• To demonstrate to hospitals the need for
isolated systems
• To guide the engineer in the application of
hospital ungrounded systems
• To describe in detail the Square D equipment
used to design effective and economical
isolated ungrounded systems
Square D has been building isolating transformers
for hospital use since the first equipment
standards appeared in 1944. We have built an
enviable reputation for reliability, low sound levels ,
and minimum inherent leakage.
Proof of the engineered superiority of Square D
products is found throughout the country in
numerous installations, many dating to the
earliest applications of isolating transformers.
This bulletin is not intended as a “do it yourself”
manual for installation of hospital isolated
systems. The information contained here
regarding codes and standards is current as of
this writing. However, these codes and standards
are continually changing and are also subject to
local changes and interpretations.
Any hospital considering design changes to
electrical systems in critical care patient areas
should obtain the services of an electrical
consulting engineer. The technical complexities of
today’s hospitals dictate that all involved parties
have a thorough understanding of the hospital’s
objectives. This is the only way to avoid
purchasing unnecessary equipment.
Time spent planning the changes will result in
large dividends, provided the following parties
are involved:
• Consulting engineer
• Hospital administrator
• Hospital engineer
• Chief of surgery
• Chief of anesthesiology
• Cardiologist
• Manufacturer’s representative
HISTORY
During the 1920s and ’30s, the number of fires
and explosions in operating rooms grew at an
alarming rate. Authorities determined that the
major causes of these accidents fell into two
categories:
• Man-made electricity
• Static electricity (75% of recorded incidents)
In 1939, experts began studying these conditions
in an attempt to produce a safety standard. The
advent of W orld W ar II dela y ed the study’ s results
until 1944. At that time, the National Fire
Protection Agency (NFPA) published “Safe
Practices in Hospital Operating Rooms.”
The early standards were not generally adopted
in new hospital construction until 1947. It soon
became apparent that these initial standards fell
short of providing the necessary guidelines for
construction of rooms in which combustible
agents would be used.
NFPA appointed a committee to revise the 1944
standards. In 1949, this committee published a
new standard, NFPA No. 56, the basis for our
current standards.
The National Electrical Code (NEC) of 1959 firmly
established the need for ungrounded isolated
distribution systems in areas where combustible
gases are used.
In the same year, the NEC incorporated the NFPA
standards into the code. The NFPA No. 56A–
Standard for the Use of Inhalation Anesthetics,
received major revisions in 1970, 1971, 1973,
and 1978.
In 1982, NFPA No. 56A was incorporated into a
new standard, NFPA No. 99—Health Care
Facilities. The new document includes the text of
several other documents, such as:
• NFPA-3M• 56HM
• 56K• 56B
• 76A• 56C
• 76B• 56D
• 76• 56G
The material originally covered by NFPA 56A
is now located in Chapter 3 of NFPA No. 99.
NFPA No. 99 was updated in 1984, 1987, 1990,
1993 and 1996.
The increased use of electronic diagnostic and
treatment equipment, and the corresponding
increase in electrical hazards, has resulted in the
use of isolated ungrounded systems in new areas
of the hospital since 1971. These new hazards
were first recognized in NFPA bulletin No. 76BM,
published in 1971. Isolating systems are now
commonly used for protection against electrical
shock in many areas, among them:
• Intensive care units (ICUs)
• Coronary care units (CCUs)
• Emergency departments
• Special procedure rooms
• Cardiovascular laboratories
• Dialysis units
• Various wet locations
ELECTRICAL HAZARDS IN HOSPITALS
The major contributors to hospital electrical
accidents are faulty equipment and wiring.
Electrical accidents fall into three categories:
• Fires
• Burns
• Shock
This section covers the subject of electrical shock.
Electrical shock is produced by current, not
voltage. It is not the amount of v oltage a person is
exposed to, but rather the amount of current
transmitted through the person’s body, that
determines the intensity of a shock. The human
body acts as a large resistor to current flow. The
average adult exhibits a resistance between
100,000 ohms (Ω) and 1,000,000 Ω, measured
hand to hand. The resistance depends on the
body mass and moisture content.
The threshold of perception for an average adult
is 1 milliampere (mA). This amount of current
will produce a slight tingling feeling through
the fingertips.
Between 10 and 20 mA, the person experiences
muscle contractions and finds it more difficult to
release his or her hand from an electrode.
The hazardous levels of current f or many patients
are amazingly smaller. The most susceptible
patient is the one exposed to externalized
conductors, diagnostic catheters, or other electric
contact to or near the heart.
Surgical techniques bypass the patient’s body
resistance and expose the patient to electrical
current from surrounding equipment. The highest
risk is to patients undergoing surgery within the
thoracic cavity. Increased use of such equipment
as heart monitors, dye injectors, and cardiac
catheters increases the threat of electrocution
when used within the circulatory system.
Other factors contributing to electrical
susceptibility are patients with hypokalemia,
acidosis, elevated catecholamine levels,
hypoxemia, and the presence of digitalis. Adult
patients with cardiac arrhythmias can be
electrocuted through the misuse of pacemakers
connected directly to the myocardium.
Infants are more susceptible to electric shock
because of their smaller mass, and thus lower
body resistance. Much has been written about
current levels considered lethal for catheterized
and surgical patients. Considerable controversy
exists about the actual danger level for a patient
who has a direct electrical connection to his or her
heart. The minimum claimed hazard level seems
to be 10 microamperes (µA) with a maximum level
given at 180 µA. Whatever the correct level,
between 10 and 180 µA, it is still only a fraction of
the level that is hazardous to medical attendants
serving the patient.
It is believed that approximately 1,000 Ω of
resistance lies between the patient’s heart and
external body parts.
All of this information leads us to the conclusion
that the patient environment is a prime target for
electrical accidents. Nowhere else can one find
these elements: lowered body resistance, more
electrical equipment, and conductors such as
blood, urine, saline, and water. The combination
of these elements presents a challenge to
increase electrical safety.
An externally applied current of 50 mA causes
pain, possibly fainting, and exhaustion.
An increase to 100 mA will cause ventricular
fibrillation.
Electric equipment operating in the patient vicinity ,
even though operating perfectly, may still be
hazardous to the patient. This is because every
piece of electrical equipment produces a leakage
current. The leakage consists of any current,
including capacitively coupled current, not
intended to be applied to a patient, but which may
pass from exposed metal parts of an appliance to
ground or to other accessible parts of an
appliance.
Normally, this current is shunted around the
patient via the ground conductor in the power
cord. However, as this current increases, it can
become a hazard to the patient.
Isolated systems are now commonly used to
protect against electrical shock in many areas,
among them:
• Intensive care units (ICUs)
• Coronary care units (CCUs)
• Emergency departments
• Special procedure rooms
• Cardiovascular laboratories
• Dialysis units
• Various wet locations
Without proper use of grounding, leakage
currents could reach values of 1,000 µA before
the problem is perceived. On the other hand, a
leakage current of 10 to 180 µA can injure the
patient. Ventricular fibrillation can occur from
exposure to this leakage current.
Figure 1 illustrates the origin and path of leakage
current.
Failure to use the grounding conductor in power
cords causes a dangerous electrical hazard. This
commonly results from using two-prong plugs and
receptacles, improper use of adapters, use of twowire extension cords, and the use of damaged
electrical cords or plugs. Figure 2 illustrates these
hazards.
