Redhat CERTIFICATE SYSTEM 8, SYSTEM 8 User Manual

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Red Hat Certificate

System 8

Install Guide

Ella Deon Lackey

Publication date: July 22, 2009, updated on March 25, 2010

Install Guide

Red Hat Certificate System 8 Install Guide

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About This Guide vii

1. Examples and Formatting .............................................................................................. vii

1.1. Formatting for Examples and Commands ............................................................. vii

1.2. Tool Locations .................................................................................................... vii

1.3. Guide Formatting ................................................................................................ vii

2. Additional Reading ........................................................................................................ viii

3. Giving Feedback ............................................................................................................ ix

4. Document History ............................................................................................................ x

1. Overview of Certificate System Subsystems 1

1.1. Subsystems for Managing Certificates ........................................................................... 1

1.1.1. Certificate Manager ........................................................................................... 3

1.1.2. Registration Authority ......................................................................................... 3

1.1.3. Data Recovery Manager .................................................................................... 3

1.1.4. Online Certificate Status Manager ...................................................................... 4

1.2. Subsystems for Managing Tokens ................................................................................. 4

1.2.1. Token Processing System .................................................................................. 5

1.2.2. Token Key Service ............................................................................................ 5

1.2.3. Enterprise Security Client ................................................................................... 5

1.3. Planning the Installation ................................................................................................ 6

2. Prerequisites Before Installing Certificate System 9

2.1. Supported Platforms, Hardware, and Programs .............................................................. 9

2.1.1. Supported Platforms .......................................................................................... 9

2.1.2. Supported Web Browsers .................................................................................. 9

2.1.3. Supported Smart Cards ................................................................................... 10

2.1.4. Supported HSM ............................................................................................... 10

2.1.5. Supported Charactersets .................................................................................. 10

2.2. Required Programs, Dependencies, and Configuration ................................................. 11

2.2.1. Java Development Kit (JDK) ............................................................................ 11

2.2.2. Apache ........................................................................................................... 11

2.2.3. Red Hat Directory Server ................................................................................. 12

2.2.4. Additional Packages ........................................................................................ 12

2.2.5. Firewall Configuration and iptables ................................................................... 13

2.2.6. SELinux Settings ............................................................................................. 13

2.3. Packages Installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux .......................................................... 13

2.4. Required Information for Subsystem Configuration ....................................................... 15

2.5. Setting up Tokens for Storing Certificate System Subsystem Keys and Certificates .......... 16

2.5.1. Types of Hardware Tokens ............................................................................... 16

2.5.2. Using Hardware Security Modules with Subsystems .......................................... 17

2.5.3. Viewing Tokens ............................................................................................... 21

2.5.4. Detecting Tokens ............................................................................................. 21

3. Installation and Configuration 23

3.1. Overview of Installation ............................................................................................... 23

3.2. Installing the Certificate System Packages ................................................................... 25

3.2.1. Installing through yum ...................................................................................... 25

3.2.2. Installing from an ISO Image ............................................................................ 27

3.3. Configuring a CA ........................................................................................................ 27

3.4. Configuring an RA ...................................................................................................... 36

3.5. Configuring a DRM, OCSP, or TKS ............................................................................. 43

3.6. Configuring a TPS ...................................................................................................... 50

iii

Install Guide

4. Additional Installation Options 61

4.1. Requesting Subsystem Certificates from an External CA ............................................... 61

4.2. Installing a CA with ECC Enabled ............................................................................... 64

4.2.1. Loading a Third-Party ECC Module .................................................................. 64

4.2.2. Loading the Certicom ECC Module ................................................................... 65

4.3. Changing the Hashing Algorithm Used for Subsystem Keys .......................................... 69

4.4. Enabling IPv6 for a Subsystem ................................................................................... 70

4.5. Configuring Separate RA Instances ............................................................................. 71

5. Creating Additional Subsystem Instances 75

5.1. About pkicreate .......................................................................................................... 75

5.2. Running pkicreate for a Single SSL Port ...................................................................... 77

5.3. Running pkicreate with Port Separation ....................................................................... 78

6. Cloning Subsystems 79

6.1. About Cloning ............................................................................................................ 79

6.1.1. Cloning for CAs ............................................................................................... 80

6.1.2. Cloning for DRMs ............................................................................................ 81

6.1.3. Cloning for Other Subsystems .......................................................................... 81

6.1.4. Cloning and Key Stores ................................................................................... 81

6.1.5. Cloning Considerations .................................................................................... 82

6.2. Exporting Keys from a Software Database ................................................................... 82

6.3. Cloning a CA ............................................................................................................. 82

6.4. Cloning OCSP Subsystems ........................................................................................ 85

6.5. Cloning DRM and TKS Subsystems ............................................................................ 88

6.6. Converting Masters and Clones .................................................................................. 90

6.6.1. Converting CA Clones and Masters .................................................................. 90

6.6.2. Converting OCSP Clones ................................................................................. 92

6.7. Updating CA Clones ................................................................................................... 92

7. Silent Configuration 95

7.1. About pkisilent ............................................................................................................ 95

7.2. Silently Configuring Subsystem ................................................................................... 99

7.3. Cloning a Subsystem Silently .................................................................................... 102

7.4. Performing Silent Configuration Using an External CA ................................................ 102

8. Updating and Removing Subsystem Packages 105

8.1. Updating Certificate System Packages ....................................................................... 105

8.2. Uninstalling Certificate System Subsystems ............................................................... 106

8.2.1. Removing a Subsystem Instance .................................................................... 106

8.2.2. Removing Certificate System Subsystem Packages ......................................... 107

9. Using Certificate System 109

9.1. Starting the Certificate System Console ..................................................................... 109

9.2. Starting, Stopping, and Restarting an Instance ........................................................... 109

9.3. Starting the Subsystem Automatically ........................................................................ 109

9.4. Finding the Subsystem Web Services Pages ............................................................. 111

9.5. Default File and Directory Locations for Certificate System .......................................... 114

9.5.1. Default CA Instance Information ..................................................................... 115

9.5.2. Default RA Instance Information ..................................................................... 116

9.5.3. Default DRM Instance Information .................................................................. 116

9.5.4. Default OCSP Instance Information ................................................................. 117

9.5.5. Default TKS Instance Information .................................................................... 118

9.5.6. Default TPS Instance Information .................................................................... 118

9.5.7. Shared Certificate System Subsystem File Locations ....................................... 119

Index 121

About This Guide

This guide explains how to install and configure Red Hat Certificate System subsystems, as well as covering some basic administrative tasks and advanced installation techniques. This guide also lists the supported platforms and dependencies for Red Hat Certificate System; for other information, see the Release Notes.

The Certificate System Deployment Guide explains different usage scenarios, and it is a good idea to understand the major concepts in that guide before installing the Certificate System subsystems. The Certificate System Administrator's Guide covers all of the administrative tasks of Red Hat Certificate System, such as configuring logging, setting up certificate and CRL publishing, requesting and issuing certificates, and building CRLs.

Certificate System agents should refer to the Certificate System Agent's Guide for information on performing agent tasks, such as handling certificate requests and revoking certificates. For information on using Certificate System to manage smart cards and security tokens, see Managing Smart Cards with the Enterprise Security Client.

1. Examples and Formatting

1.1. Formatting for Examples and Commands

All of the examples for Red Hat Certificate System commands, file locations, and other usage are given for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (32-bit) systems. Be certain to use the appropriate commands and files for your platform.

To start the Red Hat Certificate System:

service pki-ca start

Example 1. Example Command

1.2. Tool Locations

All of the tools for Red Hat Certificate System are located in the /usr/bin directory. These tools can be run from any location without specifying the tool location.

1.3. Guide Formatting

Certain words are represented in different fonts, styles, and weights. Different character formatting is used to indicate the function or purpose of the phrase being highlighted.

Formatting Style Purpose

Monospace font Monospace is used for commands, package names, files and

Monospace with a background

vii

About This Guide

Formatting Style Purpose

Italicized text Any text which is italicized is a variable, such as

Bolded text Most phrases which are in bold are application names, such as

Other formatting styles draw attention to important text.

NOTE

A note provides additional information that can help illustrate the behavior of the system or provide more detail for a specific issue.

IMPORTANT

Important information is necessary, but possibly unexpected, such as a configuration change that will not persist after a reboot.

WARNING

A warning indicates potential data loss, as may happen when tuning hardware for maximum performance.

2. Additional Reading

The documentation for Certificate System includes the following guides:

• Certificate System Deployment Guide1 describes basic PKI concepts and gives an overview of the planning process for setting up Certificate System.

This manual is intended for Certificate System administrators.

• Certificate System Installation Guide2 covers the installation process for all Certificate System subsystems.

This manual is intended for Certificate System administrators.

• Certificate System Administrator's Guide3 explains all administrative functions for the Certificate System. Administrators maintain the subsystems themselves, so this manual details backend configuration for certificate profiles, publishing, and issuing certificates and CRLs. It also covers managing subsystem settings like port numbers, users, and subsystem certificates.

This manual is intended for Certificate System administrators.

• Certificate System Agent's Guide4 describes how agents — users responsible for processing certificate requests and managing other aspects of certificate management — can use the Certificate System subsystems web services pages to process certificate requests, key recovery, OCSP requests and CRLs, and other functions.

viii

Giving Feedback

This manual is intended for Certificate System agents.

• Managing Smart Cards with the Enterprise Security Client5 explains how to install, configure, and use the Enterprise Security Client, the user client application for managing smart cards, user certificates, and user keys.

This manual is intended for Certificate System administrators, agents, privileged users (such as security officers), and regular end users.

• Using End User Services6 is a quick overview of the end-user services in Certificate System, a simple way for users to learn how to access Certificate System services.

This manual is intended for regular end users.

• Certificate System Command-Line Tools Guide7 covers the command-line scripts supplied with Red Hat Certificate System.

This manual is intended for Certificate System administrators.

• Certificate System Migration Guide8 covers version-specific procedures for migrating from older versions of Certificate System to Red Hat Certificate System 8.0.

This manual is intended for Certificate System administrators.

• Release Notes9 contains important information on new features, fixed bugs, known issues and workarounds, and other important deployment information for Red Hat Certificate System 8.0.

All of the latest information about Red Hat Certificate System and both current and archived documentation is available at http://www.redhat.com/docs/manuals/cert-system/.

3. Giving Feedback

If there is any error in this Installation Guide or there is any way to improve the documentation, please let us know. Bugs can be filed against the documentation for Red Hat Certificate System through Bugzilla, http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla. Make the bug report as specific as possible, so we can be more effective in correcting any issues:

• Select the Red Hat Certificate System product.

• Set the component to Doc - quick install guide.

• Set the version number to 8.0.

• For errors, give the page number (for the PDF) or URL (for the HTML), and give a succinct description of the problem, such as incorrect procedure or typo.

For enhancements, put in what information needs to be added and why.

• Give a clear title for the bug. For example, "Incorrect command example for setup script options" is better than "Bad example".

We appreciate receiving any feedback — requests for new sections, corrections, improvements, enhancements, even new ways of delivering the documentation or new styles of docs. You are welcome to contact Red Hat Content Services directly at docs@redhat.com.

About This Guide

4. Document History

Revision

8.0.10

Adding information on new end-entities client authentication port for the CA, related to the MitM resolution in Errata RHBA-2010:0169.

Revision 8.0.9 February 18, 2009 Ella Deon Lackey dlackey@redhat.com

Changing LunaSA setup, per Bugzilla 537529. Correcting the cs_port definition, per Bugzilla 533303.

Revision 8.0.8 December 21, 2009 Ella Deon Lackey dlackey@redhat.com

Updating platform support to include 64-bit Windows platforms, per Errata RHBA-2009:1687.

Revision 8.0.7 November 25, 2009 Ella Deon Lackey

Updating the pkisilent documentation and expanding the CA configuration section to add ability to specify the CA siging algorithm at installation, per Errata RHBA-2009:1602.

Revision 8.0.6 November 12, 2009 Ella Deon Lackey

Updating the Certicom ECC configuration per comment #3 in Bugzilla 507428. Correcting the 'rpm -qi' example in checking prerequisites, per QE feedback. Adding note about (no) 64-bit support for ESC.

