Robert Bosch VIMA01 Users Manual

FCC ID: LXP-VIMA01 (IC: 2298A-VIMA01) Report No. M070149_Cert_Immobiliser
APPENDIX H
USER MANUAL
EMC Technologies Pty Ltd – 176 Harrick Road, Keilor Park VIC 3042 Australia
www.emctech.com.au
ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 1 of 49
F005VP0801
Drawn
Checked
Approved
RBAU-EB/EBS2-JL 03/10/06
RBAU-EB/EBS2-VA 03/10/06
RBAU-EB/EBS2 03/10/06
By Date Signature
1. ALTERATION LIST
Issue
No.
Alteration Number, Description
Valid From
By Checked
1.0 New Specification for ABIC1 Solution 03/10/06 EBS2/JL
“WARNING: ANY CHANGES OR MODIFICATIONS NOT EXPRESSIVELY APPROVED BY ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD COULD VOID THE USER’S AUTHORITY TO OPERATE THIS EQUIPMENT.
THIS DEVICE COMPLIES WITH PART 15 OF THE FCC RULES. OPERATION IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING TWO CONDITIONS: (1) THIS DEVICE MAY NOT CAUSE HARMFUL INTERFERENCE, AND (2) THIS DEVICE MUST ACCEPT ANY INTERFERENCE RECEIVED, INCLUDING INTERFERENCE THAT MAY CAUSE UNDESIRED OPERATION.
Issue Number:
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
1.0 Dev No. 3881
Valid from:
14/2/06
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
DEV04205.9/I-1
ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 2 of 49
F005VP0801
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. ALTERATION LIST..........................................................................................................................................................1
2. TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................................................................2
3. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS ..........................................................................................................................................5
4. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................................................5
4.1.1 Immobiliser Background..........................................................................................................................................5
4.1.1.1 Model : Proposed Smartra3................................................................................................................................................5
4.1.2 Document description...............................................................................................................................................6
4.1.3 Diagram: Smartra communications interfaces........................................................................................................6
4.2 EMS TO SMARTRA COMMUNICATIONS DESCRIPTION (OSI MODEL):............................................................................. 7
4.2.1 Diagram: OSI model................................................................................................................................................7
4.2.1.1 Requirements from customer.............................................................................................................................................8
4.2.2 Proposed Solution....................................................................................................................................................8
4.2.3 Diagram Showing Proposed Design:.......................................................................................................................8
4.2.4 States of the smartra.................................................................................................................................................9
4.2.4.1 State transition Diagram:...................................................................................................................................................9
4.2.4.1.1 States:............................................................................................................................................................................9
4.2.4.1.2 State Transitions:..........................................................................................................................................................9
4.2.5 System security.......................................................................................................................................................10
4.2.6 Secret Encryption Key (SEK) Learning..................................................................................................................10
4.2.6.1 Diagram: Secret Key learning flow .................................................................................................................................10
4.3 ASSUMPTIONS MADE...................................................................................................................................................12
4.4 REFERENCES................................................................................................................................................................12
5. MESSAGE STRUCTURE BETWEEN EMS AND SMARTRA ..................................................................................13
5.1.1 Data Packet Breakdown.........................................................................................................................................13
5.2 06H - ACKNOWLEDGE..................................................................................................................................................14
5.3 53H - SOFTWARE VERSION. .........................................................................................................................................14
5.4 4BH - TRANSPONDER IDE (PRE ID MATCHING) .........................................................................................................15
5.4.1 0x4B – (Existing) Pre Secret Encryption Key – kept for backwards compatibility................................................15
5.4.2 0x4B – New – Secret Encryption Key – with Encryption check.............................................................................15
5.5 41H - TRANSPONDER AUTHENTICATION......................................................................................................................16
5.6 57H - TRANSPONDER WRITE EEPROM PAGE. ............................................................................................................16
5.7 52H - TRANSPONDER READ EEPROM PAGE...............................................................................................................16
5.8 4EH NEUTRALISE A [LEARNT] SMARTRA..................................................................................................................17
5.9 54H TEACH SMARTRA...............................................................................................................................................17
5.10 15H - NEGATIVE RESPONSES........................................................................................................................................18
6. MESSAGE FLOW BETWEEN EMS, SMARTRA AND TRANSPONDER...............................................................19
6.1 BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................................................19
6.1.1 Starting Communications.......................................................................................................................................19
6.1.2 Stopping Communications......................................................................................................................................19
6.1.3 (Re)Teaching Mode................................................................................................................................................19
6.1.3.1 Diagram: Explaining how to read message flow diagrams..............................................................................................19