Answers
There are no perfect electrical systems or infallible
equipment to eliminate hospital electrical
accidents. However, careful planning on the part
of the consulting engineer, architect, contractor,
and hospital personnel can reduce electrical
hazards to nearly zero. Hospital electrical
equipment receives much physical abuse;
therefore, it must be properly maintained to
provide electrical safety for patients and staff.
Procedures for electrical safety should include the
following:
• Check all wall power receptacles and their
polarities regularly.
• Routinely verify that conductive surfaces are
grounded in all patient areas.
• Request that patient electrical devices such as
toothbrushes and shavers be battery powered.
• Use completely sealed and insulated remote
controls for use in patient beds.
• Use bedrails made of plastic or covered in
insulating material.
5
General Information and Application
Codes and Standards
CODES AND STANDARDS
It would not be practical to attempt to reproduce
the codes and standards that affect the
application of isolated distribution systems in
hospitals. As was previously mentioned, codes
are continually refined and updated, with frequent
amendments between major publications. All
hospitals should have copies of the current
standards for reference; the design engineer
must
have this information available. Obtain
copies of all standards referenced in this bulletin
from the National Fire Protection Association,
Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02269.
This chapter briefly covers the sections of codes
and standards that apply to hospital isolated
ungrounded distribution systems. This chapter
only covers a few of the important points within
these standards. A thorough study of applicable
codes and standards is required to effectively
design a project.
NFPA No. 99
History
Published by the NFPA, this code is included as a
reference in the NEC Article 517.
NFPA No. 99 addresses fire, explosion, and
electrical safety in hospitals. It consolidates 12
individual NFPA documents or standards into
one document.
Many hospitals and consulting engineers are
unaware of this document and its requirements.
Square D recommends that all consulting
engineers who design hospitals have the
hardcover “handbook” version of this document
available.
Anesthetizing Location Classifications
The first type of location is that which is flammable
because explosive anesthesia is used. This
location must be designed to comply with NEC
Article 501.
There are many other requirements for the
flammable anesthetizing locations; these
requirements are discussed in Chapter 12 of
NFPA No. 99. Explosive anesthesia is now
virtually non-existent in the United States.
Therefore, this handbook does not cover the
flammable location in any detail.
Non-flammable anesthetizing location
requirements are also covered in Chapter 12 of
NFPA No. 99. A permanent sign must be
displayed at the entrance to all flammable
locations. It must state that only non-flammable
anesthetics can be used in the room.
Non-flammable anesthetizing locations can be
further divided into locations that are subject to
becoming wet and those that are not. A wet
location requires special protection against
electrical shock. The allowable protection is
as follows:
• Ground-fault circuit interrupter if first-fault
conditions are to be allowed to interrupt power
• Isolated power system if first-fault conditions
are not to be allowed to interrupt power
The governing body of the hospital will make the
determination of a “wet location,” using the
following definition:
A patient care area that is normally subject to
wet conditions while patients are present. This
includes standing fluids on the floor or
drenching of the work area, either of which
condition is intimate to the patient or staff.
Routine housekeeping procedures and
incidental spillage of liquids do not define a
wet location.
NFP A No . 99 defines the items in an anesthetizing
location, which must be powered from the isolated
ungrounded system. Because this section is
subject to individual interpretation by local Code
authorities, work closely with these authorities
before selecting the equipment to be powered
from standard grounded systems. This is
especially important when ordering permanently
installed equipment, such as X-ray apparatus.
NFPA No. 99 and the NEC Article 517 allow the
grounded circuit providing power to an isolated
system to enter the non-hazardous area of an
anesthetizing location. However, ungrounded
wiring and grounded service wiring cannot occupy
the same conduit or raceway.
The primary and secondary of the isolation
transformer cannot exceed 600 volts (V) in any
isolation system that supplies power to an
anesthetizing area or other critical care patient
area. The secondary circuit conductors must be
provided with an approved overcurrent protective
device in both conductors of each branch circuit.
Paragraph 3–3.2.2.2 of NFPA No. 99 sets the
limits of impedance to ground of the isolated
system and the instructions for testing to
determine compliance with the standards. The
size of the isolation transformer should be limited
to 10 kVA or less.
Even in the most sophisticated operating rooms,
the equipment load rarely exceeds 5 kVA. When
writing specifications, we suggest choosing an
isolated transformer rated at 5 kVA, having a
continuous overload capability of 25 to 50%. The
transformer will thus be designed to operate at a
relatively cool normal temperature, but will still be
able to handle future demands which exceed
today’s norm.
Conductors for the isolated ungrounded system
must be color-coded:
• Orange for conductor #1
• Brown for conductor #2
• Green for the grounding conductor.
• Where three-phase isolated systems are used,
the third color, or that f or conductor #3, must be
yellow .
Paragraph 3–3.2.2.3 of NFPA No. 99 describes
the line isolation monitor (ground detector)
required to monitor the isolated system. The
limitation for total system hazard is set at 5 mA.
Paragraph 3–3.3.2 of NFPA No. 99 specifies the
“Grounding System.” This subject is also
discussed in detail in “grounding” on page 14 of
this handbook.
Article 517, National Electrical Code—
NFPA No. 70
Article 517-3 specifies the legal minimum
requirements in most states. It is the document
used by most inspectors. When designing the
system, use it in conjunction with NFPA No. 99,
which is included as a reference in Article 517.
Other NFPA standards are also referenced in
Article 517, such as NFPA-101 and NFPA-20.
Patient Care Areas
Article 517 defines three types of patient
care areas:
•
General Care Areas:
examining rooms, treatment rooms, clinics,
and similar areas. In these areas, the patient
may come in contact with ordinary appliances,
such as nurse call systems, electrical beds,
examining lamps, telephones, and
entertainment devices. Patients may also be
connected to electro-medical devices, such as
heating pads, EKGs, drainage pumps,
monitors, otoscopes, ophthalmoscopes, and
IV lines.
•
Critical Care Areas:
intensive care units, coronary care units,
angiography laboratories, cardiac
catheterization laboratories, delivery rooms,
operating rooms, and similar areas. In these
areas, patients are subjected to invasive
procedures and connected to line-operated,
electro-medical devices.
•
Wet Locations:
subject to wet conditions while patients are
present. This includes standing fluids on the
floor or drenching of the work area, either of
which condition is intimate to the patient or
staff. Routine housekeeping procedures and
incidental spillage of liquids do not define a wet
location. Critical care and general care areas
can also be considered wet areas. The
governing body of the hospital determines
whether a location is to be considered “wet.”
As with NFPA No. 99, anesthetizing locations are
classified as:
• Hazardous locations which use flammable
anesthetics. These locations must meet class I
division requirements and must have isolated
power systems.
• Other-than-hazardous locations, allowing the
use of grounded power systems.
Both types of anesthetizing locations must be
further classified as “wet” or “not wet” areas. If
designated as a wet location, extra electrical
General Care Critical Care
protection is required. The acceptable protection
is the same as that defined for NFPA No. 99.
The designation of all of the above-mentioned
areas in the health care facility is the responsibility
of the facility’ s go verning body . Before a designer
can choose the proper electrical distribution
system for a hospital, the governing body of the
hospital must inform the designer about the
location’s use. This requires close coordination
with the medical staff of the facility, to ensure that
the designer understands current medical
procedures as well as possible future procedures.
The NEC recognizes that hospital patients are
more susceptible to electrical shock than are
normally healthy individuals. Consequently,
patients must be protected through use of special
procedures. The special procedures and
equipment required become more complicated
with the degree of electrical susceptibility of
the patient.