Revision 8.0.5 November 3, 2009 Ella Deon Lackey

Adding information on setting the NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT environment variable for the console and clarifying the security database argument in the modutil step for configuring the Certicom ECC module.

Revision 8.0.4 August 28, 2009 Ella Deon Lackey

Removing the draft watermarks. Tech reviews for chapter 2 (prerequisites) and chapter 9 (basic usage), per Bugzilla #510578 and #510587.

Revision 8.0.3 August 11, 2009 Ella Deon Lackey

March 25, 2010 Ella Deon Lackey dlackey@redhat.com

Tech reviews for chapter 8, per Bugzilla #510586. Adding extra bullet point on using unique certificate nicknames for HSMs, related to Bugzilla #510987.

Revision 8.0.2 August 3, 2009 Ella Deon Lackey

Tech reviews for chapter 4, per Bugzilla #510580.

Revision 8.0.1 July 26, 2009 Ella Deon Lackey

Tech reviews for chapters 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7, per Bugzilla #510577, #510579, #510581, #510582, #510585. Adding a section for configuring netHSM to work with SELinux, per Bugzilla #513312, with cross references in the instance configuration sections.

Revision 8.0.0 July 22, 2009 Ella Deon Lackey

Initial draft for Certificate System 8.0 Installation Guide.

Chapter 1.

Overview of Certificate System Subsystems

Red Hat Certificate System is a highly configurable set of components which create and manage certificates and keys at every point of the certificate lifecycle. Certificate System is based on open standards so that it effectively creates a scalable, customizable, and robust public-key infrastructure (PKI).

Certificate System has subsystems which discretely handle different PKI management functions. These subsystems interact in flexibly established ways to manage certificates and to manage tokens.

1.1. Subsystems for Managing Certificates

Up to four Certificate System subsystems work together to manage certificates:

• Certificate Manager, a certificate authority (CA) which issues, renews, and revokes certificates and publishes certificate revocation lists (CRLs)

• Data Recovery Manager (DRM), which archives and recovers keys

• Online Certificate Status Manager (OCSP), which processes requests for certificates' revocation status

• Registration Authority (RA), which validates and approves certificate requests locally and then forwards approval to the CA to issue the certificates

Chapter 1. Overview of Certificate System Subsystems

The core of the Certificate System is the Certificate Manager. This is the only required subsystem and handles the actual certificate management tasks. The other subsystems can be added for additional functionality (the DRM) or to move the load for some common operations off of the CA, such as using an OCSP for status requests and an RA to process certificate requests.

The CA, RA, DRM, and OCSP are the subsystems used to manage certificates, keys, and CRLs, through every step of the cycle of a certificate:

1. Generating a certificate request (CA or RA)

2. Submitting the request to a CA (CA or RA)

3. Generating key pairs (CA)

4. Storing the key pairs (DRM)

5. Issuing the certificate (CA)

6. Recovering the keys if the certificate is lost (DRM)

Certificate Manager

7. Revoking the certificate (CA)

8. Checking whether the certificate is revoked or active when an entity tries to use the certificate for

authentication (OCSP)

All of the subsystems (CA, RA, DRM, and OCSP, as well as the token subsystems) are organized together in security domains. Security domains define communication between subsystems, and this makes the Certificate System very efficient. For example, if a user needs to archive keys, the request can be processed by the first available DRM in the domain, automatically. The available DRMs in the domain are automatically updated every time a new DRM is configured.

1.1.1. Certificate Manager

The Certificate Manager subsystem is a certificate authority. It issues, renews, revokes, and publishes a wide variety of certificates: for servers, for users, for routers, for other subsystems, and for file or object signing. The Certificate Manager also compiles and publishes CRLs.

Certificate Managers can be structured in series (hierarchy), so that one Certificate Manager sets policies and issues signing certificates to a subordinate CA. The highest Certificate Manager in the chain is a root CA.

A special kind of certificate is used by CAs to sign certificates they issue, sort of like a stamp or seal. This is called a CA signing certificate. A subordinate CA is issued a CA signing certificate by a CA higher in the hierarchy, and the parameters of the CA signing certificate are set by the superior CA. A CA which issues its own signing certificate has a self-signed certificate. There are benefits to having a self-signed CA certificate for your root CA, as well as some benefits to having the certificate signed by a third-party CA.

Additionally, a Certificate Manager is always the subsystem which works as the registry for the security domain. The very first Certificate Manager configured must create a security domain, but every Certificate Manager configured after has the option of joining an existing security domain rather than creating a new one. The configuration of your PKI deployment determines whether you need multiple security domains; for more information, see the Red Hat Certificate System Deployment Guide.

1.1.2. Registration Authority

The Registration Authority subsystem handles certain certificate issuing tasks locally, such as generating and submitting certificate requests. This effectively makes the RA a load-balancer for the CA; a local RA can receive and verify the legitimacy of a certificate request (authenticate it) and then forward valid requests to the CA to issue the certificate. Certificates can also be retrieved through the RA and the status of the request can be checked through the RA, both of which lower demand on the CA.

The RA is normally set up outside of the firewall, and the CA is set up behind the firewall so that requests can be submitted to Certificate System externally, while the CA is protected.

The RA accepts requests for a smaller number of certificate types than the CA, including user, server, and router certificates.

1.1.3. Data Recovery Manager

The Data Recovery Manager (DRM) is a key recovery authority, which means it works with the Certificate Manager when a certificate is issued and stores private encryption keys. Those private keys can be restored (in a PKCS #12 file) if a certificate is lost.

Chapter 1. Overview of Certificate System Subsystems

NOTE

The DRM only archives encryption keys, not signing keys, because that compromises the non-repudiation properties of signing keys. Non-repudiation means that a user cannot deny having performed some action, such as sending an encrypted email, because they are the only possessor of that key.

1.1.4. Online Certificate Status Manager

The Online Certificate Status Manager is an OCSP service, external to the Certificate Manager. Although the Certificate Manager is configured initially with an internal OCSP service, an external OCSP responder allows the OCSP subsystem to be outside the firewall and accessible externally, while keeping the Certificate Manager behind the firewall. Like the RA, the OCSP acts as a loadbalancer for requests to the Certificate Manager.

The Online Certificate Status Manager verifies the status of a certificate by checking a certificate revocation list, published by the Certificate Manager, to see if the specified certificate has been revoked. More than one Certificate Manager can publish CRLs to a single OCSP.

1.2. Subsystems for Managing Tokens

Two subsystems are required to manage tokens:

• Token Processing System (TPS), which accepts operations from a token and forwards them to the CA (for processing certificate requests, renewal, issuing, and revocation) and to the DRM (to archive or restore keys)

• Token Key Service (TKS), which generates master keys and symmetric keys for the TPS to use when communicating with other subsystems

A third application, the Enterprise Security Client, is the interface between the user and the TPS.

Token Processing System

1.2.1. Token Processing System

The Token Processing System (TPS) is the conduit between the user-centered Enterprise Security Client, which interacts with the tokens, and the Certificate System backend subsystems, such as the Certificate Manager. The TPS is required in order to manage smart cards.

The TPS communicates with the CA and DRM for processing token operations. The TPS also communicates with the TKS to derive token-specific secret keys.

1.2.2. Token Key Service

The Token Key Service (TKS) uses a master key to derive specific, separate keys for every smart card. The TPS uses these secret keys to communicate with each smart card securely, since all communication between the TPS and the smart card is encrypted.

The only Certificate System subsystem which the TKS interacts with is the TPS.

1.2.3. Enterprise Security Client

The Enterprise Security Client is not a subsystem since it does not perform any operations with certificates, keys, or tokens. The Enterprise Security Client, as the name implies, is a user interface which allows people to manage certificates on smart cards very easily. The Enterprise Security Client sends all token operations, such as certificate requests, to the TPS, which then sends them to the CA.

Chapter 1. Overview of Certificate System Subsystems

1.3. Planning the Installation

Before beginning to install and configure the Certificate System subsystems, determine what the organization of the PKI is.

Q: What types of subsystems do you need to install?

A: This depends on the kind of functionality you need and the load you expect to have. There

are several different kinds of subsystems for managing certificates (Section 1.1, “Subsystems

for Managing Certificates”) and for managing tokens (Section 1.2, “Subsystems for Managing Tokens”).

Q: How many subsystems do you need to install?

A: This depends very much on the expected load and also on geographical or departmental

divisions. Subsystems can be cloned, meaning they essentially are clustered, operating as a single unit, which is good for load balancing and high availability. Additionally, security domains create trusted relationships between subsystems, allowing them to work together to find available subsystems to respond to immediate needs. Multiple security domains can be used in a single PKI, with multiple instances of any kind of subsystem.

Q: Will the subsystem certificates and keys be stored on the internal software token in

Certificate System or on an external hardware token?

A: Certificate System supports two hardware security modules (HSM): nCipher netHSM 2000 and

Safenet LunaSA. Using a hardware token can require additional setup and configuration before installing the subsystems, but it also adds another layer of security.

Q: What machines should the subsystem be installed on?

A: This depends on the network design. The RA and OCSP subsystems are specifically designed

to operate outside a firewall for user convenience, while the CA, DRM, and TPS should all be secured behind a firewall.

Q: To what security domain should a subsystem instance be added?

A: Because the subsystems within a security domain have trusted relationships with each other, it is

important what domain a subsystem joins. Security domains can have different certificate issuing policies, different kinds of subsystems within them, or a different Directory Server database. Map out where (both on the physical machine and in relation to each other) each subsystem belongs, and assign it to the security domain accordingly.

Q: Should a subsystem be cloned?

A: Cloned subsystems work together, essentially as a single instance. This can be good for high

demand systems, failover, or load balancing, but it can become difficult to maintain. For example, cloned CAs have serial number ranges for the certificates they issue, and a clone could hit the end of its range.

Q: Should the Certificate Manager be a self-signed root CA or a subordinate CA?

Planning the Installation

A: A Certificate Manager can be configured as either a root CA or a subordinate CA. The difference

between a root CA and a subordinate CA is who signs the CA signing certificate. A root CA signs its own certificate. A subordinate CA has another CA (either internal or external) sign its certificate.

A self-signing root CA issues and signs its own CA signing certificate. This allows the CA to set its own configuration rules, like validity periods and the number of allowed subordinate CAs.

A subordinate CA has its certificates issued by a public CA or another Certificate System root CA. This CA is subordinate to the other CA's rules about its certificate settings and how the certificate can be used, such as the kinds of certificates that it can issue, the extensions that it is allowed to include in certificates, and the levels of subordinate CAs the subordinate CA can create.

One option is to have the Certificate manager subordinate to a public CA. This can be very restrictive, since it introduces the restrictions that public CAs place on the kinds of certificates the subordinate CA can issue and the nature of the certificate chain. On the other hand, one benefit of chaining to a public CA is that the third party is responsible for submitting the root CA certificate to a web browser or other client software, which is a major advantage for certificates that are accessed by different companies with browsers that cannot be controlled by the administrator.

The other option is make the CA subordinate to a Certificate System CA. Setting up a Certificate System CA as the root CA means that the Certificate System administrator has control over all subordinate CAs by setting policies that control the contents of the CA signing certificates issued.

It is easiest to make the first CA installed a self-signed root, so that it is not necessary to apply to a third party and wait for the certificate to be issued. Make sure that you determine how many root CAs to have and where both root and subordinate CAs will be located.

Chapter 2.

Prerequisites Before Installing Certificate System

Before installing the Red Hat Certificate System subsystems, check out the requirements and dependencies for the specific platform, as well as looking at the installed packages.

2.1. Supported Platforms, Hardware, and Programs

2.1.1. Supported Platforms

The Certificate System subsystems (CA, RA, DRM, OCSP, TKS, and TPS) are supported on the following platforms:

• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (x86, 32-bit)

• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (x86_64, 64-bit)

The Enterprise Security Client, which manages smart cards for end users, is supported on the following platforms:

• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (x86, 32-bit)

• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 (x86_64, 64-bit)

• Microsoft Windows Vista 32-bit

• Microsoft Windows Vista 64-bit

• Microsoft Windows XP 32-bit

• Microsoft Windows XP 64-bit

2.1.2. Supported Web Browsers

The services pages for the subsystems require a web browser that supports SSL. It is strongly recommended that users such as agents or administrators use Mozilla Firefox to access the agent services pages. Regular users should use Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft Internet Explorer.

