This document constitutes the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the AP-120 series
Wireless Access Points with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation from Aruba Networks. This security policy
describes how the AP meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2, and how to place and
maintain the AP in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the FIPS 140-2 Level 2
validation of the product.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More
information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) Web-site at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html
This document can be freely distributed.
1.1 Aruba Dell Relationship
Aruba Networks is the OEM for the Dell PowerConnect W line of products. Dell products are identical to
the Aruba products other than branding and Dell firmware is identical to Aruba firmware other than
branding.
Table 1 - Corresponding Aruba and Dell Part Numbers
NOTE: References to Aruba, ArubaOS, Aruba AP-120 Series wireless access points apply to both the
Aruba and Dell versions of these products and documentation.
1.2 Acronyms and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AP Access Point
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CLI Command Line Interface
CO Crypto Officer
CPSec Control Plane Security protected
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
ECO External Crypto Officer
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FE Fast Ethernet
GE Gigabit Ethernet
GHz Gigahertz
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
Hz Hertz
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IPSec Internet Protocol security
KAT Known Answer Test
KEK Key Encryption Key
L2TP Layer-2 Tunneling Protocol
LAN Local Area Network
LED Light Emitting Diode
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SPOE Serial & Power Over Ethernet
TEL Tamper-Evident Label
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
6
2 Product Overview
Aruba Part Number
Dell Corresponding Part Number
AP-124-F1
W-AP124-F1
AP-125-F1
W-AP125-F1
This section introduces the various Aruba Wireless Access Points, providing a brief overview and summary
of the physical features of each model covered by this FIPS 140-2 security policy.
2.1 Aruba AP-120 Series
This section introduces the Aruba AP-120 series Wireless Access Points (APs) with FIPS 140-2 Level 2
validation. It describes the purpose of the AP, its physical attributes, and its interfaces.
Figure 1 – Aruba AP-120 Series Wireless Access Points
The Aruba AP-124 and AP -125 are high-performance 802.11n (3x3) MIMO, dual-radio (concurrent
802.11a/n + b/g/n) indoor wireless access points capable of delivering combined wireless data rates of up to
600Mbps. These multi-function access points provide wireless LAN access, air monitoring, and wireless
intrusion detection and prevention over the 2.4-2.5GHz and 5GHz RF spectrum. The access points work in
conjunction with Aruba Mobility Controllers to deliver high-speed, secure user-centric network services in
education, enterprise, finance, government, healthcare, and retail applications.
2.1.1 Physical Description
The Aruba AP-120 series Access Point is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module consisting of
hardware and firmware, all contained in a hard plastic case. The module contains IEEE 802.11a, 802.11b,
802.11g, and 802.11n transceivers, and up to 3 integrated or external omni-directional multi-band dipole
antenna elements may be attached to the module.
The plastic case physically encloses the complete set of hardware and firmware components and represents
the cryptographic boundary of the module.
The Access Point configuration tested during the cryptographic module testing included:
4.9” x 5.13” x 2.0” (124mm x 130mm x 51mm)
15oz (0.42 Kgs)
2.1.1.2 Interfaces
The module provides the following network interfaces:
2 x 10/100/1000 Base-T Ethernet (RJ45) Auto-sensing link speed and MDI/MDX
Antenna (model Aruba AP-124 only)
o 3 x RP-SMA antenna interfaces (supports up to 3x3 MIMO with spatial diversity)
1 x RJ-45 console interface
The module provides the following power interfaces:
48V DC 802.3af or 802.3at or PoE + interoperable Power-over-Ethernet (PoE) with intelli-source
PSE sourcing intelligence
5V DC for external AC supplied power (adapter sold separately)
2.1.1.3 Indicator LEDs
There are 5 bicolor (power, ENET 0, 1, and WLAN) LEDs which operate as follows:
Table 1- Indicator LEDs
8
Label
Function
Action
Status
Flashing
2.4GHz Air monitor
WLAN 5Ghz
5GHz Radio Status
Off
5GHz radio disabled
On - Amber
5GHz radio enabled in WLAN mode
On – Green
5GHz radio enabled in 802.11n mode
Flashing
2.4GHz Air monitor
9
3 Module Objectives
Section
Section Title
Level
1
Cryptographic Module Specification
2 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
2 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
2
4
Finite State Model
2
5
Physical Security
2 6 Operational Environment
N/A 7 Cryptographic Key Management
2 8 EMI/EMC
2 9 Self-tests
2
10
Design Assurance
2
11
Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A
This section describes the assurance levels for each of the areas described in the FIPS 140-2 Standard. In
addition, it provides information on placing the module in a FIPS 140-2 approved configuration.
3.1 Security Levels
3.2 Physical Security
The Aruba Wireless AP is a scalable, multi-processor standalone network device and is enclosed in a robust
plastic housing. The AP enclosure is resistant to probing(please note that this feature has not been tested as
part of the FIPS 140-2 validation) and is opaque within the visible spectrum. The enclosure of the AP has
been designed to satisfy FIPS 140-2 Level 2 physical security requirements.