The hospital administration and designer
are responsible for determining the degree of
patient susceptibility and selecting the correct
equipment. This selection process requires
close communication between the hospital
administration, medical staff, and the consulting
electrical engineer.
It is generally accepted that any time the normal
body resistance of a patient is bypassed, the body
becomes electrically susceptible. Degree of
susceptibility varies from having an electrical
probe or catheter connected to the heart muscle,
to having electrodes attached to the outer skin
after conductive paste is applied. Patients who
are anesthetized, or are demobilized through
illness, restraints, or drug therapy, also have a
higher degree of electrical susceptibility than
normal individuals. Such patients cannot av oid or
disconnect themselves from an electrical hazard
that would be relatively harmless to a
normal person.
UL 2601-1
This is the UL Standard against which all medical
and dental equipment is tested by the
Underwriters’ Laboratories. UL derives its
standards for performance requirements from the
applicable NFPA standards and the NEC.
Demand that any appliance purchased for use in
patient care areas be labelled under this UL
Standard for use in the specific area designated.
UL 1022
Line isolation monitors are measured against this
UL Standard. Insist that an y line isolation monitor
installed in the facility have a UL component
recognition under this standard.
UL 1047
This is the UL Standard for hospital isolating
equipment. Do not accept any hospital isolation
equipment unless it is listed and labelled as a
complete system under this standard. This
assures the hospital and consulting engineer
that the equipment meets all existing codes
and standards.
ISOLATED SYSTEMS
For example, a patient who has impaired nerve
sensitivity cannot detect heat. A cup of very hot
coffee would not be a hazard for a normal person;
however, it is a potential disaster for the nerveimpaired individual.
Certain medical conditions may render a patient
particularly vulnerable to electrical shock. These
patients may require special protection even
though their normal body resistance has not been
intentionally bypassed.
Give special consideration to the following
potential electrically susceptible patient areas:
• Acute care beds
• Angiographic labs
• Cardiac catheterization labs
• Coronary care units
• Delivery rooms
• Dialysis units
• Emergency room treatment areas
• Human physiology labs
• Intensive care units
• Operating rooms
• Post-operative recovery rooms
The term “isolated system” can apply to many
systems in a hospital, such as the management
of patients having a communicable disease.
However, it is unlikely that any of the other
systems is as widely used, yet as poorly
understood, as the system discussed in
this handbook.
The isolating system covered in this manual is
really an “isolated ungrounded electrical
distribution system.” Although these isolated
systems are very important to hospital operations,
many hospital staff lack even a basic
understanding of how isolating systems work.
This includes the technicians responsible for
maintaining the systems.
Consulting engineers and plant operating
engineers who specify and apply these isolating
systems usually understand them; but they have
difficulty passing this knowledge to laymen.
Hopefully, this section will help them fill this
communication gap. The following simple analogy
should help the layman understand isolated
systems.
In this example, consider an electrical receptacle
in the counter area of a household kitchen. The
ground in this case is the kitchen plumbing fixture.
Figure 3 illustrates this example.
Receptacle
Fixture
Black Wire
White Wire
Figure 3 Kitchen Plumbing As a Ground
Electrical current comes to the receptacle via two
insulated conductors. One of them is usually
black, the other white. Many people feel they can
safely touch either one of these conductors, but
this oversimplification could result in a dangerous
shock.
When the two conductors touch each other, a
violent arc results, part of the conductor melts,
and the fuse opens or the circuit breaker trips.
This demonstrates the energy that is used when
any household appliance is run. Because the
household appliance does not open a fuse or trip
a circuit breaker the appliance places resistance
between the two conductors. In placing
resistance, the appliance limits the amount of
current that can flow. However, the amount of
current that can flow must always be less than the
current rating of the fuse or circuit breaker.
When a light bulb touches both wires, it
illuminates. If one of its terminals touches the
white conductor in the receptacle, nothing
happens. If the other terminal of the light bulb
touches the kitchen plumbing, nothing happens. If
the white wire touches the plumbing, nothing
happens. The conclusion must be that the white
wire is safe to handle as long as the black
conductor is not handled at the same time.
when it is attached to a copper rod driven into the
ground or to a convenient piece of conductive
plumbing pipe, which ultimately runs into the
ground. The white conductor (known as the
neutral
) is grounded when it is installed by the
utility company.
The conclusion from the previous paragraph is
that current flows from the black wire to
any
grounded conductive surface, of which there are
many. The black conductor is safe to handle as
long as you do not simultaneously touch the white
conductor or any grounded item.
This type of electrical system is commonly called
a “grounded electrical distribution system.”
Ungrounded System
To convert available power from a receptacle into
an
ungrounded service
is to
isolate
the receptacle from the grounded
is possible. The first step
service. There are several ways to isolate power,
but the most common and economical is to use an
isolating transformer.
The available grounded electrical power
energizes a coil in the isolating transformer; this
coil is called the
current in the
primary winding
secondary winding
. This induces a
, which is
completely insulated from the primary winding by
electromagnetic induction. No direct electrical
connection exists between the primary and
secondary coils.
Figure 4 shows how a transformer is constructed
and connected to a receptacle.
10
Using the example as above, but with the black
wire, the connections cause different results.
When one terminal of the light bulb touches the
black conductor, nothing happens. However,
when the other terminal of the light bulb touches
the kitchen plumbing, the bulb illuminates as it did
when it touched both wires. When the black wire
touches the kitchen plumbing, there is a violent
arc, much as if both conductors had touched
each other.
The conclusion from the above paragraph is that
it is safe to handle the black conductor only if y ou
do not simultaneously touch the white conductor,
kitchen plumbing, or any other grounded item.
Obviously, the white conductor and the kitchen
plumbing have something in common. That is that
they are
When electrical devices are connected across two
conductors on the transformer, they work as if
they were connected directly to a grounded
system. The conclusion to be drawn is that the
isolating transformer provides the same usable
electrical energy as does the grounded power
circuit.
Repeating the experiments with the light bulb , we
find that current will not flow if a single terminal of
2/98
General Information and Application
Isolated Systems
the light touches either secondary conductor of
the isolating transformer. No current flo ws if either
secondary conductor of the transformer touches
the plumbing (ground). Furthermore, no sparking
occurs when either conductor touches the
plumbing; the fuse or circuit breaker maintains the
connection.
The conclusion is that current does not flow from
either conductor of the isolated system to ground.
In more technical terms,
to ground exists from either conductor of an
isolated electrical system.
System Comparison
The previous section illustrates that conductors of
an isolated system are safer to handle than are
the conductors of a grounded system. Now let’s
use the same kitchen receptacle to show a
comparison between a grounded system and an
isolated system.
When installing a new curtain rod at the window
over the kitchen sink, one would probably use a
small electric drill. If the residence was built within
the last 30 years, the receptacle most likely has
three openings, not two. The third opening is
shaped to receive a pin (U slot) rather than a
blade-shaped prong. The portable electric drill
probably has a three-prong plug. This third point
of contact simply connects the metal case of the
drill to ground. The connection to g round from the
pin on the receptacle is often made by a third wire
that is run with the power conductors, or by a
metal pipe (conduit) which encloses the two
conductors that serve the receptacle.
The electric drill has an electric motor which is
completely enclosed in a conductive housing. The
housing is connected to a third wire in the power
cord, which in turn connects to ground.