NOTE

The only browser that is fully-supported for the HTML-based instance configuration wizard is Mozilla Firefox.

Platform Agent Services End User Pages

Red Hat Enterprise Linux Firefox 3.x Firefox 3.x

Windows Vista Firefox 2.x Firefox 2.x

Internet Explorer 7 and higher

Windows XP Firefox 2.x Firefox 2.x

Chapter 2. Prerequisites Before Installing Certificate System

Platform Agent Services End User Pages

Internet Explorer 6 and higher

Mac OS 10.x Agent services are not

supported for Mac

Table 2.1. Supported Web Browsers by Platform

Firefox 2.x

2.1.3. Supported Smart Cards

The Enterprise Security Client supports Global Platform 2.01-compliant smart cards and JavaCard 2.1 or higher.

The Certificate System subsystems have been tested using the following tokens:

• Gemalto TOP IM FIPS CY2 64K token, both as a smart card and GemPCKey USB form factor key

• Gemalto Cyberflex e-gate 32K token

• Safenet 330J Java smart card

Smart card testing was conducted using the SCM SCR331 CCID reader.

The only card manager applet supported with Certificate System is the CoolKey applet which ships with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3.

2.1.4. Supported HSM

Red Hat Certificate System supports two hardware security modules (HSM), nCipher netHSM 2000 and Chrysalis-IT LunaSA.

HSM Firmware Appliance Software Client Software

Safenet Chrysalis-ITS LunaSA

nCipher netHSM 2000 2.33.60 11.10

4.5.2 3.2.4 3.2.4

2.1.5. Supported Charactersets

Red Hat Certificate System fully supports UTF-8 characters in the CA end users forms for specific fields. This means that end users can submit certificate requests with UTF-8 characters in those fields and can search for and retrieve certificates and CRLs in the CA and retrieve keys in the DRM when using those field values as the search parameters.

Four fields fully-support UTF-8 characters:

• Common name (used in the subject name of the certificate)

• Organizational unit (used in the subject name of the certificate)

• Requester name

• Additional notes (comments appended by the agent to the certificate)

Required Programs, Dependencies, and Configuration

NOTE

This support does not include supporting internationalized domain names, like in email addresses.

2.2. Required Programs, Dependencies, and Configuration

To install any Red Hat Certificate System subsystems on Red Hat Enterprise Linux, three programs are required: OpenJDK, Apache or Tomcat (depending on the subsystem), and Red Hat Directory Server. All other require packages should be present as part of the base Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system packages.

2.2.1. Java Development Kit (JDK)

Certificate System requires OpenJDK 1.6.0. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux systems, this must be installed separately. The OpenJDK can be installed by using yum or by downloading the packages directly from http://openjdk.java.net/install/. For example:

yum install java-1.6.0-openjdk

After installing the JDK, run /usr/sbin/alternatives as root to insure that the proper JDK is available:

/usr/sbin/alternatives --config java

There are 3 programs which provide 'java'.

Selection Command

---------------------------------------------- 1 /usr/lib/jvm/jre-1.4.2-gcj/bin/java 2 /usr/lib/jvm/jre-1.6.0-openjdk/bin/java *+ 3 /usr/lib/jvm/jre-1.6.0-sun.x86_64/bin/java

See http://kbase.redhat.com/faq/FAQ_54_4667.shtm for more information on using the JDK for Red Hat Certificate System.

2.2.2. Apache

Apache 2.x must be installed in order to install the TPS subsystem. Check that the appropriate version of Apache is installed.

yum info httpd Installed Packages Name : httpd Arch : x86_64 Version: 2.2.3 Release: 22.el5_3.2 Size : 2.9 M Repo : installed ...

Install Apache if it is not already available. For example:

Chapter 2. Prerequisites Before Installing Certificate System

yum install httpd

2.2.3. Red Hat Directory Server

All subsystems require access to Red Hat Directory Server 8.1 on the local machine or a remote machine. This Directory Server instance is used by the subsystems to store their system certificates and user data.

The Directory Server used by the Certificate System subsystems can be installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 32-bit, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.3 64-bit, or Solaris 9 Sparc 64-bit, regardless of the system on which Red Hat Certificate System is installed.

Check that the Red Hat Directory Server is already installed. For example:

yum info redhat-ds Installed Packages Name : redhat-ds Arch : x86_64 Version : 8.1.0 Release : 0.14el5dsrv Size : 136M Repo : installed ...

Install and configure Red Hat Directory Server 8.1, if a directory service is not already available. For example:

yum install redhat-ds

setup-ds-admin.pl

Go through the configuration wizard; the default settings are fine for the Certificate System needs.

Installing Red Hat Directory Server is described in more detail in the Red Hat Directory Server Installation Guide.

2.2.4. Additional Packages

The following package groups and packages must be installed on all Red Hat Enterprise Linux systems:

• gnome-desktop (package group)

• compat-arch-support (package group)

• web-server (package group)

• kernel-smp (package)

• e2fsprogs (package)

• firefox (package)

To verify that the packages are installed, just run rpm -qi For example:

rpm -qi gnome-desktop

Firewall Configuration and iptables

gnome-desktop-2.16.0-1.el5

On 64-bit Red Hat Enterprise Linux platforms, be certain that the 64-bit (x86_64) compat-libstdc ++ libraries are installed, and not only the 32-bit (i386) libraries. To confirm this, run the following as root:

rpm -qi compat-libstdc++ --queryformat '%{NAME}-%{VERSION}-%{RELEASE}.%{ARCH}.rpm\n' | grep x86_64

Numerous libraries should be displayed.

2.2.5. Firewall Configuration and iptables

Any firewalls must be configured to allow access to the Certificate System ports and to any other applications, like Red Hat Directory Server, which are required for the operation of the subsystems. Use caution when configuring the firewall, so that the system remains secure. The port numbers for the default instances are listed in Section 9.5, “Default File and Directory Locations for Certificate

System”.

As part of configuring the firewalls, if iptables is enabled, then it must have configured policies to allow communication over the appropriate Certificate System ports. Configuring iptables is described in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Deployment Guide, such as "Using iptables."1 Installing the subsystems will fail unless iptables is turned on and properly configured.

2.2.6. SELinux Settings

SELinux policies for Certificate System subsystems are installed as a dependency for Certificate System 8.0, in the pki-selinux package. The SELinux policies are automatically configured whenever a new instance is created by the pkicreate command.

Red Hat recommends running Certificate System with SELinux in enforcing mode, to make the most of the security policies.

If SELinux is set to enforcing, then any external modules or hardware which interact with the subsystems must be configured with the proper SELinux settings to proceed with subsystem installation:

• Third-party modules, such as for ECC or HSM, must have an SELinux policy configured for them, or

SELinux needs to be changed from enforcing mode to permissive mode to allow the module to function. Otherwise, any subsystem operations which require the ECC module will fail.

Changing SELinux policies is covered in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Deployment Guide, such as

chapter 46, "Customizing SELinux Policy2."

• SELinux policies must be set for any nCipher netHSM 2000 modules, as described in

Section 2.5.2.4, “Setting up SELinux on nCiper netHSM 2000”.

2.3. Packages Installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux

Multiple packages are installed with the Certificate System, in addition to the core Certificate System components.

http://www.redhat.com/docs/en-US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/5.2/html/Deployment_Guide/s1-fireall-ipt-act.html

Chapter 2. Prerequisites Before Installing Certificate System

RPMs for Certificate System Subsystems and Components

osutil pki-kra pki-tks

pki-setup pki-tps

pki-ca pki-migrate

pki-common pki-native-tools symkey

pki-console pki-ocsp

pki-java-tools

RPMs for Tomcat Web Services

ant jakarta-commons-discovery jakarta-oro

avalon-framework jakarta-commons-el regexp

avalon-logkit jakarta-commons-fileupload tomcat5

axis jakarta-commons-httpclient tomcat5-common

bcel jakarta-commons-launcher tomcat5-jasper

classpathx-jaf jakarta-commons-logging tomcat5-server

classpathx-mail jakarta-commons-modeler velocity

eclipse-ecj jakarta-commons-pool werken.xpath

geronimo-specs jdom wsdl4j

xalan-j2

geronimo-specs-compat jakarta-commons-beanutils xerces-j2

jakarta-commons-collections ldapjdk xml-commons

jakarta-commons-daemon log4j xml-commons-apis

jakarta-commons-dbcp mx4j xml-commons-resolver

jakarta-commons-digester

RPMs for Apache Web Services

mod_perl perl-XML-NamespaceSupport

pcre-devel perl-XML-Parser

perl-XML-SAX perl-Parse-RecDescent

tcl perl-XML-Simple

tcl-devel

RPMs for LDAP Support

cyrus-sasl mozldap-devel mozldap-tools

RPMs for SQL Lite Support for the RA

perl-DBD-SQLite perl-DBI sqlite-devel

RPMs for NSS and NSPR

jss

Required Information for Subsystem Configuration

RPMs for NSS and NSPR

nspr

nss

svrcore

2.4. Required Information for Subsystem Configuration

When the Certificate System subsystems are configured, some outside information must be available, as listed in Table 2.2, “Required Information for Configuring Subsystems”.

Information Description

preop.pin parameter in the CS.cfg file in the instance conf/ directory. This is used to log into the configuration wizard.

Security domain information CAs can create a new security domain, which

requires a unique name and a username and password for the CA agent who administers the domain. All other subsystems must join an existing security name. Have the username and password of the CA agent who administers the domain.

CA information If the subsystem is not a CA, then it is necessary

to select a CA from a drop-down menu or add an external CA. If a Certificate System CA is selected, then supply the CA agent username and password.

Subsystem information (for TPS configuration) When installing a TPS, you must have already

configured the other subsystem and have their bind information available:

The CA The TKS (required) The DRM (optional, for server-side key generation)

When configuring the TPS, the TKS and DRM to connect with the TPS are selected from a dropdown list of all subsystems within the security domain.

Directory Server hostname and port number The Certificate System uses the user database

of the Directory Server to store its information, and the hostname and port number of the LDAP directory is required for the Certificate System to access the database.

Directory Manager DN and password The Certificate System must be able to bind to

the user database, so a user ID and password must be supplied to bind to the Directory Server. This user is normally the Directory Manager. The

Chapter 2. Prerequisites Before Installing Certificate System

Information Description

default Directory Manager DN is cn=Directory Manager.

Certificate and key recovery files (for cloning) If the subsystem being configured is a clone of

another subsystem, then the backup files for the master subsystem must be locally accessible.

Table 2.2. Required Information for Configuring Subsystems

2.5. Setting up Tokens for Storing Certificate System

Subsystem Keys and Certificates

A subsystem instance generates and stores its key information in a key store, called a token. A subsystem instance can be configured for the keys to be generated and stored using the internal NSS token or on a separate cryptographic device, a hardware token.

2.5.1. Types of Hardware Tokens

A token is a hardware or software device that performs cryptographic functions and stores public-key certificates, cryptographic keys, and other data. The Certificate System defines two types of tokens, internal and external, for storing key pairs and certificates that belong to the Certificate System subsystems.

2.5.1.1. Internal Tokens

An internal (software) token is a pair of files, usually called the certificate database and key database, that the Certificate System uses to generate and store its key pairs and certificates. The Certificate System automatically generates these files in the filesystem of its host machine when first using the internal token. These files were created during the Certificate System subsystem configuration if the internal token was selected for key-pair generation.

In the Certificate System, the certificate database is named cert8.db; the key database is named key3.db. These files are located in the instanceID/alias directory.

2.5.1.2. External Tokens

An external token refers to an external hardware device, such as a smart card or hardware security module (HSM), that the Certificate System uses to generate and store its key pairs and certificates. The Certificate System supports any hardware tokens that are compliant with PKCS #11.