3.2.1 Applying TELs
The Crypto Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused tamper evident
labels. The Crypto Officer should employ TELs as follows:
Before applying a TEL, make sure the target surfaces are clean and dry.
Do not cut, trim, punch, or otherwise alter the TEL.
Apply the wholly intact TEL firmly and completely to the target surfaces.
Ensure that TEL placement is not defeated by simultaneous removal of multiple modules.
Allow 24 hours for the TEL adhesive seal to completely cure.
Record the position and serial number of each applied TEL in a security log.
For physical security, the AP requires Tamper-Evident Labels (TELs) to allow detection of the opening of
the device, and to block the serial console port (on the bottom of the device). To protect the device from
tampering, TELs should be applied by the Crypto Officer as pictured below:
10
3.2.2 Aruba AP-124 TEL Placement
This section displays all the TEL locations on the Aruba AP-124. The AP124 requires a minimum of 3
TELs to be applied as follows:
3.2.2.1 To detect opening of the chassis cover:
1. Spanning the left chassis cover and the top and bottom chassis covers
2. Spanning the right chassis cover and the top and bottom chassis covers
3.2.2.2 To detect access to restricted ports
3. Spanning the serial port
The tamper-evident labels shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS approved mode of
operation.
Following is the TEL placement for the Aruba AP-124:
Figure 1: AP-124 Front view
11
Figure 2: AP-124 Back view
Figure 3: AP-124 Left view
Figure 4: AP-124 Right view
Figure 5: AP-124 Top view
12
Figure 6: AP-124 Bottom view
3.2.3 Aruba AP-125 TEL Placement
This section displays all the TEL locations on the Aruba AP-125. The AP125 requires a minimum of 3
TELs to be applied as follows:
3.2.3.1 To detect opening of the chassis cover:
1. Spanning the top and bottom covers on the left side
2. Spanning the top and bottom covers on the right
3.2.3.2 To detect access to restricted ports
3. Spanning the serial port
The tamper-evident labels shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS approved mode of
operation.
Following is the TEL placement for the Aruba AP-125:
13
Figure 7: AP-125 Front view
Figure 8: AP-125 Back view
Figure 9: AP-125 Left view
14
Figure 10: AP-125 Right view
Figure 11: AP-125 Top view
15
Physical Security Mechanism
Recommended Test Frequency
Guidance
Tamper-evident labels (TELs)
Once per month
Examine for any sign of removal,
replacement, tearing, etc. See
images above for locations of
TELs
Opaque module enclosure
Once per month
Examine module enclosure for
any evidence of new openings or
other access to the module
internals.
Figure 12: AP-125 Bottom view
3.2.4 Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
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3.3 Modes of Operation
The module has the following FIPS approved modes of operations:
•Remote AP (RAP) FIPS mode – When the module is configured as a Remote AP, it is intended to
be deployed in a remote location (relative to the Mobility Controller). The module provides
cryptographic processing in the form of IPSec for all traffic to and from the Mobility Controller.
•Control Plane Security (CPSec) protected AP FIPS mode – When the module is configured as a
Control Plane Security protected AP it is intended to be deployed in a local/private location (LAN,
WAN, MPLS) relative to the Mobility Controller). The module provides cryptographic processing
in the form of IPSec for all Control traffic to and from the Mobility Controller.
•Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode – When the module is configured in Mesh Portal mode, it is
intended to be connected over a physical wire to the mobility controller. These modules serve as
the connection point between the Mesh Point and the Mobility Controller. Mesh Portals
communicate with the Mobility Controller through IPSec and with Mesh Points via 802.11i
session. The Crypto Officer role is the Mobility Controller that authenticates via IKEv1/IKEv2
pre-shared key or RSA certificate authentication method, and Users are the "n" Mesh Points that
authenticate via 802.11i preshared key.
•Mesh Point FIPS MODE – an AP that establishes all wireless path to the Remote Mesh portal in
FIPS mode over 802.11 and an IPSec tunnel via the Remote Mesh Portal to the controller.
This section explains how to place the module in FIPS mode in either Remote AP FIPS mode, Control
Plane Security AP FIPS Mode, Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode or Mesh Point FIPS Mode. How to verify
that it is in FIPS mode. An important point in the Aruba APs is that to change configurations from any one
mode to any other mode requires the module to be re-provisioned and rebooted before any new configured
mode can be enabled.
The access point is managed by an Aruba Mobility Controller in FIPS mode, and access to the Mobility
Controller’s administrative interface via a non-networked general purpose computer is required to assist in
placing the module in FIPS mode. The controller used to provision the AP is referred to below as the
“staging controller”. The staging controller must be provisioned with the appropriate firmware image for
the module, which has been tested to FIPS 140-2, prior to initiating AP provisioning.
After setting up the Access Point by following the basic installation instructions in the module User
Manual, the Crypto Officer performs the following steps:
3.3.1 Configuring Remote AP FIPS Mode
1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2
2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
3. Deploying the AP in Remote FIPS mode configure the controller for supporting Remote APs, For
detailed instructions and steps, see Section “Configuring the Secure Remote Access Point Service” in Chapter “Remote Access Points” of the Aruba OS User Manual.