6.2 MESSAGE FLOW 1 - NORMAL OPERATION ...................................................................................................................20
6.2.1.1 Message Sequence...........................................................................................................................................................20
6.2.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................20
6.2.2 Message Flow Diagram:........................................................................................................................................20
6.3 MESSAGE FLOW 2 TWICE IG ON OR AUTHENTICATION MODE..................................................................................21
6.3.1.1 Message Sequence...........................................................................................................................................................21
6.3.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................21
6.3.2 Message Flow Diagram:........................................................................................................................................21
6.4 MESSAGE FLOW 3 TWICE IG ON OR AUTHENTICATION MODE..................................................................................22
6.4.1.1 Message Sequence...........................................................................................................................................................22
Issue Number:
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
1.0 Dev No. 3881
Valid from:
14/2/06
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
DEV04205.9/I-1
ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
6.4.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................22
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 3 of 49
F005VP0801
6.4.2 Message Flow Diagram:........................................................................................................................................22
6.5 MESSAGE FLOW 4 - TWICE IG ON OR AUTHENTICATION MODE ..................................................................................23
6.5.1.1 Message Sequence...........................................................................................................................................................23
6.5.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................23
6.5.2 Message Flow Diagram:........................................................................................................................................23
6.6 MESSAGE FLOW 5 - TWICE IG ON OR AUTHENTICATION MODE ..................................................................................24
6.6.1.1 Message Sequence...........................................................................................................................................................24
6.6.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................24
6.6.2 Message Flow Diagram:........................................................................................................................................24
6.7 MESSAGE FLOW 6 - TWICE IG ON OR AUTHENTICATION MODE ..................................................................................25
6.7.1.1 Message Sequence...........................................................................................................................................................25
6.7.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................25
6.7.2 Message Flow Diagram:........................................................................................................................................25
6.8 MESSAGE FLOW 7 - TWICE IG ON OR AUTHENTICATION MODE ..................................................................................26
6.8.1.1 Message Sequence...........................................................................................................................................................26
6.8.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................26
6.8.2 Message Flow Diagram:........................................................................................................................................26
6.9 MESSAGE FLOW 8 TWICE IG ON OR AUTHENTICATION MODE..................................................................................27
6.9.1.1 Message Sequence...........................................................................................................................................................27
6.9.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................27
6.9.2 Message Flow Diagram:........................................................................................................................................27
6.10 MESSAGE FLOW 9 TWICE IG ON OR AUTHENTICATION MODE..................................................................................28
6.10.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................28
6.10.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................28
6.10.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................28
6.11 MESSAGE FLOW 10 MISSING TRANSPONDER ............................................................................................................29
6.11.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................29
6.11.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................29
6.11.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................29
6.12 MESSAGE FLOW 11 - TRANSPONDER TEACHING OR RETEACHING MODE ....................................................................30
6.12.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................30
6.12.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................30
6.12.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................30
6.13 MESSAGE FLOW 12 - TRANSPONDER TEACHING OR RE-TEACHING MODE...................................................................31
6.13.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................31
6.13.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................31
6.13.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................31
6.14 MESSAGE FLOW 13 TRANSPONDER TEACHING OR RE-TEACHING MODE ..................................................................32
6.14.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................32
6.14.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................32
6.14.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................32
6.15 MESSAGE FLOW 14 TRANSPONDER TEACHING OR RE-TEACHING MODE ..................................................................33
6.15.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................33
6.15.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................33
6.15.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................33
6.16 MESSAGE FLOW 15 TRANSPONDER TEACHING OR RE-TEACHING MODE ..................................................................34
6.16.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................34
6.16.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................34
6.16.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................34
6.17 MESSAGE FLOW 16: TRANSPONDER TEACHING OR RE-TEACHING MODE .................................................................35
6.17.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................35
6.17.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................35
6.17.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................35
6.18 MESSAGE FLOW 17: –MISS-MATCHED SECRET KEY.....................................................................................................36
6.18.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................36
