EMC Technologies Pty Ltd – 176 Harrick Road, Keilor Park VIC 3042 Australia
www.emctech.com.au
ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 1 of 49
F005VP0801
Drawn
Checked
Approved
RBAU-EB/EBS2-JL 03/10/06
RBAU-EB/EBS2-VA 03/10/06
RBAU-EB/EBS2 03/10/06
By Date Signature
1. ALTERATION LIST
Issue
No.
Alteration Number, Description
Valid From
By Checked
1.0 New Specification for ABIC1 Solution 03/10/06 EBS2/JL
“WARNING: ANY CHANGES OR MODIFICATIONS NOT EXPRESSIVELY APPROVED BY ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD COULD VOID THE USER’S AUTHORITY TO OPERATE THIS EQUIPMENT.
THIS DEVICE COMPLIES WITH PART 15 OF THE FCC RULES. OPERATION
IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING TWO CONDITIONS: (1) THIS DEVICE MAY
NOT CAUSE HARMFUL INTERFERENCE, AND (2) THIS DEVICE MUST
ACCEPT ANY INTERFERENCE RECEIVED, INCLUDING INTERFERENCE THAT
MAY CAUSE UNDESIRED OPERATION.
2. TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................................................................2
4.2EMS TO SMARTRA COMMUNICATIONS DESCRIPTION (OSI MODEL):............................................................................. 7
4.2.1 Diagram: OSI model................................................................................................................................................7
4.2.1.1Requirements from customer.............................................................................................................................................8
4.2.4 States of the smartra.................................................................................................................................................9
4.2.5 System security.......................................................................................................................................................10
5. MESSAGE STRUCTURE BETWEEN EMS AND SMARTRA ..................................................................................13
5.1.1 Data Packet Breakdown.........................................................................................................................................13
5.84EH –NEUTRALISE A [LEARNT]SMARTRA..................................................................................................................17
6.1.3.1Diagram: Explaining how to read message flow diagrams..............................................................................................19
6.22.1 Table: Normal Message Flow............................................................................................................................40
6.22.2 Table: Twice IG ON or Authentication..............................................................................................................40
6.22.3 Table: All modes missing transponder...............................................................................................................40
6.22.5 Table: Special cases...........................................................................................................................................41
7. REPLACING OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS................................................................................................................42
7.1REPLACING THE ENGINE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (EMS)ECU....................................................................................42
7.1.1 Equipment required to replace the EMS in immo system.......................................................................................42
7.1.2 Process Flow Chart: Replacing Engine Management System EMS ......................................................................43
7.2REPLACING THE SMARTRA ECU..................................................................................................................................43
7.2.1 Equipment required to replace a Smartra unit in immo system.............................................................................43
7.2.2 Process Flow Chart : Replacing Smartra..............................................................................................................44
F005VP0800 HMC SMARTRA 3 Product Spec
F005VP0702 HMC SMARTRA 3 Engineering Test Spec
F005VP0703 HMC SMARTRA 3 Production Test Spec
F005VS0115 HMC SMARTRA 3 Sales Drawing
F005VP0801
3. INTRODUCTION
3.1.1Immobiliser Background
The Smartra3 immobiliser unit, known as the SMARt TRansponder Antenna (SMARTRA) will need to be
updated as a result of new requirements. The SMARTRA3 will be an update of an existing product.
The existing immobiliser system consisted of a passive challenge-response (mutual authentication)
transponder inside the key head and the SMARTRA unit. The SMARTRA communicates to a Control
Unit (CU) via a dedicated communications line.
3.1.1.1 Model : Proposed Smartra3
This design will use a different microcontroller with on board non-volatile memory and combined voltage
regulator and LIN transceiver system basis chip.
This document shall focus on the communications protocol between the Smartra and the Engine
Management System (EMS). The existing protocol has been used with two new messages added and
existing messages modified. The changes are required due to additional customer requirements.
The document shall present:
• Project background, requirements and proposed design.
• Message Structure between the EMS and Smartra.
• Message Flow charts: EMS to Transponder (via Smartra) considering different device states.
3.2 EMS to Smartra Communications Description (OSI model):
The communications between the EMS and the Smartra can be better described using the 7 layer OSI
model. The below diagram shows different levels of the interface in reference to the OSI model. It
describes the Physical layer the Data Link Layer and the Application Layer.
