer.
intended for the MPC180E. This is used by the MPC180E along with TS
R/W
, and A to begin a transfer.
Description
,
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Signal Descriptions
Table 2-1. Pin Descriptions (Continued)
Signal
name
TA61OTransfer Acknowledge: This signal is asserted by the MPC180E when a
PSD
VAL82IData valid: This active low signal is ignored when CONFIG=0 (MPC860
RESET
CONFIG57IConfiguration: input that indicates whether the interface is to an MPC860 or
ENDIAN40IEndian: active high for big endian mode. Low for little endian mode
IRQ
NC26, 27, 49,
DREQ1
DREQ2
CLK59IMaster clock input
TCK47IJTAG test clock
TDI48IJTAG test data input
TDO44IJTAG test data output
TMS46IJTAG test mode select
TRSTB45IJTAG test reset
Pin
locations
52IReset: asynchronous reset signal for initializing the chip to a known state. It
85OInterrupt Request: interrupt line that signifies that one or more EU modules
50, 51, 76,
100
83ODMA Request 1: active low signal which indicates that either the input or
84ODMA request 2: active low signal which indicates that either the input or
Signal
type
successful read or write has occurred.
Mode), but is active in MPC8260 Mode. The assertion of PSD
that a data beat is valid on the data bus.
Miscellaneous pins
is highly recommended that this signal be connected to a dual
hardware/software reset function. Thus, the system designer can reset the
MPC180E chip with optimal flexibility.
MPC8260
1 = 8260 interface
0 = 860 interface
(MPC860 only).
1 = big endian
0 = little endian
has asserted its IRQ
—No connection to the pin
DMA Hardware Handshake pins
output buffer is requesting data transfer by the host or DMA controller.
DREQ1
and DREQ2 are each programmable to refer to the MPC180E chip
input buffer or output buffer. This signal is designed to interoperate with a
PowerQUICC IDMA channel.
output buffer is requesting data transfer by the host or DMA controller.
DREQ1
and DREQ2 are each programmable to refer to the MPC180E Chip
input buffer or output buffer. This signal is designed to interoperate with a
PowerQUICC IDMA channel.
This chapter describes the MPC180E address map, the External Bus Interface (EBI), and
EBI registers.
3.1 Execution Unit Registers
Each MPC180E execution unit has a dedicated set of registers. The MPC180E has a uni fied
memory map that allows software addressibility to all internal registers. Figure 3-1 lists
each MPC180E register and its 12-bit MPC180E chip address.
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Address Map
Most of these registers are read and write, however some have special permissions. See
Table 3-1 for more information. The 12-bit MPC180E address of each register is shown
next to the register name. All registers are assumed to be 32 bits wide; however, registers
that contain fewer bits will return 0 (or a known value) on unused bits for that bus
transaction only. Many registers contain multiple 32-bit words. If so, the number of words
in the register set is shown in brackets after the name. Individual execution unit chapters
describe how to use these registers, the bit assignments, and bit ordering.
3.2 Address Map
Table 3-1 lists the addresses for all registers in each execution unit. The 12-bit MPC180E
address bus value is shown along with a 32-bit host processor address bus value.
The EBI handles the interface between the processor and MPC180E’s internal execution
units. It has the following features:
•Memory-mapped data transfers to/from the host to the MPC180E in single, burst, or
DMA modes
•4-Kbit input and output buffers that allows the host to set up an operation and pass
control of interrupts and data flow to the MPC180E until the operation completes
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External Bus Interface
•Automatic buffer filling and emptying. DREQ1 and DREQ2 stay asserted as long as
memory space or data is in the buffers, letting the host load data for the next
operation before the current operation finishes
•Interrupt routing and masking, which lets the host individually detect interrupts
•Interrupt auto-unmask, which lets the controller unmask an interrupt to the host
when an operation finishes
3.3.1 EBI Registers
T able 3-2 describes the controller’ s se v en 32-bit, host-addressable re gisters that are used to
program MPC180E.
Table 3-2. EBI Registers
NameR/WDescription
CSTATR/WCommand/Status Register. Used to control global MPC180E functions and to monitor interrupts
IDRID. Gives the fixed ID number unique to the MPC180E (see Section 3.3.1.2, “ID Register”).
IMASKR/WInterrupt Mask Register. Allows the masking of interrupts to the host (see Section 3.3.1.3, “IMASK
IBCTLR/WInput Buffer Control Register. Contains the starting address in the MPC180E where data from the
IBCNTR/WInput Buffer Count Register. Gives the total number of 32-bit words to be written to a specific
OBCTLR/W Output Buffer Control Register. Contains the starting address in the MPC180E’s address map from
OBCNT R/W Output Buffer Count Register. Contains the total number of 32-bit words a specific execution unit is
(see Section 3.3.1.1, “Command/Status Register (CSTAT)”).
Register”).
input buffer is to be written. Contains the counter mask field (see Section 3.3.1.4, “Input Buffer
Control (IBCTL) and Output Buffer Control (OBCTL) Registers”).
execution unit for a given operation. This number is not limited to 128 (4 Kbits), but is the total
number of words to be taken from the input buffer and written to the selected execution unit (see
Section 3.3.1.5, “Input Buffer Count (IBCNT) and Output Buffer Count (OBCNT) Registers”).
where data should be transferred to the output buffer. Also contains the counter mask field (see
Section 3.3.1.4, “Input Buffer Control (IBCTL) and Output Buffer Control (OBCTL) Registers”).
to write to the output buffer for a given operation. This number is not limited to 128 (4 Kbits), but is
the total number of words to be read from the selected (or enabled) execution unit (see
Section 3.3.1.5, “Input Buffer Count (IBCNT) and Output Buffer Count (OBCNT) Registers”).
3.3.1.1 Command/Status Register (CSTAT)
CSTAT, shown in Figure 3-2, is used to control the chip software reset and auto-unmask
function and to report interrupt status. The controller synchronizes the software reset
function to the rising edge of MCLK, guaranteeing sufficient setup and hold times.
Chapter 3. External Bus Interface and Memory Map 3-5
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External Bus Interface
010 1112131415
Field—DEU AFEU MDEU RNG PKEU
Reset0000_0000_0000_0000
R/WR/W
16 17 1819202122232427283031
Field — DEU AFEU MDEU RNG PKEU MPC180EDestinationAUTO-UNMASKRST
Reset0000_0000_0000_0000
R/WR/W
Addr0x900
Figure 3-2. Command/Status Register (CSTAT)
Table 3-3 describes CSTAT fields.
Table 3-3. CSTAT Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
0–10—Reserved, should be cleared.
11–15 Source interrupt indicators for the individual execution units. These are the masked interrupts from the
execution units.
For bits 11–15:
0 interrupt not pending
1 interrupt pending
11DEUData Encryption Standard Execution Unit External Bus Interface interrupts
12AFEUArc Four Execution Unit External Bus Interface interrupts
13MDEUMessage Digest Execution Unit External Bus Interface interrupts
14RNGRandom Number Generator External Bus Interface interrupts
15PKEUPublic key Execution Unit External Bus Interface interrupts
16–17—Reserved, should be cleared.
18–22 Raw interrupt indicators for individual execution units. These are the unmasked interrupts from the
execution units.
For bits18–22:
0 interrupt not pending
1 interrupt pending
18DEUData Encryption Standard Execution Unit interrupts
19AFEUArc Four Execution Unit interrupts
20MDEUMessage Digest Execution Unit interrupts
21RNGRandom Number Generator interrupts
22PKEUPublic key Execution Unit interrupts
23MPC180EMPC180E IRQ. This bit, when set, indicates an interrupt is pending in the MPC180E.
0 interrupt not pending
1 interrupt pending
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External Bus Interface
Table 3-3. CSTAT Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
24–27 Destination Destination bits. Only one execution unit on MPC180E can be active at a time through FIFO
28–30 AUTO-
UNMASK
31RSTSoftware reset. Performs the same function as asserting RESET
accesses, so the host must program CSTAT to enable the appropriate execution unit. The
host must guarantee that all data related to a specific operation has been processed before
updating CSTAT, otherwise unpredictable results occur in MPC180E because the controller
acts on one execution unit at a time.
1000 DEU
1001 AFEU
1010 MDEU
1011 RNG
1100 PKEU
0xxx no active module
Auto-unmask bit. Enables or disables the auto-unmask function. This function is used to
unmask an interrupt from the currently active execution unit. It is to be used when a
execution unit sends a series of intermediate interrupts the host does not want to see. For
example, if the DEU is enabled and active, many interrupts may be generated for
intermediate results. The host, however, may only be interested in the final interrupt that
occurs when the DEU completes processing all of the data. To begin the operation, the host
masks off the interrupts from the DEU and then writes to the auto-unmask bit. Then, when
the DEU completes processing all the data, the controller unmasks the DEU interrupt and
allows the final DEU interrupt (signaling the completion of processing) to be sent to the host.
The host can then read CSTAT to determine that the DEU generated an interrupt and take
appropriate action.
for bits 28–30:
000 disabled
001 enabled
bit resets the MPC180E within two MCLK cycles; the controller clears this bit.
0—
1 chip reset
on MPC180E. Setting this
The complete MPC180E register map, including all execution units, is a vailable to the host.
Although the host can access control registers and input and output buffers while an
instruction is executing, it cannot access the execution unit itself.
3.3.1.2 ID Register
Figure 3-3 shows the ID register. Note that the ID register contains a 32-bit value that
identifies the version of MPC180E. Its value at reset is 0x0045_1490 for ECC enabled or
0x0045_1491 for ECC disabled.
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External Bus Interface
07 81011131415
Field—MPC180EMDEUDEU
Reset0000_00000100_0101
R/WRead
1617192022232526282931
Field DEUAFEURNG—EBIPKEU
Reset 00010010_1001_000x
R/WRead
Addr0x901
Figure 3-3. ID Register
Table 3-4 describes the ID fields.
Table 3-4. ID Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
0–7—Reserved, should be cleared.
8–10MPC180EMPC180E version number.
11–13MDEUMessage Digest Execution Unit version number
14–16DEUData Encryption Standard Execution Unit version number
17–19AFEUArc Four Execution Unit version number
20–22RNGRandom Number Generator version number
23–25—Reserved, should be cleared.
26–28EBIController version number
29–31PKEUPublic key Execution Unit version number
3.3.1.3 IMASK Register
The built-in interrupt controller (IRQ module) gathers all execution unit interrupt signals
and presents one output (IRQ
interrupts from execution units by programming the IMASK register . In this way, interrupts
can be controlled from a single source. Some execution-unit-specific configuration is
required to ensure proper response to any interrupt. The user can read the appropriate
address in CSTAT to get the interrupt status of all execution units at once.
The interrupt port consists of the IRQ
all pending interrupts from the execution units.
All interrupts from the execution units have the same priority. Figure 3-4 shows the bit
assignments in the IRQ register for all the MPC180E execution units. All enable (mask)
registers operate on the corresponding bits. An interrupt is mask ed when its corresponding
IMASK bit is a 1.
3-8MPC180E Security Processor User’s Manual
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) to the host. It also lets the user selectively mask or disable
output, which is negated after the host responds to
Page 31
External Bus Interface
015
Field—
Reset0000_0000_0000_0000
R/WR/W
16262728293031
Field—DEU AFEU MDEU RNG PKEU
Reset0000_0000_0000_0000
R/WR/W
Addr0x902
Figure 3-4. IMASK Register
Table 3-5 describes the IMASK fields.
Table 3-5. IMASK Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
0–26—Reserved, should be cleared.
27DEUData Encryption Standard Execution Unit global interrupt control
28AFEUArc Four Execution Unit global interrupt control
29MDEUMessage Digest Execution Unit global interrupt control
30RNGRandom Number Generator global interrupt control
31PKEUPublic key Execution Unit global interrupt control
0 interrupt unmasked
1 interrupt masked
0 interrupt unmasked
1 interrupt masked
0 interrupt unmasked
1 interrupt masked
0 interrupt unmasked
1 interrupt masked
0 interrupt unmasked
1 interrupt masked
3.3.1.4 Input Buffer Control (IBCTL) and Output Buffer Control
(OBCTL) Registers
The IBCTL register is used to control the input buffer starting address and address
increment function.
The OBCTL register is used to control the output buffer starting address and address
increment function.
Figure 3-5 shows both the IBCTL and the OBCTL registers.
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External Bus Interface
07815
Field—Count Mask
Reset0000_0000_0000_0000
R/WR/W
16212231
Field—Starting Address
Reset0000_0000_0000_0000
R/WR/W
AddrIBCTL: 0x903; OBCTL: 0x905
Figure 3-5. Input Buffer Control (IBCTL) and Output Buffer Control (OBCTL)
Registers
Table 3-6 describes IBCTL fields.
Table 3-6. IBCTL Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
0–7—Reserved, should be cleared.
8–15Count maskDefines how the buffer controller presents addresses to execution units when data is
16–21—Reserved, should be cleared.
22–31 Starting address Starting address of the input buffer data destination. The starting address is the address
taken from the input buffer. The count mask bits define the number of 32-bit words to be
transferred into each execution unit as defined by the input block size upon which the
specific algorithms operate.
to which the first word of data from the input buffer is written for a given operation. All
subsequent addresses are derived from this address.
Table 3-7 describes OBCTL fields.
Table 3-7. OBCTL Register Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
0–7—Reserved, should be cleared.
8–15Count maskDefines how the buffer controller presents addresses to execution units when data is
16–21—Reserved, should be cleared.
22–31 Starting address Starting address of the output buffer data source. The starting address is the address
3-10MPC180E Security Processor User’s Manual
read from the active execution unit and written to the output buffer. The count mask bits
define the number of 32-bit words to be transferred from each execution unit as defined
by the output block size produced by the specific algorithms.
from which the first word of data to the output buffer is read for a given operation. All
subsequent addresses are derived from this address.
IBCNT indicates the number of 32-bit words to be used for an operation. For example, if
the PKEU is to operate on 512 bits (16 words), IBCNT should be set to 0x0000_0010,
corresponding to sixteen, 32-bit words to be taken from the input buffer and written to the
PKEU.
When the input buffer counter reaches its terminus, IBCNT = 0, indicating that the number
of words transferred to the active execution units matches the IBCNT value, data transfer
stops automatically.
