3com CoreBuilder 5000 Ethernet Private Line Card User Guide

CoreBuilder™5000 Ethernet
®
Private Line Card User Guide
http://www.3com.com/
Document Number 17-00439-3 Published May 1997
3Com Corporation 5400 Bayfront Plaza Santa Clara, California 95052-8145
Copyright © 3Com Corporation, 1997. All rights reserved. No part of this documentation may be reproduced in any form or by any means, or used to make any derivative work (such as translation, transformation, or adaptation) without permission from 3Com Corporation. Portions of this document are reproduced in whole or part with permission from third parties.
3Com Corporation reserves the right to revise this documentation and to make changes in content from time to time without obligation on the part of 3Com Corporation to provide notification of such revision or change.
3Com Corporation provides this documentation without warranty of any kind, either implied or expressed, including, but not limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. 3Com may make improvements or changes in the products or programs described in this documentation at any time.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT LEGENDS:
If you are a United States government agency, then this documentation and the software described herein are provided to you subject to the following restricted rights:
For units of the Department of Defense:
Restricted Rights Legend: Use, duplication, or disclosure by the Government is subject to restrictions as set forth in subparagraph (c) (1) (ii) for Restricted Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software Clause at 48 C.F.R. 52.227-7013.
For civilian agencies:
Restricted Rights Legend: Use, reproduction, or disclosure is subject to restrictions set forth in subparagraph (a) through (d) of the Commercial Computer Software – Restricted Rights Clause at 48 C.F.R. 52.227-19 and the limitations set forth in the 3Com Corporation standard commercial agreement for the software. Unpublished rights reserved under the copyright laws of the United States.
If there is any software on removable media described in this documentation, it is furnished under a license agreement included with the product as a separate document, in the hardcopy documentation, or on the removable media in a directory file named LICENSE.TXT. If you are unable to locate a copy, please contact 3Com and a copy will be sent to you.
Federal Communications Commission Notice
This equipment was tested and found to comply with the limits for a Class A digital device, pursuant to Part 15 of the FCC Rules. These limits are designed to provide reasonable protection against harmful interference when the equipment is operated in a commercial environment. This equipment generates, uses, and can radiate radio frequency energy and, if not installed and used in accordance with the instruction manual, may cause harmful interference to radio communications. Operation of this equipment in a residential area is likely to cause harmful interference, in which case you must correct the interference at your own expense.
Canadian Emissions Requirements
This Class A digital apparatus meets all requirements of the Canadian Interference-Causing Equipment Regulations.
Cet appareil numérique de la classe A respecte toutes les exigences du Règlement sur le matériel brouilleur du Canada.
EMC Directive Compliance
This equipment was tested and conforms to the Council Directive 89/336/EEC for electromagnetic compatibility. Conformity with this directive is based upon compliance with the following harmonized standards:
EN 55022 – Limits and Methods of Measurement of Radio Interference EN 50082-1 – Electromagnetic Compatibility Generic Immunity Standard: Residential, Commercial, and