4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration > Network
> Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the Configuration tab), and
clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.
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5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the Configuration > Wireless > AP
Configuration > AP Group page. There, you click the Edit button for the appropriate AP group, and then
select AP > AP System Profile. Then, check the “Fips Enable” box, check “Apply”, and save the
configuration.
6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the
LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power
supply appropriate to the particular model of the module.
7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct
connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this
represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between
the module and the staging controller.
8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the
Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page, where you should see an entry for the AP. Select
that AP, click the “Provision” button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision
the AP as Remote AP by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in Section
“Provisioning an Individual AP” of Chapter “The Basic User-Centric Networks” of the Aruba OS
User Guide. Click “Apply and Reboot” to complete the provisioning process.
a. During the provisioning process as Remote AP if Pre-shared key is selected to be the
Remote IP Authentication Method, the IKE pre-shared key (which is at least 8 characters
in length) is input to the module during provisioning. Generation of this key is outside the
scope of this policy. In the initial provisioning of an AP, this key will be entered in
plaintext; subsequently, during provisioning, it will be entered encrypted over the secure
IPSec session. If certificate based authentication is chosen, AP’s RSA key pair is used to
authenticate AP to controller during IPSec. AP’s RSA private key is contained in the AP’s non volatile memory and is generated at manufacturing time in factory.
9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully
provisioned with firmware and configuration
10. Terminate the administrative session
11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when
power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller
on the network.
3.3.2 Configuring Control Plane Security (CPSec) protected AP FIPS mode
1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2
2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
3. Deploying the AP in CPSec AP mode, configure the staging controller with CPSec under
Configuration > Controller > Control Plane Security tab. AP will authenticate to the controller
using certificate based authentication to establish IPSec. AP is configured with RSA key pair at
manufacturing. AP’s certificate is signed by Aruba Certification Authority (trusted by all Aruba
controllers) and the AP’s RSA private key is stored in non-volatile memory. Refer to “Configuring
Control Plane Security” Section in ArubaOS User Manual for details on the steps.
4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration > Network
> Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the Configuration tab), and
clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.
5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the
Configuration > Wireless > AP Configuration > AP Group page. There, you click the Edit button for the
appropriate AP group, and then select AP > AP System Profile. Then, check the “Fips Enable” box, check
“Apply”, and save the configuration.
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6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the
LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power
supply appropriate to the particular model of the module
7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct
connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this
represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between
the module and the staging controller.
8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the
Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page, where you should see an entry for the AP. Select
that AP, click the “Provision” button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision
the CPSec Mode by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in Section
“Provisioning an Individual AP” of Chapter “The Basic User-Centric Networks” of the Aruba OS
User Guide. Click “Apply and Reboot” to complete the provisioning process.
a. For CPSec AP mode, the AP always uses certificate based authentication to establish
IPSec connection with controller. AP uses the RSA key pair assigned to it at
manufacturing to authenticate itself to controller during IPSec. Refer to “Configuring Control Plane Security” Section in Aruba OS User Manual for details on the steps to
provision an AP with CPSec enabled on controller.
9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully
provisioned with firmware and configuration
10. Terminate the administrative session
11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when
power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller
on the network.
3.3.3 Configuring Remote Mesh Portal FIPS Mode
1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2
2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
3. Deploying the AP in Remote Mesh Portal mode, create the corresponding Mesh Profiles on the
controller as described in detail in Section “Mesh Profiles” of Chapter“Secure Enterprise Mesh”
of the Aruba OS User Manual.
a. For mesh configurations, configure a WPA2 PSK which is 16 ASCII characters or 64
hexadecimal digits in length; generation of such keys is outside the scope of this policy.
4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration > Network
> Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the Configuration tab), and
clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.
5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the Configuration > Wireless > AP
Configuration > AP Group page. There, you click the Edit button for the appropriate AP group, and then
select AP > AP System Profile. Then, check the “FipsEnable” box, check “Apply”, and save the
configuration.
6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the
LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power
supply appropriate to the particular model of the module.
7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct
connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this
19
represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between
the module and the staging controller.
8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the
Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page, where you should see an entry for the AP. Select
that AP, click the “Provision” button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision
the AP as Remote Mesh Portal by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in
Section “Provisioning an Individual AP” of Chapter “The Basic User-Centric Networks” of the Aruba OS User Guide. Click “Apply and Reboot” to complete the provisioning process.
a. During the provisioning process as Remote Mesh Portal, if Pre-shared key is selected to
be the Remote IP Authentication Method, the IKE pre-shared key (which is at least 8
characters in length) is input to the module during provisioning. Generation of this key is
outside the scope of this policy. In the initial provisioning of an AP, this key will be
entered in plaintext; subsequently, during provisioning, it will be entered encrypted over
the secure IPSec session. If certificate based authentication is chosen, AP’s RSA key pair
is used to authenticate AP to controller during IPSec. AP’s RSA private key is contained
in the AP’s non volatile memory and is generated at manufacturing time in factory.
b. During the provisioning process as Remote Mesh Portal, the WPA2 PSK is input to the
module via the corresponding Mesh cluster profile. This key is stored on flash encrypted.