The electrical portion of the motor must be
completely insulated from the conductive
enclosure. If it were not, arcing would result when
the black conductor of the grounded system
touched the plumbing. This “short circuit” would
disengage the circuit breaker or blow the fuse
as it did when the live conductor touched the
plumbing.
Consider this scenario: the person using the drill
touches his or her opposite hand on the plumbing
fixture for support. If the drill is in good repair and
the enclosure is properly grounded through the
power plug, the procedure is safe.
However, what if the insulation around the drill
motor is defective, allowing the live conductor of
no hazardous potential
the grounded system to contact the metal
enclosure? This is a dangerous situation. If the
ground wire is properly attached to the enclosure
and connected to ground through the ground pin
in the plug, there will be arcing in the drill where it
contacts the conductive enclosure. If there is good
contact between the live conductor and grounded
enclosure, sufficient current will flow to disengage
the circuit breaker or blow the fuse.
Two paths to ground are possible, one down the
ground wire in the cord into the receptacle ground,
and one through the person holding the drill (who
is grounded through the plumbing). Since the
resistance through the human body is much
higher than the resistance through a properly
connected ground wire, most of the current
follows the path of least resistance (the ground
wire); the person holding the drill is safe.
The key to keeping the drill safe is in the ground
connection from the drill enclosure to the ground
at the receptacle. If this connection is broken (for
example, if an improperly connected adapter is
used), the only path for current in the enclosure to
go to ground is through the drill user. A hazardous
level of current could be maintained since the
human body has sufficient resistance to keep the
current below the level required to disengage the
circuit breaker or blow the fuse. The level of
current would be high enough to be deadly.
If, on the other hand, the drill is powered from an
isolated circuit, and the ground from the drill
enclosure is disconnected, there is little potential
for current to flow through the drill user . Ev en if the
ground is intact, not enough current flows to
disengage the circuit breaker or blow the fuse.
This is a very important factor: if the drill was
really a piece of life support equipment, such as
a respirator, it would continue to run without
disengaging the circuit breaker or blowing the fuse.
Imperfect Isolating
In the previous examples, we assumed a perfect
system. Unfortunately, a perfect system is
impossible to attain.
Returning to the example of the isolating
transformer, we can convert the isolated system
back to a grounded system easily, by connecting
one secondary conductor of the transformer to
ground. This would create the potential f or current
to flow from the opposite conductor to ground, as
it would in any grounded electrical distribution
system.
An isolated system can be unintentionally
grounded. For example, if the drill is plugged into
the system with the ground intact and there is a
fault in the drill to the grounded enclosure, that
single fault converts the entire system into a
grounded system.
Keep in mind no perfect insulators exist either.
What we commonly call “insulators,” such as
rubber or plastic coverings on wire, are actually
just poor conductors. All materials conduct
electricity to some degree. Thus, everything
attached to the secondary conductors of an
isolating transformer will partially ground the
system. Examples of items that partially ground
the system, without making direct connection to
ground, include the following:
• Insulated wires enclosed in grounded
metal conduit
• Electrical components within permanently
installed electrical equipment
• Electrical components within portable devices
housed in grounded enclosures (commonly
referred to as the capacitance of the system)
Because an isolated system can easily become
grounded without giving any indication to the user ,
a way must be f ound to monitor the integrity of the
isolation in the system. With this monitoring, there
must be some warning when the system becomes
grounded. When the system becomes partially
grounded, the warning is still necessary, b ut a limit
must be set for the warning to be sounded. Limits
are established by codes and standards,
specifically the NEC.
See the “Codes and Standards” page 6 of this
manual for additional information. Codes and
standards state that an alarm must sound and
display (it must be audible
must activate when the integrity of an isolated
ungrounded system degrades to the extent that
5 mA of current will flow from either secondary
conductor to ground through a zero impedance
fault.
Line Isolation Monitor (LIM)
Codes and standards not only specify the limits
within which an isolated ungrounded system must
operate, but also the method f or checking system
integrity. A LIM is required to continuously check
the resistance (impedance) of the total isolated
ungrounded system to ground. The LIM must
respond audibly and visibly when the impedance
of the system degrades to the extent that 5 mA of
and
visible). The alarm
current will flow through either conductor of the
system to ground in a zero impedance fault.
Several points should be considered:
1. The alarm condition does
is imminent danger to the patient or anyone
else. The alarm simply indicates that the
system has reverted to a grounded or partially
grounded system, which is the same system
contained in the rest of the hospital. Correct the
problem as soon as possible; but do not
interrupt procedures that are being conducted
when the alarm sounds.
2. The LIM does not interrupt electrical service.
Loss of integrity in the ungrounded system
does not affect the operation of life support
devices.
3. An activated alarm does not mean hazardous
current is flowing. The LIM is a predictive
device; by sounding an alarm, it predicts that
5 mA of current could flow from one conductor
of the isolated system to ground if a path for
that current is provided. This requires that a
second
in the system before a true hazardous
condition exists.
The LIM is equipped with a meter (also required
by code) that gives continuous indication of the
system’s condition. The meter is calibrated in
milliamperes (mA) of current. Its position indicates
how much current could flow from either
conductor of the isolated system to ground if a
path was provided.
fault or electric failure must be present
not
mean that there
NOTE: Keep in mind that this meter merely
predicts the possibility of the condition; it does not
indicate that current is actually flowing.
Types of LIMs
Several types of line isolation monitors are
available. Reviewing them not only helps
determine requirements for a system, but helps
identify the equipment currently used in the
hospital.
Ground Detector.
LIM, but rather the original “ground detector,”
which is essentially a balanced bridge device.
Ground detectors were standard equipment until
about 1970, so many of these units are still in use.
Inexpensive to build and reliable because of its
simplicity, the ground detector is unaffected by
and does not create any radio frequency (RF)
interference. However, it only recognizes
unbalanced resistive or capacitive f aults; it cannot
recognize a partially grounded system. This
inability to sound an alarm (to recognized
balanced fault systems) is the main reason codes
and standards no longer allow its use.
Systems in the field have been observed to allow
as much as 30 mA (30,000 µA) to flow from line to
ground without sounding an alarm. This very
hazardous condition can cause an electrical
hazard to the patient or medical staff.
Ground detectors may still be used if they were
installed before 1971. Even though not required
by code, hospitals should consider revising these
systems to match current standards.
Dynamic Ground Detector.
ground detectors, now called line isolation
monitors, were developed in Canada. They are
called dynamic ground detectors, as opposed to
static ground detectors, because the measuring
circuit continually switches between the two
isolated conductors and ground. In this way, it
overcomes the greatest inadequacy of static
ground detectors — the inability to recognize and
sound an alarm at the occurrence of an excessive
balanced fault condition.
Although this unit meets current codes and
standards, it has two undesirable features:
1. This type of LIM connects to ground through a
high resistance so that it can measure the
impedance of the total system. This reduces
the integrity of the isolated system by partially
grounding it. With nothing connected to the
system except the LIM, 1000 µA could flow
from either line of the isolated system to
ground. If the LIM is calibrated to sound an
alarm when 2000 µA flow from either line to
ground, approximately one-half of the capacity
of the total system would be dedicated to the
LIM. This limits the amount of equipment that
can be connected to an isolated system, often
requiring two systems in an operating room,
rather than one.
2. Switching between the isolated conductors and
ground causes interference on the isolated
system. Sometimes, this interference can be
detected on patient monitoring equipment,
creating difficulty in gathering information
needed by the medical staff. In extreme cases,
it becomes impossible to use equipment such
as an EEG without disconnecting the LIM.