Light Industry Warning: This is a Class A product. In a domestic environment, this product may cause radio interference, in
which case you may be required to take adequate measures. Compliance with this directive depends on the use of shielded cables.
Low Voltage Directive Compliance
This equipment was tested and conforms to the Council Directive 72/23/EEC for safety of electrical equipment. Conformity with this directive is based upon compliance with the following harmonized standard:
EN 60950 – Safety of Information Technology Equipment
ii
VCCI Class 1 Compliance
This equipment is in the 1st Class category (information equipment to be used in commercial or industrial areas) and conforms to the standards set by the Voluntary Control Council for Interference by Information Technology Equipment aimed at preventing radio interference in commercial or industrial areas.
Consequently, when the equipment is used in a residential area or in an adjacent area, radio interference may be caused to radio and TV receivers, and so on.
Read the instructions for correct handling.
Fiber Cable Classification Notice
Use this equipment only with fiber cable classified by Underwriters Laboratories as to fire and smoke characteristics in accordance with Section 770-2(b) and Section 725-2(b) of the National Electrical Code.
UK General Approval Statement
The CoreBuilder 5000 Integrated System Hub and ONline System Concentrator are manufactured to the International Safety Standard EN 60950 and are approved in the U.K. under the General Approval Number NS/G/12345/J/100003 for indirect connection to the public telecommunication network.
Trademarks
Unless otherwise indicated, 3Com registered trademarks are registered in the United States and may or may not be registered in other countries.
3Com, Boundary Routing, CardFacts, EtherLink, LANplex, LANsentry, LinkBuilder, NETBuilder, NETBuilder II, NetFacts, Parallel Tasking, SmartAgent, TokenDisk, TokenLink, Transcend, TriChannel, and ViewBuilder are registered trademarks of 3Com Corporation.
3TECH, CELLplex, CoreBuilder, EtherDisk, EtherLink II, FDDILink, MultiProbe, NetProbe, and ONline are trademarks of 3Com Corporation.
3ComFacts is a service mark of 3Com Corporation. The 3Com Multichannel Architecture Communications System is registered under U.S. Patent
Number 5,301,303. AT&T is a registered trademark of American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Banyan and VINES are registered trademarks of Banyan Systems Inc. CompuServe is a registered trademark of CompuServe, Inc. DEC, DECnet, DELNI, POLYCENTER, VAX, VT100, VT220, and the Digital logo are trademarks of Digital
Equipment Corporation. Hayes is a registered trademark of Hayes Microcomputer Products. OpenView is a registered trademark of Hewlett-Packard Company. Intel is a registered trademark of Intel Corporation. AIX, IBM, and NetView are registered trademarks of International Business Machines Corporation. Microsoft, MS-DOS, Windows, Windows 95, and Windows NT are registered trademarks of
Microsoft Corporation. V30 is a trademark of NEC Corporation. NetWare and Novell are registered trademarks of Novell, Incorporated.
IPX is a trademark of Novell, Incorporated. OSF and OSF/Motif are registered trademarks of Open Software Foundation, Inc. ONC, OpenWindows, Solaris, Solstice, Sun, Sun Microsystems, SunNet Manager, and SunOS are trademarks
of Sun Microsystems, Inc.
iii
SPARCstation is a trademark licensed exclusively to Sun Microsystems Inc. OPEN LOOK is a registered trademark of Unix System Laboratories, Inc. UNIX is a registered trademark of X/Open Company, Ltd. in the United States and other countries. Other brand and product names may be registered trademarks or trademarks of their respective holders.
iv