OBCNT contains the number of 32-bit words expected to be read for a particular operation.
For example, if the DEU module is to operate on 512 bits, OBCNT should be set to
0x0000_0010, corresponding to sixteen 32-bit words to be read from the DEU module and
written to the output buffer.
The output buffer asserts DREQx
until OBCNT = 0, which indicates that the total number
of processed 32-bit words has been read from the output buffer.
Figure 3-6 shows the IBCNT and OBCNT registers.
The controller (EBI) is the interface between the host, the input and output FIFOs, and the
individual execution units. It also contains control logic designed to help off load flow
control from the host. The controller facilitates single access or burst reads and writes from
the host, and it also manages the interrupts that execution units send to the host. The
controller also controls DREQ1
to and from the buffers.
The MPC180E EBI supports the MPC860 or MPC8260 processor interface, depending on
the static state of the external pin CONFIG. When CONFIG is 0, the MPC180E interface
is MPC860-compatible. When CONFIG is 1, the MPC180E interface is
MPC8260-compatible. Burst access is only supported to/from the input and output FIFOs.
In MPC860 mode, MPC180E always assumes bursts to be four 32-bit words. In MPC8260
mode, MPC180E always assumes bursts to be eight 32-bit words.
and DREQ2, which can be used to signal DMA transfers
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EBI Controller Operation
Table 3-8 summarizes the operation in clock cycles of the EBI in MPC860 and MPC8260
modes.
Table 3-8. EBI Operation Summary
Name
Single beat read/write to/from EBI register or FIFO02
Single beat read/write to/from execution unitsat least 2at least 3
4-beat burst read/write to/from FIFOs0not supported
4-beat burst read/write to/from execution unitsnot supportednot supported
8-beat burst read/write to/from FIFOsnot supported2
8-beat burst read/write to/from execution unitsnot supportednot supported
MPC860 Mode
CONFIG=0
MPC260 Mode
CONFIG=1
Single accesses are those that are only to one address and for which one 32-bit data word
is transferred. For writes or reads to the execution units, it is possible that the EBI will
generate one or more wait states to the host. This is a function of the current programming
of the EBI registers and the state of the execution unit being addressed. At no time will the
EBI generate a wait state for an access to an EBI register (CSTAT, ID, IMASK, IBCTL,
IBCNT, OBCTL, OBCNT).
Burst accesses are defined as exactly four (MPC860 mode) or eight (MPC8260 mode)
32-bit writes or reads at consecutive addresses. A burst transfer begins by the assertion of
CS
, TS, and BURST along with the address.
3.4.1 Buffer Accesses (FIFO Mode)
The controller contains an input buffer and an output b uffer of 4096 bits each. These b uffers
can be written to directly by the host or by using DMA. For direct access, the host simply
writes or reads the address of the buffer.
DREQ1
and DREQ2 (input/output buffer ready) are programmable handshake signals used
for buffer control. An external DMA controller can use this handshake to service the input
or output buffer with data transfers as required. The EBI CSTAT register determines
whether these signals reflect the state of the input buffer or output buffer. By default,
DREQ1
refers to the state of the input buffer and DREQ2 refers to the state of the output
buffer.
NOTE:
DREQx
refers to either DREQ1 or DREQ2. Either can be
programmed to refer to the state of the input or output buffer.
In FIFO mode, the input buffer automatically fills and the output buffer automatically
empties. In the input buffer, this is accomplished by assertion of DREQx
whenever at least
four 32-bit words (in MPC860 mode) or eight 32-bit words (in MPC8260 mode) of space
are available. Similarly, for the output buffer, DREQx
remains asserted as long as at least
four 32-bit words (MPC860 mode) or eight 32-bit words (MPC8260 mode) are in the
output buffer to be read.
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Chapter 4
Data Encryption Standard Execution
Unit
This chapter explains how to program the DEU (Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit)
to encrypt or decrypt a message.
4.1 Operational Registers
All operational registers within the main control block are 32-bit addressable, howe ver they
may contain less than 32 bits. The keys, initialization vector , plainte xt and ciphertext are all
64-bit, and each takes two registers. Each has a left (most significant word) and a right (least
significant word) register. Table 4-1 lists DEU registers. These registers are described in
more detail in the following sections.
Table 4-1. Data Encryption Standard Execution Unit (DEU) Registers
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4.1.1 DEU Control Register (DCR)
The control register, shown in Figure 4-1, contains static bits that define the encryption
mode of operation for the DEU. This is typically written along with the keys and
initialization vector at the start of each new encryption process. All unused bits of DCR
are read as 0 values.
028293031
Field—MODE XDES E/D
Reset0000_0000_0000_0000
R/WR
Addr
0x200
Figure 4-1. DES Control Register (DCR)
Table 4-2 describes control register fields.
Table 4-2. DCR Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
0–28—Reserved, should be cleared.
29MODESelects the DES mode of operation. Both Electronic Code Book (ECB) and Cipher Block
30XDESControls single DES or triple DES.
31E/DControls whether the input data will be encrypted or decrypted.
Chaining (CBC) are supported.
0 = ECB
1 = CBC
0 = Single DES
1 = Triple DES
0 = decrypt
1 = encrypt
R/W
4.1.2 DEU Configuration Register (DCFG)
The configuration register contains two bits that are set only during hardware initialization.
All unused bits of DCFG are read as 0 values.
0293031
Field—RST IMSK
Reset0000_0000_0000_0000
R/WR
Addr0x20E
Figure 4-2. DEU Configuration Register (DCFG)
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Operational Registers
Table 4-3 describes DCFG fields.
Table 4-3. DCFG Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
0–29—Reserved, should be cleared.
30RSTThe DES can be reset by asserting the RESET signal or by setting the Software Reset bit in
31IMSKClearing the interrupt mask bit will allow interrupts on the IRQ
the Control Register. The software and hardware resets are functionally equivalent. The
software reset bit will clear itself one cycle after being set.
0 —
1 software reset
bit in the status register. This bit is set (interrupts disabled) any time a hardware/software
reset is performed. The user must clear this bit to enable hardware interrupts.
0 enable interrupts
1 disable interrupts
pin. It does not affect the IRQ
4.1.3 DEU Status Register (DSR)
The status register contains bits that give information about the state of the DEU. There are
two bits which state when more input can be written to the input data register and read from
the output data register . To maximize throughput, data is buf fered, and reading and writing
can be overlapped. When the IRDY bit is one, new data can be written to the input
(DATA_IN) registers. It is possible to write three 64-bit blocks of data before any output
data is read (and the IRDY signal goes low).
Figure 4-3 shows the DES status register.
0293031
Field—IDRY ORDY
Reset0000_0000_0000_0000
R/WR
Addr0x201
Figure 4-3. DES Status Register (DSR)
Table 4-4 describes DSR fields.
Table 4-4. DSR Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
0–29—Reserved, should be cleared.
30IRDYInput Ready. Input Buffer ready to accept more data.
31ORDYOutput Ready. Output Buffer has data to send.
Upon completion of an encryption (or decryption), the ORDY signal will go high,
indicating that the output is ready to be read from the DATA_OUT registers. If interrupts
are enabled, then IRQ
will be asserted. After the ORDY signal goes high, new data in the
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Operational Registers
DATA_IN registers will start processing. When completed, the resulting output will be held
in a working register until the output ciphertext is read from the DATA_OUT registers.
Then the held data will be copied to the DATA_OUT registers and the ORDY signal
asserted again. The interrupt IRQ
signal will be active as long as ODRY is asserted.
4.1.4 Key Registers
The DEU supports up to three independent 56-bit keys. Each key uses two 32-bit registers
(56 bits of key plus 8 bits of parity). Note that key parity bits are ignored in processing.
For single DES, only one key is used (K ey1_L and K ey1_R); the other two are ignored. F or
Triple DES, all three keys are used. To simulate two-key Triple DES (in which the first and
third keys are identical), Key1_L and Key1_R are also written to Key3_L and Key3_R.
When using three-key triple DES, the three keys must be written in order (K ey1, K e y2, and
then Key3), otherwise the first key may overwrite the third.
The key registers are read/write and must not be written while data is being
encrypted/decrypted. Doing so will result in corrupted data.
4.1.5 Initialization Vector
The DEU supports CBC mode, which requires a 64-bit initialization vector (IV). The IV
uses two 32-bit registers (IV_L and IV_R). The IV should be written before the first block
of data is encrypted. After each block of data is encrypted, the Initialization Vector register
is updated to prepare for the next block of data. This register is readable so that the current
encryption context (mode, keys, and IV) can be saved and restored.
The Initialization Vector registers must not be written while data is being encrypted or
decrypted. Doing so will result in corrupted data.
4.1.6 DATAIN
Data to be encrypted or decrypted is written to the DATAIN registers. Data is first written
to DATAIN-R and then to DATAIN-L. DEU processing begins automatically with the
completion of the write to the DATAIN-L register.
4.1.7 DATAOUT
Processed data is stored in the DATAOUT registers. Data must be read from DATAOUT-R
first. Reading data from DATA OUT-L indicates completion of the 64-bit block read, which
allows the DEU to write the next 64 bits to DATAOUT-R and DATAOUT-L. If two 64-bit
blocks have been written to the DATAIN registers while the DATAOUT registers haven’t
been read, the DEU will stall to prevent an overwrite. IF three 64-bit blocks are written to
DATAIN before any are read from DATAOUT, the IRDY bit in the Status register will go
low, indicating that any additional blocks written to DATAIN will cause a loss of data due
to overwrite.
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Chapter 5
Arc Four Execution Unit
This chapter explains how to program the AFEU (Arc Four Execution Unit) to encrypt or
decrypt a message.
5.1 Arc Four Execution Unit Registers
All operational registers within the main control block are 32-bit addressable. However,
they may contain less than 32 bits.
T able 5-1 lists AFEU re gisters. These registers are described in more detail in the follo wing
sections.
Table 5-1. Arc Four Execution Unit (AFEU) Registers
The AFEU Status Re gister, shown in Figure 5-1, contains seven bits of information. These
bits describe the state of the AFEU circuit and are all active-high.
0 24 25 262728293031
Field—Input Buffer
empty
Reset0000_0000_0000_0000
R/WRead
Addr0x401
Figure 5-1. Arc Four Execution Unit Status Register
Table 5-2 describes the AFEU Status Register fields.
Table 5-2. AFEU Status Register Field Descriptions
BitNameDescription
0–24 —Reserved, should be cleared.
25Input Buffer emptySet when there is no data waiting in the AFEU Input Buffer. This can be used to monitor
when the AFEU is ready to receive the next sub-message while it is processing the
current sub-message. Writing to the Message register will clear this bit.
26Full message done Set when the last sub-message has been processed. This bit will remain set until a new
key is written. Reading from the Cipher register will clear this bit.
27Sub-message done Set when the sub-message has been processed. Once the next sub-message is written,
the AFEU will begin processing it and this bit will clear.
28Permute doneSet once the memory is permuted with the key. Once the first sub-message is written, the
AFEU will begin processing the message and this bit will clear.
29Initialize doneSet once memory initialization is complete. Once the key data and length is written, the
AFEU will begin permuting the memory and this bit will clear.
30IRQAsserted whenever an interrupt is pending (if interrupts are enabled). The following
conditions will generate an interrupt:
Memory initialization done
Memory permutation done
Sub-Message processing done
Full Message processing done
The specific cause of the interrupt can be determined by reading the additional bits of the
status register.
Hardware interrupts are disabled following a reset. The IRQ bit in the status register is not
affected by masking hardware interrupts in the control register.
31Busy Asserted whenever the AFEU core is not in an idle state. Memory initialization or
permutation and message processing conditions will cause this bit to be set. The Busy bit
will be set during context writes/reads.
Full msg
done
Sub-msg
done
Permute
done
Initialize
done
IRQBusy
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Arc Four Execution Unit Registers
5.1.2 Control Register
Figure 5-2 shows the AFEU Control Register.
0293031
Field—RSTIMSK
Reset0000_0000_0000_0001
R/WW
Addr
Figure 5-2. Arc Four Execution Unit Control Register
Table 5-3 describes the AFEU Control Register fields.
Table 5-3. AFEU Control Register Field Descriptions
BitNameDescription
0–29 —Reserved, should be cleared.
30RSTThe AFEU can be reset by asserting the RESET signal or by setting the Software Reset bit in the
31IMSK Clearing the interrupt mask bit will allow interrupts on the IRQ
Control Register. The software and hardware resets are functionally equivalent. The software
reset bit will clear itself one cycle after being set.
0 —
1 software reset
the status register. This bit is set (interrupts disabled) any time a hardware/software reset is
performed. The user must clear this bit to enable hardware interrupts.
0 enable interrupts
1 disable interrupts
0x400
pin. It does not affect the IRQ bit in
5.1.3 Clear Interrupt Register
The Clear Interrupt Register is a write-only register. Writing to this register will clear the
IRQ
signal and the IRQ bit in the status register. The actual data written to this register is
ignored.
5.1.4 Key Length Register
The Key Length Register is a 4-bit write-only register that stores the number of bytes
(minus one) in the key. Writing to this register will signal the AFEU to start permuting the
memory with the key. Therefore, the key must be written before writing to this register.
Each register is 32-bits wide (write-only). Because the key size may be 1 to 16 bytes in
length, the key data is stored in four individually addressable re gisters. The ke y low register
holds the lowest significant four bytes of the key . The Ke y Lower-Middle Re gister holds the
next lowest four bytes of the key. The Key Upper-Middle Register holds the next highest
four bytes of the key. The Key Upper Register holds the most significant four bytes of the
key.
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Arc Four Execution Unit Registers
NOTE:
If the key length is not divisible by four, the lower key data
registers must be filled before writing to the upper key data
registers.
5.1.6 Message Byte Double-Word Register
The Message Byte Double-Word Register is a 3-bit write-only register and is used to hold
the number of bytes (minus one) in the last/partial sub-message. A 1 in the MSB of this
register indicates to the AFEU that this is the last sub-message. Figure 5-3 shows the
Message Byte Double-Word Register. The default number of sub-message bytes is four.
028293031
Field—Last1
Reset0000_0000_0000_0000
R/W
Addr
1
Setting the Last Sub-message bit in this register will cause the AFEU to reset and start initializing once the full
message is complete. The contents of the cipher register will hold the last processed sub-message.