The extent of difficulty encountered with these
types of interference varies with the installation
and design of the patient monitoring equipment.
The Square D type EDD line isolation monitor is
typical of the second generation of LIMs. This unit
was the first of the low leakage LIMs. It contributes
The first dynamic
less leakage to the system because of its higher
impedance connection ground. Rather than use
half the system capacity for the LIM, this unit
reduces LIM contribution to less than 25% of the
system’s capacity.
The type EDD LIM still uses a switching circuit
and still causes interference with patient
monitoring equipment.
IGD ISO-GARD
®
Line Isolation Monitor. This LIM
represents the most recent generation of line
isolation monitors. It virtually eliminates all of the
undesirable features in the early dynamic ground
detectors and line isolation monitors. It
contributes only 50 µA of leakage to the system,
about one percent of the system’s usable
capacity.
The special circuitry developed by Square D
monitors both sides of the line continuously,
eliminating the need for switching. It does not
generate any interference that could aff ect patient
monitoring devices. For detailed information on
the ISO-GARD LIM, see page 51 of this handbook
or request the Square D bulletin covering line
isolation monitors.
Figure 5 compares the degree of interference
produced by the ISO-GARD LIM with older LIMs.
Grounding in a patient care or anesthetizing
location is an important safeguard against shock
and electrocution. Proper grounding dissipates
static charges and shunts fault currents and
normal leakage currents away from attendants.
Electric Equipment Power Cord Grounding
The green grounding conductor in an equipment
power cord prevents static potentials from
reaching dangerous values on noncurrent
carrying parts such as housings, cases, and
boxes of electrical appliances. If these parts are
not properly grounded, a static charge could
accumulate; the charge could reach a large
enough value to automatically discharge as an
electric static spark. This static charge could be a
hazard to the patient and attendant if it ignited
some flammable gas or material, or if it
discharged to the patient as a shock.
This grounding conductor also provides a path for
leakage current which could be conducted to an
electrical appliance case. The magnitude of this
leakage current depends on the characteristics of
the appliance and its insulation. The leakage
current could result in potential differences
between pieces of equipment and could flow
through vital organs of the patient, if a patient
current path is established. For example, during
cardiac catheterization, small amounts of current
could cause ventricular fibrillation.
Figure 6 illustrates the current path for leakage
current which could develop in an electrically
operated patient bed. Since the patient pro vides a
grounding path via the attendant and pacemaker , a
current divider will result. Ho wever , the resistance
through the power cord ground conductor is
significantly lower , providing protection for the
patient. Ho we v er, if the ground wire is broken, most
of the current would flow through the patient. In this
example, we assume that non-isolated patient
monitoring leads are used.
EKG Monitor
Because the resistance of a grounding conductor
is extremely important, you must give it careful
consideration. Wire resistance is inversely
proportional to its cross-sectional area. The
cross-sectional area is usually expressed in units
of AWG (American Wire Gauge). The lower the
AWG, the larger the wire. For example, the
grounding conductor in a power cord is #18 A WG;
it represents about 0.0064 ohms/foot. On the
other hand, #10 AWG only represents 0.001
ohms/foot.
Current codes and standards for new construction
of critical care areas require that no more than
40 millivolts (mV) exist between the reference
point and exposed conductor surfaces in the
patient’s vicinity. This means, for a piece of
electrical equipment using a #18 AWG ground
wire in a 15-ft power cord, no more than 416 mA
of fault current could develop without exceeding
the 40 mV potential difference requirement.
These faults could develop through internal
aborted components or poor power cord
insulation. There is no certain way to prevent
these faults; however, their magnitudes can be
kept to a minimum through the use of an isolated
power system. Using the isolated system, an
initial line to ground fault can be kept as low as
5 mA, if the system is operating in the “safe”
condition. The power cord ground wire could
easily accommodate a 5 mA fault and stay well
within the requirements of NFPA No. 99 and
the NEC.
Permanently Installed Ground System
(Hard Wiring)
Providing proper grounding for all electrical
devices assumes that they connect to a sufficient
ground system which interconnects to provide an
equipotential ground plane for the patient. Current
codes and standards require that all conductive
surfaces within the patient vicinity must be
properly grounded. The grounding system
permits intermingling of electric appliances
located near or applied to the patient without the
hazard of leakage or fault current to the patient.
By interconnecting all metal surfaces within the
patient area, potential differences between the
metal surfaces can be kept to a minimum.
14
Possible
Broken
Ground
Attendant contacting bed to
pacemaker catheter terminals
Since a potential difference is required to produce
a current flow, the entire ground plane can rise
above ground zero as long as all metal is at the
same potential. Even if a person contacts two
pieces of metal, both at 10V , a current path will not
develop. This ground plane is established by the
use of a properly connected ground system.
2/98
General Information and Application
Design Guide
Equipotential Grounding
The NEC (1971, 1975, and 1978 editions)
specified and dictated the use of an equipotential
grounding system with maximum resistance for
each branch of such a system. While these
requirements are considerably reduced in the
NEC and NFPA No. 99, grounding requirements
still remain more demanding than those shown in
Article 250 for other occupancies. Because of this ,
electrical design engineers should still plan for
special grounding requirements in these areas.
Carefully study the code to determine exactly
what special grounding provisions must be
provided in each project.
Ground Jacks
In previous codes, provisions for grounding
conductive non-electrical devices were dictated.
These provisions were met by supplying each
critical patient care area with a specified type of
ground jack. Each operating room was required to
have a minimum of six ground jacks.
While this is no longer a code requirement,
Square D recommends that at least one ground
jack be placed in each critical care patient area.
This ground jack provides connection to the
grounding system for redundant grounding of
exceptionally hazardous equipment. The jac k also
allows connection to the grounding system for
testing. The cost of a single ground jack, or even
several ground jacks, in a room is quite low.
I. System Concept
With the increased complexity of isolated
systems, it is more important than ever to use a
system approach in which all components work
with each other to obtain a specific result. The
components in an isolated power system can be
purchased separately; ho wever, it is much easier
and makes more sense to purchase a complete
system.
When manufacturers design and build complete
systems, many factors are considered: proper
and attractive packaging, con v enient design, and
ease of maintenance. The component system, on
the other hand, invariably results in duplication of
functions, high jobsite labor costs, excessive
system leakages, and the lack of a dependable
single vendor.
The variety of Square D modular system
components gives the electrical consulting
engineer and architect great design latitude.
Consequently , a system to fit the special needs of
each hospital is practical.
In spite of this great versatility, all Square D
modules interface with each other perfectly. When
designing the modules that make up its systems,
the Square D engineering department considered
every important requirement for isolated systems.
Among these considerations are:
• Operating and panel face temperatures
• Sound levels
• Minimum leakage
• Ease of maintenance
• Interchangeability of components
• Pleasing appearance
• Ease of installation
II. Application
The design of isolated systems from Square D
ensures that all pieces of a system are compatible
with each other. This is the first step toward having
a working system, but it is only one of four
ingredients that make up a superior system. The
second ingredient has been discussed but bears
repeating: there must be good communication
between the parties planning the system for the
hospital. Poor communication causes poor
planning, which will be very costly and timeconsuming if the system must be modified after it
is installed.
The consulting electrical engineer must be the
nucleus of the team that makes the decisions.
However, each team member contributes vital
information to the system design.