9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully
provisioned with firmware and configuration
10. Terminate the administrative session
11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when
power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller
on the network.
To verify that the module is in FIPS mode, do the following:
1. Log into the administrative console of the Aruba Mobility Controller
2. Verify that the module is connected to the Mobility Controller
3. Verify that the module has FIPS mode enabled by issuing command “show ap ap-name <ap-
name> config”
4. Terminate the administrative session
3.3.4 Configuring Remote Mesh Point FIPS Mode
1. Apply TELs according to the directions in section 3.2
2. Log into the administrative console of the staging controller
3. Deploying the AP in Remote Mesh Point mode, create the corresponding Mesh Profiles on the
controller as described in detail in Section “Mesh Points” of Chapter “Secure Enterprise Mesh” of
the Aruba OS User Manual.
a. For mesh configurations, configure a WPA2 PSK which is 16 ASCII characters or 64
hexadecimal digits in length; generation of such keys is outside the scope of this policy.
4. Enable FIPS mode on the controller. This is accomplished by going to the Configuration > Network
> Controller > System Settings page (this is the default page when you click the Configuration tab), and
clicking the FIPS Mode for Mobility Controller Enable checkbox.
5. Enable FIPS mode on the AP. This accomplished by going to the Configuration > Wireless > AP
Configuration > AP Group page. There, you click the Edit button for the appropriate AP group, and then
20
select AP > AP System Profile. Then, check the “Fips Enable” box, check “Apply”, and save the
configuration.
6. If the staging controller does not provide PoE, either ensure the presence of a PoE injector for the
LAN connection between the module and the controller, or ensure the presence of a DC power
supply appropriate to the particular model of the module.
7. Connect the module via an Ethernet cable to the staging controller; note that this should be a direct
connection, with no intervening network or devices; if PoE is being supplied by an injector, this
represents the only exception. That is, nothing other than a PoE injector should be present between
the module and the staging controller.
8. Once the module is connected to the controller by the Ethernet cable, navigate to the
Configuration > Wireless > AP Installation page, where you should see an entry for the AP. Select
that AP, click the “Provision” button, which will open the provisioning window. Now provision
the AP as Remote Mesh Portal by filling in the form appropriately. Detailed steps are listed in
Section “Provisioning an Individual AP” of Chapter “The Basic User-Centric Networks” of the
Aruba OS User Guide. Click “Apply and Reboot” to complete the provisioning process.
a. During the provisioning process as Remote Mesh Point, if Pre-shared key is selected to
be the Remote IP Authentication Method, the IKE pre-shared key (which is at least 8
characters in length) is input to the module during provisioning. Generation of this key is
outside the scope of this policy. In the initial provisioning of an AP, this key will be
entered in plaintext; subsequently, during provisioning, it will be entered encrypted over
the secure IPSec session. If certificate based authentication is chosen, AP’s RSA key pair
is used to authenticate AP to controller during IPSec. AP’s RSA private key is contained in the AP’s non volatile memory and is generated at manufacturing time in factory.
b. During the provisioning process as Mesh Point, the WPA2 PSK is input to the module via
the corresponding Mesh cluster profile. This key is stored on flash encrypted.
9. Via the logging facility of the staging controller, ensure that the module (the AP) is successfully
provisioned with firmware and configuration
10. Terminate the administrative session
11. Disconnect the module from the staging controller, and install it on the deployment network; when
power is applied, the module will attempt to discover and connect to an Aruba Mobility Controller
on the network.
3.3.5 Verify that the module is in FIPS mode
For all the approved modes of operations in either Remote AP FIPS mode, Control Plane Security AP FIPS
Mode, Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode or Mesh Point FIPS Mode do the following to verify the module is
in FIPS mode:
1. Log into the administrative console of the Aruba Mobility Controller
2. Verify that the module is connected to the Mobility Controller
3. Verify that the module has FIPS mode enabled by issuing command “show ap ap-name <ap-
name> config”
4. Terminate the administrative session
3.4 Operational Environment
The operational environment is non-modifiable. The Operating System (OS) is Linux, a real-time multithreaded operating system that supports memory protection between processes. Access to the underlying
21
Linux implementation is not provided directly. Only Aruba-provided Crypto Officer interfaces are used.
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface
Module Physical Interface
Data Input Interface
10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports
802.11a/b/g/n Radio Transceiver
Data Output Interface
10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports
802.11a/b/g/n Radio Transceiver
Control Input Interface
10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports (PoE)
Status Output Interface
10/100/1000 Ethernet Ports
802.11a/b/g/n Radio Transceiver
LEDs
Power Interface
Power Supply
PoE
There is no user interface provided.
3.5 Logical Interfaces
The physical interfaces are divided into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2 as described in the
following table.
Table 2 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
Data input and output, control input, status output, and power interfaces are defined as follows:
Data input and output are the packets that use the networking functionality of the module.