CONTENTS

HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE
Audience 1 Structure of This Guide 1 Document Conventions 2 Related Documents 3
3Com Documents 3 Reference Documents 4
1 INTRODUCTION
CoreBuilder 5000 Ethernet Private Line Card Overview 1-1 Private Line Card Architecture Overview 1-2 Jamming Packets 1-4
Eavesdropping Event Timing 1-4 Intrusion Event Timing 1-5
Security Feature Overview 1-6
Autolearning 1-7 Eavesdropping Protection 1-7 Intrusion Protection 1-7
Theory of Operation 1-7
Ethernet Packet Transmission 1-7 Ethernet Security Issues 1-8
Eavesdropping Protection 1-8 Intrusion Detection 1-10
Where to Go From Here 1-11
2 INSTALLING THE PRIVATE LINE CARD
Precautionary Procedures 2-1 Unpacking Procedure 2-1 Installing a CoreBuilder 5000 Ethernet Private Line Card 2-2 Where to Go From Here 2-3
3 CONFIGURING THE PRIVATE LINE CARD
Security Configuration Overview 3-2 Setting the Module to a Network 3-2 Showing and Configuring Port Parameters 3-3
Showing Port Security 3-4 Configuring Port Autolearning 3-5 Configuring Port Jamming 3-5 Configuring Port Intruder Checking 3-6 Configuring Failsafe 3-6 Configuring Group Codes 3-7
Showing and Configuring Network Parameters 3-8
Showing Network Security 3-8 Configuring Network Autolearning 3-9 Configuring Eavesdrop Protection 3-10 Configuring Source Address Checking 3-10 Configuring Source Port Checking 3-11 Configuring Intruder Jamming 3-12 Configuring Intruder Reporting 3-12
Configuring Intruder Port Disabling 3-13 Enabling Security on the Network 3-13 Security Address Table Information 3-14
Setting a MAC Address Manually 3-15
Showing MAC Addresses 3-16
Saving the MAC Address Table 3-17
Reverting to the Previous MAC Address Table 3-18
Deleting MAC Addresses 3-18 Security Intruder Table Information 3-18
Showing the Intruder Table 3-19
Deleting the Intruder Table 3-19 Where to Go From Here 3-20
vi
4 TROUBLESHOOTING INFORMATION
Troubleshooting Using the Module Status LED 4-1 Troubleshooting PLC Configuration Problems 4-2
Hardware Configuration Problems 4-2
Software Configuration Problems 4-3 Technical Assistance 4-5 Where to Go From Here 4-5
A SPECIFICATIONS
General Specifications A-1 Power Specifications A-1 Environmental Specifications A-2 Mechanical Specifications A-2
B CONFIGURATION EXAMPLES
Providing Eavesdrop Protection with Continuous Autolearn B-1 Providing Maximum Security B-3 Configuring Security for a Complex Network Setup B-7
C TECHNICAL SUPPORT
Online Technical Services C-1
World Wide Web Site C-2
3Com Bulletin Board Service C-2
Access by Analog Modem C-2
Access by Digital Modem C-2 3ComFacts Automated Fax Service C-3 3ComForum on CompuServe Online Service C-3
Support From Your Network Supplier C-4 Support From 3Com Corporation C-5 Returning Products for Repair C-6 Accessing the 3Com MIB C-6 Contacting 3Com Technical Publications C-7
vii
INDEX
3COM CORPORATION LIMITED WARRANTY
viii

FIGURES

1-1 PLC and Media Module Interaction 1-3 1-2 Eavesdropping Event Timing Processing Time 1-4 1-3 Jamming a Packet with Eavesdropping Enabled 1-5 1-4 Eavesdropping Event Timing Processing Time 1-6 1-5 Jamming a Packet with Eavesdropping Enabled 1-6 1-6 Transmitting Packets on an Ethernet Network 1-8 1-7 Transmitting Information on a Secure Network 1-9 1-8 Sample Security Address Table 1-10 1-9 Intruder Transmissions on a Secure Network 1-10
2-1 Installing a CoreBuilder 5000 Private Line Card 2-3 B-1 Less Restrictive Network Security Setup B-2 B-2 Using the PLC to Provide Maximum Network Security B-6 B-3 Complex Network Security Setup B-8
ix

TABLES

3-1 Configuration Overview 3-2
3-2 Port and Related Network Parameters 3-3
4-1 Troubleshooting Using the Module Status LED 4-1
4-2 Troubleshooting Software Conflicts 4-3
A-1 General Specifications A-1 A-2 Power Specifications A-1 A-3 Environmental Specifications A-2 A-4 Mechanical Specifications A-2
B-1 Configuring Parameters to Provide Minimum Security B-2 B-2 Configuring Parameters to Provide Maximum Security B-4 B-3 Security Considerations for a Complex Network Setup B-9
xi

HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE

This guide explains how to install and operate the 3Com CoreBuilder 5000 Ethernet Private Line Card (referenced throughout this guide as the private line card or PLC). It also includes information on configuring this card using a CoreBuilder Management Module.
Before installing or using the private line card, read Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of this guide for basic installation and operation instructions.