PKCS #11 is a standard set of APIs and shared libraries which isolate an application from the details of the cryptographic device. This enables the application to provide a unified interface for PKCS #11compliant cryptographic devices.

The PKCS #11 module implemented in the Certificate System supports cryptographic devices supplied by many different manufacturers. This module allows the Certificate System to plug in shared libraries supplied by manufacturers of external encryption devices and use them for generating and storing keys and certificates for the Certificate System managers.

Consider using external tokens for generating and storing the key pairs and certificates used by Certificate System. These devices are another security measure to safeguard private keys because hardware tokens are sometimes considered more secure than software tokens.

Using Hardware Security Modules with Subsystems

Before using external tokens, plan how the external token is going to be used with the subsystem:

• All system keys for a subsystem must be generated on the same token.

• The subsystem keys must be installed in an empty HSM slot. If the HSM slot has previously been used to store other keys, then use the HSM vendor's utilities to delete the contents of the slot. The Certificate System has to be able to create certificates and keys on the slot with default nicknames. If not properly cleaned up, the names of these objects may collide with previous instances.

• A single HSM can be used to store certificates and keys for mulitple subsystem instances, which may be installed on multiple hosts. When an HSM is used, any certificate nickname for a subsystem must be unique for every subsystem instance managed on the HSM.

2.5.1.3. Hardware Cryptographic Accelerators

The Certificate System can use hardware cryptographic accelerators with external tokens. Many of the accelerators provide the following security features:

• Fast SSL connections. Speed is important to accommodate a high number of simultaneous enrollment or service requests.

• Hardware protection of private keys. These devices behave like smart cards by not allowing private keys to be copied or removed from the hardware token. This is important as a precaution against key theft from an active attack of an online Certificate Manager.

2.5.2. Using Hardware Security Modules with Subsystems

The Certificate System supports the nCipher netHSM hardware security module (HSM) by default. Certificate System-supported HSMs are automatically added to the secmod.db database with modutil during the pre-configuration stage of the installation, if the PKCS #11 library modules are in the default installation paths.

During configuration, the Key Store panel displays the supported modules, along with the NSS internal software PKCS #11 module. All supported modules that are detected show a status of Found and is individually marked as either Logged in or Not logged in. If a token is found but not logged in, it is possible to log in using the Login under Operations. If the administrator can log into a token successfully, the password is stored in a configuration file. At the next start or restart of the Certificate System instance, the passwords in the password store are used to attempt a login for each corresponding token.

Administrators are allowed to select any of the tokens that are logged in as the default token, which is used to generate system keys.

2.5.2.1. Adding or Managing the HSM Entry for a Subsystem

When an HSM is selected as the default token, the following parameters are set in instance's CS.cfg file to configure the HSM:

#RHCS supported modules preop.configModules.module0.commonName=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module preop.configModules.module0.imagePath=../img/mozilla.png preop.configModules.module0.userFriendlyName=NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module preop.configModules.module1.commonName=nfast preop.configModules.module1.imagePath=../img/ncipher.png

Chapter 2. Prerequisites Before Installing Certificate System

preop.configModules.module1.userFriendlyName=nCipher's nFast Token Hardware Module preop.configModules.module2.commonName=lunasa preop.configModules.module2.imagePath=../img/safenet.png preop.configModules.module2.userFriendlyName=SafeNet's LunaSA Token Hardware Module #selected token preop.module.token=Internal Key Storage Token

In addition, the following parameter is set in the password.conf for the HSM password:

hardware-nethsm=caPassword

2.5.2.2. Using Chrysalis LunaSA HSM

To make sure that a LunaSA HSM works with Certificate System, edit the configuration files for the HSM before configuring the subsystems:

1. Check that the LunaSA module has been properly installed:

modutil -dbdir /var/lib/subsystem_name/alias -list

Listing of PKCS #11 Modules

-----------------------------------------------------------

1. NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module slots: 2 slots attached status: loaded

slot: NSS Internal Cryptographic Services token: NSS Generic Crypto Services

slot: NSS User Private Key and Certificate Services token: NSS Certificate DB

2. lunasa library name: /usr/lunasa/lib/libCryptoki2_64.so slots: 1 slot attached status: loaded

slot: LunaNet Slot token: lunasa3-ca

If the LunaSA module isn't listed, then install the module manually:

a. Stop the subsystem.

service subsystem_name stop

b. Load the module.

modutil -dbdir /var/lib/subsystem_name/alias -nocertdb -add lunasa -libfile /usr/ lunasa/lib/libCryptoki2_64.so

c. Verify that the module has been loaded.

modutil -dbdir /var/lib/subsystem_name/alias -list

d. Start the subsystem.

Using Hardware Security Modules with Subsystems

service subsystem_name start

2. Open the /etc/Chrystoki.conf configuration file.

3. Add this configuration parameter.

Misc { NetscapeCustomize=1023; }

4. If they are there, remove these two configuration lines for the applet version.

AppIdMajor=2; AppIdMinor=4;

Then, after going through the subsystem configuration, but before restarting the server when completing the configuration wizard, edit the subsystem configuration to recognize the token:

1. Stop the server.

service subsystem_name stop

2. Edit the instance's serverCertNick.conf file in the /var/lib/subsystem_name/conf

directory. Add the HSM token name to the serverCert parameter.

The original value only points to the server:

Server-Cert instanceID

The new value includes a reference to the LunaSA HSM:

lunasa3-ca:Server-Cert instanceID"

3. Start the server.

service subsystem_name start

2.5.2.3. Installing External Tokens and Unsupported HSM

To use HSMs which are not officially supported by the Certificate System, add the module to the subsystem database manually. If the desired HSM does not appear in the Security Modules panel during the subsystem configuration, check that the HSM is installed and activated correctly. Then run modutil manually to add the module to the secmod.db database.

1. Install the cryptographic device, using the manufacturer's instructions. Be sure to name the token

something that will help identify it easily later.

2. Install the PKCS #11 module using the modutil command-line utility.

a. Open the alias directory for the subsystem which is being configured with the PKCS #11

module. For example:

Chapter 2. Prerequisites Before Installing Certificate System

cd /var/lib/pki-ca/alias

b. The required security module database file, secmod.db, should be created by default when

the subsystem is created. If it does not exist, use the modutil utility to create secmod.db.

modutil -dbdir . -nocertdb -create

c. Use the modutil utility to set the library information.

modutil -dbdir . -nocertdb / -add module_name -libfile library_file

library_file specifies the path to the library file containing the PKCS #11 interface module and module_name gives the name of the PKCS #11 module which was set when the drivers were

installed.

• For the LunaSA HSM:

modutil -dbdir . -nocertdb -add lunasa -libfile /usr/lunasa/lib/libCryptoki2.so

• For an nCipher HSM:

modutil -dbdir . -nocertdb -add nethsm -libfile /opt/nfast/toolkits/pkcs11/ libcknfast.so

2.5.2.4. Setting up SELinux on nCiper netHSM 2000

SELinux policies are created and configured automatically for all Certificate System instances, so Certificate System can run with SELinux in enforcing or permissive modes.

If SELinux is in enforcing mode, than any hardware tokens to be used with the Certificate System instances must also be configured to run with SELinux in enforcing mode, or the HSM will not be available during subsystem installation.

IMPORTANT

SELinux must be configured for the HSM before installing any Certificate System instances.

1. Install the SELinux packages for Certificate System.

yum install pki-selinux

2. Reset the context of files in /dev/nfast to match the newly-installed policy.

/sbin/restorecon -R /dev/nfast

3. Restart the netHSM software.

Viewing Tokens

2.5.3. Viewing Tokens

To view a list of the tokens currently installed for a Certificate System instance, use the modutil utility.

1. Open the instance alias directory. For example:

cd /var/lib/pki-ca/alias

2. Show the information about the installed PKCS #11 modules installed as well as information on

the corresponding tokens using the modutil tool.

modutil -dbdir . -nocertdb -list

2.5.4. Detecting Tokens

To see if a token can be detected by Certificate System, use the TokenInfo utility. This is a Certificate System tool which is available after the Certificate System packages are installed.

TokenInfo

This utility will return all tokens which can be detected by the Certificate System, not only tokens which are installed in the Certificate System.

Chapter 3.

Installation and Configuration

The Certificate System is comprised of subsystems which can be independently installed on different servers, multiple instances installed on a single server, and other flexible configurations for availability, scalability, and failover support. The procedures for downloading, installing, and configuring instances of Certificate System subsystems are described in this chapter.

The Certificate System servers include six subsystems:

• Certificate Authority (CA)

• Registration Authority (RA)

• Data Recovery Manager (DRM), sometimes referred to as a Key Recovery Authority (KRA)

• Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Responder

• Token Key Service (TKS)

• Token Processing System (TPS)

The Certificate System client is the Enterprise Security Client. For information about the Enterprise Security Client, see the Certificate System Enterprise Security Client Guide.

3.1. Overview of Installation

The individual subsystems for Red Hat Certificate System are installed and then configured individually. The initial installation is done using package management tools such as RPM; the subsystem setup is done through an HTML-based configuration wizard.

1. Install a Red Hat Directory Server. This can be on a different machine from the Certificate System,

which is the recommended scenario for most deployments.

2. Download the Certificate System packages from the Red Hat Network channel. Each subsystem

has its own packages, as well as dependencies and related packages. These are listed in

Section 2.3, “Packages Installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux”.

3. Install the packages, as described in Section 3.2, “Installing the Certificate System Packages”.

By default, the installation process immediately launches pkicreate to create the default instances as soon as the subsystem packages are installed. The default instances are configured with the default settings listed in Section 9.5, “Default File and Directory Locations for Certificate

System”. It is also possible to prevent the pkicreate command from running so that you can

configure an instance with custom settings, which is described in Chapter 5, Creating Additional

Subsystem Instances.

4. Configure the Certificate System CA subsystem. At least one CA subsystem must be installed and

fully configured before any other type of subsystem can be configured.

See Section 3.3, “Configuring a CA” for instructions on setting up the Certificate Manager.

5. Configure the RA, OCSP, DRM, and TKS subsystems. Once the CA is installed, the other

subsystems, except for the TPS, can be installed and configured in any order.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

See Section 3.5, “Configuring a DRM, OCSP, or TKS” and Section 3.4, “Configuring an RA” for the process on installing and configuring the OCSP, DRM, TKS, and RA subsystems.

6. Configure the TPS subsystem. The TPS requires having an existing TKS and DRM available when it is configured, so this is the last subsystem to set up.

See Section 3.6, “Configuring a TPS” for the process on installing and configuring the TPS.

The order in which subsystems are configured is very important because of the basic relationships which are established between subsystems at the time they are installed. For example, every subsystem depends on a certificate authority; the TPS also depends on a TKS and (optionally) DRM.

Figure 3.1. Order of Subsystem Configuration

Installing the Certificate System Packages

3.2. Installing the Certificate System Packages

There are two ways to obtain and install the subsystem packages. For all supported platforms, the Certificate System packages can be downloaded as ISO images through the appropriate Red Hat Network channel. These packages are then installed through a package utility, such as rpm.

Alternatively, if the appropriate network access is available, the subsystems and dependencies can be downloaded and installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux systems using the yum command.

Several packages are installed with the Certificate System packages for related applications and dependencies, not only for the subsystems. These packages are listed in Section 2.3, “Packages

Installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux”.

• Section 3.2.1, “Installing through yum”

• Section 3.2.2, “Installing from an ISO Image”

NOTE

When the first subsystem is installed on a machine, the installation process automatically creates a new user (pkiuser) and group (pkiuser). All default Certificate System instances run as this user and group.

3.2.1. Installing through yum

NOTE

pkicreate is launched by the installer to create the default instances, using default settings. There is an environment variable, DONT_RUN_PKICREATE, which stops the pkicreate script from running automatically after the subsystems are installed.

Setting DONT_RUN_PKICREATE allows the default instances to be installed in userdefined installation directories, instead of the default locations in /var/lib. It can be preferable to install through the ISO image with this environment variable set to block the pkicreate script for deployments where the default instances must be installed in custom locations.