Control input consists of manual control inputs for power and reset through the power interfaces
(5V DC or PoE). It also consists of all of the data that is entered into the access point while using
the management interfaces.
Status output consists of the status indicators displayed through the LEDs, the status data that is
output from the module while using the management interfaces, and the log file.
o LEDs indicate the physical state of the module, such as power-up (or rebooting),
utilization level, and activation state. The log file records the results of self-tests,
configuration errors, and monitoring data.
A power supply may be used to connect the electric power cable. Operating power may also be
provided via Power Over Ethernet (POE) device when connected. The power is provided through
the connected Ethernet cable.
Console port is disabled by covering TEL when operating in each of FIPS modes.
The module distinguishes between different forms of data, control, and status traffic over the network ports
by analyzing the packet headers and contents.
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4 Roles, Authentication and Services
4.1 Roles
The module supports the roles of Crypto Officer, User, and Wireless Client; no additional roles (e.g.,
Maintenance) are supported. Administrative operations carried out by the Aruba Mobility Controller map
to the Crypto Officer role. The Crypto Officer has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the
module, including the configuration, loading, and zeroization of CSPs.
Defining characteristics of the roles depend on whether the module is configured as a Remote AP, CPSec
AP or as a Mesh AP:
Remote AP:
o Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer is the Aruba Mobility Controller that has the
ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration,
loading, and zeroization of CSPs.
o User role: in the standard configuration, the User operator shares the same services and
authentication techniques as the Mobility Controller in the Crypto Officer role.
o Wireless Client role: in Remote AP configuration, a wireless client can create a
connection to the module using WPA2 and access wireless network access/bridging
services. In advanced Remote AP configuration, when Remote AP cannot communicate
with the controller, the wireless client role authenticates to the module via WPA2-PSK
only.
CPSec AP:
o Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer is the Aruba Mobility Controller that has the
ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration,
loading, and zeroization of CSPs.
o User role: in the standard configuration, the User operator shares the same services and
authentication techniques as the Mobility Controller in the Crypto Officer
o Wireless Client role: in CPSec AP configuration, a wireless client can create a connection
to the module using WPA2 and access wireless network access services.
Mesh AP (Mesh Point or Remote Mesh Portal configuration):
o Crypto Officer role: the Crypto Officer role is the Aruba Mobility Controller that has the
ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module, including the configuration,
loading, and zeroization of CSPs.
o User role: the second (or third, or nth) AP in a given mesh cluster
o Wireless Client role: in Mesh AP configuration, a wireless client can create a connection
to the module using WPA2 and access wireless network access services.
4.1.1 Crypto Officer Authentication
The Aruba Mobility Controller implements the Crypto Officer role. Connections between the module and
the mobility controller are protected using IPSec. Crypto Officer authentication is accomplished via either
proof of possession of the IKE preshared key or AP’s RSA key pair, which occurs during the IKE key
exchange. In CPSec AP mode, AP can only authenticate using RSA key (stored in non-volatile memory).
23
4.1.2 User Authentication
Authentication
Mechanism
Mechanism Strength
IKE shared secret
(CO role)
For IKE, there are a 95^8 (=6.63 x 10^15) possible preshared keys. In order
to test the guessed key, the attacker must complete an IKE aggressive mode
exchange with the module. IKE aggressive mode consists of a 3 packet
exchange, but for simplicity, let’s ignore the final packet sent from the AP to
the attacker.
An IKE aggressive mode initiator packet with a single transform, using
Diffie-Hellman group 2, and having an eight character group name has an
IKE packet size of 256 bytes. Adding the eight byte UDP header and 20 byte
IP header gives a total size of 284 bytes (2272 bits).
The response packet is very similar in size, except that it also contains the
HASH_R payload (an additional 16 bytes), so the total size of the second
packet is 300 bytes (2400 bits).
Assuming a link speed of 1Gbits/sec (this is the maximum rate supported by
the module), this gives a maximum idealized guessing rate of 60,000,000,000
/ 4,672 = 12,842,466 guesses per minute. This means the odds of guessing a
correct key in one minute is less than 12,842,466/(6.63x10^15) = 1.94 x 10^9, which is much less than 1 in 10^5.
Authentication for the User role depends on the module configuration. When the module is configured as a
Mesh AP, the User role is authenticated via the WPA2 preshared key. When the module is configured as a
Remote AP, the User role is authenticated via the same IKE pre-shared key/RSA key pair that is used by
the Crypto Officer. In CPSec AP mode, User authentication is accomplished via same RSA key pair that is
used by the Crypto Officer.
4.1.3 Wireless Client Authentication
The wireless client role, in the Remote AP, Mesh AP or CPSec AP configuration authenticates to the
module via WPA2. WEP and/or Open System configurations are not permitted in FIPS mode. In advanced
Remote AP configuration, when Remote AP cannot communicate with the controller, the wireless client
role authenticates to the module via WPA2-PSK only.
4.1.4 Strength of Authentication Mechanisms
The following table describes the relative strength of each supported authentication mechanism.