W
0x408
sub-message
Figure 5-3. Arc Four Execution Unit Message Byte Double-Word Register
# sub-message
bytes - 1
5.1.7 Message Register
The Message Register is a 32-bit write-only register that stores the sub-message to be
processed. This can either be the plaintext to be encrypted or ciphertext to be decrypted.
Writing data to this register signals the AFEU to start processing the data.
5.1.8 Cipher Register
The Cipher Register is a 32-bit read-only register that stores the processed sub-message.
This can either be the encrypted ciphertext or decrypted plaintext. Data in this register is
valid when the sub- or full message done bit is set in the status register.
NOTE:
If the sub-message is less than 32-bits, the unused bits in the
Cipher Register will be the same as the corresponding bits
written to the Message Register.
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Arc Four Execution Unit Registers
5.1.9 S-box I/J Register
The Sbox I/J Register is a 24-bit read/write register where the Sbox I/J pointers are stored.
The contents of this register must be read prior to context switching and must be written
back to the AFEU before resuming message processing of an interrupted message. This
register may be accessed whenever the AFEU is idle.
5.1.10 S-box0 – S-box63 Memory
The S-box Memory consists of 64 read/write 32-bit blocks. The entire contents of the S-box
memory must be read prior to context switching and must be written back to the AFEU
before resuming message processing of an interrupted message. The S-box memory may
be accessed whenever the AFEU is idle.
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Chapter 6
Message Digest Execution Unit
This chapter explains how to program the MDEU (Message Digest Execution Unit) within
the MPC180E to hash a message for authentication.
6.1 Operational Registers
All operational registers within the MDEU are 32-bit addressable, however they may
contain less than 32 bits.
Table 6-1 lists message registers. These registers are described in more detail in the
following sections.
Table 6-1. Message Digest Execution Unit (MDEU) Registers
The Identification Register contains a value reserved for a particular version and
configuration of the MDEU. As future hardw are is developed to support dif ferent field types
or different microcode, each version will be assigned a different identifier.
The value returned is ID = 0x0001.
6.1.2 MDEU Control Register (MCR)
The control register contains static bits that define the mode of operation for the MDEU. In
addition to the static control bits, several bits are dynamic. These dynamic bits are set by a
write to the MCR initiated by the host processor and are reset automatically by the MDEU
after one cycle or operation. All unused bits of the MCR are read as 0 values.
Figure 6-1 shows the MDEU Control Register and T able 6-2 describes this register’s fields.
0–19—Reserved, should be cleared.
20ENGO Enables automatic start of hashing as soon as the MDMB buffers have all been written. It
21OPAD The assertion of OPAD causes:
22IPADThe assertion of IPAD causes the value written to the 512 bit Message Buffer to be
23—Reserved, should be cleared.
24MD5The assertion of the MD5 bit signifies that an MD5 hash will be computed. If both MD4
25MD4The assertion of the MD4 bit signifies that an MD4 hash will be computed. If both MD4
26RSTThe RST bit is a software reset signal. When activated, the MDEU will reset immediately,
27IEThe IE bit represents the Interrupt Enable flag. When set to 1, the IRQ
28GOThe GO bit initiates the processing of the 512 bit message currently stored in the
29BSWP The BSWP bit causes byte-swapping of the Message Digest Buffer Registers
30STEP The STEP bit allows the MDEU to be stepped through on a single clock cycle basis.
31—Reserved, should be cleared.
is not necessary to set the GO bit manually.
1. The value written to the 512 bit Message Buffer to be exclusive-ORed with the outer
hash pad value
2. Unlike IPAD , a procedural change occurs: upon starting the hash of the value written to
the Message Buffer, the contents of the Message Digest Buffer is copied to the Message
Buffer, and is padded appropriately.
By performing the copy from MDB to MB, the step of appending the inner hash result to
the padded key is performed automatically. OPAD is autocleared upon completion of a
hash of a single message block.
exclusive-ORed with the inner hash pad value . This v alue is autocleared upon completion
of a hash of a single message block. Note that because this control bit affects the value
stored in the 512 bit message buffer, if block chaining is to be used, it should be set only
while the secret key is written to the 512 bit Message Buffer, and should be cleared
manually at the same time GO is asserted.
and MD5 are not asserted, a SHA-1 Hash will be computed.
and MD5 are not asserted, a SHA-1 Hash will be computed.
halting any ongoing hash. All registers and buffers revert to their initial state. Normally,
asserting GO continues an existing hash function across multiple 512-bit message
blocks. Should a fresh-hash be desired for a new message block, the RST bit should be
asserted prior to loading the new message block into the Message Buffer.
thus when an interrupt occurs, the IRQ
all interrupts are disabled, and the IRQ
bit acts as the global interrupt enable.
Message Buffer. This hash will be a continuation of any existing hash of multiple
message blocks. In order to begin a new hash, the RST bit described below should be
asserted prior to loading the new 512 bit Message Block. The 512 bit Message Block is
double-buffered; a ne w b lock of message ma y be written while a hash is under process. If
a new block is so written, then hashing will continue with the new block without GO
needing to be reasserted.
(MDA-MDE) as they are read out of the MDEU.
When active, that is 1, the MDEU computes one “round” of the currently selected hash.
signal will be activated. When the IE bit is set to 0,
output pin will be held inactive, that is, 0. The IE
signal is enabled,
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Operational Registers
6.1.3 Status Register (MSR)
The status register contains bits that give information about the state of the MDEU. Upon
completion of a hash, DONE is asserted in bit 0 of MSR, followed by an interrupt on IRQ
if interrupts are enabled. In addition, whenever the contents of the message buffer are
copied for internal hash processing, BE is asserted. Assertion of BE will cause an interrupt
only if interrupts are enabled and buffer -empty interrupt is enabled (MCR:BIE is asserted).
Address Error (AE) is asserted by addressing MDEU but not specifying a valid address
within MDEU.
The MSR is effectively a read-only register. Its contents cannot be modified by the host
processor except to be reset, which occurs when the host processor performs a write to the
MSR, regardless of the data value.
Figure 6-2 shows the MDEU status register and Table 6-3 describes this register’s fields.
015
Field—
Reset0000_0000
R/WR/W
162728293031
Field—IRQ AEBE DONE
Reset0000_0000
R/WR/W
Addr0x016
Figure 6-2. MDEU Status Register (MSR)
Table 6-3. MSR Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
0–27–Reserved, should be cleared.
28IRQ0 interrupt not indicated
29AE0 address error not detected
30BE0 message buffer not empty
31DONE0 hash not completed
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1 address error detected
1 message buffer empty
1 hash completed
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Operational Registers
6.1.4 Message Buffer (MB0—MB15)
The MDEU hashes a message contained in the 16-word Message Buffer. The message
should be processed such that a single-character message would be written to MB0. MB15
should only be programmed if the message block uses at least 481 bits.
The Message Buffer is not cleared upon completion of a computation process. Therefore,
when programming the final block of a multi-block message, all locations should be
appropriately written using the padding required by the selected Message Digest algorithm.
The message is double-buffered; once hashing begins the MDEU does not depend on the
value stored in the Message Buffer . Therefore, the next block of a multi-block message may
be written as soon as MSR:BE is asserted.
If IPAD or OPAD are asserted while the Message Buffer is written, then the value stored
will be the value applied to the data bus exclusive-ORed with the appropriate pad value. In
addition, assertion of OPAD causes the contents of the Message Digest Buffer to be copied
into the first four or five words of the Message Buffer , with all other words set appropriately
for a two-block message.
6.1.5 Message Digest Buffer (MA–ME)
When DONE and IRQ are asserted, the current hash value for all message blocks processed
since the last reset are available in Message Digest Buf fer locations MA–ME. For MD4 and
MD5, which produce a 128 bit hash, ME is to be ignored.
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Chapter 7
Public Key Execution Unit
This chapter explains how to program the PKEU (Public Key Execution Unit) to perform
mathematical functions.
7.1 Operational Registers
All operational registers within the main control block are 32-bit addressable, howe ver they
may contain less than 32 bits.
Table 7-1 lists all PKEU registers. These registers are described in more detail in the
following sections.
The Identification Register contains a value reserved for a particular version and
configuration of the PKEU. As future hardw are is dev eloped to support different field types
or different microcode, each version will be assigned a different identifier.
The value returned is ID = 0002x.
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Operational Registers
7.1.2 Control Register (PKCR)
The Control Register contains static bits that define the mode of operation for the PKEU.
In addition to the static control bits, several bits are dynamic. These dynamic bits are set by
a write to the PKCR initiated by the host processor, and are reset automatically by the
PKEU after one cycle of operation. All unused bits of the PKCR are read as 0 values.
Figure 7-1 shows the PKEU control register.
012345678 9101112131415
Field regNselregBselregAsel— F2M XYZ RpRnRST IEGO ECC—
Auto clearNYNYNYY
Reset0000_0000
R/WR/W
Addr0xB01
Figure 7-1. PKEU Control Register (PKCR)
Table 7-2 describes the PKEU control register fields.
Table 7-2. PKCR Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
0–1regNsel 00 memory N block 0 select
2–3regBsel 00 memory B block 0 select
4–5regAsel 00 memory A block 0 select
6—Reserved, should be cleared.
7F
8XYZThe XYZ bit enables the PKEU point multiply operation to bypass certain processing used support
01 memory N block 1 select
10 memory N block 2 select
11 memory N block 3 select
01 memory B block 1 select
10 memory B block 2 select
11 memory B block 3 select
01 memory A block 1 select
10 memory A block 2 select
11 memory A block 3 select
MThe F2M bit causes the PKEU to perform arithmetic in the polynomial-basis. This must be set when
2
executing operations f or ECC F
This would be required for all RSA and ECC F
0 integer arithmetic (RSA or ECC F
1 polynomial-basis arithmetic (ECC F
systems that operate in affine coordinates. Specifically, when set, the PKEU simply provides the
final results (i.e. the X, Y, and Z field elements) which are no longer in the Montgomery format.
When XYZ is zero, the PKEU assists the host in achieving its desired affine coordinate results . This
is accomplished by including Z
Montgomery residue system. It is the responsibility of the host to find the inverses of Z
provide these back to the PKEU to compute the affine coordinates.
0 affine coordinates
1 projective coordinates
The regAsel, regBsel, and regNsel fields set pointers referencing
memory blocks in the A, B, and N memories, respectively. Each
memory, particularly where ECC is concerned, can be thought of
as constituting four sub-memories (e.g. A(0), A(1), A(2), and A(3)).
Each sub-memory contains 32 16-bit locations (or 512 bits). For
ECC processing, these sub-memories are used to store the
multitude of intermediate data and final field elements required
during processing. These memory pointers are used to determine
which memory block is to be referenced during arithmetic
processing or moves from one location to another. All of this is
transparent to the host and performed automatically by the PKEU
for high-level functions. However, for low-level functions, such as
field add or multiplies, the host may set these pointers to reference
a particular memory block. This flexibility allows, for example, the
following computation: A(3) * B(1) * R
m. When clear , all processing is perf ormed using integer arithmetic.
2
)
p
2
2
and Z3 in addition to X, Y, and Z and leaving these results in the
M)
processing.
p
-1
mod N(2).
2
and Z3 and
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Operational Registers
Table 7-2. PKCR Field Descriptions (Continued)
BitsNameDescription
9R
10RSTThe RST bit is a software reset signal. When activated, the PKEU will reset immediately. All
11IEThe IE bit represents the Interrupt Enable flag. When set to 1, the IRQ signal is enabled, thus when
12GOThe GO bit initiates the execution of the routine pointed to by the Program Counter (PC). This is
13ECCThe ECC bit signifies that one of the ECC-related routines will be executed. Conversely, by not
14–15 —Reserved, should be cleared.
For a description of RpRn see Section 7.5.3, “RpRN mod P Calculation.”
pRn
2
0 R
mod N enabled
1 R
mod P enabled
pRn
registers revert to their initial state, and the Program Counter (PC) will jump to 0. Instruction
execution will halt, and any pending interrupt will be deactivated. All memories (A, B, and N) will
indirectly be reset since this signal causes the “clear all” routine to be executed.
0 normal processing
1 reset the PKEU
an interrupt occurs, the IRQ signal will be activated. When the IE bit is set to 0, all interrupts are
disabled, and the IRQ output pin will be held inactive, i.e. 0. The IE bit acts as the global interrupt
enable.
Note that this does not affect the SR[IRQ] bit. That bit is set regardless of IE.
0 interrupts disabled
1 interrupts enabled
accomplished by fetching the instruction addressed by the PC and to keep executing instructions
until a jump to location 0 is encountered which tells the PKEU to stop executing. It is important to
realize that once the PKEU is “going”, the host has limited access to the PKEU internal memory
space. Specifically, reads and writes to the RAMs are ignored during this state and all other
locations must be referenced with extreme caution. Under normal circumstances, only the Status
Register and EXP(k) should be actively referenced during this mode.
0 rest condition
1 execute instructions without stopping
setting this bit, the PKEU will be configured to correctly execute RSA-related routines.
0 RSA processing enabled
1 ECC processing enabled
7.1.3 Status Register (PKSR)
The Status Register contains bits that give information about the state of the PKEU. If an
error occurs during normal operation, a bit in the PKSR will be set to 1. After a GO is issued
to the PKCR, the next jump to location 0 will cause a bit in the Status Register to be set,
followed by an interrupt on IRQ if interrupts are enabled.
The PKSR is effectiv ely a read-only register . Its contents cannot be directly modified by the
host processor except to be reset, which occurs when the host processor performs a write
to the PKSR, regardless of the data value. Note that the host may indirectly affect the
contents of the PKSR, such as when GO is asserted.
Figure 7-2 shows the PKEU status register and Table 7-3 describes this register’s fields.
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Operational Registers
0101112131415
Field—E_RDY IRQ OBZDONE
Reset0000_0000_0000_0001
R/WR
Addr0xB02
Figure 7-2. PKEU Status Register (PKSR)
Table 7-3. PKSR Field Descriptions
Bits NameDescription
0–10 —Reserved, should be cleared.
11E_RDY The E_RDY (exponent or k ready) bit indicates that the execution unit is ready to accept the
12IRQThe IRQ bit of the Status Register reflects the value of the IRQ output pin of the PKEU.