NOTE

To use an IPv6 hostname for configuration, set the hostname in the PKI_HOSTNAME environment variable before installing the packages. This is described in Section 4.4,

“Enabling IPv6 for a Subsystem”.

To install the initial subsystems on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (32-bit), run a command like the following for each subsystem:

yum install pki-subsystem

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

NOTE

yum is used only for the first subsystem instance; any additional subsystem instances are added using pkicreate.

subsystem can be any of the Certificate System subsystems:

• ca for the Certificate Manager.

• ra for the Registration Authority.

• kra for the Data Recovery Manager.

• ocsp for the Online Certificate Status Protocol Responder.

• tks for the Token Key System.

• tps for the Token Processing System.

• console for the Java console.

Once the packages are installed, then the installer automatically launches the pkicreate script to create the default subsystem instance automatically. A URL to access the new instance is printed to the screen which gives the subsystem instances hostname, port, and a login PIN to access the configuration wizard.

PKI instance creation Utility ...

PKI instance creation completed ...

Starting instance_name: [ OK ]

instance_name (pid 17990) is running ...

'instance_name' must still be CONFIGURED! (see /var/log/instance_name-install.log)

Before proceeding with the configuration, make sure the firewall settings of this machine permit proper access to this subsystem.

Please start the configuration by accessing:

https://hostname.domainname:admin-port/subsystem_type/admin/console/config/login?pin=pin

After configuration, the server can be operated by the command:

/sbin/service instance_name start | stop | restart

To install the pkiconsole to administer the subsystems, run the following:

yum install pki-console

Installing from an ISO Image

3.2.2. Installing from an ISO Image

Red Hat Certificate System 8.0 can also be downloaded from Red Hat Network as an ISO image. This ISO image contains an RPMS/ directory which can be used as a local yum repository.

1. Open the Red Hat Certificate System 8.0 Red Hat Network channel and download the ISO image.

2. Place that RPMS/ directory on a web server and then configure yum to use that location as a repository.

3. Install Certificate System as described in Section 3.2.1, “Installing through yum”, including setting any environment variables, HSMs, or IPv6 settings.

3.3. Configuring a CA

The CA is always the first subsystem to be configured; every other subsystem depends on the CA for its configuration. The CA, along with setting up the CA hierarchy for the PKI, issues certificates which every subsystem uses to function and sets up a security domain which establishes trusted relationships between subsystems.

NOTE

If a CA has an ECC signing certificate, it can issue both RSA and ECC client certificates. To enable ECC for the CA, load an ECC module first (described in Section 4.2, “Installing

a CA with ECC Enabled”) and then configure the CA.

Subsystem configuration is done by accessing a unique web-based configuration page for the instance. The only supported web browser for subsystem configuration is Mozilla Firefox.

1. Install the subsystem packages. For example:

yum install pki-ca

http://server.example.com:9180/ca/admin/console/config/login?pin=

2. Open the configuration wizard using the URL returned from the package installation.

Alternatively, log into the setup wizard through admin link on the services page and supply the preop.pin value from the /var/lib/pki-ca/conf/CS.cfg file when prompted.

https://server.example.com:9444/ca/services

3. Create a new security domain.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

The default CA instance must create a new security domain. Subsequent CAs can create a new domain or join an existing security domain, but it is recommended that each CA have its own security domain.

4. Enter a name for the new instance.

Configuring a CA

5. Set up the PKI hierarchy. Commonly, the first CA is a root, or self-signed, CA, meaning that it signs its own CA signing certificate rather than submitting its certificates to a third-party CA for issuance. Subsequent CAs can be subordinate CAs to that root. There are many other options, depending on the PKI environment.

For a CA, there are two possible configuration options:

• Root CA. A root CA signs its own CA signing certificate and, therefore, can set its own certificate

issuance rules.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

• Subordinate CA. A subordinate CA receives its CA signing certificate from a root CA. The root CA must be referenced here; it can be another Certificate System CA, but, for the default (i.e., first) CA instance, this will probably be an external root CA. The certificate requests generated in this process must be submitted to the external CA and be approved before configuration can be completed.

See the planning question Should the Certificate Manager be a self-signed root CA or a

subordinate CA?1.

6. Fill in the information for the LDAP server which will be used for the instance's internal database. This requires connection information for the Directory Server instance, such as the hostname, port number, bind DN (username), and password. This step also creates a database in the Directory Server and a corresponding base directory entry (base DN) to use for the subsystem's entries.

The hostname can be the fully-qualified domain name or an IPv4 or IPv6 address, if IPv6 was configured before the packages were installed.

NOTE

One thing that can derail subsystem configuration or function is having services that are unable to connect with each other. If servers that need to communicate with each other are on different servers or networks, when the firewalls and iptables must be configured to give the required access.

Configuring a CA

If the Red Hat Directory Server instances is on a different server or network than the Certificate System subsystem, then make sure that the Certificate System host's firewall allows access to whatever LDAP port was set in the previous configuration panel.

Installation will not complete if iptables is not configured properly. To configure iptables, see the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Deployment Guide, such as "Using

iptables."2 It is also possible to simply turn iptables off.

7. Select the token which will store the Certificate System certificates and keys; a list of detected hardware tokens and databases is given.

IMPORTANT

Any hardware tokens used with the instance must be configured before configuring the subsystem instance. If the HSM is not properly configured, it may not be listed in the key stores panel or the instance may not function properly. HSM configuration is described in Section 2.5.2, “Using Hardware Security Modules with Subsystems”.

To determine whether a token is detected by the Certificate System, use the TokenInfo tool, as described in Section 2.5.4, “Detecting Tokens”.

The Certificate System automatically discovers Safenet's LunaSA and nCipher's netHSM hardware security modules. The discovery process assumes that the client software installations for these modules are local to the Certificate System subsystem and are in the following locations:

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

• LunaSA: /usr/lunasa/lib/libCryptoki2.so

• nCipher: /opt/nfast/toolkits/pkcs11/libcknfast.so

8. Set the key size and the hashing algorithm to use. By default, the settings for the signing key are applied to the keys for every certificate for the CA. To set different key types, sizes, or hashing algorithms for each certificate, click the [Advanced] link to expand the form so each key pair is listed.

The default RSA key size is 2048 and for ECC, 256.

NOTE

An ECC CA signing certificate can be used to sign both ECC and RSA certificates. If you do not want to use the ECC client certificate that is generated at installation, simply replace the client certificate after configuration, and keep the ECC CA signing certificate.

An ECC module must be loaded for ECC certificates to be generated. Adding ECC support is covered in Section 4.2, “Installing a CA with ECC Enabled”. Any ECC-enabled PKCS#11 module must be loaded before beginning to configure the CA.

Configuring a CA

The hashing algorithms that are available depend on whether RSA or ECC is selected as the key type. For RSA, the available algorithms are as follows:

• SHA256withRSA (the default)

• SHA1withRSA

• SHA256withRSA

• SHA512withRSA

• MD5withRSA

• MD2withRSA

For ECC:

• SHA256withEC (the default)

• SHA1withEC

• SHA384withEC

• SHA512withEC

9. Optionally, change the subject names for the certificates.

NOTE

Certificate nicknames must be unique, and changing the default nicknames is one way to ensure that.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

Having unique certificate nicknames is vital for using an HSM, since any nickname conflicts (even for subsystems on different servers) will cause configuration to fail.

10. The next panels generate and show certificate requests, certificates, and key pairs.

If an external CA is used to issue the certificates, configuration cannot go forward until they are received from the external CA. When they are issued, paste the certificates into this panel to add them to the CA database, and then proceed with the installation. Click Apply to view the certificates as they are imported.

11. If the subsystem will ever be cloned, or as a protection if keys or certificates are ever lost, back up the keys and certificates when prompted. It is also possible to extract these keys later, as long as they are not stored on an HSM.

NOTE

It is not possible to export keys and certificates stored on an HSM to a .p12 file. It is also not necessary to extract keys from the HSM to clone a subsystem. The keys are already stored on the HSM and accessible to any cloned instances.

Configuring a CA

12. Provide the information for the new subsystem administrator.

13. Click Next through the remaining panels to import the agent certificate into the browser and complete the configuration.

14. When the configuration is complete, restart the subsystem.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

service pki-ca restart

IMPORTANT

The new instance is not active until it is restarted, and weird behaviors can occur if you try to use the instance without restarting it first.

3.4. Configuring an RA

Subsystem configuration is done by accessing a unique web-based configuration page for the instance. The only supported web browser for subsystem configuration is Mozilla Firefox.

IMPORTANT

Before any RA can be set up, a Certificate System CA must be installed, configured, and running. This subsystem depends on the CA to issue their certificates and to create a security domain. If the security domain CA is not available, then the configuration process fails.

1. Install the subsystem packages. For example:

yum install pki-ra

https://server.example.com:12889//ra/admin/console/config/login?pin=kI7E1MByNIUcPJ6RKHmH

2. Open the configuration wizard using the URL returned by the package installation.

https://server.example.com:12889//ra/admin/console/config/login?pin=kI7E1MByNIUcPJ6RKHmH

Alternatively, log into the setup wizard through admin link on the services page and supply the preop.pin value from the /var/lib/pki-ra/conf/CS.cfg file when prompted.

https://server.example.com:12889/services

3. Join an existing security domain by entering the CA information. This URL can be identified by

running service pki-ca status on the CA's host; the security domain URL is returned with the other configuration settings. For example:

https://server.example.com:9445

When the CA is successfully contacted, then supply the admin username and password for the CA so that it can be properly accessed.

Configuring an RA

The hostname for the security domain CA can be the fully-qualified domain name or an IPv4 or IPv6 address, if IPv6 was configured before the packages were installed.

4. Enter a name for the new instance.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

5. Select the CA which will issue, renew, and revoke certificates for certificates processed through the RA. All of the CAs configured in the security domain are listed in a dropdown menu.

6. Click Next on the Internal Database panel; the SQLite database is created automatically.

NOTE

The RA uses a SQLite database to store its configuration and user data rather than an LDAP database, as the other subsystems do.

7. Select the token which will store the Certificate System certificates and keys; a list of detected hardware tokens and databases is given.

IMPORTANT

To determine whether a token is detected by the Certificate System, use the TokenInfo tool, as described in Section 2.5.4, “Detecting Tokens”.

Configuring an RA

• LunaSA: /usr/lunasa/lib/libCryptoki2.so

• nCipher: /opt/nfast/toolkits/pkcs11/libcknfast.so

8. Set the key size. The default RSA key size is 2048.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

9. Optionally, change the subject names for the certificates.

Configuring an RA

NOTE

Certificate nicknames must be unique, and changing the default nicknames is one way to ensure that.

Having unique certificate nicknames is vital for using an HSM, since any nickname conflicts (even for subsystems on different servers) will cause configuration to fail.

10. The next panels generate and show certificate requests, certificates, and key pairs.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

If an external CA is used to issue the certificates, configuration cannot go forward until they are received from the CA. When they are issued, paste the certificates into this panel to add them to the subsystem database, and then proceed with the installation. Click Apply to view the certificates as they are imported.

11. Provide the information for the new subsystem administrator.

Configuring a DRM, OCSP, or TKS

12. Click Next through the remaining panels to import the agent certificate into the browser and complete the configuration.

13. When the configuration is complete, restart the subsystem.

service pki-ra restart

IMPORTANT

The new instance is not active until it is restarted, and weird behaviors can occur if you try to use the instance without restarting it first.

3.5. Configuring a DRM, OCSP, or TKS

Subsystem configuration is done by accessing a unique web-based configuration page for the instance. The only supported web browser for subsystem configuration is Mozilla Firefox.

IMPORTANT

Before any DRM, OCSP, or TKS subsystem can be set up, a Certificate System CA must be installed, configured, and running. These subsystems depend on the CA to issue their certificates and to create a security domain. If the security domain CA is not available, then the configuration process fails.

