R&S®FSPN
Phase Noise Analyzer and VCO
Tester
Instrument Security Procedures
(;ÝÄ_2)
1179544702
Version 01
This document describes the types of memory and their use in the R&S®FSPN.
While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information herein, it is provided without
warranty. Design iteration and revisions may result in minor differences between the information provided
here and your product.
© 2022 Rohde & Schwarz GmbH & Co. KG
Mühldorfstr. 15, 81671 München, Germany
Phone: +49 89 41 29 - 0
Email: info@rohde-schwarz.com
Internet: www.rohde-schwarz.com
Subject to change – data without tolerance limits is not binding.
R&S® is a registered trademark of Rohde & Schwarz GmbH & Co. KG.
Trade names are trademarks of the owners.
1179.5447.02 | Version 01 | R&S®FSPN
Throughout this document, products from Rohde & Schwarz are indicated without the ® symbol , e.g. R&S®FSPN is indicated as
R&S FSPN.
R&S®FSPN
Contents
Contents
1 Overview................................................................................................. 3
2 Instrument models covered.................................................................. 4
3 Security terms and definitions..............................................................4
4 Statement of volatility............................................................................5
5 Instrument sanitization procedure....................................................... 7
6 Operability outside the secured area...................................................8
7 Validity of instrument calibration after sanitization............................9
8 Special security features.......................................................................9
Glossary................................................................................................10
Index......................................................................................................10
1 Overview
Securing important information is crucial in many applications.
Generally, highly secured environments do not allow any test equipment to leave the
area unless it can be proven that no user information leaves with the test equipment,
e.g. to be calibrated.
"Regarding sanitization, the principal concern is ensuring that data is not unintentionally released" [1].
This document provides a statement regarding the volatility of the memory types used
and specifies the steps required to sanitize an instrument.
The procedures in this document follow "NIST Special Publication 800-88: Guidelines
for Media Sanitization" [1].
In addition, recommendations are provided to safeguard information on the
R&S FSPN.
References
See the following literature for further information.
3Instrument Security Procedures 1179.5447.02 ─ 01
R&S®FSPN
Instrument models covered
[1] Kissel Richard L. [et al.] Guidelines for Media Sanitization = Special Publication (NIST SP) =
NIST SP - 800-88 Rev 1. - Gaithersburg : [s.n.], December 17, 2014.
[2] National Industrial Security Program Authorization Office Defense Security Service (DSS)
Assessment and Authorization Process Manual (DAAPM). - May 6, 2019.
[3] ACSC Australian Cyber Security Centre Australian Government Information Security Manual,
January 2020.
2 Instrument models covered
Table 2-1: R&S FSPN models
Product name Order number
R&S FSPN8 1322.8003.06
R&S FSPN26 1322.8003.24
3 Security terms and definitions
Terms defined in Guidelines for Media Sanitization
NIST Special Publication 800-88 [1]
●
Sanitization
"Media sanitization refers to a process that renders access to target data on the
media infeasible for a given level of effort."
●
Clear
"Clear applies logical techniques to sanitize data in all user-addressable storage
locations for protection against simple non-invasive data recovery techniques; typically applied through the standard Read and Write commands to the storage
device, such as by rewriting with a new value or using a menu option to reset the
device to the factory state (where rewriting is not supported)."
●
Purge
"Purge applies physical or logical techniques that render Target Data recovery
infeasible using state of the art laboratory techniques."
●
Destroy
"Destroy renders Target Data recovery infeasible using state of the art laboratory
techniques and results in the subsequent inability to use the media for storage of
data."
Control of media
Another option to secure sensitive information is to keep physical media within the
classified area, see [1], paragraph 4.4.
4Instrument Security Procedures 1179.5447.02 ─ 01
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