13OBThe OB bit of the Status Register is set to 1 if a read or write operation is to an unknown or
14ZThe ERR bit of the Status Register is set to 1 if a general error occurs in the PKEU. Any error
15DONE The DONE bit of the Status Register is set to 1 when a branch to location 0 occurs. All of the
next 32-bit word of exponent data or point multiplier (k) data in the EXP(k) register. The host
processor may poll the status register to determine if this data needs to be provided or rely on
IRQ (if enabled) to signal when to look at the register to determine what data needs to be
provided. A write to the EXP(k) register will clear this bit as well as the associated IRQ (as long
as no other condition has also cause IRQ’s assertion). Note that there is approximately a two
cycle latency associated with the clearing of IRQ following a write to the EXP(k) register.
Since the EXP(k) register is double-buffered, the host response time, while important, is not
critical to meet maximum performance. At a minimum, the host will ha v e 8 integer m ultiplies f or
RSA or 8 point doubles for ECC to provide new data before adversely impacting the run time.
Refer to the run-time formulae (see Table 7-26) to determine the exact time available for the
target operating frequency.
For those instances where the host does not need to know the status of E_RDY (i.e. lower-le vel
routines), it is recommended that it mask this bit to prevent it from affecting the IRQ signal.
However, it will be set regardless of CR[IE].
reserved address. The contents of the data bus on an out-of-bounds read is indeterminate.
not associated with one of the Status Register bits will cause the ERR bit to assert.
embedded routines cause the DONE bit to be asserted upon completion. Also, upon reset, the
DONE bit is set. This signifies to the host that the PKEU is ready for normal operation following
the reset. Until that time, the PKEU is busy with its boot procedure. This primarily entails
running the “clear all” routine, clearing all embedded RAM.
7.1.4 Interrupt Mask Register (PKMR)
The Interrupt Mask Register allows the host processor to individually disable certain
interrupts. Normally, any change in the Status Register will cause a hardware interrupt on
the IRQ pin, as long as the Interrupt Enable (IE) bit in the Control Register is set to 1. If a
given bit of the PKMR is set to 1, the corresponding bit in the PKSR will no longer cause
the interrupt.
The PKMR is a read-write register. Its contents may be read or written by the host
processor.
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Operational Registers
All unused bits of the PKMR are read as 0 values. Since the PKMR is a 16-bit register,
when the host processor reads the PKMR, its contents are copied onto D[15:0], and the
upper half of D is driven with 0’s.
Figure 7-3 shows the PKEU Interrupt Mask Register and T able 7-4 describes this register’s
fields.
0101112131415
Field—E_RDY —OB— DONE
Reset0000_0000
R/WR/W
Addr0xB03
Figure 7-3. PKEU Interrupt Mask Register (PKMR)
Table 7-4. PKMR Field Descriptions
Bits NameDescription
15–5 —Reserved, should be cleared.
4E_RDY The E_RDY (exponent or k ready) bit indicates that the execution unit is ready to accept the
3—Reserved, should be cleared.
2OBThe OB bit of the Status Register is set to 1 if a read or write operation is to an unknown or
1—Reserved, should be cleared.
0DONE The DONE bit of the status register is set to 1 when a branch to location 0 occurs. All of the
next 32-bit word of exponent data or point multiplier (k) data in the EXP(k) register. The host
processor may poll the status register to determine if this data needs to be provided or rely on
IRQ (if enabled) to signal when to look at the register to determine what data needs to be
provided. A write to the EXP(k) register will clear this bit as well as the associated IRQ (as long
as no other condition has also cause IRQ’s assertion). Note that there is approximately a two
cycle latency associated with the clearing of IRQ following a write to the EXP(k) register.
Since the EXP(k) register is double-buffered, the host response time, while important, is not
critical to meet maximum performance. At a minimum, the host will ha v e 8 integer m ultiplies f or
RSA or 8 point doubles for ECC to provide new data before adversely impacting the run time.
Refer to the run-time formulae (see Table 7-26) to determine the exact time available for the
target operating frequency.
For those instances where the host does not need to know the status of E_RDY (i.e. lower-le vel
routines), it is recommended that it mask this bit to prevent it from affecting the IRQ signal.
reserved address. The contents of the data bus on an out-of-bounds read is indeterminate.
embedded routines cause the DONE bit to be asserted upon completion. Also, upon reset, the
DONE bit is set. This signifies to the host that the PKEU is ready for normal operation following
the reset. Until that time, the PKEU is busy with its boot procedure. This primarily entails
running the “clear all” routine, clearing all embedded RAM.
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Operational Registers
7.1.5 EXP(k) Register
The EXP(k) register contains the exponent (EXP) during exponentiation routines or the
point multiplier (k) during ECC point multiply routines. EXP(k)_SIZE must be specified
before writing to the EXP(k) register. Since EXP(k) is 32 bits in size, data must be written
to it during exponentiations or point multiplies and never before. This data must be
provided most significant word (msw) to least significant word (lsw). The host processor
determines, via IRQ (if not masked) or IRD
data is required. When IRQ is asserted, the host processor will look at the status word to see
what was set. If the E(k) RDY bit is set, the host processor knows it must provide the next
byte of EXP(k). If IRQ is masked, then it must poll the status register to determine when to
provide the next word of EXP(k). When the host writes to the EXP(k) register, the E(k)
RDY bit of the status register is cleared. As with all status register bits, the writing to the
status register location will clear all of its bits, including the E(k) RDY bit.
There is an associated latency between the writing of the EXP(k) register and the
deassertion of E(k) RDY (and IRQ). For this reason, it is recommended that the host waits
a minimum of three cycles before polling the status register following a write to EXP(k).
The EXP(k) register is internally double-buffered. As a result, the host response time, while
important, is not critical to meet maximum performance. At a minimum, the host will ha v e
32 integer multiplies for RSA or 32 point doubles for ECC to provide new data before
adversely impacting the run time. Refer to the run-time formulae (see Table 7-26) to
determine the exact time available for the target operating frequency.
Y (if selected to send via a DREQ pin), that new
The host will be required to provide the first byte of EXP(k) very shortly after initiating the
routine (point multiply or exponentiation). Because of the double buffering, the second byte
will be allowed to be written very shortly after the first written byte of EXP(k). For this
reason, IRQ and E_RDY is deasserted for only one c ycle following the write of the first byte
of EXP(k). Once the second byte of EXP(k) is written, then there is a larger amount of time
before the subsequent IRQ and E_RDY is asserted.
The maximum size for either the exponent or k is limited only by the EXP(k)_SIZE register
that is, 64 words or 2048 bits). In practice, the values are typically less than or equal to the
key size (for RSA) or field size (ECC).
7.1.6 Program Counter Register (PC)
The Program Counter is an 11-bit register that contains the address of the next instruction
to be executed. This register is a read-write register. During normal routine execution, this
register is preloaded with the software routine’s entry address.
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Memories
7.1.7 Modsize Register
This register sets the maximum size of the modulus (or prime) for RSA and ECC Fp or the
irreducible polynomial for ECC F
digit = 16 bits) for RSA and ECC F
m. The maximum size of these vectors is 128 digits (1
2
and 32 digits for ECC F2m (Note that the value written
p
to modsize is not checked for validity). Thus, modsize represents the number of 16-bit
blocks in the modulus or irreducible. If the number of bits in the modulus or irreducible is
not evenly divisible by 16, then those remaining bits above the evenly divisible number of
bits constitutes an entire 16-bit block in so far as setting modsize is concerned. Modsize is
specified as a value between 0 and 127, which indicates a block size of 1 to 128 digits. On
power-up or clear, modsize is set to 0. This register must be written to before initiating an
arithmetic function.
All functions have a minimum modsize greater than zero for the function to operate
properly.
7.1.8 EXP(k)_SIZE
EXP(k)_SIZE sets the maximum size of the exponent or multiplier vector in terms of 32-bit
words. The minimum size is one 32-bit word, and the maximum size is 64 32-bit words.
EXP(k)_SIZE will be specified as a value between 0 and 63, which indicates an exponent
or multiplier size of 1 to 64 bytes. On power-up or clear, EXP(k)_SIZE is 0.
7.2 Memories
The PKEU uses four memory spaces (RAM) consisting of 128 16-bit words. Three of these
memories, A, B, and N, are R/W accessible to the host during normal operation. The fourth
memory, t (or tmp) is normally not accessible to the host accept when the PKEU is placed
in test mode.
Each individual memory can be thought of as consisting of four, equally sized (32 16-bit
words), separate sub-blocks (e.g. A(0), A(1), A(2), and A(3)). Depending on the function to
be executed, it may be necessary to specify which sub-block is to be referenced for the
operation. The host specifies the sub-block for each memory via the PKCR. Note that it is
not possible for the host to specify the tmp memory sub-blocks.
Prior to any operation, A, B, and N must be loaded with appropriate data. Once the
operation is complete, the expected results may then be read from these memories. During
processing, the PKEU uses all available memory to hold intermediate results. Memories
can not be written to during processing or boot.
Note that despite being implemented as a series of 16 bit half -words, conversion from 32
bit words to 16 bit half-words is handled by the host interface. The RAM can only be
written or read using 32 bit words.
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ECC Routines
7.3 ECC Routines
7.3.1 ECC Fp Point Multiply
The PKEU performs the Elliptic Curve point multiply function which is the highest level
of ECC abstraction supported by the device. It is the intention that the host processor use
the PKEU in such a way as to support ECC schemes defined in IEEE P1363 (and other ECC
standards) where the point multiply is the critical and most computationally intensive, but
not final, step in many of these schemes. The point multiply is performed in a near
fully-automated fashion; however, there is some interaction required by the host processor
(described below).
Point multiplies in F
are carried out by the PKEU by performing repeated point add and
p
point double operations using projective coordinates. As a result, the host processor is
responsible for providing the point P represented as the point (X, Y, Z). For systems that do
not operate in the projective coordinate scheme (i.e. point P is represented as the point
(x,y)), X is simply x, Y is y, and Z is 1. The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below.
NOTE:
The scalar ‘k’ is assumed to be positive. If k = 0, the results of
the point multiply are (1, 1, 0). If k < 0, then k ← (-k) and
Y ← -Y (modP).
NOTE:
The input ‘Z’ is assumed to be non-zero. If zero, then the
results of the point multiply are (1, 1, 0).
Table 7-5. ECC Fp Point Multiply
Fp Point Multiply
ComputationQ = k*P, where Q ≡ (X
Entry namemultkPtoQ
Entry address0x001(FpmultkPtoQ)
Pre-conditionsA0 = x
Run-time
conditions
(non-projective coordinate when XYZ=0) or X1 (projective coordinate when XYZ=1)
1
A1 = y
(non-projective coordinate when XYZ=0) or Y1 (projective coordinate when XYZ=1)
1
A2 = (z
≡1) (non-proj. coordinate when XYZ=0) or Z1 (projective coordinate when XYZ=1)
1
A3 = a elliptic curve parameter
B0 = b elliptic curve parameter
2
B1 = R
mod N value
N0 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
EXP(k) = ms 32-bits of k (provided in 32 bit words throughout the point multiply, msb to lsb);
first word provides following routine invocation per ERDY assertion.
3,Y3,Z3
), P ≡ (X1,Y1, Z1)
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Table 7-5. ECC Fp Point Multiply (Continued)
Post-conditions B1 = X2 / X’
Special
conditions
B2 = Y2 / Y’
B3 = Z2 / Z’
A2 = undefined (when XYZ = 1) or Z
A3 = undefined (when XYZ = 1) or Z
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
—
ECC Routines
Fp Point Multiply
2
2
2
2
(when XYZ = 0)
2
3
(when XYZ = 0)
2
Initial Condition
2
R
mod N
1 (or Z
y1 (or Y1)
(or X1)
x
1
prime pprime p
‘1’ - ECC enabled
k (run-time)
‘0’ - F
B3
B2
B1
b
a
)
1
select ‘1’ or ‘0’
p
set
set
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
enabledsame
Modsize
EXP(k)_SIZE
Final Condition
(or Z’2)
Z
2
(or Y’2)
Y
2
X
(or X’2)
2
?
3
? (or Z
)
2
2
? (or Z
)
2
?
?
?
?
?
same
?
same
same
same
Figure 7-4. ECC Fp Point Multiply Register Usage
It is important to note that unlike the RSA exponentiation routine, the point to be multiplied
is not expected to be in the Montgomery residue system when loaded into the PKEU. All
of the other ECC parameters are also expected to be loaded in standard format. This
includes the a and b parameters of the ECC system. In addition, the “R
2
mod N” term is
also required. This term is used by the PKEU to put the operands in the Montgomery
residue system. See the full description of this function/value below.
It is the responsibility of the host processor to provide multiplier data to the PKEU during
the operation. That is, the ‘k’ from the point multiplication ‘kP’ must be provided
dynamically by the host micro-processor in 32-bit words. Note that the host must supply
the k data starting with the most significant 32-bit word and working down to the least
significant word. Each individual word, however, is formatted msb to lsb (i.e.
“k_word[msb:lsb]”).
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ECC Routines
PKEU asserts the IRQ signal when it is ready to accept more data. This tells the host
processor to read PKSR to see what was set. If the E_RDY bit is set, the host processor
knows it must provide the next w ord of k - this data is written into the EXP(k) register one
8-bit word at a time. If this interrupt bit is masked, then it must poll the status register to
determine when to provide the next word of k. The host should not look for the assertion of
E_RDY until after the routine (i.e. PKCR[GO] bit). Any data written to EXP(K) prior to
this will be ignored.
Pin IRDY_B also is used to signify when PKEU is ready for the ne xt 32 bit word of EXP(k).
IRDY_B is active (low) whenever E_RDY bit in the status register is active (high).
The point multiplication is optimized to efficiently produce results for systems that work in
the projective coordinate scheme but can accelerate affine schemes as well. The host
processor selects the scheme via the PKCR XYZ bit.