Audience This guide is intended for the following people at your site:

Network manager or administrator
Hardware installer
5000 Distributed

Structure of This Guide

This guide contains the following chapters:
Chapter 1, Introduction – Describes the functions and features of the CoreBuilder 5000 Ethernet Private Line Card.
Chapter 2, Installing the Private Line Card – Provides detailed information on unpacking and installing the private line card.
Chapter 3, Configuring the Private Line Card – Explains how to configure network and port configuration parameters. In addition, this chapter provides information on the security address table and intruder table.
Chapter 4, Troubleshooting Information – Provides help in isolating and correcting problems that may arise when installing or operating this module.
2 HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE
Appendix A, Specifications – Provides electrical, environmental, and mechanical specifications for the private line card.
Appendix B, Configuration Examples – Provides detailed examples on the configuration of your network using the security features provided by the PLC.
Appendix C, Technical Support – Lists the various methods for contacting the 3Com technical support organization and for accessing other product support services.
Index

Document Conventions

The following document conventions are used in this manual:
Convention Indicates Example
Courier text User input In the Agent Information Form, enter
MIS in the New Contact field.
System output After pressing the Apply button, the
Bold command string Path names Before you begin, read the readme.txt
Text in angled brackets Italic text in braces
Capitalized text in plain brackets
Italics Text emphasis,
User-substituted identifiers
Keyboard entry by the user
document titles
system displays the message Transmi tting dat a.
file located in /usr/ snm/a gent s. In the command above, substitute
<rem_name> with the name of the remote machine.
Use the following command to show port details:
SHOW PORT {
Type your password and press [ENTER].
Ensure that you press the Apply button after you add the new search parameters.
slot
.all} VERBOSE

Related Documents 3

Icon Notice Type Alerts you to...
Information note Important features or instructions
Caution Risk of personal safety, system damage, or loss
of data
Warning Risk of severe personal injury
Related Documents This section provides information on supporting documentation,
including:

3Com Documents

Reference Documents
3Com Documents The following documents provide additional information on 3Com
products:
CoreBuilder 5000 Integrated System Hub Installation and Operation Guide – Provides information on the installation, operation, and
configuration of the CoreBuilder 5000 Integrated System Hub. This guide also describes the principal features of the CoreBuilder 5000 Fault-Tolerant Controller Module.
CoreBuilder 5000 Distributed Management Module User Guide – Provides information on the CoreBuilder 5000 Distributed Management Module’s operation, installation, and configuration. This guide also describes the software commands associated with the Distributed Management Module.
CoreBuilder 5000 Distributed Management Module Commands Guide – Describes each management command by providing detailed information on the command’s format, use, and description.
For a complete list of 3Com documents, contact your 3Com representative.
4 HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE

Reference Documents The following documents supply related background information:

Case, J., Fedor, M., Scoffstall, M., and J. Davin, The Simple Network
Management Protocol, RFC 1157, University of Tennessee at Knoxville, Performance Systems International and the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, May 1990.
Rose, M., and K. McCloghrie, Structure and Identification of Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets, RFC 1155,
Performance Systems International and Hughes LAN Systems, May
1990.
1

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides introductory information on the 3Com® CoreBuilder 5000 Ethernet Private Line Card (PLC), including:
CoreBuilder 5000 Ethernet Private Line Card Overview
Private Line Card Architecture Overview
Jamming Packets
Security Feature Overview
Theory of Operation
Where to Go From Here
CoreBuilder 5000 Ethernet Private Line Card Overview
The CoreBuilder™ 5000 Ethernet Private Line Card is a daughtercard that you can install on any CoreBuilder 5000 Ethernet Media Module or CoreBuilder 5000 Distributed Management Module with Ethernet Carrier (6106M-MGT). The PLC enables you to secure any network to which the card is assigned. Once assigned to an Ethernet network, you can configure the PLC to provide:
Intrusion protection for all CoreBuilder 5000 Ethernet ports
Eavesdropping protection for all CoreBuilder 5000 Ethernet ports
MAC address autolearning, including continuous self-management
of address tables
Optional port disable when the PLC detects intruders
You must use DMM 2.00 software or above to manage and configure the PLC.
1-2 INTRODUCTION