1. Install the subsystem packages. For example, to install a DRM:

yum install pki-kra

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

NOTE

A Data Recovery Manager (DRM) is also known as a Key Recovery Agent (KRA). All command-line tools and many files for the DRM use the abbreviation kra for this reason. In the documentation, the subsystem used to archive and recover keys is called the DRM or KRA interchangeably.

http://server.example.com:10180/kra/admin/console/config/login?pin=kI7E1MByNIUcPJ6RKHmH

2. Open the configuration wizard using the URL returned by the package installation.

http://server.example.com:10180/kra/admin/console/config/login?pin=kI7E1MByNIUcPJ6RKHmH

Alternatively, log into the setup wizard through admin link on the services page and supply the preop.pin value from the /var/lib/subsystem_name/conf/CS.cfg file when prompted.

https://server.example.com:10444/kra/services

3. Join an existing security domain by entering the CA information. This URL can be identified by

running service pki-ca status on the CA's host; the security domain URL is returned with the other configuration settings. For example:

https://server.example.com:9445

When the CA is successfully contacted, then supply the admin username and password for the CA so that it can be properly accessed.

4. Enter a name for the new instance.

Configuring a DRM, OCSP, or TKS

5. Select the CA which will perform the operations processed through the subsystem, such as key archival.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

The hostname can be the fully-qualified domain name or an IPv4 or IPv6 address.

NOTE

Installation will not complete if iptables is not configured properly. To configure iptables, see the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Deployment Guide, such as "Using

iptables."3 It is also possible to simply turn iptables off.

7. Select the token which will store the Certificate System certificates and keys; a list of detected hardware tokens and databases is given.

Configuring a DRM, OCSP, or TKS

IMPORTANT

To determine whether a token is detected by the Certificate System, use the TokenInfo tool, as described in Section 2.5.4, “Detecting Tokens”.

• LunaSA: /usr/lunasa/lib/libCryptoki2.so

• nCipher: /opt/nfast/toolkits/pkcs11/libcknfast.so

8. Set the key size. The default RSA key size is 2048.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

9. Optionally, change subject names to the listed certificates.

NOTE

Certificate nicknames must be unique, and changing the default nicknames is one way to ensure that.

Configuring a DRM, OCSP, or TKS

Having unique certificate nicknames is vital for using an HSM, since any nickname conflicts (even for subsystems on different servers) will cause configuration to fail.

10. The next panels generate and show certificate requests, certificates, and key pairs.

11. Provide the information for the new subsystem administrator.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

12. Click Next through the remaining panels to import the agent certificate into the browser and complete the configuration.

13. When the configuration is complete, restart the subsystem.

service pki-kra restart

IMPORTANT

The new instance is not active until it is restarted, and weird behaviors can occur if you try to use the instance without restarting it first.

3.6. Configuring a TPS

Subsystem configuration is done by accessing a unique web-based configuration page for the instance. The only supported web browser for subsystem configuration is Mozilla Firefox.

IMPORTANT

Before the TPS can be set up, a Certificate System CA and TKS must be installed and configured. If you want to enable server-side key generation, then the DRM must also be installed and configured. The TPS configuration wizard automatically establishes relationships between the CA, TKS, and DRM and the TPS, so specific CA, TKS, and DRM instances must be available to the TPS.

1. Install the subsystem packages. For example:

yum install pki-tps

Configuring a TPS

2. Open the configuration wizard using the URL returned by the package installation. For example:

http://server.example.com:7888/tps/admin/console/config/login?pin=kI7E1MByNIUcPJ6RKHmH

Alternatively, log into the setup wizard through admin link on the services page and supply the preop.pin value from the /var/lib/pki-tps/conf/CS.cfg file when prompted.

http://server.example.com:7888/tps/services

3. Join an existing security domain by entering the CA information. This URL can be identified by

running service pki-ca status on the CA's host; the security domain URL is returned with the other configuration settings. For example:

https://server.example.com:9445

When the CA is successfully contacted, then supply the admin username and password for the CA so that it can be properly accessed.

4. Enter a name for the new instance.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

5. Select the CA which will issue, renew, and revoke certificates for token operations requested through the TPS subsystem.

6. Supply information about the TKS which will manage the TPS keys. Select the TKS from the dropdown menu of TKS subsystems within the security domain.

Configuring a TPS

7. There is an option for server-side key generation for tokens enrolled through the TPS. If serverside key generation is selected, supply information about the DRM which will generate keys and archive encryption keys. Key and certificate recovery is initiated automatically through the TPS, which is a DRM agent. Select the DRM from the drop-down menu of DRM subsystems within the security domain.

The hostname for the DRM can be the fully-qualified domain name or an IPv4 or IPv6 address.

8. Fill in the Directory Server authentication directory. This directory is used by the TPS to authenticate users which access the Enterprise Security Client and as an additional database for certificates and keys.

This Directory Server instance is not the same Directory Server instance used as the TPS's internal database. This is a general user directory, which may be accessed by other applications or users. The TPS's internal database is used exclusively by the TPS and is created on the fly as the TPS is configured.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

The hostname of the LDAP server can be the fully-qualified domain name or an IPv4 or IPv6 address.

9. Fill in the information for the LDAP server which will be used for the instance's internal database. This requires connection information for the Directory Server instance, such as the hostname, port number, bind DN (username), and password. This step also creates a database in the Directory Server and a corresponding base directory entry (base DN) to use for the subsystem's entries.

Configuring a TPS

The hostname can be the fully-qualified domain name or an IPv4 or IPv6 address.

NOTE

Installation will not complete if iptables is not configured properly. To configure iptables, see the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Deployment Guide, such as "Using

iptables."4 It is also possible to simply turn iptables off.

10. Select the token which will store the Certificate System certificates and keys; a list of detected hardware tokens and databases is given.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

IMPORTANT

To determine whether a token is detected by the Certificate System, use the TokenInfo tool, as described in Section 2.5.4, “Detecting Tokens”.

• LunaSA: /usr/lunasa/lib/libCryptoki2.so

• nCipher: /opt/nfast/toolkits/pkcs11/libcknfast.so

11. Set the key size.

Configuring a TPS

12. Optionally, change subject names to the listed certificates.

NOTE

Certificate nicknames must be unique, and changing the default nicknames is one way to ensure that.

Having unique certificate nicknames is vital for using an HSM, since any nickname conflicts (even for subsystems on different servers) will cause configuration to fail.

Chapter 3. Installation and Configuration

13. The next panels generate and show certificate requests, certificates, and key pairs.

If an external CA is used to issue the certificates, configuration cannot go forward until they are received from the CA. When they are issued, paste the certificates into this panel to add them to the TPS database, and then proceed with the installation. Click Apply to view the certificates as they are imported.

14. Provide the information for the new subsystem administrator.

Configuring a TPS

15. Click Next through the remaining panels to import the agent certificate into the browser and complete the configuration.

16. When the configuration is complete, restart the subsystem.

service pki-tps restart

IMPORTANT

The new instance is not active until it is restarted, and weird behaviors can occur if you try to use the instance without restarting it first.

Chapter 4.

Additional Installation Options

The Certificate System default installation, and all subsequent instances created with pkicreate, make certain assumptions about the instances being installed, such as the default signing algorithm to use for CA signing certificates and whether to allow IPv6 addresses for hosts.

This chapter describes additional configuration options that impact the installation and configuration for new instances, so many of these procedures occur before the instance is created.

4.1. Requesting Subsystem Certificates from an External

Most of the time, it is easier and simpler to have a CA within your PKI be the root CA, since this affords a lot of flexibility for defining the rules and settings of the PKI deployment. However, for public-facing networks, this can be a difficult thing to implement, because web administrators have to find some way to propagate and update CA certificate chains to their clients so that any site is trusted. For this reason, people often use public CAs, hosted by companies like VeriSign or Thawte, to issue CA signing certificates and make all of their CAs subordinate to the public CA. This is one of the planning considerations covered in the Certificate System Deployment Guide.

All subsystem certificates can be submitted to an external CA when the subsystem is configured. When the certificates are generated from a CA outside the Certificate System deployment (or from a Certificate System CA in a different security domain), then the configuration process does not occur in one sitting. The configuration process is on hold until the certificates can be retrieved. Aside from that delay, the process is more or less the same as in Chapter 3, Installation and Configuration.

1. Install the subsystem packages, and open the configuration URL.

2. Join a security domain. For a CA, it is also possible to create a new security domain.

3. Set the subsystem information, like its name.

4. For a CA, set the CA to be a subordinate CA. This is required in order to submit CA subsystem certificates to an external CA; making a root CA automatically generates self-signed certificates.

5. Set up the internal database.

6. Select the key store, and generate the key pairs.

7. Set the subsystem certificate names; you can set these to whatever you want, but make sure that they conform to any requirements that the external CA sets for the subject names of certificates.

At the bottom of the screen is the list of CAs which are available to accept the submitted certificate requests. Choose External CA from the drop-down menu.

Chapter 4. Additional Installation Options

8. In the Requests and Certificates panel, the CA signing certificate is listed, with an action required label. Once that certificate is generated, the other certificates for the CA will be

automatically generated.

For other subsystems, each subsystem certificate has an action required label and must be submitted to the external CA.

Requesting Subsystem Certificates from an External CA

9. Click the Step 1: Copy the certificate request link, and copy the certificate request to a file or the clipboard.

10. Submit the request to the external CA. Leave the browser with the configuration wizard open as you wait for the certificates to be generated, so that it is easier to pick up the process.

11. Click Step 2, and import the certificate chain for the issuing CA. This certificate chain must not contain the leaf certificate (the certificate being requested).

12. After retrieving the issued certificates, click the Step 3: Paste in the base 64-encoded certificate link, and paste in the new certificate (this should be only the new certificate, not a certificate chain).

13. For the CA, this only has to be done for the signing certificate. For the other subsystems, repeat steps 9, 10, and 12 for each certificate.

When all the certificates have been submitted, click Next to resume the configuration process.

14. Export the keys for the certificates, if the subsystem will be cloned.

15. Create the administrator user.

16. When the configuration is done, restart the subsystem.

Chapter 4. Additional Installation Options

service subsystem_name restart

4.2. Installing a CA with ECC Enabled

Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is much more secure than the more common RSA-style encryption, which allows it to use much shorter key lengths and makes it faster to generate certificates. CAs which are ECC-enabled can issue both RSA and ECC certificates, using their ECC signing certificate.

Certificate System does not include a module natively to enable ECC, but it is possible to load and use a third-party PKCS #11 module with ECC-enabled.

To use the ECC module, it must be loaded before the subsystem instance is configured.

IMPORTANT

Third-party ECC modules must have an SELinux policy configured for them, or SELinux needs to be changed from enforcing mode to permissive mode to allow the module to function. Otherwise, any subsystem operations which require the ECC module will fail.

4.2.1. Loading a Third-Party ECC Module

1. Copy the third-party module to a common directory, like /usr/lib for 32-bit systems or /usr/ lib64 for 64-bit systems.

2. Create a new CA instance by running pkicreate, but do not go through the configuration wizard.

3. Stop the CA.

service pki-ca stop

4. The CA runs as the pkiuser user. As root, create a home directory for pkiuser.

/usr/sbin/usermod --home /usr/share/pki/pkiuser pkiuser cd /usr/share/pki mkdir pkiuser HOME=/usr/share/pki/pkiuser export HOME

5. Install the third-party module in the CA's security databases so it is available for the configuration.

cd /var/lib/pki-ca/alias

modutil -dbdir . -nocertdb -add THIRD_PARTY_MODULE -libfile /usr/lib/libYourNewModule.so

This creates a directory called .THIRD_PARTY_MODULE in the new home directory created for root (the new pkiuser home directory). For example, if the module's name is EccForPki, then the directory is named .EccForPki/

6. Using modutil, set the password for the new ECC module token.

Loading the Certicom ECC Module

modutil -dbdir . -nocertdb -changepw "THIRD_PARTY_MODULE_TOKEN"

7. Change the ownership of the new home directory from root to pkiuser.

cd /usr/share/pki chown -R pkiuser:pkiuser pkiuser

8. Add the password for the ECC token to the CA's password file.

vim /etc/pki-ca/password.conf

hardware-THIRD_PARTY_MODULE_TOKEN=secret

The hardware- prefix is required.