For affine coordinate systems (CR [XYZ]= 0):
The results of the calculation are returned to the A and B storage registers. Note that these
values correspond to the projectiv e coordinate values X, Y , Z, Z
2
, and Z3. X, Y, and Z are in
the Montgomery residue system. In order to put the projective coordinates into their affine
form, the following equations which define their relationships must be calculated:
x = X/Z
y = Y/Z
Because the PKEU does not support the inverse function, it is the responsibility of the host
processor to find (Z
2
;
3
;
2)-1
and (Z3)-1 by using any number of available modulo-n inversion
techniques. Once this is accomplished, the host may then provide these values back to the
PKEU to perform the final two field (modular) multiplications to find x and y. It is advisable
that the user perform these multiplications in the PKEU to remove the values from the
Montgomery residue system.
For projective coordinate systems (Control Register Bit XYZ = 1):
The results of the calculation are returned to the B memory. Note that these values
correspond to the projective coordinate values X, Y, and Z and are no longer in the
Montgomery residue system. The host may take these results as the complete point multiply
(including the exit from the Montgomery residue system) (e.g. (XR)(Z
2)-1R-1
modN = X).
The following restrictions apply to the point multiply:
•The value of the k vector must be greater than one for this function to work properly .
•The point multiply operates with a minimum of five digits (Modsize = 4).
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ECC Routines
7.3.2 ECC Fp Point Add
This function is extensively utilized by the point multiply routine. However, its value as a
stand-alone routine to the host processor is extremely limited. As a result, the information
provided on the routine is primarily for testing and debug purposes.
Table 7-6. ECC F
ComputationR = P + Q, where R ≡ (X
Entry nameFpaddPtoQ
Entry address0x002(FpaddPtoQ)
Pre-conditions A0 = X’
Post-conditions A0 = X’
Special
conditions
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
A1 = Y’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
A2 = Z’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
A3 = a’ (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system)
B0 = b’ (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system)
B1 = X’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
2
B2 = Y’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
2
B3 = Z’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
2
N0 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
1
A1 = Y’
1
A2 = Z’1
A3 = a’
B0 = b’
B1 = X’
3
B2 = Y’
3
B3 = Z’3
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
All variables followed with the tick mark (‘) indicate it is in the Montgomery residue system.
Initial Condition
Z’
2
Y’
2
X’
2
b’
a’
Z’
1
Y’
1
X’
1
modulus Nmodulus N
‘1’ - ECC enabled
‘0’ - Fp enabledsame
3,Y3,Z3
set
Point Add
p
Fp Point Add
), P ≡ (X1,Y1, Z1), and Q ≡ (X2,Y2, Z2)
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
Modsize
EXP(k)_SIZE
Final Condition
Z’
3
Y’
3
X’
3
b’
a’
Z’
1
Y’
1
X’
1
?
?
?
same
same
Figure 7-5. ECC Fp Point Add Register Usage
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ECC Routines
7.3.3 ECC Fp Point Double
This function is extensively utilized by the point multiply routine. However, its value as a
stand-alone routine to the host processor is extremely limited. As a result, the information
provided on the routine is primarily for testing and debug purposes.
Table 7-7. ECC F
ComputationR = Q + Q = 2 * Q, where R ≡ (X
Entry nameFpdoubleQ
Entry address0x003(FpdoubleQ)
Pre-conditionsB1 = X’
Post-conditions B1 = X’
Special
conditions
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
B2 = Y’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
B3 = Z’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
A3 = a’ (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system)
B0 = b’ (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system)
N0 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
3
B2 = Y’
3
B3 = Z’3
A3 = a’
B0 = b’
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
All variables followed with the tick mark (‘) indicate it is in the Montgomery residue system.
While not explicitly mentioned or necessary, the contents registers A0, A1, and A2 a left
undisturbed in anticipation that these will store the generator point (P) during a point multiply.
Initial Condition
Z’
1
Y’
1
X’
1
b’
a’
modulus Nmodulus N
‘1’ - ECC enabled
‘0’ - Fp enabledsame
set
), and Q ≡ (X3,Y3, Z3)
3,Y3,Z3
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
Modsize
EXP(k)_SIZE
Point Double
p
Fp Point Double
Final Condition
Z’
3
Y’
3
X’
3
b’
a’
same
same
same
?
?
?
same
same
Figure 7-6. ECC Fp Point Double Register Usage
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ECC Routines
7.3.4 ECC Fp Modular Add
Modular addition may be performed on any two vectors loaded into A (A0-A3) and B
(B0-B3), where both of these vectors are less than the value stored in the modulus register
N (N0-N3). The results are stored in the respective B register. For ECC functionality, this
function is used by the point add and point double routines but is available to the host
interface - typically for higher-level ECC-related functions. This function operates with a
minimum of four digits (Modsize = 3).
Prior to initiating this function, the A, B and N register pointers must be set in the control
register which indicate which sub-registers (e.g A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted
operands. See Table 7-2 for a detailed description. Once this is performed, the host
processor may successfully initiate this function.
Table 7-8. Modular Add
Modular Add
ComputationC = D + E mod N, where D, E, and C are integers and are less than N
Entry namemodularadd
Entry address0x008(modularadd)
Pre-conditionsA0-3 = D (integer, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register)
Post-conditions B0-3 = results of modular addition stored where the B operand was located
Special
conditions
B0-3 = E (integer, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register)
N0-3 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
The function operates the same regardless of whether or not the operands are in the Montgomery
residue system.
Initial Condition
E (if B0 selected)
D (if A0 selected)
modulus N (if N0 selected)modulus N (if N0 selected)
‘1’ - ECC enabled
‘0’ - Fp enabledsame
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
set
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
regAsel
regBsel
regNsel
Modsize
EXP(k)_SIZE
Final Condition
?
?
?
C (if B0 selected)
?
?
?
same
same
same
same
same
Figure 7-7. Modular Add Register Usage
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ECC Routines
7.3.5 ECC Fp Modular Subtract
Modular subtraction may be performed on any two vectors loaded into A (A0–A3) and B
(B0–B3), where both of these vectors are less than the value stored in the modulus register
N (N0–N3). This is accomplished by computing A-B if A > B or A-B+N if A < B. The
results are stored in the respective B register. For ECC functionality, this function is used
by the point add and point double routines but is available to the host interface. This
function operates with a minimum of four digits (Modsize = 3).
Before this function is initialized, the A, B and N re gister pointers must be set in the control
register which indicate which sub-registers (A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted operands.
See Table 7-2 for a detailed description. Once this is performed, the host processor may
successfully initiate this function.
Table 7-9. Modular Subtract
Modular Subtract
ComputationC = D - E mod N, where D, E, and C are integers and are less than N
Entry namemodularsubtract;
Entry address009h(modularsubtract)
Pre-conditions A0-3 = D (integer, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register)
Post-conditions B0-3 = results of modular subtraction stored where the B operand was located
Special
conditions
B0-3 = E (integer, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register)
N0-3 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
The function operates the same regardless of whether or not the operands are in the
Montgomery residue system.
Initial Condition
E (if B0 selected)
D (if A0 selected)
modulus N (if N0 selected)modulus N (if N0 selected)
‘1’ - ECC enabled
‘0’ - Fp enabledsame
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
set
EXP(k)_SIZE
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
regAsel
regBsel
regNsel
Modsize
Final Condition
?
?
?
C (if B0 selected)
?
?
?
same
same
same
same
same
Figure 7-8. Modular Subtract Register Usage
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ECC Routines
7.3.6 ECC Fp Montgomery Modular Multiplication
((A × B × R-1) mod N)
The (A × B × R-1) mod N calculation is the core function of the PKEU. It is used to assist
the point add and double routines in completing their functions. For ECC purposes, this
function will rarely be used directly by the host processor. This function operates with a
minimum of five digits (Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:
Table 7-10. Modular Multiplication
Modular Multiply
-1
ComputationC = A * B * R
mod N, where A, B, and C are integers less than N and R = 2
number of digits of the modulus vector
Entry namemodularmultiply
Entry address0x00a(modularmultiply)
Pre-conditionsA0-3 = A (integer, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register)
B0-3 = B (integer, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register)
N0-3 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Post-conditions A0-3 = A operand is preserved
B0-3 = results of modular multiplication stored where the B operand was located
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special
conditions
Typically, though it is not mandatory, the operands will be in the Montgomery residue system. The
only time this would not be the case is when manually placing a value into the Montgomery residue
system.
16D
where D is the
Initial Condition
B (if B0 selected)
A (if A0 selected)
modulus N (if N0 selected)modulus N (if N0 selected)
‘1’ - ECC enabled
‘0’ - Fp enabledsame
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
set
EXP(k)_SIZE
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
regAsel
regBsel
regNsel
Modsize
Final Condition
?
?
?
C (if B0 selected)
A (if A0 selected)
?
?
?
same
same
same
same
same
Figure 7-9. Modular Multiplication Register Usage
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ECC Routines
7.3.7 ECC Fp Montgomery Modular Multiplication
((A × B × R-2) mod N)
The (A × B × R-2) mod N calculation is similar to the standard ‘R-1’ Montgomery
multiplication except an additional R is divided out. This function is ideal for those ECC
applications which work in affine coordinates. In that case, the host may use this function
to exit projective coordinates. F or example, the host could find x, for x = X/Z
2)-1
(Z
are in the Montgomery residue system. Loading X and (Z2)-1 into the appropriate
operand registers and initiating this function would yield x which is no longer in the
Montgomery residue system. This function operates with a minimum of 5 digits
(Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:
number of digits of the modulus vector
Entry namemodularmultiply2
Entry address0x00b (modularmultiply2)
Pre-conditionsA0-3 = A (integer, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register)
B0-3 = B (integer, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register)
N0-3 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Post-conditionsA0-3 = A operand is preserved
B0-3 = results of modular multiplication stored where the B operand was located
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special
—
conditions
mod N, where A, B, and C are integers less than N and R = 2
2
, where X and
16D
where D is the
Initial Condition
B (if B0 selected)
A (if A0 selected)
modulus N (if N0 selected)modulus N (if N0 selected)
‘1’ - ECC enabled
‘0’ - Fp enabledsame
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
set (00, 01, 10, 11)
The PKEU performs the elliptic curve point multiply function which is the highest level of
ECC abstraction supported by the device. It is the intention that the host processor use the
PKEU in such a way as to support ECC schemes defined in IEEE P1363 (and other ECC
standards) where the point multiply is the critical and most computationally intensive, but
not final, step in many of these schemes. The point multiply is a nearly fully automated.
However, some interaction is required by the host processor (described below).
Point multiplies in F
m are carried out by the PKEU by performing repeated point add and
2
point double operations using projective coordinates. As a result, the host processor is
responsible for providing the point P represented as the point (X, Y, Z). For systems that do
not operate in the projective coordinate scheme (that is, point P is represented as the point
(x, y)), X is simply x, Y is y, and Z is 1. The complete set of I/O conditions is shown belo w:
Table 7-12. ECC F2m Point Multiply
F2m Point Multiply
ComputationQ = k*P, where Q ≡ (X
Entry namemultkPtoQ(will probably be the same as F
Entry address0x001(multkPtoQ)
Pre-conditionsA0 = x
Run-time
conditions
Post-conditions B1 = X
Special
conditionsThe ‘c’ elliptic curve parameter is a function of the ‘b’ parameter and field size: .
(when XYZ=0) or X1 (when XYZ=1)
1
A1 = y
(when XYZ=0) or Y1 (when XYZ=1)
1
A2 = (z
≡1) (when XYZ=0) or Z1 (when XYZ=1)
1
A3 = a elliptic curve parameter
B0 = c elliptic curve parameter
2
B1 = R
mod N value
N0 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
EXP(k) = ms 8-bits of k (provided in 8 bit words throughout the point multiply, msb to lsb);
first word provides following routine invocation per ERDY assertion.
/ X’
2
B2 = Y2 / Y’
B3 = Z2 / Z’
A2 = undefined (when XYZ = 1) or Z
A3 = undefined (when XYZ = 1) or Z
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
2
2
2
3,Y3,Z3
), P ≡ (X1,Y1, Z1)
)
p
2
(when XYZ = 0)
2
3
(when XYZ = 0)
2
m2–
2
cb
=
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ECC Routines
Initial Condition
2
R
mod N
c
a
)
1 (or Z
1
y1 (or Y1)
(or X1)
x
1
irred. poly.irred. poly.
‘1’ - ECC enabled
k (run-time)
select ‘1’ or ‘0’
‘1’ - F
m enabledsame
2
set
set
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
Modsize
EXP(k)_SIZE
Final Condition
(or Z’2)
Z
2
(or Y’2)
Y
2
X
(or X’2)
2
?
3
? (or Z
)
2
2
? (or Z
)
2
?
?
?
?
?
same
?
same
same
same
Figure 7-11. ECC F2m Point Multiply I/O
It is important to note that unlike the RSA exponentiation routine, the point to be multiplied
is not expected to be in the Montgomery residue system when loaded into the PKEU. All
of the other ECC parameters are also expected to be loaded in standard format. This
includes the a, c, and modulus parameters of the ECC system. In addition, the “R
2
mod N”
term is also required. This term is used by the PKEU to put the operands in the Montgomery
residue system. See the full description of this function below.
It is the responsibility of the host processor to provide multiplier data to the accelerator
during the operation. That is, the ‘k’ from the point multiplication ‘kP’ must be provided
dynamically by the host micro-processor in 32-bit words. Note that the host must supply
the k data starting with the most significant 32-bit word and working down to the least
significant word. Each individual word, however, is formatted msb to lsb (i.e.
“k_word[msb:lsb]”).
PKEU asserts the IRQ signal when it is ready to accept more data. This tells the host
processor to read the status word to see what was set. If the E_RDY bit is set (or pin
IRDY_B acti ve lo w), the host processor knows it must pro vide the next word of k - this data
is written into the EXP(k) register one 32-bit word at a time. If this interrupt is masked, then
it must poll the status register to determine when to provide the next word of k. The host
should not look for the assertion of E_RDY until after the routine (i.e. PKCR[GO] bit). An y
data written to EXP(K) prior to this will be ignored.
The point multiplication is optimized to efficiently produce results for systems that work in
the projective coordinate scheme but can accelerate affine schemes as well. The host
processor selects the scheme via the CR XYZ-bit.