Private Line Card Architecture Overview

To provide security for your network, the PLC and media module (or DMM) must work together. To accomplish this, the PLC and the media module need to communicate with each other using the:
Serial Identification (SID) Line
Ethernet Backplane Network
Serial Identification Line – The PLC uses the SID to send security messages to the media module. Security messages instruct the media
module to either pass or jam a packet. In addition, the PLC uses the SID to receive slot and port information for each packet that is transmitted on the backplane.
Ethernet Backplane Network – The PLC uses the Ethernet backplane network to listen for the destination address of each packet transmitted on the backplane. The PLC looks up each source and destination address to ensure it is valid. Once the PLC determines the validity of a packet, it generates a security message and sends that message to the media module using the SID.
The combination of these two communication paths enables the PLC and the media module to effectively provide security for your network (see Figure 1-1
).
The media module performs a pass or jam of a packet on a per-port basis.
PLC
Media module
Private Line Card Architecture Overview 1-3
Serial Identi fication Line
HUB
1
PLC receives the slot and port ident ific ation for the packet from the media module.
Back plane segment
2
PLC receives the destination address for the packet from the media mo dule.
3
PLC generates a security message and sends it to all media modules attached to the backplane segment. The media modules then pass or jam the packet based on the security message.
Media module
Figure 1-1 PLC and Media Module Interaction
As shown in Figure 1-1, the PLC issues security messages on a per packet basis to all repeater ports in the hub. Each port interprets the message and either jams or passes the packet. Jamming packets not only prevents eavesdropping, but also prevents the successful transmission of an intruder's packet.
A jammed packet consists of alternating 1s and 0s in place of the packet data. A jammed packet has the same length as the originally transmitted packet. A station that receives a jammed packet will disregard the packet because the cyclical redundancy check (CRC) field of the packet is incorrect. You can enable or disable jamming on a per-port basis.
Security processing is done as the packet passes through the system. Consequently, the PLC adds no additional delay to packet transmissions.
1-4 INTRODUCTION

Jamming Packets Before the PLC instructs a media module to jam a packet, it must first

look up the appropriate source or destination address and transmit the security message to the media module. The time it takes to process each request differs depending on whether the media module jams an intruder packet or provides eavesdropping protection.
The remainder of this section describes packet jamming and packet event timing, including:

Eavesdropping Event Timing

Intruder Event Timing
Eavesdropping
Event Timing
Before the PLC instructs the media module to jam a packet, it must first determine if the port that receives the packet is the intended recipient. Once the PLC receives the destination address of the packet, it performs the following:
1 The PLC performs a lookup of the packet destination address and
creates a security message (processing time – 8 bit times).
2 The PLC transmits the security message to all media modules using the
Serial Identification (SID) Line (processing time – 16 bit times).
3 The media module processes the security message and performs a jam
if necessary (processing time – 8 bit times).
To complete the generation of the security message, the entire process requires a total of 32 bit times. Because the PLC needs to look up the destination address of the packet, the eavesdropping event timing begins at the end of the destination address field as shown in
Figure 1-2
.
32 bit times (total processing time)
Figure 1-2 Eavesdropping Event Timing Processing Time
Jamming Packets 1-5
If the security message that the media module generates jams the packet, the jam occurs after the first 32 bits of the source address field as shown in Figure 1-3
.
Intrusion Event
Timing
32 bit times (total processing time)
Figure 1-3 Jamming a Packet with Eavesdropping Enabled
Data is jamm ed
Before the PLC instructs the media module to jam a packet, it must first determine if the source address of the packet that is transmitted belongs to a valid user.
Once the PLC receives the source address of the packet, it performs the following:
1 The PLC performs a lookup of the packet source address and creates a
security message (processing time – 11 bit times).
2 The PLC transmits the security message to all media modules using the
Serial Identification (SID) Line (processing time – 16 bit times).
3 The media module processes the security message and performs a jam
if necessary (processing time – 8 bit times).
To complete the generation of the security message, the entire process requires a total of 35 bit times. Because the PLC needs to look up the source address of the packet, the intrusion event timing begins at the end of the source address field as shown in Figure 1-4
.
1-6 INTRODUCTION
35 bit times (total proc es si ng time )
Figure 1-4 Eavesdropping Event Timing Processing Time
If the security message that the media module generates jams the packet, the jam occurs after the first 35 bits of the source address field as shown in Figure 1-5
.