In the past, projects run by capable consulting
electrical engineers have required modifications
costing several thousand dollars per operating
room. This was not because of poor planning, but
because the engineers did not receive the
information needed to plan usable systems. This
lack of information led to such errors as incorrect
voltage for portable X-ray machines, insufficient
receptacles, and insufficient capacity in isolating
systems.
The team approach benefits all members of the
hospital team, for example:
• The architect can make the proper provisions
for mounting the equipment; this results in
superior aesthetic quality. The architect can
also specify the proper equipment, avoiding
later difficulties.
• As part of the team, the hospital administrator
can make informed decisions when ordering
equipment for the operating room, specifying
maximum leakages, and correct cords and
connectors. The proper accessories are often
available at no extra cost, if they are specified
when the order is placed.
• The chief staff surgeon can specify a traffic
flow within the operating room, allowing the
engineer to provide proper receptacle
placement.
• If included in the team, the hospital
maintenance engineer will better understand
the isolated system. This enab les the engineer
to perform maintenance more conveniently
and efficiently.
III. General Application Criteria
A. System Size
The system must stay as small as possible to limit
leakage currents.
connected to the isolated system increases the
total hazard index: LIM, transformer, circuit
breakers, secondary wiring, and any peripheral
equipment. The system hazard current must be
kept well below maximum to allow for normal
current leakage, which will come from the
equipment operating on this power supply.
Additionally, the code states that the unloaded
system, with the LIM disconnected, must have a
minimum line-to-ground impedance of 200,000 Ω.
On a 120V system, this corresponds to 600 µA
when measured through a milliammeter
connected between line and ground.
When considering system size, we must include
all wiring between the circuit breakers in the
isolated panel and their receptacles.
wire
contributes leakage, so we must keep the
total footage to a
need to place the isolation panel as close as
possible to the point of usage.
The use of a central system, containing individual
distribution systems for several operating rooms
or CCUs, is not practical except in rare
circumstances. The only time a central system
makes sense is when this location coincides with
the closest placement of individual panels to each
room. In other cases, the central system would
result in longer runs from the panel to the
receptacles and devices. This would increase
system hazard current.
Remember that everything
Every foot of
minimum
. This emphasizes the
B. System Capacity
In selecting the capacity of an isolating
transformer, remember that the patient care areas
generally present an intermittent load condition
and load diversity. A given area may contain
equipment that requires power greater than the
isolated system provides; but the hospital will not
use every piece of equipment at the same time.
The isolated power requirement of the operating
room is almost always under 5 kVA. Howev er, the
Square D 5 kVA isolation panel incorporates a
transformer built with a 220°C insulation system,
suitable for 150°C rise. The full load design
temperature, however, is limited to a 55°C rise.
Therefore, the transformer can easily provide
power for loads up to 150% of its rating. This is an
important feature in an isolating transformer since
it provides for intermittent heavy loads, lik e those
presented by hypothermia equipment. In critical
care areas, where one transformer serves one
bed, a 3 kVA transformer is recommended.
Since the amount of wire is often proportional to
the number of circuit breakers, keep the number
of circuit breakers to a minimum. This can be done
by connecting two to four receptacles to one
circuit breaker. In most cases, an operating room
panel with eight or ten secondary breakers is
sufficient. If additional receptacles are required,
up to 16 secondary breakers can be used.
Isolation panels serving a single bed in a critical
care area require only eight secondary breakers.
C. System Wiring and Conduit
The selection of a proper conductor is one of the
most important design criteria of an isolated
power system. If improper conductor insulation is
chosen, the result is the same as if the capacitive
leakage is raised. A good commercially available
wire insulation for this application is cross-linked
polyethylene, having a mineral filler instead of a
carbon black filler. A minimum wall thickness of
2/64" should be demanded for use in 120V, 208V ,
and 240V applications. It is also important to
specify wire with a dielectric constant of 3.5 or
less, as recommended by the NEC and NFPA
No. 99.
Standard Type THHN wire is definitely unsuitable .
It can, howev er, be used f or the ground conductor .
The code demands that the #1 conductor in the
system be color-coded orange, the #2 conductor
color-coded brown, and the ground conductor
color-coded green. In three-phase systems, the
third conductor shall be color-coded yellow.
Square D is often asked to specify manufacturers
and wire catalog numbers for the low leakage
conductor. This is extremely difficult to do since
the availability of these wires diff ers from region to
region. Also, manufacturers have sometimes
discontinued production of wire types that we
have recommended. The most accessible XLP
wire has been Rome Cable Corporation low
leakage wire #FR-XLP (VW-1 XHHW-2).
Avoid the use of wire pulling compound since it
increases the capacitive coupling. The code no
longer allows wire pulling compound to be used in
conduits for isolated power systems. This
compound is usually unnecessary, because most
of the runs on an isolated system are short.
Occasionally, difficulty occurs in X-ray circuits
since these conductors are somewhat larger.
These difficult runs can be anticipated and
provided for by using oversized conduits to ease
the situation.
Obviously, conduits must be dry or the leakage
characteristics designed into the system will
suffer. During construction, keep conduit ends
capped so they remain free from moisture. The
specifications should state that, if moisture
accidentally enters the conduits, they must be
swabbed and thoroughly dried before conductors
are pulled. Use minimum fills for conduits; this
results in a better random lay of the conductors
within the conduit, which further reduces the
capacitive coupling.
The table below shows the appro ximate expected
hazard currents per foot of power conductor,
using the various wiring schemes described in the
preceding paragraphs.The consulting engineer
can use this table to estimate the system hazard
current at the design stages. Values given are
approximate; variations in humidity, conduit
moisture content, conduit fill, and wire insulation
will give different results.
Hazard Current Leakage Contributed by
Wiring
Materials UsedResult
TW wire, metal conduit. Wire pulling compound
with ground conductor.
XLP wire, metal conduit. No wire pulling
compound with ground conductor.
3 µA per ft of wire
1 µA per ft of wire
IV. System Design
A. Operating Room Layout
Before the electrical design of an operating room
begins, some important information should be
acquired from hospital personnel. Most hospital
operating rooms have a set traffic pattern and
positioning for the operating room table. This is
usually restricted to the location of the overhead
operating room light. However, since the position
of the head of the operating room table can be
varied, the hospital personnel should advise the
electrical engineer of the table’s standard
position. The traffic pattern, along with the
positioning of the surgeon and support team,
should also be verified. The positioning of the
electrical equipment in the operating room has a
direct relationship to this information. In the
following example, we will use a configuration
shown in Figure 7 on page 18.
The panel is located behind the support team,
near the head of the operating room table. The
location of this panel is important; correct
placement will keep electrical and ground cords
out of the traffic area.
A 5 kV A isolation panel is recommended f or
operating room use. Be sure to determine the load
of secondary equipment being used; very few
cases will require a 7.5 kV A transf ormer . The 5 kV A
isolation transformer from Square D is capable of a
150% continuous overload within its maximum
designed temperature.
T en secondary circuit breakers are recommended for
the panel in this example. Each circuit breaker
should supply two power receptacles; 16 receptacles
are shown in this illustration. The table below shows
the recommended breaker-to-load schedule.
Secondary Circuit Breaker Schedule
Number of
Breakers
48 Receptacles In Panel (2 Per Breaker)
2
2
1Surgical Light
1Clocks, Film Illuminator
Load
4 Receptacles In Anesthetist’s Module
(2 Per Breaker)
4 Receptacles in Surgeon’s Module
(2 Per Breaker)
Two additional circuit breakers should be used for
the overhead operating room light, the surgical
chronometer, and film illuminator. If the optional
remote power and ground module is used, the four
receptacles in the optional module should be
served by one circuit breaker , and the four
receptacles in the surgeon’s module by another
circuit breaker.