9. Edit the CA configuration and add a line to require signature verification.

ca.requestVerify.token=THIRD_PARTY_MODULE_TOKEN

10. Start the CA.

service pki-ca start

11. Continue with the CA configuration, with two important configuration settings:

• In the Key Store panel, the ECC module should be listed as an available token. Select that module for the key store.

• In the Key Pairs panel, ECC should be listed as an option to use to generate the keys used for the CA's certificates. Select the ECC key type.

12. After completing the configuration for the CA, try to log into the CA console.

pkiconsole https://server.example.com:9445/ca

This fails, because the console is not yet configured to run with ECC enabled. However, this does create the security databases for the console, so the ECC module can be loaded.

13. Load the ECC module into the console security databases.

cd ~/.redhat-idm-console/

modutil -dbdir . -nocertdb -add THIRD_PARTY_MODULE -libfile /usr/lib/libYourNewModule.so

Now, logging into the console succeeds.

4.2.2. Loading the Certicom ECC Module

Certicom's ECC module has a slightly different configuration process than the procedure for loading a general ECC module.

Chapter 4. Additional Installation Options

1. Copy the third-party libraries to a common directory, like /usr/lib for 32-bit systems or /usr/ lib64 for 64-bit systems.

There are two library files for the Certicom ECC modules, libsbcpgse.so and libsbgse2.so.

2. Cache the recent shared libraries.

ldconfig

3. Install the CA, but do not go through the configuration wizard.

4. Stop the CA.

service pki-ca stop

5. The CA runs as the pkiuser user. As root, create a home directory for pkiuser.

/usr/sbin/usermod --home /usr/share/pki/pkiuser pkiuser cd /usr/share/pki mkdir pkiuser HOME=/usr/share/pki/pkiuser export HOME

6. Open the subsystem's alias directory. For example:

cd /var/lib/pki-ca/alias

7. Install the third-party module in the CA's security databases so it is available for the configuration.

modutil -dbdir . -nocertdb -add certicom -libfile /usr/lib/libsbcpgse.so

This creates a .certicom directory in the new pkiuser home directory.

8. Certicom's ECC module includes an initpin file; copy this into the new pkiuser directory and give it execute permissions. For example:

cp /tmp/initpin /usr/share/pki/pkiuser

chmod +x initpin

9. Run Certicom's initpin file from the /usr/share/pki/pkiuser directory. This first prompts for the directory to use for the Certicom token databases; use the pkiuser home directory, / usr/share/pki/pkiuser. This also prompts to set a password for the module, and then proceed with configuring the module.

/usr/share/pki/pkiuser/initpin

Please enter the directory where the token databases exist or will be created: /usr/share/pki/pkiuser Enter PIN: Confirm PIN:

Security Builder API for PKCS #11 Samples

Loading the Certicom ECC Module

CryptoAes() success CryptoArc4() success CryptoDes() success CryptoDh() success CryptoDsa() success CryptoEcdh() success CryptoEcdsa() success CryptoEcmqv() success CryptoPkcs1Enc() success CryptoPkcs1Sig() success CryptoRsaEnc() success CryptoRsaSig() success CryptoSha1() success Token() samples starting Slot info for Slot 0 Desc: FIPS Generic Crypto Services V1.0.1d manufacturerID: Certicom Corp. flags: 0x1 CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT hardwareVersion: 1.0 ...

10. Edit the pkiuser's home directory so that every file is owned by pkiuser.

cd /usr/share/pki; chown -R pkiuser:pkiuser pkiuser

11. List the Certicom ECC module to make sure it has been properly loaded. The module is in security

databases in the subsystem's alias directory. For example:

modutil -dbdir /var/lib/pki-ca/alias -list certicom

12. Add the password for the ECC token to the subsystem's password file. Escape any spaces or special characters in the name. For example:

vim /etc/pki-ca/password.conf

hardware-Certicom\ FIPS\ Cert/Key\ Services=secret

The hardware- prefix is required.

13. Edit the CA configuration and add a line to require signature verification. In this file, spaces and special characters do not need to be escaped. For example:

ca.requestVerify.token=Certicom FIPS Cert/Key Services

14. Edit file dtomcat5-instance file for the subsystem in the /usr/bin directory, and add a line to use the ECC module.

umask 00002 NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT=1 export NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT

15. Start the CA.

Chapter 4. Additional Installation Options

service pki-ca start

16. Continue with the CA configuration, with two important configuration settings:

• In the Key Store panel, the ECC module should be listed as an available token. Select that module for the key store.

• In the Key Pairs panel, ECC should be listed as an option to use to generate the keys used for the CA's certificates. Select the ECC key type.

17. After completing the configuration, try to log into the subsystem console.

pkiconsole https://server.example.com:9445/ca

This fails, because the console is not yet configure to run in ECC. However, this does create the security databases for the console, so the ECC module can be loaded.

Load the ECC module into the console security databases.

cd ~/.redhat-idm-console/

modutil -dbdir . -nocertdb -add certicom -libfile /usr/lib/libsbcpgse.so

Now, logging into the console succeeds.

18. The web browser used to access administrative and agent services pages also needs to be configured to support ECC.

a. Create a user for the browser profile, such as agent-pki.

b. Launch Firefox and create a profile for this user; this automatically creates the required

security databases and directory.

c. Set the root home directory to /home/agent-pki, and make sure the directory is owned by

root.

chown -R root:root /home/agent-pki

d. Copy the ECC module libraries and initpin file to the /home/agent-pki directory. All

these files should be owned by root.

e. Load the ECC module.

modutil -dbdir /home/agent-pki/.mozilla/profile.default -nocertdb -add certicom libfile /usr/lib/libsbcpgse.so

f. Run the initpin file. When prompted, enter the Certicom token database directory, /usr/

share/pki/pkiuser, and enter the PIN configured for those databases.

./initpin

g. Change the ownership of the new user's home directory from root to the user. For example:

Changing the Hashing Algorithm Used for Subsystem Keys

chown -R agent-pki:agent-pki /home/agent-pki

h. In the terminal with the /home/agent-pki directory open, export the environment variable

that allows ECC support.

export NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT=1

i. Open Firefox again. The Certicom module should be available and you should be able to log

into it successfully.

j. Then, import the agent certificate and root CA certificate or certificate chain into Firefox so that

the user profile can access the agent services pages.

19. The NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT environment variable also needs to be set to access the subsystem Java console with an ECC certificate. This can be set in the .bashrc file for the user who uses the console. For example:

vim /home/jsmith/.bashrc

# User specific aliases and functions NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT=1 export NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT

4.3. Changing the Hashing Algorithm Used for Subsystem

Keys

When a CA is installed, along with determining the key type and size, the hashing algorithm for the key pair is set. However, for other subsystems, the hashing algorithm is not configurable, so they use whatever the default is for the CA which issues their certificates.

Instead of using the CA's hashing algorithm, it is possible to edit the profiles used to generate the subsystem certificates; then, the configuration wizard will use whatever hashing algorithm is in the profile instead of the one used by the CA.

NOTE

This is true for subordinate CAs as well as other subsystems. While some of the certificates for a sub CA are generated locally — and therefore can take a user-defined hashing algorithm for their keys in the configuration wizard — other certificates for the sub CA (like its signing certificate) are generated by another CA and default to that CA's key hashing algorithm.

To assign the hashing algorithm to the certificate, add this line to the profile in the CA's profile directory, such as /var/lib/instance_name/profiles/ca:

default.params.signingAlg=hashing_alg

Chapter 4. Additional Installation Options

TIP

Editing certificate profiles is covered in the Administrator's Guide.

Each of the subsystem certificate profiles can be edited:

• caInternalAuthOCSPCert.cfg

• caInternalAuthTransportCert.cfg

• caInternalAuthAuditSigningCert.cfg

• caInternalAuthServerCert.cfg

• caInternalAuthDRMstorageCert.cfg

• caInternalAuthSubsystemCert.cfg

The hashing algorithms that are available depend on whether RSA or ECC is selected as the key type. For RSA, the available algorithms are as follows:

• SHA256withRSA (the default)

• SHA1withRSA

• SHA256withRSA

• SHA512withRSA

• MD5withRSA

• MD2withRSA

For ECC:

• SHA256withEC (the default)

• SHA1withEC

• SHA384withEC

• SHA512withEC

4.4. Enabling IPv6 for a Subsystem

Certificate System automatically configures and manages connections between subsystems. Every subsystem must interact with a CA as members of a security domain and to perform their PKI operations.

For these connections, Certificate System subsystems can be recognized by their host's fullyqualified domain name or an IP address. By default, Certificate System resolves IPv4 addresses and hostnames automatically, but Certificate System can also use IPv6 for their connections. IPv6 is supported for all server connections: to other subsystems, to the administrative console (pkiconsole), or through command-line scripts such as tpsclient.

Configuring Separate RA Instances

op=var_set name=ca_host value=IPv6 address

If a host has both an IPv4 address and an IPv6 name, then an environment variable can be set before the Certificate System packages are installed so that Certificate System setup scripts will recognize the IPv6 name.

1. If the default (first) instances should use IPv6, set the environment variable to keep pkicreate from running.

export DONT_RUN_PKICREATE=1

2. Install the Red Hat Certificate System packages.

3. Set the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in the /etc/hosts file. For example:

vim /etc/hosts

192.0.0.0 server.example.com IPv4 address 3ffe:1234:2222:2000:202:55ff:fe67:f527 server6.example.com IPv6 address

4. Then, export the environment variable to use the IPv6 address for the server. For example:

export PKI_HOSTNAME=server6.example.com

5. Unset the DONT_RUN_PKICREATE variable so that the new instances can be created.

export DONT_RUN_PKICREATE=0

6. Run pkicreate to create the new instance. The values for the server hostname in the CS.cfg file will be set to the IPv6 address.

4.5. Configuring Separate RA Instances

When an RA is installed or created, it is automatically added to a default Registration Managers Group on the CA. This means that all RA managers belong to the same group, by default.

However, a particular site might require more than one RA instance, each having its own set of RA agents. If the site policy disallows cross-management between the RA instances, then extra configuration is needed to create separate RA groups.

1. Install and configure the first RA instance.

2. Add the new RA group to the Certificate Manager.

a. Start the Console. For example:

pkiconsole https://server.example.com:9445/ca

b. Click Users and Groups, and then click Groups.

c. Click Add to open the Edit Group Information dialog box.

d. Enter the group name and description, such as Registration Manager2 Agents.

Chapter 4. Additional Installation Options

e. Click OK.

3. Add the new RA authentication instance to the CA:

a. Open the CA configuration directory, and edit the CS.cfg file

cd /etc/pki-ca

vi CS.cfg

b. Search for the string raCertAuth.

c. Copy those lines for the first RA instance, paste them, and edit them for the second RA

instance's information. For example:

auths.instance.raCertAuth.agentGroup=Registration Manager Agents auths.instance.raCertAuth.plug-inName=AgentCertAuth auths.instance.ra2CertAuth.agentGroup=Registration Manager2 Agents auths.instance.ra2CertAuth.plug-inName=AgentCertAuth

4. Add the new RA user enrollment profile to the Certificate Manager's certificate profiles list to utilize the new RA authentication instance.

a. Open the CA profiles directory.

cd /var/lib/pki-ca/profiles/ca

b. Copy the current RA profile to create the new profile. For example:

cp caDualRAuserCert.cfg caDualRA2userCert.cfg

c. Edit the new file to contain the second RA instance's information. Change raCertAuth to

ra2CertAuth.