24
Authentication
Mechanism
Mechanism Strength
Wireless Client
WPA2-PSK
(Wireless Client
Role)
For WPA2-PSK there are at least 95^16 (=4.4 x 10^31) possible
combinations. In order to test a guessed key, the attacker must complete the
4-way handshake with the AP. Prior to completing the 4-way handshake, the
attacker must complete the 802.11 association process. That process involves
the following packet exchange:
Attacker sends Authentication request (at least 34 bytes)
AP sends Authentication response (at least 34 bytes)
Attacker sends Associate Request (at least 36 bytes)
AP sends Associate Response (at least 36 bytes)
Total bytes sent: at least 140. Note that since we do not include the actual 4way handshake, this is less than half the bytes that would actually be sent, so
the numbers we derive will absolutely bound the answer.
The theoretical bandwidth limit for IEEE 802.11n is 300Mbit, which is
37,500,000 bytes/sec. In the real world, actual throughput is significantly less
than this, but we will use this idealized number to ensure that our estimate is
very conservative.
This means that the maximum number of associations (assume no delays, no
inter-frame gaps) that could be completed is less than 37,500,000/214 =
267,857 per second, or 16,071,429 associations per minute. This means that
an attacker could certainly not try more than this many keys per second (it
would actually be MUCH less, due to the added overhead of the 4-way
handshake in each case), and the probability of a successful attack in any 60
second interval MUST be less than 16,071,429/(4.4 x 10^31), or roughly 1 in
10^25, which is much less than 1 in 10^5.
Mesh AP WPA2
PSK (User role)
Same as Wireless Client WPA2-PSK above
Certificate based
authentication –RSA
key pair (CO role)
The module supports RSA 2048-bit keys, which has at least 112-bits of
equivalent strength. The probability of a successful random attempt is
1/(2^112), which is less than 1/1,000,000. The probability of a success with
multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 5.6e7/(2^112), which
is less than 1/100,000.
25
4.2 Services
Service
Description
CSPs Accessed (see section 6
below for complete description of
CSPs)
FIPS mode enable/disable
The CO selects/de-selects FIPS
mode as a configuration option.
None.
Key Management
The CO can configure/modify the
IKE shared secret (The RSA
private key is protected by nonvolatile memory and cannot be
modified) and the WPA2 PSK
(used in advanced Remote AP
configuration). Also, the CO/User
implicitly uses the KEK to
read/write configuration to nonvolatile memory.
IKE shared secret
WPA2 PSK
KEK
Remotely reboot module
The CO can remotely trigger a
reboot
KEK is accessed when
configuration is read during
reboot. The firmware verification
key and firmware verification CA
key are accessed to validate
firmware prior to boot.
Self-test triggered by CO/User
reboot
The CO can trigger a
programmatic reset leading to
self-test and initialization
KEK is accessed when
configuration is read during
reboot. The firmware verification
key and firmware verification CA
key are accessed to validate
firmware prior to boot.
Update module firmware
The CO can trigger a module
firmware update
The firmware verification key
and firmware verification CA key
are accessed to validate firmware
prior to writing to flash.
Configure non-security related
module parameters
CO can configure various
operational parameters that do not
relate to security
None.
The module provides various services depending on role. These are described below.
4.2.1 Crypto Officer Services
The CO role in each of FIPS modes defined in section 3.3 has the same services.
26
Service
Description
CSPs Accessed (see section 6
below for complete description of
CSPs)
Creation/use of secure
management session between
module and CO
The module supports use of
IPSec for securing the
management channel.
IKE Preshared Secret
DH Private Key
DH Public Key
IPSec session encryption
keys
IPSec session
authentication keys
RSA key pair
Creation/use of secure mesh
channel
The module requires secure
connections between mesh points
using 802.11i
CO may view system status
information through the secured
management channel
See creation/use of secure
management session above.
Service
Description
CSPs Accessed (see section 6
below for complete description of
CSPs)
Generation and use of 802.11i
cryptographic keys
When the module is in mesh
configuration, the inter-module
mesh links are secured with
802.11i.
802.11i PMK
802.11i PTK
802.11i EAPOL MIC
Key
802.11i EAPOL
Encryption Key
4.2.2 User Services
The User services defined in Remote AP FIPS mode and CPSec protected AP FIPS mode shares the same
services with the Crypto Officer role, please refer to Section 4.2.1, “Crypto Officer Services”. The
following services are provided for the User role defined in Remote Mesh Portal FIPS mode and Remote
Mesh Point FIPS mode.
27
Service
Description
CSPs Accessed (see section 6
below for complete description of
CSPs)
802.11i AES-CCM key
802.11i GMK
802.11i GTK
Use of WPA preshared key for
establishment of IEEE 802.11i
keys
When the module is in mesh
configuration, the inter-module
mesh links are secured with
802.11i. This is authenticated
with a shared secret
WPA2 PSK
Service
Description
CSPs Accessed (see section 6
below for complete description of
CSPs)
Generation and use of 802.11i
cryptographic keys
In all modes, the links between
the module and wireless client are
secured with 802.11i.