When laying out the operating room electrical
system, the location of power and ground
receptacles is significant. Power and ground cords
can be dangerous to circulating personnel; so ,
whenever possib le, locate receptacles so cords do
not lie within the major traffic area. Since the
operating room support team uses most of the
electrical outlets, the majority of the services should
be placed behind them, near the head of the table.
Little traffic occurs between the support team and
the anesthetist. Locate a power and ground
module at the head of the table so the anesthetist
can easily connect equipment.
Locate an additional module behind the surgeon,
near the head of the table. This giv es the surgeon
easy access to power for surgical equipment.
Proper location of the receptacles on these two
panels, plus receptacles in the isolation panel,
should eliminate tripping hazards in the traffic
flow area.
There are distinct advantages to integrating
power ground receptacles into one enclosure,
rather than in individual power receptacles
scattered around the room. The single enclosure
places the receptacles at the point of usage and
provides a lower resistance ground path between
electrical appliances. Standard straight blade
receptacles, NEMA Configuration #5-20R, are
now acceptable in operating rooms.
A clock and elapsed-time indicator are required
for most operating rooms, enabling the surgeon
and anesthetist to easily see clock time and
elapsed time. It also giv es the support team easy
access to the controls. Mount the control panel for
the timer at the five foot level with the timer
mounted at the seven foot level. Some OR teams
prefer to place the control panel within reach of
the anesthetist.
Locate the film illuminator directly behind the
surgeon for easy accessibility. Place the X-ray
receptacle remote indicator behind the support
team. If the optional remote power and ground
module is used, locate it at the far end of the room;
its primary purpose is to supply power for standb y
equipment such as blood warmers and sterilizers.
Figure 7 illustrates the size of power and ground
conductors and their correct routing in a typical
operating room.
Conductive flooring is still required by code in all
flammable and mixed facilities. Conductive
flooring is not required for rooms that are
designed as nonflammable anesthetizing areas.
It is convenient to hav e several separate physical
points of grounding connected to one electrical
point. To do this, designate a central reference
ground point, most often located in the isolation
panel. F or all practical purposes, all ground points
in the room are at the same electrical potential.
Figure 8 shows a typical operating room
grounding system. The ground modules in the
operating room contain a highly conductive bus
bar equipped with a suitable number of lugs to be
used for permanent terminations.
In operating rooms or critical care areas the
portable X-ray outlets require 208V or 240V, and
will need a separate isolated distribution system
(when isolated power is being used in that room).
It is a common procedure to use a single isolated
system to supply X-ray circuits for as many as
eight operating rooms. These circuits interlock so
that only a single circuit can be energized at a
given time. The practice has been feasible
because few hospitals have more than one
portable X-ray machine, and when a hospital has
multiple units, it is likely that only one unit will be
used at a time.
The circuit is selected at a push-button station in
the panel. An “all off” mode is provided. The
isolating transformer, circuit breakers, LIM, and
control equipment are all mounted in an attractive
flush-mounted enclosure.
When the Square D X-ray panel is used, locate it
as centrally as possible in the area it will serve.
Lay out circuit feeders for minimum length, as in
the case of operating room 120V circuits.
The system provides for a remote indicator alarm
at each circuit outlet. The only indicator alarm
which is operating is the one on the energized
circuit. A green light on the remote indicator
illuminates, telling operating room personnel that
the circuit is energized and safe to use. Another
advantage to wiring remote indicator alarms is
that, if a fault occurs, the only alarm that sounds
will be in the operating room with the energized
circuit.
Be careful when connecting the ground terminal
of the X-ray receptacle to the grounding system;
the ground terminal must connect to the ground
system serving the patient who is served by the
X-ray receptacle. Connect the ground terminal of
the LIM, which monitors the X-ray panel, to the
equipment ground bus in the emergency
distribution panel serving the 120V isolated
systems within these areas. In addition, connect a
#12 AWG ground wire between the X-ray panel
and the X-ray receptacle.
C. Interlocking Methods
There have been several different methods of
controlling the interlocking system for X-ray
receptacles. The method to be used is a matter of
personal choice. Discuss the methods with the
electrical consultant, hospital administration, and
hospital radiology staff. Make the final selection
after weighing the pros and cons of each method.
At Square D, we have found that the most
generally acceptable method is the one just
discussed — a series of selector push-buttons,
located in the panel, which control the receptacle
energizing mode. If the panel is not accessible,
the push-button station can be in a separate
module, built in a conv enient location or added to
the operating room nurse’s console.
An on/off switch at each receptacle can provide
the selection mode. Energizing this switch would
automatically lock out all other receptacles. At first
glance, this system appears logical; it lets the
X-ray technician control the circuit at the X-ray
location. However, this method has not worked
well in practice. If a circuit is not shut off after it is
used, other circuits remain locked out. If a
technician cannot get power to a circuit, he may
have to search several other rooms to find the
receptacle that was left in the on position.
Generally, operating rooms are connected to
the nurse’s station through an intercom, or are
located close enough so direct verbal
communication is possible. This allows the
radiologist to ask the operating suite nurse to
energize the circuit in a particular room.
Square D supplies a variety of interlocking
type panels and schemes; do not hesitate to ask
Square D for the special system that your
hospital requires.
The surgical facility panel offers another method
of providing isolated power in an operating room.
This large panel condenses many of the electrical
accessories normally found in an operating room
into one unit.
Components normally included in the surgical
facility panel are:
• Isolation transformer
• Surgical clocks and timers
• Line isolation monitor (LIM)
• AM/FM, CD stereo system
• Audible indicator alarm
• Ground jacks
• Circuit breaker panel
• Double-size film illuminators
• Ground bus
• X-ray receptacles
• Power receptacles
• AM/FM cassette stereo system
Because all of these components are in the same
panel, location of this panel within the operating
room is critical. When specifying a surgical f acility
panel, consider which location is best for all
concerned personnel.
Surgical facility panels are custom designed and
assembled; this allows each hospital to specify
the individual components that are needed in
that hospital.
Typical Surgical Facility Panel
V. Field Test and Inspection
Because of the complexity of isolated power and
the ground system, the manufacturer should field
test the system before use. This is the only w ay to
ensure that the system is properly installed. The
services of a factory technician are available from
Square D. The f actory trained technician performs
the following on-site testing:
• All tests on the isolated system, ground
network, and LIM are in accordance with
Article 517 of the National Electrical Code and
with NFPA No. 99.
• The ground test for power and ground
receptacles is performed by applying a
constant current between the room reference
grounding bus and each ground contact of
each receptacle, measuring the resulting
voltage. The calculated resistance should be
below 0.1Ω. The potential difference between
exposed conductive surfaces in the patient
vicinity is checked; the difference cannot
exceed 20mV across a 1000Ω resistor under
normal operation.
• The LIM is tested as installed in the complete
isolated system. Combinations of resistiv e and
capacitive faults are placed on the isolated
power system. The proper response of the line
isolation monitor and its associated alarm
device(s) is observed. Corrective steps are
taken if improper operation is observed. The
completed system is retested to ensure proper
operation.
• The impedance of the isolated system
(impedance to ground of either conductor) is
tested. Impedance must exceed 200,000Ω to
conform with NFPA No. 99. The entire
installation of the isolated equipment is
inspected for conformance with applicable
codes to ensure that no code is violated.