6.18.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................36
6.18.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................36
6.19 MESSAGE FLOW 18: OLD EMS WITH A NEW LEARNT SMARTRA ...............................................................................37
6.19.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................37
6.19.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................37
Issue Number:
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
1.0 Dev No. 3881
Valid from:
14/2/06
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
DEV04205.9/I-1
ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 4 of 49
F005VP0801
6.19.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................37
6.20 MESSAGE FLOW 19: OLD EMS WITH A VIRGIN SMARTRA.........................................................................................38
6.20.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................38
6.20.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................38
6.20.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................38
6.21 MESSAGE FLOW 20: OLD SMARTRA WITH A NEW EMS ............................................................................................39
6.21.1.1 Message Sequence ...........................................................................................................................................................39
6.21.1.2 Message Flow Detail .......................................................................................................................................................39
6.21.2 Message Flow Diagram:....................................................................................................................................39
6.22 SUMMARY TABLES : MESSAGE FLOW SUMMARY ........................................................................................................40
6.22.1 Table: Normal Message Flow............................................................................................................................40
6.22.2 Table: Twice IG ON or Authentication..............................................................................................................40
6.22.3 Table: All modes missing transponder...............................................................................................................40
6.22.4 Table: Transponder (Re)teaching mode............................................................................................................41
6.22.5 Table: Special cases...........................................................................................................................................41
7. REPLACING OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS................................................................................................................42
7.1 REPLACING THE ENGINE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (EMS) ECU....................................................................................42
7.1.1 Equipment required to replace the EMS in immo system.......................................................................................42
7.1.2 Process Flow Chart: Replacing Engine Management System EMS ......................................................................43
7.2 REPLACING THE SMARTRA ECU..................................................................................................................................43
7.2.1 Equipment required to replace a Smartra unit in immo system.............................................................................43
7.2.2 Process Flow Chart : Replacing Smartra..............................................................................................................44
7.3 REPLACING KEYS (TRANSPONDERS)............................................................................................................................44
7.3.1 Process Flow Chart : Replacing/Adding Keys.......................................................................................................44
7.4 REPLACING ANTENNA .................................................................................................................................................44
8. DIAGNOSTIC TESTER REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................................45
8.1.1 Diagnostic Tester Introduction ..............................................................................................................................45
8.1.2 The Diagnostics tester interface diagram:.............................................................................................................45
8.1.3 Programming Diagnostic PIN Number DPN (on the Smartra).............................................................................45
8.1.3.1 Message Flow Diagram (Programming Diagnostic PIN – both Smartra and EMS)........................................................46
8.1.3.2 Message Flow Diagram (Programming Diagnostic PIN – EMS......................................................................................46
8.1.3.3 Message Flow Diagram (Programming Diagnostic PIN – Smartra)................................................................................47
8.1.4 Aftermarket PIN number sequence: .......................................................................................................................47
8.1.5 Changing Diagnostic PIN Number (DPN) on Smartra..........................................................................................47
8.1.6 Accessing diagnostic functions...............................................................................................................................48
8.1.6.1 Message Flow Diagram (Changing State – correct PIN).................................................................................................48
8.1.6.2 Message Flow Diagram (Changing Smartra State – in-correct PIN)...............................................................................49
Issue Number:
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
1.0 Dev No. 3881
Valid from:
14/2/06
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
DEV04205.9/I-1
ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 5 of 49
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
Applicable Standards Title
F005VP0800 HMC SMARTRA 3 Product Spec F005VP0702 HMC SMARTRA 3 Engineering Test Spec F005VP0703 HMC SMARTRA 3 Production Test Spec F005VS0115 HMC SMARTRA 3 Sales Drawing
F005VP0801
3. INTRODUCTION
3.1.1 Immobiliser Background
The Smartra3 immobiliser unit, known as the SMARt TRansponder Antenna (SMARTRA) will need to be updated as a result of new requirements. The SMARTRA3 will be an update of an existing product.
The existing immobiliser system consisted of a passive challenge-response (mutual authentication) transponder inside the key head and the SMARTRA unit. The SMARTRA communicates to a Control Unit (CU) via a dedicated communications line.
3.1.1.1 Model : Proposed Smartra3
This design will use a different microcontroller with on board non-volatile memory and combined voltage regulator and LIN transceiver system basis chip.
Issue Number:
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
1.0 Dev No. 3881
Valid from:
14/2/06
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
DEV04205.9/I-1
ROBERT BOSCH
-
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 6 of 49
F005VP0801
3.1.2 Document description
This document shall focus on the communications protocol between the Smartra and the Engine Management System (EMS). The existing protocol has been used with two new messages added and existing messages modified. The changes are required due to additional customer requirements.
The document shall present:
Project background, requirements and proposed design.