802.11i PMK
802.11i PTK
802.11i EAPOL MIC
Key
802.11i EAPOL
Encryption Key
802.11i AES-CCM key
802.11i GMK
802.11i GTK
Use of WPA preshared key for
establishment of IEEE 802.11i
keys
When the module is in advanced
Remote AP configuration, the
links between the module and the
wireless client are secured with
802.11i. This is authenticated
with a shared secret only.
WPA2 PSK
Wireless bridging services
The module bridges traffic
between the wireless client and
the wired network.
None
4.2.3 Wireless Client Services
The following module services are provided for the Wireless Client role in each of FIPS approved modes.
28
4.2.4 Unauthenticated Services
The module provides the following unauthenticated services, which are available regardless of role. No
CSPs are accessed by these services.
System status – SYSLOG and module LEDs
802.11 a/b/g/n
FTP
TFTP
NTP
GRE tunneling of 802.11 wireless user frames (when acting as a “Local AP”)
Reboot module by removing/replacing power
Self-test and initialization at power-on
29
5 Cryptographic Algorithms
FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms have been implemented in hardware and firmware.
The firmware supports the following cryptographic implementations.
ArubaOS OpenSSL AP Module implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
o AES (Cert. #1851)
o HMAC (Cert. #1099)
o RNG (Cert. #970)
o RSA (Cert. #934)
o SHS (Cert. #1628)
o Triple-DES (Cert. #1199)
ArubaOS Module implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
o AES (Cert. #1850)
o HMAC (Cert. #1098)
o RNG (Cert. #969)
o RSA (Cert. #933)
o SHS (Cert. #1627)
o Triple-DES (Cert. #1198)
ArubaOS UBOOT Bootloader implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
o RSA (Cert. #935)
o SHS (Cert. #1629)
Hardware encryption acceleration is provided by Cavium Octeon 5010 for bulk cryptographic operations
for the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
Encrypts
IKEv1/IKEv2
preshared keys
and
configuration
parameters
IKEv1/IKEv2 Pre-shared
secret
64 character
preshared
key
CO configured
Encrypted in
flash using the
KEK; zeroized
by updating
through
administrative
interface, or by
the ‘ap wipe
out flash’
command.
Module and
crypto officer
authentication
during
IKEv1/IKEv2;
entered into
the module in
plaintext
during
initialization
and encrypted
over the IPSec
session
subsequently.
IPSec session encryption
keys
168-bit
Triple-DES,
or
128/192/256
bit AES
keys;
Established during
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory;
zeroized when
session is
closed or
system powers
off
Secure IPSec
traffic
IPSec session
authentication keys
HMAC
SHA-1 keys
Established during
Diffie-Hellman key
agreement
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory;
zeroized when
session is
closed or
system powers
off
Secure IPSec
traffic
The following Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) are used by the module:
31
CSP
CSP TYPE
GENERATION
STORAGE
And
ZEROIZATI
ON
USE
IKEv1/IKEv2 DiffieHellman Private key
1024-bit
DiffieHellman
private key
Generated internally
during IKEv1/IKEv2
negotiation
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory;
zeroized when
session is
closed or
system is
powered off
Used in
establishing
the session key
for IPSec
IKEv1/IKEv2 DiffieHellman shared secret
128 bit Octet
Generated internally
during IKEv1/IKEv2
negotiation
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory;
zeroized when
session is
closed or
system is
powered off
IKEv1/IKEv2
payload
integrity
verification
ArubaOS OpenSSL RNG
Seed for FIPS compliant
ANSI X9.31, Appendix
A2.4 using AES-128 Key
algorithm
Seed (16
Bytes)
Derived using NONFIPS approved HW RNG
(/dev/urandom)
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory only;
zeroized on
reboot
Seed ANSI
X9.31 RNG
ArubaOS OpenSSL RNG
Seed key for FIPS
compliant ANSI X9.31,
Appendix A2.4 using
AES-128 Key algorithm
Seed key (16
bytes, AES128 Key
algorithm)
Derived using NONFIPS approved HW RNG
(/dev/urandom)
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory only;
zeroized on
reboot
Seed ANSI
X9.31 RNG
ArubaOS Cryptographic
Module RNG Seed for
FIPS compliant 186-2
General Purpose (X
change Notice); SHA-1
RNG
Seed (64
bytes)
Derived using NONFIPS approved HW RNG
(/dev/urandom)
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory only;
zeroized on
reboot
Seed 186-2
General
Purpose (X
change
Notice); SHA1 RNG
ArubaOS Cryptographic
Module RNG Seed key for
FIPS compliant 186-2
General Purpose (X
change Notice); SHA-1
RNG
Seed Key
(64 bytes)
Derived using NONFIPS approved HW RNG
(/dev/urandom)
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory only;
zeroized on
reboot
Seed 186-2
General
Purpose (X
change
Notice); SHA1 RNG
32
CSP
CSP TYPE
GENERATION
STORAGE
And
ZEROIZATI
ON
USE
WPA2 PSK
16-64
character
shared secret
used to
authenticate
mesh
connections
and in
remote AP
advanced
configuration
CO configured
Encrypted in
flash using the
KEK; zeroized
by updating
through
administrative
interface, or by
the ‘ap wipe
out flash’
command.