• The technician gives a log book to the hospital
staff. The staff uses the book to record
maintenance and periodic test data. The
technician provides orientation to the system,
and its maintenance and testing. During this
orientation, the technician will answer any
questions the hospital staff has about the
system. At a later date , the hospital receiv es a
letter containing the test results.
• Use extreme caution, some of the following
procedures are performed when circuits are
energized.
• Only trained personnel should perform these
procedures.
• Use electrically insulated tools.
Failure to observe these instructions will
result in death or serious injury.
A periodic maintenance program is essential to
the safety of hospital patients and personnel. The
services of a factory technician are available from
Square D. Following a rigid maintenance program
can reduce electrical hazards significantly.
Because of the size of hospital electrical systems,
it is difficult to establish and follow a maintenance
program that includes the entire hospital.
Howev er , checking anesthetizing and critical care
areas more frequently than general patient areas
is recommended.
Isolated Power System
Before using an isolated power system, certain
tests should be conducted to verify proper
installation of the equipment and wiring. To
conduct these tests, disconnect all secondary
equipment from the secondary circuits. Conduct
these tests before patient occupation. Follow the
test procedures listed below:
LIM T est
1. Energize the isolation panel by closing the
primary circuit breaker. Leave the secondary
circuit breakers in the off position. Verify that
the LIM is operating. You should observe a
slight meter deflection, indicating the monitor
hazard current plus the hazard current for the
isolation panel.
2. Press the push-to-test button on the LIM to
ensure its test capability . Also check f or audible
and visible alarms attached to the LIM. The
alarms should operate in the safe condition and
in the alarm condition. Ensure that the alarm
will silence when the silence button is pressed.
3. Record the hazard current reading for the LIM
with only the primary circuit breaker closed.
Then close one secondary circuit breaker at a
time, recording the hazard current reading for
that circuit only. Close only one circuit breaker
at a time; otherwise, the reading cannot be
attributed to a specific circuit. If any circuit
shows an unusually high hazard current
compared to other circuits, investigate it
immediately.
4. Determine the line-to-ground impedance
between each of the power conductors and
ground. Conduct this test at any of the
receptacles; be sure that all the secondary
breakers are in the “on” position. Disconnect
the LIM from the circuit during this test. To
conduct this test, place a 0–1 milliammeter
between either line to ground and measure the
current. The value of current divided into the
system voltage determines the system
impedance. This impedance must be greater
than 200 kilohm (kΩ) for either line to ground.
For a 120V system, this compares to 600µA.
Conduct this system impedance test without
any secondary equipment connected to the
circuits. If the impedance is less than that
required by NFPA No. 99, investigate the
system and correct the problem.
5. Test the LIM to ensure the proper alarm trip
point. To perform this test, place a value of
resistance between one line and ground to act
as the fault impedance. The fault impedance
should be inserted directly into the LIM with all
secondary wiring disconnected. Use the
following equation for fault impedance:
E = System Voltage
R = Fault Impedance in Ohms
I = Alarm Trip Current-Monitor Hazard Current
at Trip Point in Amperes
E
R =
I
For a capacitive fault, use the following equation:
E = System Voltage
R = Fault Impedance as Calculated Above in
Ohms
C = Capacitance in Farads
C =
The LIM should alarm for an impedance of 10% of
this value; if it does not alarm, contact the
manufacturer.
NFPA No. 99 recommends that the following
formula be used to fault the LIM:
R = 200 X System Voltage
e.g., If a system measures 120V, the fault
impedance would be:
R = 200 X 120
= 24 K ohms
Ground T est
6. For proper continuity, test the ground system
associated with the isolated power system
before its initial use. To perform the test, inject
20A between the ground bus in the isolation
panel and the grounded points on receptacles
and ground jacks. The potential difference
measured between these two points should not
exceed 2V. If it does exceed 2V, inspect the
ground for proper connection and properly
sized wire. The 20A ground test can also verify
that all metal within the room is properly
grounded. To perform this test, attach probes
between metal surfaces and the room ground
bus; v erify the ground connection. This test can
also be conducted with an 0–0.1 ohm meter.
7. Perform periodic testing, according to this
schedule:
• Test the LIM push-to-test button monthly.
Check the associated alarms and silence
functions.
• Calculate an external fault impedance once
every six months. At this time, take LIM
readings with all circuit breakers closed and
with all circuit breakers open. This provides a
running history for the permanently installed
wired system. If these values significantly
increase, inspect the system and take
corrective action.
Medical Equipment Maintenance
The increased use of biomedical instruments
presents another maintenance responsibility.
Hospitals should establish routine programs to
test and maintain such equipment.
The maintenance program should apply to all
patient care areas; but it is of g reatest importance
for special care units where the most seriously ill
patients and the most complex equipment coexist. The amount of equipment present v aries by
hospital, affecting the complexity of the program.
However, the following items should be found in
every medical equipment testing program:
• An established procedure ensuring that
equipment serves the purpose for which it is
intended; that it is safe, reliable, and the best
choice for its purpose
• Specifications that must be adhered to by
manufacturers before lease/purchase
of equipment
• Adequate customer support from the
manufacturer, ensuring technical assistance,
repair, and consultation as needed
• Periodic inspections, calibration, and
preventive maintenance
• Immediate, thorough inspections when
equipment malfunction or shock is considered
a possibility
• Close monitoring of services provided by
outside vendors
• A logging/reporting system that provides
effective control and record keeping
• In-service training to ensure safe, effectiv e use
of medical equipment
22
Adapters and Extension Cords
The use of extension cords in patient areas and
anesthetizing locations often presents an
electrical hazard. Although extension cords offer
flexibility , the y are often abused. These cords ma y
lie in traffic areas where people step on them and
roll equipment over them. They may also lie in
pools of fluid. It is safer to install a sufficient
number of accessible receptacles than to use
extension cords.
employ their own medical engineering personnel,
share this personnel with other hospitals, or
contract with an outside vendor to service medical
equipment. Each hospital must choose the best
option for its purposes.
The size of the hospital, presence of other
hospitals in the area, and regional demographics
will help each hospital make the appropriate
decisions about testing personnel.
Leakage Current.
potential for leakage current. Periodically test
these pieces of equipment and tag the equipment,
showing leakage current readings. Equipment
that connects directly to patients should have its
patient leads checked for leakage current. Each
hospital should maintain the necessary testing
equipment to conduct these testing procedures.
All portable equipment has the
Testing Pr ograms.
medical equipment control program should
include the following factors:
• The hospital should obtain competent,
objective biomedical engineering assistants
when planning and developing the program.
• A committee must be formed, which meets for
the sole purpose of medical equipment control.
• All medical equipment must be defined and
inventoried.
• The hospital should appraise several options
for its equipment control, rather than choose
the easiest or most available program.
• The appropriate medical engineering services
must be obtained.
• The necessary test equipment must be leased/
purchased, and be kept on site.
• The hospital must develop procedures,
specifications, and additional program
components to meet its needs.
Square D Company
3300 Medalist Drive
Oshkosh, WI 54901 USA
(920) 426-1330
www.squared.com
Electrical equipment should be serviced only by qualified electrical maintenance personnel, and
this document should not be viewed as sufficient instruction for those who are not otherwise
qualified to operate, service or maintina the equipment discussed. Although reasonable care has
been taken to provide accurate and authoritative information in this document, no responsibility is
assumed by Square D for any consequences arising out of this material.