Message Structure between the EMS and Smartra.
Message Flow charts: EMS to Transponder (via Smartra) considering different device states.
Replacing immobiliser system components
Diagnostic tester interface.
3.1.3 Diagram: Smartra communications interfaces
Transponder Smartra
Low Frequency
w ireless link
125kHz ASK
single wire
asynch bi-dir
comms
4800baud
This docume nt
focusses on Smartra
to EMS interface
EMS
(comms master)
Issue Number:
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
1.0 Dev No. 3881
Valid from:
14/2/06
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
DEV04205.9/I-1
ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 7 of 49
F005VP0801
3.2 EMS to Smartra Communications Description (OSI model):
The communications between the EMS and the Smartra can be better described using the 7 layer OSI model. The below diagram shows different levels of the interface in reference to the OSI model. It describes the Physical layer the Data Link Layer and the Application Layer.
3.2.1 Diagram: OSI model
Application
Layer
Presentation
Layer
Session
Layer
Transport
Layer
Network
Layer
Data Li nk
Layer
Physical
Layer
EM S Action Messages:
06h (ACK) Acknowledge 53h (ASCII 'S') Software version 4Bh (ASCII 'K') Transponder I DE * 41h (ASCII 'A') Transponder Authentication (Additional info for I D Matching) 57h (ASCII 'W') Transponder Write EEPROM page 52H (ASCII 'R') Transponder Read EEPROM page 4Eh (ASCII ‘N’) Neutralise a Taught Smartra ** 54h (ASCII ‘T’) Teach Smartra ** 15h (ASCII nak) Negative response *
For every me ssage sent to the SMARTRA from the CU there w ill be a response from the SMARTRA unit. Only one command can be sent at a time to the SMARTRA unit.
A negative response to any command is possibl e . * - modif ied message ** - new message
The protocol between the Control Unit (CU) and the SMARTRA is defined as :-
Address Length Action Data CS
The protocol between the SMARTRA and the CU is defined as :-
1 start bit-low, 8 data bits, no parity, 2 stop bits-high.
Idle Start
Address Length Data CS
Data
Bit 1
8 bits
S top bit
2 bits
Idle
Dedicated single wire bet ween Immobiliser and Contr ol Unit. Bi-directional
Asynchronous
Communications @ 4800 baud
Logic Low = 0 V, Logic High = 12V, Idle State High
Issue Number:
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
1.0 Dev No. 3881
Valid from:
14/2/06
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
DEV04205.9/I-1
ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 8 of 49
F005VP0801
3.2.1.1 Requirements from customer
Requirements for the new Smartra:
automobile to be Thatcham Compliant to withstand attack on car for >300secs.
Product required to be backward compatible with existing system.
Current system :
Engine Management System (EMS) ECU can be replaced easily and car can be started <300secs
with matching transponders.
Smartra is transparent ie. passes messages to and from the EMS and transponder (no memory).
3.2.2 Proposed Solution
To meet new customer requirements the EMS and the Smartra shall be matched together using the
same Secret Encryption Key (SEK).
The Secret Encryption Key (SEK) is generated and taught to the Smartra and EMS at the OEM end
of line tester.
The EMS and Smartra will generate the Secret Encryption Key (SEK) from a common 9 byte
Diagnostic PIN Number (DPN) unique for each car (ie. use 6 bytes from Diagnostic PIN Number (DPN)). See section 3.2.6.
The Secret Encryption Key (SEK) will be used during all communications between the EMS and the
Smartra to ensure that the EMS and Smartra are matched.
To test if the units are matched:
o The EMS generates a Random Number and passes to the Smartra.
o Smartra encrypts the Random Number using the Secret Encryption Key(SEK) and passes
back the encrypted value to the EMS.
o EMS encrypts the random number using its Secret Encryption Key(SEK) and then evaluates
if the Smartra response is the same as the EMS encryption.
Thieves need to replace the EMS, Smartra and Transponder to steal the car. The Smartra shall be
placed in a difficult to get to position in the car (increase time to replace).
3.2.3 Diagram Showing Proposed Design:
SM ARTRA
transponder
LF interface
Issue Number:
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
1.0 Dev No. 3881
Automobile Assy
Single Wire
Comms
Valid from:
EMS
Single Wire
14/2/06
Comms
Diagnostic
Tester
Securit y Pin No. to access the
EM S and Smartra
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
DEV04205.9/I-1
ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 9 of 49
F005VP0801
3.2.4 States of the smartra
With the new proposed Design the Smartra shall have 3 states ([Virgin] and [Neutral] states behave the same).