Used to derive
the PMK for
802.11i mesh
connections
between APs
and in
advanced
Remote AP
connections;
programmed
into AP by the
controller over
the IPSec
session.
802.11i Pairwise Master
Key (PMK)
512-bit
shared secret
used to
derive
802.11i
session keys
Derived from WPA2
PSK
In volatile
memory only;
zeroized on
reboot
Used to derive
802.11i
Pairwise
Transient Key
(PTK)
802.11i Pairwise Transient
Key (PTK)
512-bit
shared secret
from which
Temporal
Keys (TKs)
are derived
Derived during 802.11i
4-way handshake
In volatile
memory only;
zeroized on
reboot
All session
encryption/dec
ryption keys
are derived
from the PTK
802.11i
EAPOL MIC Key
128-bit
shared secret
used to
protect 4way (key)
handshake
Derived from PTK
In volatile
memory only;
zeroized on
reboot
Used for
integrity
validation in 4way
handshake
802.11i EAPOL Encr Key
128-bit
shared secret
used to
protect 4way
handshakes
Derived from PTK
In volatile
memory only;
zeroized on
reboot
Used for
confidentiality
in 4-way
handshake
802.11i data AES-CCM
encryption/MIC key
128-bit AESCCM key
Derived from PTK
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory;
zeroized on
reboot
Used for
802.11i packet
encryption and
integrity
verification
(this is the
CCMP or
AES-CCM
key)
33
CSP
CSP TYPE
GENERATION
STORAGE
And
ZEROIZATI
ON
USE
802.11i Group Master Key
(GMK)
256-bit
secret used
to derive
GTK
Generated from approved
RNG
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory;
zeroized on
reboot
Used to derive
Group
Transient Key
(GTK)
802.11i Group Transient
Key (GTK)
256-bit
shared secret
used to
derive group
(multicast)
encryption
and integrity
keys
Internally derived by AP
which assumes
“authenticator” role in
handshake
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory;
zeroized on
reboot
Used to derive
multicast
cryptographic
keys
802.11i Group AES-CCM
Data Encryption/MIC Key
128-bit
AES-CCM
key derived
from GTK
Derived from 802.11
group key handshake
Stored in
plaintext in
volatile
memory;
zeroized on
reboot
Used to protect
multicast
message
confidentiality
and integrity
(AES-CCM)
RSA private Key
1024/2048bit RSA
private key
Generated on the AP
(remains in AP at all
times)
Stored in and
protected by
AP’s nonvolatile
memory.
zeroized by the
‘ap wipe out
flash’
command
Used for
IKEv1/IKEv2
authentication
when AP is
authenticating
using
certificate
based
authentication
34
7 Self Tests
The module performs the following Self Tests after being configured into either Remote AP mode or
Remote Mesh Portal mode. The module performs both power-up and conditional self-tests. In the event any
self-test fails, the module enters an error state, logs the error, and reboots automatically.
The module performs the following power-up self-tests:
Aruba Hardware known Answer tests:
o AES KAT
o HMAC-SHA1 KAT
o Triple-DES KAT
ArubaOS OpenSSL AP Module
o AES KAT
o HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC SHA384) KAT
o RNG KAT
o RSA KAT
o SHA (SHA1, SHA256 and SHA384) KAT
o Triple-DES KAT
ArubaOS Cryptographic Module
o AES KAT
o HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC SHA384, and HMAC512) KAT
o FIPS 186-2 RNG KAT
o RSA (sign/verify)
o SHA (SHA1, SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512) KAT
o Triple-DES KAT
ArubaOS Uboot Bootloader Module
o Firmware Integrity Test: RSA 2048-bit Signature Validation
The following Conditional Self-tests are performed in the module:
Continuous Random Number Generator Test–This test is run upon generation of random data by
the module's random number generators to detect failure to a constant value. The module stores
the first random number for subsequent comparison, and the module compares the value of the
new random number with the random number generated in the previous round and enters an error
state if the comparison is successful. The test is performed for the approved as well as nonapproved RNGs.
RSA pairwise Consistency Test
Firmware load test
These self-tests are run for the Cavium hardware cryptographic implementation as well as for the Aruba
OpenSSL AP and ArubaOS cryptographic module implementations.
Self-test results are written to the serial console.
In the event of a KATs failure, the AP logs different messages, depending on the error.
35
For an ArubaOS OpenSSL AP module and ArubaOS cryptographic module KAT failure:
AP rebooted [DATE][TIME] : Restarting System, SW FIPS KAT failed
For an AES Cavium hardware POST failure:
Starting HW SHA1 KAT ...Completed HW SHA1 AT
Starting HW HMAC-SHA1 KAT ...Completed HW HMAC-SHA1 KAT
Starting HW DES KAT ...Completed HW DES KAT
Starting HW AES KAT ...Restarting system.
36
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