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For affine coordinate systems (XYZ = 0):
ECC Routines
The results of the calculation are returned to the A and B storage registers. Note that these
values correspond to the projectiv e coordinate values X, Y , Z, Z
2
, and Z3. X, Y, and Z are in
the Montgomery residue system. In order to put the projective coordinates into their affine
form, the following equations which define their relationships must be calculated:
x = X/Z
y = Y/Z
Since the PKEU does not support the inverse function, it is the responsibility of the host
processor to find (Z
2
;
3
;
2)-1
and (Z3)-1 by using any number of available
modulo-irreducible-polynomial inversion techniques. Once this is accomplished, the host
may then provide these values back to the PKEU to perform the final two field
multiplications to find x and y. It is advisable that the user perform these multiplications in
the PKEU to remove the values from the Montgomery residue system.
For projective coordinate systems (XYZ = 1):
The results of the calculation are returned to the B memory. Note that these values
correspond to the projective coordinate values X, Y, and Z and are no longer in the
Montgomery residue system. The host may take these results as the complete point multiply
(including the exit from the Montgomery residue system) (e.g. (XR)(Z
2)-1R-1
modN = X).
The following restrictions apply to the point multiply:
•The value of the k vector must be greater than one for this function to work properly.
•The point multiply operates with a minimum of five digits (Modsize = 4).
7.3.9 ECC F2m Point Add
This function is extensively utilized by the point multiply routine. However, its value as a
stand-alone routine to the host processor is extremely limited. As a result, the information
provided on the routine is primarily for testing and debug purposes.
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ECC Routines
Table 7-13. ECC F
m Point Add
2
F2m Point Add
ComputationR = P + Q, where R ≡ (X
Entry nameF
Entry address0x005(F
Pre-conditionsA0 = X’
maddPtoQ
2
maddPtoQ)
2
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
A1 = Y’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
A2 = Z’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
A3 = a’ (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system)
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
2
B2 = Y’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
2
B3 = Z’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
2
N0 = irreducible polynomial of the ECC system
Post-conditions A0 = X’
A1 = Y’
A2 = Z’1
1
1
A3 = a’
B0 = c’
B1 = X’
3
B2 = Y’
3
B3 = Z’3
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special
conditionsThe c elliptic curve parameter is a function of the ‘b’ parameter and field size: .
m2–
2
cb
=
All variables followed with the tick mark (‘) indicate it is in the Montgomery residue system.
Initial Condition
Z’
2
Y’
2
X’
2
c’
a’
Z’
1
Y’
1
X’
1
irred. poly.irred. poly.
‘1’ - ECC enabled
‘1’ - F2m enabledsame
set
EXP(k)_SIZE
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
Modsize
Final Condition
Z’
3
Y’
3
X’
3
c’
a’
Z’
1
Y’
1
X’
1
?
?
?
same
same
Figure 7-12. ECC F2m Point Add Register Usage
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ECC Routines
7.3.10 ECC F2m Point Double
This function is extensively utilized by the point multiply routine. However, its value as a
stand-alone routine to the host processor is extremely limited. As a result, the information
provided on the routine is primarily for testing and debug purposes.
Table 7-14. ECC F
m Point Double
2
F2m Point Double
ComputationR = Q + Q = 2 * Q, where R ≡ (X
Entry nameF
Entry address0x006(F
Pre-conditionsB1 = X’
mdoubleQ
2
mdoubleQ)
2
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
B2 = Y’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
B3 = Z’
(projective coordinate in Montgomery residue system)
1
A3 = a’ (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system)
), and Q ≡ (X3,Y3, Z3)
3,Y3,Z3
B0 = c’ (elliptic curve parameter in Montgomery residue system)
N0 = prime p (modulus) of the ECC system
Post-conditions B1 = X’
B2 = Y’
B3 = Z’3
3
3
A3 = a’
B0 = c’
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special
conditionsThe c elliptic curve parameter is a function of the ‘b’ parameter and field size: .
m2–
2
cb
=
All variables followed with the tick mark (‘) indicate it is in the Montgomery residue system.
While not explicitly mentioned or necessary , the contents registers A0, A1, and A2 a left undisturbed
in anticipation that these will store the generator point (P) during a point multiply.
Initial Condition
Z’
1
Y’
1
X’
1
c’
a’
irred. poly.irred. poly.
‘1’ - ECC enabled
‘1’ - F2m enabledsame
set
EXP(k)_SIZE
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
Modsize
Final Condition
Z’
3
Y’
3
X’
3
b’
a’
same
same
same
?
?
?
same
same
Figure 7-13. ECC F2m Point Double Register Usage
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ECC Routines
7.3.11 ECC F2m Add (Subtract)
Field addition in F2m (polynomial-basis) may be performed on any two vectors loaded into
A (A0-A3) and B (B0-B3), where both of these vectors are less than the value stored in the
modulus (irreducible polynomial) register N (N0-N3). The results are stored in the
respective B register. In F
well as subtraction, therefore, it is sufficient to support both of these functions with this
single routine. This function operates with a minimum of 4 digits (Modsize = 3).
Prior to initiating this function, the A, B, and N re gister pointers must be set in the Control
Register which indicate which sub-registers (e.g A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted
operands. See Control Register description for a detailed description. Once this is
performed, the host processor may successfully initiate this function.
m, this function provides identical results for both addition as
2
Table 7-15. F
m Modular Add (Subtract)
2
F2m Modular Add (Subtract)
ComputationC = D + E mod N, where D, E, and C are integers and are less than N
Entry namemodularadd (same as with integer add)
Entry address0x008(modularadd)
Pre-conditionsA0-3 = D (binary polynomial, exact A-location pre-selected in control register)
B0-3 = E (binary polynomial, exact B-location pre-selected in control register)
N0-3 = irreducible polynomial of the ECC system
Post-conditionsB0-3 = results of modular addition (subtraction) stored where the B operand was located
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special
conditions
The function operates the same regardless of whether or not the operands are in the Montgomery
residue system.
7.3.12 ECC F2m Montgomery Modular Multiplication
((A × B × R-1) mod N)
The (A × B × R-1) mod N calculation is the core function of the PKEU. This function is
used to assist the point add and double routines in completing their functions. For ECC
purposes, this function will rarely be used directly by the host processor. This function
operates with a minimum of 5 digits (Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is
shown below:
Table 7-16. F
m Modular Multiplication
2
F2m Modular Multiply
-1
ComputationC = A * B * R
mod N, where A, B, and C are integers less than N and R = 2
number of digits of the modulus vector
Entry namemodularmultiply (same for F
or F2m)
p
Entry address0x00a(modularmultiply)
Pre-conditionsA0-3 = A (binary polynomial, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register)
B0-3 = B (binary polynomial, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register)
N0-3 = irreducible polynomial of the ECC system
Post-conditions A0-3 = A operand is preserved
B0-3 = results of modular multiplication stored where the B operand was located
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special
conditions
T ypically, though it is not mandatory, the oper ands will be in the Montgomery residue system. The only
time this would not be the case is when manually placing a value into the Montgomery residue system.
7.3.13 ECC F2m Montgomery Modular Multiplication
((A × B × R-2) mod N)
The (A × B × R-2) mod N calculation is similar to the standard ‘R-1’ Montgomery
multiplication except an additional R is divided out. This function is ideal for those ECC
applications which work in affine coordinates. In that case, the host may use this function
to exit projective coordinates. F or example, the host could find x, for x = X/Z
2)-1
(Z
are in the Montgomery residue system. Loading X and (Z2)-1 into the appropriate
operand registers and initiating this function would yield x which is no longer in the
Montgomery residue system. This function operates with a minimum of 5 digits
(Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:
2
, where X and
Table 7-17. F
m Modular Multiplication (with double reduction)
2
F2m Modular Multiply (with double reduction)
-2
ComputationC = A * B * R
mod N, where A, B, and C are binary polynomials with order than N and R = 2
where D is the number of digits of the irreducible polynomial
Entry namemodularmultiply2 (same as F
)
p
Entry address0x00b (modularmultiply2)
Pre-conditionsA0-3 = A (binary polynomial, exact A-location pre-selected in Control Register)
B0-3 = B (binary polynomial, exact B-location pre-selected in Control Register)
N0-3 = irreducible polynomial of the ECC system
Post-conditions A0-3 = A operand is preserved
B0-3 = results of modular multiplication stored where the B operand was located
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
For the RSA-related descriptions which follow, it is generally recommended that all
memory block pointers (regAsel, regBsel, etc.) are set to zero. For the modular
exponentiation routine, the pointers are actually ignored. For the multiplies, add, subtract,
2
and R
settings.
While potentially dangerous due to the commonly large sizes of RSA operands, this
flexibility is allowed to support Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). CRT often generates
intermediate values which must be stored for later use. By using pointers, these values may
be stored in the PKEU and efficiently used again without the host having to store/retrieve
these values to/from general memory . It is left to the application dev eloper to use these tools
to support CRT.
functions, it is possible to set these pointers and have the PKEU adhere to these
7.4.1 (A × R-1)
EXP
mod N
The PKEU carries out exponentiations by repeated multiply operations. The multiplies are
controlled internally by the PKEU, howev er, it is the responsibility of the host processor to
provide exponent data (32-bit words at a time) to the accelerator during the operation. Note
that the host must supply the exponent data starting with the most significant 32-bit word
and working down to the least significant word. Each individual word, however, is
formatted msb to lsb (i.e. “exp_word[msb:lsb]”).
PKEU asserts the IRDY_B and IRQ signals when it is ready to accept more exponent data
(IRQ only if E_RDY is not mask ed). This tells the host processor to read the SR to see what
was set. If the E_RD Y bit is set, the host processor knows it must provide the next word of
the exponent - this data is written into the EXP(k) register one 32-bit word at a time. If this
interrupt bit is masked, then it must poll the status register to determine when to provide the
next word of the exponent. The host should not look for the assertion of E_RDY until after
the routine (i.e. CR[GO] bit). Data previously written to EXP(K) is ignored.
The data to be exponentiated must be provided in the Montgomery format. Consider the
vector A’, the data to be exponentiated where A’ = AR mod N. By providing A’, the results
of (A’ × R
-1)EXP
mod N yields (A × R × R-1)
EXP
mod N, or equivalently, (A)
EXP
mod N.
The result of the calculation is returned to the B storage register . Note that this value has no
remaining R terms and therefore is no longer in Montgomery format. The value of the
exponent vector must be greater than one for this function to work properly. This function
operates with a minimum of 5 digits (Modsize = 4). The exponent may be as small as one
byte (EXP(k)_SIZE = 0).The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:
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RSA Routines
Table 7-18. Integer Modular Exponentiation
Integer Modular Exponentiation
-1)EXP
ComputationS = (A’ * R
Entry nameexpA
Entry address0x007(expA)
Pre-conditionsA0-3 = A’ (the value A in the Montgomery residue system)
N0-3 = modulus
Run-time
conditions
EXP(k) = msb exponent word (provided in 8-bit words throughout the exponentiation);
first word provides following routine invocation per ERDY assertion.
Post-conditions B0-3 = S
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special
conditions
A, N, and B have the lsb digits in A0, N0, and B0, respectively. As required, data will occupy the
more significant memory blocks.
mod N
Initial Condition
etc.
A’ (bits 1023:512)
N (bits 1023:512)
modulus N (bits 511:0)modulus N (bits 511:0)
exponent (run-time)
etc.
A’ (bits 511:0)
etc.
‘0’ - ECC disabled
‘0’ - integer-mod-n enabledsame
set
set
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
Modsize
EXP(k)_SIZE
Final Condition
etc.
S (bits 1023:512)
S (bits 511:0)
etc.
etc.
A’ (bits 1023:512)
A’ (bits 511:0)
7.4.2 RSA Montgomery Modular Multiplication
((A × B × R-1) mod N)
The (A × B × R-1) mod N calculation is the core function of the PKEU. It is used to assist
the exponentiation routine in completing its operation though it is also available to the host
processor - typically to put messages into the Montgomery format. This function operates
with a minimum of five digits (Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown
below:
Table 7-19. Modular Multiplication
Modular Multiply
-1
ComputationC = A * B * R
mod N, where A, B, and C are integers less than N and R = 2
number of digits of the modulus vector
Entry namemodularmultiply
Entry address0x00a(modularmultiply)
Pre-conditionsA0-3 = A
B0-3 = B
N0-3 = modulus
Post-conditions A0-3 = A operand is preserved
B0-3 = results of modular multiplication stored where the B operand was located
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special
conditions
T ypically, though it is not mandatory, the oper ands will be in the Montgomery residue system. The only
time this would not be the case is when manually placing a value into the Montgomery residue system.
Prior to initiating this function, the A and B register pointers must be set in the control
register which indicate which sub-registers (e.g A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted
operands. See Table 7-2 for a detailed description. Once this is performed, the host
processor may successfully initiate this function.
Chapter 7. Public Key Execution Unit 7-27
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
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RSA Routines
7.4.3 RSA Montgomery Modular Multiplication
((A × B × R-2) mod N)
The (A × B × R-2) mod N calculation is similar to the standard ‘R-1’ Montgomery
multiplication except an additional R is divided out. This function is particularly helpful
when using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This function operates with a minimum of
five digits (Modsize = 4). The complete set of I/O conditions is shown below:
Modular addition may be performed on any two vectors loaded into A (A0-A3) and B
(B0-B3), where both of these vectors are less than the value stored in the modulus register
N (N0-N3). The results are stored in the respective B register. This function is particularly
helpful when using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This function operates with a
minimum of 4 digits (Modsize = 3).
Prior to initiating this function, the A and B register pointers must be set in the control
register which indicate which sub-registers (e.g A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted
operands. See Table 7-2 for a detailed description. Once this is performed, the host
processor may successfully initiate this function.
Table 7-21. Modular Add
Modular Add
ComputationC = D + E mod N, where D, E, and C are integers and are less than N
Entry namemodularadd
Entry address0x008(modularadd)
Pre-conditionsA0-3 = D
Post-conditions B0-3 = results of modular addition stored where the B operand was located
Special
conditions
B0-3 = E
N0-3 = modulus
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
The function operates the same regardless of whether or not the operands are in the Montgomery
residue system.
