The first one is the most important because BIOS must behave differently. Historically, ACMs have been
designed to be either a client or server ACM. As the technology advances, client and server requirements are
converging, allowing a single ACM design to support both client and server models. For this case the ACM
automatically detects if the platform has client or server hardware. The TXT Execution Profile selection allows
you to override the automatic selection and force the ACM behavior.
The server profile is also considered to be the Unified profile. That is client ACMs have the option of behaving as
a legacy client ACM or as server ACM.
Select Default to allow the ACM to detect based on platform hardware. Select Unified to force the ACM to
follow the unified server operation, and select Client to force the ACM to follow the client operation.
Not all platforms allow override and selecting a profile that is not supported by the ACM is an error.
6.3.3 Secrets Scrubbing Policy
The OS can set a Secrets flag after a successful measured launch (i.e., MLE is active) indicating it wants the
platform to protect secrets and sensitive information it might have in memory in case of an unexpected reset.
When there is an unexpected reset and the Secrets flag is set, the ACM makes sure the scrubbing process
completes. Typically, the BIOS is responsible for scrubbing the memory, and then calling the ACM to clear the
Secrets flag.
The default policy is “only Trust Verified BIOS to scrub memory”. If IBB verification fails, then the ACM will
execute the backup scrubbing method. When BIOS is trusted to scrub memory, if BIOS incurs an error in its
attempt to scrub memory, it can request the ACM to perform the backup scrubbing method.
You have the option to instruct the ACM to Always Trust BIOS. In which case the ACM will only perform the
backup scrubbing method if requested by the BIOS. This may be desired when there are other protections in
place, such as data in system memory is encrypted (e.g., secure enclaves/SGX).
You also have the option to instruct the ACM to Trust No BIOS. In which case the ACM will always perform
backup scrubbing when Secrets flag is set. Typically this is only selected on platforms that support memory
depletion power down scrubbing process.
6.3.4 Backup Policy
There are two fallback methods the ACM can use when BIOS cannot scrub memory.
• Memory depletion power down scrubbing process - The ACM powers down the platform for a time
sufficient to cause significant memory loss. The ACM programs the platform to wake after an interval
sufficient to assure memory content has been lost and then powers down the platform. Once the ACM
verifies the platform had powered down for the expected time, the ACM clears the Secrets flag and
allows memory to be enabled.
• Unbreakable shutdown – The ACM enters an unbreakable shutdown to prevent access to system
memory.
• PFR Recovery – If the platform supports PFR (Platform Firmware Resiliency), upon TXT measurement
failure, the platform will fall back into T-1 and perform a firmware recovery.