3.2.4.1 State transition Diagram:
Learnt
(follows new
protocol-
Smartra3)
2
Neutral
(follows old
protocol-
Smartra2)
1
1
Virgin
(follows old
protocol-
Smartra2)
3.2.4.1.1 States: [Virgin] – virgin product after EOL testing.
[Neutral] – part has Diagnostic PIN Number(DPN) and Secret Encryption Key(SEK) cleared using
diagnostic tester so it can go into [Learnt] state again.
[Learnt] – part has been taught a Diagnostic PIN Number(DPN) at the OEM end of line tester or
using diagnostic tester in the field. Secret Encryption Key(SEK) is generated from the Diagnostic PIN Number(DPN). (refer to 3.2.6)
3.2.4.1.2 State Transitions:
1) Smartra is taught the Diagnostic PIN Number(DPN) and generates the Secret Encryption Key(SEK).
2) Diagnostic Tester Places Smartra into Neutral Mode when correct DPN has been entered. * Note : For backwards compatibility a [virgin] or [neutral] Smartra3 will function as a Smartra2 until unit
is placed into [learnt] state.
Issue Number:
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
1.0 Dev No. 3881
Valid from:
14/2/06
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
DEV04205.9/I-1
ROBERT BOSCH
r
-
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 10 of 49
F005VP0801
3.2.5 System security
If a thief replaces the Smartra with a virgin Smartra the car will not start as the virgin Smartra does not match the EMS.
If a thief replaces three components with a matching set (Transponder, Smartra and EMS) then by breaking lock barrel the car can start. The car will start however the period of time to replace the Smartra takes time ie. longer than 5 minutes to pass the Thatcham attack test. Refer to section 3.4 – References.
A thief could steal a car in a short time if they have access to a Diagnostic Tester and a ECU with his corresponding Diagnostic PIN Number (DPN) then the thief can steal the car by:
a. replacing the EMS with a matching EMS and transponder set. b. use Diagnostic Tester to neutralise the Smartra3, using the secure HMC Diagnostic PIN Number
(DPN) of EMS.
c. use Diagnostic Tester to program the new Diagnostic PIN Number (DPN) that matches the thiefs
EMS Diagnostic PIN Number (DPN). The security of the system depends on the security of the DPN.
3.2.6 Secret Encryption Key (SEK) Learning
The EMS and Smartra will generate the Secret Encryption Key (SEK).
Secret Encryption Key (SEK) is generated from the first 6 bytes of the 9 byte Diagnostic PIN Number
(DPN).
The DPN is taught to the Smartra and EMS at the OEM end of line tester or in the field.
The encryption algorithm requires each of the 6 SEK bytes to be an uneven number between 3 and
253. o Therefore both the EMS and Smartra will use the same function that will check value of PIN
and adjust each byte of the Secret Encryption Key (SEK) accordingly:
If DPN byte is <3 or >253 then SEK byte = 0x55.
Else If DPN byte is even then SEK byte = DPN byte – 1.
Else SEK byte = DPN byte.
3.2.6.1 Diagram: Secret Key learning flow
Transponder
Secret Encrytpion
Key (SEK) (6 bytes)
generated from
Diagnostic PIN Number (DPN)
SM ARTR A
0 xXXXXXXXXXXX
0 xXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Diagnostic PIN (9
bytes) number
stored in eeprom
on Smartra
Automobile Assy
0 xXXXXXXXXXXX
0 xXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Secret Encrytp ion
Key (SEK) (6
bytes) - generated
from Diagnostic
PIN Number (DPN)
EMS
Diagnostic PIN 9
byte number
stored in eeprom
on EMS
Diagnos ti c Test e
0 xXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
OEM end of line tester
shall generate a
Diagnostic Security Pin
N umber and pass the
number to the EMS.
Issue Number:
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
1.0 Dev No. 3881
Valid from:
14/2/06
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
DEV04205.9/I-1
ROBERT BOSCH
(AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.
A.B.N. 48 004 315 628
PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
F005VP0801
SMARTRA III IMMOBILISER Page 11 of 49
Issue Number:
© THIS DRAWING IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF ROBERT BOSCH (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD. WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED OR GIVEN TO THIRD PARTIES.
1.0 Dev No. 3881
Valid from:
14/2/06
Print Date:
28 March, 2007
DEV04205.9/I-1
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