Initial Condition
E(⇑)
D(⇑)
modulus N(⇑)modulus N(⇑)
‘0’ - ECC disabled
‘0’ - integer-modulo-n enabledsame
set (00)
set (00)
set (00)
set
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
regAsel
regBsel
regNsel
Modsize
EXP(k)_SIZE
Final Condition
C(⇑)
same
same
same
same
same
Figure 7-20. Modular Add Register Usage
Chapter 7. Public Key Execution Unit 7-29
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 80
RSA Routines
7.4.5 RSA Fp Modular Subtract
Modular addition may be performed on any two vectors loaded into A (A0-A3) and B
(B0-B3), where both of these vectors are less than the value stored in the modulus register
N (N0-N3). This is accomplished by computing A-B if A > B or A-B+N if A < B. The
results are stored in the respective B register. This function is particularly helpful when
using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This function operates with a minimum of 4 digits
(Modsize = 3).
Prior to initiating this function, the A and B register pointers must be set in the control
register which indicate which sub-registers (e.g A0, B0, A1, B1, etc.) are the targeted
operands. See Table 7-2 for a detailed description. Once this is performed, the host
processor may successfully initiate this function.
Table 7-22. Modular Subtract
Modular Subtract
ComputationC = D - E mod N, where D, E, and C are integers and are less than N
Entry namemodularsubtract
Entry address0x009(modularsubtract)
Pre-conditionsA0-3 = D
Post-conditions B0-3 = results of modular subtraction stored where the B operand was located
Special
conditions
B0-3 = E
N0-3 = modulus
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
The function operates the same regardless of whether or not the operands are in the Montgomery
residue system.
Initial Condition
E(⇑)
D(⇑)
modulus N(⇑)modulus N(⇑)
‘0’ - ECC disabled
‘0’ - integer-modulo-n enabledsame
set
set (00)
set (00)
set (00)
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
regAsel
regBsel
regNsel
Modsize
EXP(k)_SIZE
Final Condition
C(⇑)
same
same
same
same
same
Figure 7-21. Modular Subtract Register Usage
7-30MPC180E Security Processor User’s Manual
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 81
Miscellaneous Routines
7.5 Miscellaneous Routines
The remaining routines are general in nature and are not specific to any particular
cryptographic algorithm.
7.5.1 Clear Memory
This routine clears all of the RAM memory locations in the PKEU. This includes the A, B,
and N RAMs. All locations are set to zero. All other registers are cleared either via a reset
(software or hardware) or by explicitly writing zeros to each register. Following a reset
(software or hardware), this routine is automatically inv oked. This accounts for the majority
of time between reset and the assertion of the DONE bit in the status register.
Table 7-23. Clear Memory
Clear Memory
ComputationA, B, N, and t memories are overwritten with zeros
Entry nameclearmemory
Entry address0x00d(r2)
Pre-conditions —
Post-conditions A = B = N = 0 (all locations)
Special
conditions
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
—
Initial Condition
EXP(k)_SIZE
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
regAsel
regBsel
regNsel
Modsize
Final Condition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
same
Figure 7-22. Clear Memory Register Usage
Chapter 7. Public Key Execution Unit 7-31
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 82
Miscellaneous Routines
7.5.2 R2 mod N Calculation
The PKEU has the capability to calculate R2 mod N, where R = 2
of digits of the modulus vector (Modsize+1, where Modsize is specified independently).
This function is used to assist in placing operands into the Montgomery residue system.
When possible, this value should be pre-computed. If this value is not available, then the
host processor may invoke this function to determine the value before the operation. This
function takes a non-trivial amount of time (see Table 7-26) so if at all possible, this value
should be stored for future use.
Note that this operation primarily exists to support RSA operations since R
not always be known prior to the execution of certain protocols. For ECC applications, the
modulus is a system-wide parameter, which means that the R
pre-computed before any real-time operations by any other system entity and stored for
future use. For this reason, R
the control register bit F
2
mod N only supports integer-modulo-n computations (i.e.
M must be 0).
2
This function operates with a minimum of 4 digits (Modsize = 3) and with the most
significant digit (16-bits) of the modulus being non-zero. The complete set of I/O
conditions is shown below:
Table 7-24. R2 mod N
R2 mod N
2
ComputationR
Entry namer2
Entry address0x00c(r2)
Pre-conditions Modsize = number of digits of the modulus vector - 1
Post-conditions B1 = R
Special
conditions
mod N, where R = 2
N0-3 = modulus
2
mod N
N0-3 = modulus
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
—
16D
and D is the number of digits of the modulus vector
16D
and D is the number
2
mod N may
2
mod N value may be
7-32MPC180E Security Processor User’s Manual
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 83
Miscellaneous Routines
Initial Condition
modulus N(⇑)modulus N(⇑)
‘0’ - ECC disabled
‘0’ - integer-modulo-n enabledsame
set
set (00)
set (00)
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
XYZ
F2M
regAsel
regBsel
regNsel
Modsize
EXP(k)_SIZE
Final Condition
2
R
mod N(⇑)
same
same
Figure 7-23. R2 mod N Register Usage
7.5.3 RpRN mod P Calculation
The PKEU has the ability to calculate RpRN mod P, where Rp = 2
16D
, and RN = 2
the number of digits of the modulus P, and E is the number of digits of the modulus N, and
D + 4 < E. This constant is used in performing Chinese Remainder Theorem calculations
given modulus N = P × Q, where P and Q are prime numbers. Although labelled R
P, this function can also compute R
mod Q. The requirement D + 4 < E is not a
QRN
requirement of the command, but a system requirement, as for all subfunctions of Chinese
Remainder Theorem to be executable on the PKEU, the number of digits of P and Q must
each be at least five.
As with the standard R
and only works with the Control Register F
2
mod N operation, this operation exists primarily to support RSA
M bit set to zero.
2
To use this function, MOD_SIZE must be programmed with D-1, and EXP_SIZE must be
programmed with E-1, and the prime modulus (either P or Q) is written into memory N.
The complete set of I/O conditions is shown in Table 7-26.
16E
PRN
; D is
mod
Chapter 7. Public Key Execution Unit 7-33
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Page 84
Miscellaneous Routines
Table 7-25. R
pRN
RpRN mod P
ComputationR
mod P, where Rp = 2
pRN
and E is the number of digits of the modulus N, and D + 4 < E
16D
, and RN = 2
16E
Entry namer2
Entry address0x00c(r2)
Pre-conditions Modsize = number of digits of the vector D - 1
EXP(k) SIZE = number of digits of the vector E-1
Post-conditions B0-3 = RpRN mod P
N0-3 = modulus
Unless explicitly noted, all other registers are not guaranteed to be any particular value.
Special
—
conditions
Initial Condition
modulus P(⇑)modulus P(⇑)
‘0’ - ECC disabled
‘1’ - RpRn enabled
‘0’ - integer-modulo-n enabledsame
set (D-1)
set (E-1)
set (00)
B3
B2
B1
B0
A3
A2
A1
A0
N3
N2
N1
N0
ECC
EXP(k)
RpRn
F2M
regAsel
regBsel
regNsel
Modsize
EXP(k)_SIZE
mod P
; D is the number of digits of the modulus P,
Final Condition
2
mod N(⇑)
R
same
same
same
Figure 7-24. RPRN mod P Register Usage
7-34MPC180E Security Processor User’s Manual
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 85
Embedded Routine Performance
7.6 Embedded Routine Performance
The formulas listed in Table 7-26 show the run times for the PKHA embedded routines.
Many of these are data dependent, which result in variable length run times. For these cases,
the average run-time is noted.
For these formulas, the following definitions apply:
F = operating frequency
MS = number of 16-bit blocks in the modulus (that is, the value assigned to the Modsize reg. plus one)
Ne = number of bits in the exponent or multiplier (k)
avg = average run time (applied to a nominal case which assumes 50% 1’s = in Ne
wcs = worst-case run time
bcs = best-case run time
(avg)Ne* t
mulfp
addfp
dblfp
(avg)Ne* t
mulf2m
addf2m
dblf2m
(avg)1.5*Ne*[t
exp
(wcs)
mult1
t
(bcs)
mult1
(wcs)
mult2
t
(bcs)
mult2
(wcs)
add
t
(bcs)
add
(wcs)
sub
t
(bcs)
sub
r2
clr_ram
+ 0.5*Ne* t
dblfp
16*(t
) + 4*(t
mult1
10*(t
mult1
dblf2m
20*(t
mult1
10*(t
mult1
(1/F) * [(MS)
(1/F) * [(MS)
(1/F) *2* [(MS)
(1/F) *2* [(MS)
(1/F) * [4*(MS)+ 11]
(1/F) * [3*(MS)+ 6]
(1/F) * [3*(MS)+ 11]
(1/F) * [2*(MS)+ 6]
<tbd>
(1/F) * 4 * (MS+ 5)
add
) + 11*(t
+ 0.5*Ne* t
) + 7*(t
add
) + 4*(t
add
] + t
mult1
2
+ 10*(MS)+ 27]
2
+ 9*(MS)+ 22]
2
+ 10*(MS)+ 27]
2
+ 9*(MS)+ 22]
+ 8*(t
addfp
) + 5*(t
)+2*(t
add
addf2m
) + 15*(MS)
) + 9*(MS)
(wcs)
mult1
mult1
) + 19*(MS)
sub
) + 10*(MS)
sub
+ 8*(t
move
move
) + 6*(MS)
mult1
1
move
move
move
) + 6*(MS)
move
NOTE:
When t
without references to wcs or bcs is encountered,
mult1
assume that for 75% of the time, bcs will occur and for the
other 25%, wcs (i.e. t
0.25*t
The formulas given for t
mult1
(wcs)).
mulfp
↔ 0.75*t
mult1
and t
mulf2m
(bcs) +
mult1
are for XYZ bit of the
Control Register set to one. If set to zero, the run-time would
be nearly identical but additional support from the host
processor would be required to fully complete the operation.
See the point multiply descriptions in Embedded Routine
Reference section for more details.
Chapter 7. Public Key Execution Unit 7-35
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 86
Embedded Routine Performance
7-36MPC180E Security Processor User’s Manual
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 87
Chapter 8
Random Number Generator
This chapter explains how to program the RNG (Random Number Generator) to create a
random number.
8.1 Overview
The RNG is a digital integrated circuit capable of generating 32-bit random numbers. It is
designed to comply with the FIPS-140 standard for randomness and non-determinism. A
linear feedback shift register (LSFR) and cellular automata shift register (CASR) are
operated in parallel to generate pseudo-random data.
8.2 Functional Description
The RNG consists of six major functional blocks:
•Bus Interface Unit (BIU)
•Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)
•Cellular Automata Shift Register (CASR)
•Clock Controller
•2 Ring Oscillators
The states of the LFSR and CASR are advanced at unknown frequencies determined by the
two ring oscillator clocks and the clock control. When a read is performed, the oscillator
clocks are halted and a collection of bits from the LFSR and CASR are x’ored together to
obtain the 32-bit random output. The BIU interfaces with the External Bus Interface (EBI)
to allow communication between the EBI and the RNG.
8.3 Typical Operation
A typical procedure for reading random data is as follows. When a gi ven operation calls for
random data, the CPU writes the number of 32-bit random words required to the MPC180E
EBI, specifically to the Output Buffer Count Register (see section 3.3.1.5). The EBI
monitors the ORDY bit in the RNG Status Register (Fig 8-1). This bit signals whether the
random data is ready . Once the ORDY bit goes low , the EBI reads the 32-bit word from the
RNG Random Output Register (Table 8-1) and writes it to the MPC180E Output FIFO,
Chapter 8. Random Number Generator 8-1
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 88
Random Number Generator Registers
repeating this process until the required number of 32-bit random words have been
generated. Reads by the EBI can be repeated as soon as the ORDY bit is dri v en high again.
The process is outlined as follows:
•CPU sets up MPC180E EBI to generate required number of random words.
•EBI waits for ORD
Y signal to be driven low.
•EBI reads autorand (Automatic Random Output Register), writes to Output FIFO.
•Repeat previous steps until Output Buffer Count Register reaches zero.
At this point, the EBI can generate an interrupt to inform the CPU that the required number
of random words is waiting in the Output FIFO. These random words can be read by the
CPU for immediate write back to the MPC180E, or written into memory for later use.
Table 8-2 describes the RNG status register fields.
Table 8-2. RNG Status Register Field Descriptions
BitsNameDescription
0–17—Reserved.
18ORDYThe ORDY bit will be driven high when random data is ready. If the user performs a read
19–30 –Reserved.
31ON/OFF A value of 1 indicates that the RNG is on and the shift registers are randomizing.
8-2MPC180E Security Processor User’s Manual
of the Random Output Register while the ORDY bit is lo w, the RNG will assert wait states
until the ORDY bit goes high.
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 89
Chapter 9
Hardware Parameters
This chapter provides the AC and DC electrical specifications as well as the thermal
characteristics of the MPC180E.
9.1 Absolute Maximum Ratings
Table 9-1 lists ranges of basic parameters.
Table 9-1. Absolute Maximum Ratings
CharacteristicNameAbsolute MinAbsolute MaxUnit
Power supply voltage—CoreV
Power supply voltage—I/OV
Storage temperature—-55 +150°C
Lead temperature (for 10 seconds)—— +300°C
Static input pin voltage—-0.3+3.6 Volts
Input current to guarantee latch-up can not occur——— mA
1
Permanent device damage may occur if ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM RATINGS are exceeded. Functional operation
should be restricted to RECOMMENDED OPERATING CONDITIONS. Exposure to higher than recommended
voltages for extended periods of time could affect device reliability.
2
This device contains circuitry to protect the inputs against damage due to high static voltages or electric fields;
however, it is advised that normal precautions be taken to avoid application of any voltage higher than maximum
rated voltages to this high-impedance circuit.
DD
DD
-0.3+1.95 Volts
-0.3+3.6 Volts
1,2
Chapter 9. Har dware Parameters 9-1
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 90
Package Thermal Characteristics
9.2 Package Thermal Characteristics
Table 9-2 shows the thermal resistances for the 100 pin LQFP package.
Table 9-2. Package Thermal Characteristics
RatingSymbolMaxUnit
Junction to ambient
1,2
(@200Ifm)
Single–layer board
Four–layer board
R40
°C/W
25
Junction to board
Junction to case
1
Junction temperature is a function of on-chip power dissipation, package thermal resistance, mounting site
(board) temperature, ambient temperature, air flow, board population, and board thermal resistance.
2
Per SEMI G38-87.
3
Indicates the average thermal resistance between the die and the printed circuit board.
4
Indicates the average thermal resistance between the die and the case top surface via the cold plate
method (MIL SPEC-883 Method 1012.1).