Security Feature Overview

35 bit times (total processing time)
Data is Jamm ed
Figure 1-5 Jamming a Packet with Eavesdropping Enabled
This section discusses some of the most commonly used network and port security features that the PLC provides for your network, including:
Autolearning
Eavesdropping Protection
Intrusion Protection
For more information on these features, refer to Chapter 3, Configuring the Private Line Card.

Theory of Operation 1-7

Autolearning Network and port autolearning parameters enable the PLC to

automatically learn the MAC address for nodes on your network. Each address is then stored in a security address table for future reference. For example, if you set up a new security configuration on your network, you can use the autolearning feature to quickly learn all valid users on your network with per-port and network autolearning enabled. Depending on your configuration, it is possible to have continuous self-management of your address tables.
Eavesdropping
Protection
Eavesdropping protection prevents all nodes except the intended recipient from receiving packets transmitted on the network. This provides administrators with a private line Ethernet that ensures all communication is successfully transmitted only to the intended recipient of the packet. Packets transmitted to other nodes are jammed.

Intrusion Protection Intrusion protection prevents intruders from transmitting data to a port

with intrusion protection enabled on a secure network. Only valid users (that is, users listed in the security address table) can successfully transmit data on a secure network.
The PLC checks the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) for each packet to ensure that partial packets are not treated as intruders.
Theory of
This section provides an overview of Ethernet, including:
Operation

Ethernet Packet Transmission

Ethernet Security Issues
Ethernet Packet
Transmission
Each time a packet is transmitted on an Ethernet network it is accessible by all nodes on that network. For example, in Figure 1-6 message transmitted from Node A to Node B is received by every node on the network including the intended recipient. Each node examines the transmitted packet and if the physical address of the node does not match the destination address in the packet, the node discards the packet.
, a
1-8 INTRODUCTION
.
NODE A
PCPrinter
NODE B
Laptop
Figure 1-6 Transmitting Packets on an Ethernet Network
In a standard network, this type of transmission provides an adequate method for exchanging data between nodes. In a secure environment, however, this type of transmission is not acceptable.
Ethernet Security
Issues
To provide a secure method of data transfer on an Ethernet network, you must ensure that you:
Prevent eavesdropping
Provide intruder detection
By providing both eavesdropping protection and intruder detection you prevent unwanted listeners from monitoring the transmission of Ethernet packets and you stop intruders from transmitting packets on the network.
The remainder of this section describes:
Eavesdropping Protection
Intrusion Detection
Eavesdropping Protection
Eavesdropping prevents any user, including an intruder, from examining the contents of a packet destined for another port.
The following example shows a typical use of the CoreBuilder 5000 Private Line Card to provide eavesdropping in a networked environment.
Theory of Operation 1-9
Preventing
Eavesdropping on a
Secure Network
VALID USER Port 4.4 04-60-8c-8c-6 1-5a
VALID USER Port 4.10 04-44-8c-7c-56-4b
As shown in Figure 1-7, all nodes connect to Ethernet Network 2.
Message transmitted from User A to User C
A
B
Ethernet Network 2
C
D
VALID USER Port 8.6 08-60-8c-7f-61-6f
VALID USER Port 8.18 08-60-2c-7a-55-7d
Figure 1-7 Transmitting Information on a Secure Network
On the module in slot 4, a CoreBuilder 5000 Private Line Card is attached and configured to secure Ethernet Network 2. To provide the minimum amount of security, the network administrator has enabled eavesdropping.
As a result, when User A transmits data to User C, the following occurs:
User C successfully receives the MAC frame (packet)
The packet is jammed at all other ports so Users B and D cannot
examine the packet contents
Because the network administrator enabled eavesdropping, only the destination address of User C is recognized by the PLC. Consequently, all other transmitted packets, regardless of whether the intended recipient is a valid user or intruder, are jammed at the port level.
Figure 1-8 Figure 1-7
represents the Security Address Table associated with .
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