3.2.1Diagram: OSI model
Application
Layer
Presentation
Layer
Session
Layer
Transport
Layer
Network
Layer
Data Li nk
Layer
Physical
Layer
EM S Action Messages:
06h (ACK) Acknowledge
53h (ASCII 'S') Software version
4Bh (ASCII 'K') Transponder I DE *
41h (ASCII 'A') Transponder Authentication (Additional info for I D Matching)
57h (ASCII 'W') Transponder Write EEPROM page
52H (ASCII 'R') Transponder Read EEPROM page
4Eh (ASCII ‘N’) Neutralise a Taught Smartra **
54h (ASCII ‘T’) Teach Smartra **
15h (ASCII nak) Negative response *
For every me ssage sent to the SMARTRA from the CU there w ill be a response from the
SMARTRA unit. Only one command can be sent at a time to the SMARTRA unit.
A negative response to any command is possibl e .
* - modif ied message
** - new message
The protocol between the Control Unit (CU) and the SMARTRA is defined as :-
AddressLengthActionDataCS
The protocol between the SMARTRA and the CU is defined as :-
1 start bit-low, 8 data bits, no parity, 2 stop bits-high.
IdleStart
AddressLengthDataCS
Data
Bit 1
8 bits
S top bit
2 bits
Idle
Dedicated single wire bet ween Immobiliser and Contr ol Unit.
Bi-directional
Asynchronous
Communications @ 4800 baud
Logic Low = 0 V, Logic High = 12V, Idle State High
With the new proposed Design the Smartra shall have 3 states ([Virgin] and [Neutral] states behave the
same).
3.2.4.1 State transition Diagram:
Learnt
(follows new
protocol-
Smartra3)
2
Neutral
(follows old
protocol-
Smartra2)
1
1
Virgin
(follows old
protocol-
Smartra2)
3.2.4.1.1 States:
[Virgin] – virgin product after EOL testing.
[Neutral] – part has Diagnostic PIN Number(DPN) and Secret Encryption Key(SEK) cleared using
diagnostic tester so it can go into [Learnt] state again.
[Learnt] – part has been taught a Diagnostic PIN Number(DPN) at the OEM end of line tester or
using diagnostic tester in the field. Secret Encryption Key(SEK) is generated from the
Diagnostic PIN Number(DPN). (refer to 3.2.6)
3.2.4.1.2 State Transitions:
1) Smartra is taught the Diagnostic PIN Number(DPN) and generates the Secret Encryption Key(SEK).
2) Diagnostic Tester Places Smartra into Neutral Mode when correct DPN has been entered.
* Note : For backwards compatibility a [virgin] or [neutral] Smartra3 will function as a Smartra2 until unit
If a thief replaces the Smartra with a virgin Smartra the car will not start as the virgin Smartra does not
match the EMS.
If a thief replaces three components with a matching set (Transponder, Smartra and EMS) then by
breaking lock barrel the car can start. The car will start however the period of time to replace the
Smartra takes time ie. longer than 5 minutes to pass the Thatcham attack test. Refer to section 3.4 –
References.
A thief could steal a car in a short time if they have access to a Diagnostic Tester and a ECU with his
corresponding Diagnostic PIN Number (DPN) then the thief can steal the car by:
a. replacing the EMS with a matching EMS and transponder set.
b. use Diagnostic Tester to neutralise the Smartra3, using the secure HMC Diagnostic PIN Number
(DPN) of EMS.
c. use Diagnostic Tester to program the new Diagnostic PIN Number (DPN) that matches the thiefs
EMS Diagnostic PIN Number (DPN).
The security of the system depends on the security of the DPN.
3.2.6 Secret Encryption Key (SEK) Learning
• The EMS and Smartra will generate the Secret Encryption Key (SEK).
• Secret Encryption Key (SEK) is generated from the first 6 bytes of the 9 byte Diagnostic PIN Number
(DPN).
• The DPN is taught to the Smartra and EMS at the OEM end of line tester or in the field.
• The encryption algorithm requires each of the 6 SEK bytes to be an uneven number between 3 and
253.
o Therefore both the EMS and Smartra will use the same function that will check value of PIN
and adjust each byte of the Secret Encryption Key (SEK) accordingly:
• If DPN byte is <3 or >253 then SEK byte = 0x55.
• Else If DPN byte is even then SEK byte = DPN byte – 1.