3
(bottom)
4
(top)
R17
R9
9.3 Pin Capacitance
Table 9-3 shows the pin capacitances for the input and I/O pins.
Table 9-3. Capacitance
ParameterSymbolMinTypMaxUnit
Input capacitanceC
Input/output capacitanceC
1
f = 1.0MHz, TA = 0 to 70∞C, periodically sampled rather than 100% tested
1
in
I/O
—5 7pF
—5 7pF
°C/W
°C/W
9-2MPC180E Security Processor User’s Manual
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 91
AC/DC Electrical Characteristics
9.4 AC/DC Electrical Characteristics
T able 9-4 shows DC electrical characteristics. Unless specified otherwise, conditions are as
follows:
V
= 0 V
SS
Power supply voltage—CoreV
Power supply voltage—I/OV
Input low voltage (Vdd = Min) V
Input high voltage (Vdd = Max) V
AC supply currentI
Standby supply currentI
Input leakage current @ V
Three-state input current @ V
Input buffer/pad capacitanceC
Input/output buffer/pad capacitanceC
Output high voltage (I
Output low voltage
I
= 3.2 mA, CL = 35 pF (IRQ)
ol
I
= 3.2 mA, CL = 50 pF (D[0:31])
ol
and TA = 0° C to 120° C.
DC
Table 9-4. DC Electrical Characteristics
CharacteristicNameMinTypMaxUnits
≥ Vin ≥ V
DD
= -400 µA)V
oh
≥ Vin ≥ V
DD
SS
1.65—1.95V
DD
3.135—3.465V
DD
——0.8V
il
2.0——V
ih
DD
SS
I
leak
SS
I
z
in
io
oh
V
ol
—— —mA
—— —mA
——10µA
——10µA
—5 —pF
—5 —pF
2.4——V
——0.4V
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
9.5 AC Timing Specification
T able 9-5 shows the AC timing specifications for the master clock and reset signals. Unless
specified otherwise, conditions are as follows:
Table 9-5. AC Timing Specifications—Clock and Reset Pins
ConditionNameMinTypMaxUnits
rfc
c
dc
rst
rfr
Chapter 9. Har dware Parameters 9-3
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
—— 3nS
—66—MHz
455055%
16——cycles
—— 1µS
Page 92
Data Transf er
Table 9-6 shows the AC timing specifications for data signals.
Table 9-6. AC Timing Specifications—Signal Pins
ConditionNameMinMaxUnits
Address setup time to MCLK riseT
Address hold time from MCLK riseT
Data (write) setup time to MCLK riseT
Data (write) hold time from MCLK riseT
TS setup time to MCLK riseT
TS hold time from MCLK riseT
setup time to MCLK riseT
R/W
R/W
hold time from MCLK riseT
MCLK rise to D (read) active delayT
MCLK fall to D (read) HiZ delayT
MCLK rise to IRQ
T able 9-7 shows how CS, TS, and R/W interact to determine the cycle type. The host asserts
TS
to indicate the start of a transfer.
Table 9-7. Determination of Cycle Types
CSTSR/WCycle T ype
001MPC180E Read
000MPC180E Write
010 or 1MPC180E Idle
10 or 10 or 1MPC180E Idle
9-4MPC180E Security Processor User’s Manual
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Page 93
Exception Timing
9.7 Exception Timing
An interrupt occurs when MPC180E asserts IRQ, indicating to the microprocessor that an
event worth monitoring has happened. After the interrupt is received and processed by the
microprocessor, the processor may read CSTAT to determine which execution unit caused
the interrupt.
Figure 9-1 shows the timing for a typical interrupt cycle.
is asserted by the rising edge of MCLK.
The RESET
in that cycle; otherwise, it is recognized in the following cycle. After RESET
input must be stable on the falling edge of MCLK to guarantee its recognition
is negated, the
processor needs to guarantee at least four idle cycles before accessing the MPC180E.
MCLK
IRQ
Figure 9-1. Exception Cycle Timing
)()
(
)()
(
Interrupt read and cleared
Chapter 9. Har dware Parameters 9-5
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Page 94
Case Outline Package Dimensions
9.8 Case Outline Package Dimensions
3X
VIEW Y
4X
100
1
N0.2 T L–M
4X 25 TIPS
76
75
N0.2 T L–M
C
L
AB
G
X
X = L, M OR N
AB
L
M
B
V
VIEW Y
BASE METAL
F
V1
B1
25
2650
A1
N
51
PLATING
S1
A
S
2
q
C
T
4X
0.08 T
SEATING
PLANE
3
q
4X
VIEW AA
NOTES:
1. DIMENSIONS AND TOLERANCES PER ASME
2. DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETERS.
3. DATUMS L, M AND N TO BE DETERMINED AT THE
4. DIMENSIONS S AND V TO BE DETERMINED AT
5. DIMENSIONS A AND B DO NOT INCLUDE MOLD
100X
6. DIMENSION D DOES NOT INCLUDE DAMBAR
0.05
(W)
1
q
2X R
R1
(K)
E
0.25
GAGE PLANE
q
C2
C1
(Z)
VIEW AA
J
U
D
M
0.08NT
SECTION AB–AB
ROTATED 90 CLOCKWISE
Y14.5M, 1994.
SEATING PLANE, DATUM T.
SEATING PLANE, DATUM T.
PROTRUSION. ALLOWABLE PROTRUSION IS 0.25
PER SIDE. DIMENSIONS A AND B INCLUDE MOLD
MISMATCH.
PROTRUSION. DAMBAR PROTRUSION SHALL
NOT CAUSE THE LEAD WIDTH TO EXCEED 0.35.
MINIMUM SPACE BETWEEN PROTRUSION AND
ADJACENT LEAD OR PROTRUSION 0.07.
AES. The Advanced Encryption Standard that will replace DES (Data
Encryption Standard) around the turn of the century. Rijndael
algorithm under final evaluation.
AFEU. Arc Four Execution Unit. Encryption engine which implements a
stream cipher compatible with the RC4 algorithm from RSA
Security, Inc.
Authentication. The action of verifying information such as identity,
ownership, or authorization.
Architecture. A detailed specification of requirements for a processor or
computer system. It does not specify details of how the processor or
computer system must be implemented; instead it provides a
template for a family of compatible implementations.
Big-endian. A byte-ordering method in memory where the address n of a
word corresponds to the most-significant byte. In an addressed
memory word, the bytes are ordered (left to right) 0, 1, 2, 3, with 0
being the most-significant byte. See Little-endian.
Block cipher. A symmetric cipher which encrypts a message by breaking it
down into blocks and encrypting each block.
Block cipher based MAC. MAC that is performed by using a block cipher
as a keyed compression function.
Buffer count registers. Contain the number of 32-bit words to be transferred
to/from an execution unit for a given operation.
PRELIMINARY—SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE
Glossary Glossary-1
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Bulk Data Encryption. The process of converting plaintext to ciphertext.
Refers to encryption operations other than key exchange and
hashing.
Burst. A multiple-word data transfer whose total size is typically equal to a
cache block. In MPC860 mode, four words. In MPC8260 mode,
eight words.
C
CBC. Cipher block chaining. Mode of DES encryption which uses IVs which
are altered by the context of the preceding block.
Chinese Remainder Theorem. Mathematical theorem based on the
congruence of greatest common denominator and least common
multiple. CRT is used in support of asymmetric key exchange.
Ciphertext. T e xt (an y information) which has been encrypted so as to render
it unreadable by parties without the proper decryption keys.
Clear. To cause a bit or bit field to register a value of zero. See also Set.
Context. Information associated with an encryption/decryption operation.
Typical context constituents are session keys, initialization vectors,
and security associations.
Context memory. Local or system memory reserved for storage of security
context information.
Context switching. The act of changing session-specific parameters, such as
Keys and IVs, between the end of the current packet and the next.
Cryptography. The art and science of using mathematics to secure
information and create a high degree of trust in the electronic realm.
See also public key, secret key, symmetric-key, and threshold
cryptography.
Crypto-analysis. The art and science of code breaking. Develops methods of
attacking encryption algorithms to recover plaintext in significantly
less time that brute force attacks.
Decryption. The process of converting ciphertext to plaintext. Also referred
to as decoding.
DES. Data encryption standard. A block cipher that uses a 56-bit key to
encrypt 64-bit blocks of data, one block at a time.
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3DES. Triple DES. Encryption operation which permutes 64 bit blocks of
plaintext with 64 bit keys three times. Triple DES is exponentially
stronger than single DES encryption.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange. A key exchange protocol allowing the
participants to agree on a key over an insecure channel.
Digest. Commonly used to refer to the output of a hash function, e.g. message
digest refers to the hash of a message.
Digital signature. The encryption of a message digest with a private key.
DMA. Direct Memory Access.
DSA. Digital Signature Algorithm. DSA is a public-k ey method based on the
discrete logarithm problem. Proposed by NIST.
DSS. Digital signature standard proposed by NIST.
E
EBI. External Bus Interface. A functional block in the MPC180E that
mediates between internal and external signals.
ECB. Electronic code book. A mode of DES which uses initialization v ectors
that are not modified by processing of the previous packet.
ECC. Elliptic curve cryptosystem. A public-key cryptosystem based on the
properties of elliptic curves.
Elliptic curve. The set of points (x, y) satisfying an equation of the form
y2 = x3 + ax + b, for variables x, y and constants a, b Î F, where F is
a field.
Encryption. The transformation of plaintext into an apparently less readable
form (called ciphertext) through a mathematical process. The
ciphertext may be read by anyone who has the key that decrypts
(undoes the encryption) the ciphertext.
Execution unit. Any device or silicon block which accelerates the
mathematical transformations associated with key exchange, data
authentication, and bulk data encryption.
Exponent. In the binary representation of a floating-point number, the
exponent is the component that normally signifies the integer power
to which the value two is raised in determining the value of the
represented number.
External Bus Interface. See EBI.
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F
FIFO. First in, first out. A b uffer memory which supports in-order processing
of data.
FIPS. Federal Information Protection Standards.
Fraction. In the binary representation of a floating-point number, the field of
the significand that lies to the right of its implied binary point.
H
I
Hashing. A function that takes a variable sized input and has a fixed size
output.
HMAC. Hashed message authentication code. MAC that uses a hash function
to reduce the size of the data it processes.
IKE. Internet Key Exchange. A process used by two more parties to exchange
keys via the Internet, for future secure communication via the
Internet.
Initialization V ector. Secret value that, along with the k e y, is shared by both
encryptor and decryptor. It is a string of bits used in lieu of plainte xt
at the start of DES. Used in CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) to
complicate crypto-analysis.
Interrupt. An asynchronous exception. On PowerPC processors, interrupts
are a special case of exceptions.
Interrupt controller. Organizes the hardware interrupts coming from the
execution units into a maskable interrupt for the processor
Interrupt mask register. Allows masking of individual interrupts by the
host.
IPSec. A standard suite of protocols go verning k ey e xchange, authentication,
and encryption of IP packets for transport or tunneling over the
Internet.
Key. A string of bits used widely in cryptography, allowing people to encrypt
and decrypt data; a key can be used to perform other mathematical
operations as well. Given a cipher, a key determines the mapping of
the plaintext to the ciphertext.
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L
Latency. The number of clock cycles necessary to execute an instruction and
make ready the results of that execution for a subsequent instruction.
Least-significant bit (lsb). The bit of least value in an address, register, data
element, or instruction encoding.
Least-significant byte (LSB). The byte of least value in an address, register,
data element, or instruction encoding.
Little-endian. A byte-ordering method in memory where the address n of a
word corresponds to the least-significant byte. In an addressed
memory word, the bytes are ordered (left to right) 3, 2, 1, 0, with 3
being the most-significant byte. See Big-endian.
M
Masking. Hiding internal interrupts and signals from the external interface
via control registers.
MD4. Message Digest 4. Hashing algorithm developed by Rivest which
processes a series of 512-bit message blocks and produces a single
128-bit Hash representing the original message.
MD5. Message Digest 5. Hashing algorithm developed by Ri vest which pads
(if necessary) the message to be hashed to create a 512 bit block. This
block is compressed by XOR-ing two inputs: the 512-bit message
block, and a 128-bit key. Stronger than MD.
MDEU. Message Digest Execution Unit. A device or silicon block which
accelerates the hashing functions associated with message
authentication.
Memory-mapped accesses. Accesses whose addresses use the page or block
address translation mechanisms provided by the MMU and that
occur externally with the bus protocol defined for memory.
Message Authentication Code (MAC). A MAC is a function that takes a
variable length input and a key to produce a fix ed-length output. See
also hash-based MAC, stream-cipher based MAC, and block-cipher
based MAC.
Message Digest. The result of applying a hash function to a message.
Modular arithmetic. A form of arithmetic where integers are considered
equal if they leave the same remainder when di vided by the modulus.
Modulus. The integer used to divide out by in modular arithmetic.
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Most-significant bit (msb). The highest-order bit in an address, registers,
data element, or instruction encoding.
Most-significant byte (MSB). The highest-order byte in an address,
registers, data element, or instruction encoding.
N
P
NIST. National Institute of Standards. U.S. Government Agency responsible
for defining and certifying standards.
Padding. Extra bits concatenated with a key, password, or plaintext.
Physical memory. The actual memory that can be accessed through the
system’s memory bus.
Pipelining. A technique that breaks operations, such as instruction
processing or bus transactions, into smaller distinct stages or tenures
(respectively) so that a subsequent operation can begin before the
previous one has completed.
PKEU. Public Key Execution Unit. A device or silicon block which
accelerates the mathematical algorithms associated with public key
exchange. Typically uses the RSA or Diffie-Hellman algorithms.
PKI. Public Key Infrastructure. PKIs are designed to solve the key
management problem.
Plaintext. The data to be encrypted.
Private key. In public-key cryptography, this key is the secret key. It is
primarily used for decryption but is also used for encryption with
digital signatures.
PRNG. Pseudo Random Number Generator. A device or silicon block which
produces numbers or bits which are related to preceding and
following numbers or bits, however this relationship is nearly
imperceptible. Only predictable in a theoretical sense.
Public key. In public-key cryptography this key is made public to all, it is
primarily used for encryption but can be used for verifying
signatures.
Public-key cryptography. Cryptography based on methods involving a