5. Open the CA configuration directory, and edit the CS.cfg file.

cd /var/lib/pki-ca/conf

vi CS.cfg

a. Add caDualRA2userCert to the profiles list. For example:

profile.list=...[snip]...caRAserverCert,caRA2userCert

Make sure to use a comma to separate the entries.

b. Search for the lines for the caDualRAuserCert profile configuration, copy them, and edit

them for the second RA instance's information.

profile.caDualRAuserCert.class_id=caEnrollImpl profile.caDualRAuserCert.config=/var/lib/pki-ca/profiles/ca/caDualRAuserCert.cfg profile.caDualRA2userCert.class_id=caEnrollImpl

Configuring Separate RA Instances

profile.caDualRA2userCert.config=/var/lib/pki-ca/profiles/ca/caDualRA2userCert.cfg

6. Add a new URI mapping to allow the new RA agent to be registered in the new RA group.

a. Open the CA web applications directory, and edit the web.xml file:

cd /var/lib/pki-ca/webapps/ca/WEB-INF

vi web.xml

b. At about line 288 in the web.xml file is the servlet setting for the first RA's user. Copy the

entire entry, including the opening and closing <servlet> tags, and edit the information to match the second RA's user. For example:

<servlet> <servlet-name> caRegisterRa2User </servlet-name> <servlet-class> com.netscape.cms.servlet.csadmin.RegisterUser </servlet-class> <init-param><param-name> GetClientCert </param-name> <param-value> false </param-value> </init-param> <init-param><param-name> authority </param-name> <param-value> ca </param-value> </init-param> <init-param><param-name> ID </param-name> <param-value> caRegisterRaUser </param-value> </init-param> <init-param><param-name> AuthMgr </param-name> <param-value> TokenAuth </param-value> </init-param> <init-param><param-name> GroupName </param-name> <param-value> Registration Manager2 Agents </param-value> </initparam> <init-param><param-name> AuthzMgr </param-name> <param-value> BasicAclAuthz </param-value> </init-param> <init-param><param-name> resourceID </param-name> <param-value> certServer.ca.registerUser </param-value> </initparam> </servlet>

c. At about line 2510 in the web.xml file is the servlet-mapping setting for the first RA's user

mapping. Copy the entire entry, including the opening and closing <servlet-mapping> tags, and edit the information to match the second RA's user. For example:

<servlet-mapping> <servlet-name> caRegisterRa2User </servlet-name> <url-pattern> /admin/ca/registerRa2User </url-pattern> </servlet-mapping>

7. Restart the CA. For example:

service pki-ca restartt

8. Create the new RA instance using the pkicreate.

pkicreate -pki_instance_root=/var/lib -subsystem_type=ra -pki_instance_name=pki-ra2 secure_port=12899 -unsecure_port=12898 -verbose -user=pkiuser -group=pkiuser

9. Open the configuration file for the new RA instance, and edit its parameters to reflect the second RA instance information.

Chapter 4. Additional Installation Options

cd /var/lib/pki-ra2/conf/

vi CS.cfg

10. Change the registerRaUser setting to registerRa2User.

conn.ca1.servlet.addagent=/ca/admin/ca/registerRa2User

11. Change the caDualRAuserCert setting to caDualRA2userCert.

request.renewal.approve_request.0.profileId=caDualRAuser2Cert ... request.user.approve_request.0.profileId=caDualRA2userCert

12. Restart the new RA instance. For example:

# service pki-ra2 restart

13. A URL was generated at the end of the pkicreate command; go to that URL to configure the

second RA. For example:

http://server.example.com:12898/ra/admin/console/config/login?pin=bFyAk9nWPfgLZXffRBT9

14. When the new RA is completely configured, restart the instance.

# service pki-ra2 restart

Chapter 5.

Creating Additional Subsystem Instances

The number of subsystems that you have is flexible. There can be a single instance, there can be multiple instances on the same machine, or there can be multiple instances on multiple servers.

Creating additional subsystem instances is similar to installing and configuring the default instances; there is a script to run to create a basic installation and then an HTML-based configuration wizard to complete the setup for the instance.

All additional CA, RA, DRM, OCSP, TKS, and TPS instances are installed by running a special tool, pkicreate. After that, they are configured through the HTML-based administration page. For more information on pkicreate, see the Certificate System Command-Line Tools Guide.

TIP

Existing instances can be duplicated (cloned) for load balancing for heavily trafficked servers and for failover support. Cloning is described in Chapter 6, Cloning Subsystems.

5.1. About pkicreate

Certificate System subsystem instances are created and defined using a script called pkicreate. This script is run automatically when the subsystem packages are first installed, and it creates the default subsystem instances with their predefined settings.

The pkicreate script can be invoked after the packages are installed to create additional individual subsystem instances, with user-defined settings like the configuration and log directories and port numbers. After the instance is created, it is then configured through the HTML-based configuration wizard or by using the pkisilent script.

The syntax for pkicreate is slightly different between subsystems because of the different port configurations. The CA, OCSP, DRM, and TKS all have three SSL service ports and an unsecure service port, while the RA and TPS have two SSL service ports and an unsecure service port.

pkicreate -pki_instance_root=/directory/path -subsystem_type=type -pkiinstance_name=instance_ID -secure_port=SSLport | {-agent_secure_port=SSLport ee_secure_port=SSLport -admin_secure_port=SSLport -ee_secure_client_auth_port=SSLport_CA_only}

-unsecure_port=port -tomcat_server_port=port [-user=user_name] [-group=group_name] [-

redirect_conf=conf_directory] [-redirect_logs=log_directory]

Example 5.1. Syntax for Creating a CA, OCSP, DRM, or TKS

pkicreate -pki_instance_root=/directory/path -subsystem_type=type -pkiinstance_name=instance_ID -secure_port=SSLport -non_clientauth_secure_port=SSLport unsecure_port=port [-user=user_name] [-group=group_name] [-redirect_conf=conf_directory] [redirect_logs=log_directory]

Example 5.2. Syntax for Creating an RA or TPS

Chapter 5. Creating Additional Subsystem Instances

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To get full usage examples and syntax for the pkicreate command, run pkicreate -help.

Parameter Description

pki_instance_root Gives the full path to the new instance

configuration directory.

subsystem_type Gives the type of subsystem being created.

pki_instance_name Gives the name of the new instance. Instance

names must be unique on a single machine, but do not have to be unique within the security domain (since instances are identified by hostname and port, not instance name).

secure_port

agent_secure_port

ee_secure_port

ee_secure_client_auth_port

admin_secure_port

non_clientauth_secure_port

unsecure_port

Sets a single SSL port number for the subsystem. This parameter is required if port separation is not configured, meaning that separate ports are not assigned for the administrator, agent, and end-entities services.

Sets the SSL port for the agent web services. If this is specified, then both ee_secure_port and admin_secure_port must be specified. For CAs only, an end-entities client authentication port is also required with the ee_secure_client_auth_port option.

Sets the SSL port for the end-entities web services. If this is specified, then both agent_secure_port and admin_secure_port must be specified. For CAs only, an end-entities client authentication port is also required with the ee_secure_client_auth_port option.

For CAs only. Sets the SSL port for the endentity client authentication. If this is specified, then ee_secure_port, agent_secure_port, and admin_secure_port must be specified.

Sets the SSL port number for the administrator services, usually the pkiconsole. If this is specified, then both agent_secure_port and ee_secure_port must be specified. For CAs only, an end-entities client authentication port is also required with the ee_secure_client_auth_port option.

Sets the end entities SSL port for RA and TPS subsystems.

Sets the regular port number. If this is not set, the number is randomly generated. Still, it is

Running pkicreate for a Single SSL Port

Parameter Description

recommended that administrators set this value to make sure there are no conflicts with SELinux labels for other services.

tomcat_server_port

Sets the port number for the Tomcat web server for OCSP, TKS, and DRM instances.

redirect_conf Sets the location for the configuration files for the

new instance.

redirect_logs Sets the location for the log files for the new

instance.

user Sets the user as which the Certificate System

instance will run. This option must be set.

group Sets the group as which the Certificate System

instance will run. This option must be set.

The ports selected for the new instance should not conflict with any other ports assigned on the host or SELinux. Check the / etc/services file to see port assignments for the system. Then, run semanage port -l |grep port# to check SELinux; if there is no output, then there is no conflict with SELinux assignments.

Table 5.1. pkicreate Parameters

For more information on the pkicreate tool options, see the Certificate System Command-Line Tools Guide.

5.2. Running pkicreate for a Single SSL Port

1. Run the pkicreate command, specifying the type of subsystem being created, the configuration directory, instance name, and port numbers. For example, this created a second DRM instance:

pkicreate -pki_instance_root=/var/lib/pki-drm2 -subsystem_type=kra -pki_instance_name=pkidrm2 -secure_port=10543 -unsecure_port=10180 -tomcat_server_port=1802 -verbose

2. When the instance is successfully created, the process returns a URL for the HTML configuration page. For example:

http://server.example.com:10180/kra/admin/console/config/login?pin=nt2z2keqcqAZiBRBGLDf

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The configuration URL is written to the end of the instance's installation file, /var/ log/subsystem_name-install.log. This log is also useful for debugging an

instance.

3. Open the new instance URL, and go through the configuration wizard as described in Chapter 3,

Installation and Configuration. Supply the security domain, CA, instance ID, internal LDAP

database, and agent information.

4. When the configuration is complete, restart the subsystem.

service instance_ID restart

Chapter 5. Creating Additional Subsystem Instances

5.3. Running pkicreate with Port Separation

To create an instance with three separate ports for the different subsystem services, run pkicreate with three options which specify the services ports: -admin_secure_port, -agent_secure_port, and -ee_secure_port. For CAs only, there is an additional port for end-entity client authentication, ee_secure_client_auth_port.

Separated SSL ports is the default instance configuration because it is more secure than using a single SSL port.

1. Run the pkicreate command. For example:

pkicreate -pki_instance_root=/var/lib/pki-ca2 -subsystem_type=ca -pki_instance_name=pkica2 -admin_secure_port=9545 -agent_secure_port-9544 -ee_secure_port=9543 ee_secure_client_auth_port=9546 -unsecure_port=9180 -tomcat_server_port=1802 -verbose

2. When the instance is successfully created, the process returns a URL for the HTML configuration page. For example:

http://server.example.com:10180/kra/admin/console/config/login?pin=nt2z2keqcqAZiBRBGLDf

TIP

The configuration URL is written to the end of the instance's installation file, /var/ log/subsystem_name-install.log. This log is also useful for debugging an

instance.

3. Open the new instance URL, and go through the configuration wizard as described in Chapter 3,

Installation and Configuration. Supply the security domain, CA, instance ID, internal LDAP

database, and agent information.

4. When the configuration is complete, restart the subsystem.

service subsystem_name restart

For more information on the pkicreate tool options, see the Certificate System Command-Line Tools Guide.

Chapter 6.

Cloning Subsystems

When a new subsystem instance is first configured, the Red Hat Certificate System allows subsystems to be cloned, or duplicated, for high availability of the Certificate System. The cloned instances run on different machines to avoid a single point of failure and their databases are synchronized through replication.

6.1. About Cloning

Planning for high availability reduces unplanned outages and other problems by making one or more subsystem clones available. When a host machine goes down, the cloned subsystems can handle requests and perform services, taking over from the master (original) subsystem seamlessly and keeping uninterrupted service.

Using cloned subsystems also allows systems to be taken offline for repair, troubleshooting, or other administrative tasks without interrupting the services of the overall PKI system.

NOTE

All of the subsystems except the TPS and RA can be cloned.

Cloning is one method of providing scalability to the PKI by assigning the same task, such as handling certificate requests, to separate instances on different machines. The internal databases for the master and its clones are replicated between each other, so the information about certificate requests or archived keys on one subsystem is available on all the others.

Typically, master and cloned instances are installed on different machines, and those machines are placed behind a load balancer. The load balancer accepts HTTP and HTTPS requests made to the Certificate System subsystems and directs those requests appropriately between the master and cloned instances. In the event that one machine fails, the load balancer transparently redirects all requests to the machine that is still running until the other machine is brought back online.

Chapter 6. Cloning Subsystems

Figure 6.1. Cloning Example

The load balancer in front of a Certificate System subsystem is what provides the actual failover support in a high availability system. A load balancer can also provide the following advantages as part of a Certificate System subsystem:

• DNS round-robin, a feature for managing network congestion that distributes load across several

different servers.

• Sticky SSL, which makes it possible for a user returning to the system to be routed the same host

used previously.

6.1.1. Cloning for CAs

Cloned instances have the exact same private keys as the master, so their certificates are identical. For CAs, that means that the CA signing certificates are identical for the original master CA and its cloned CAs. From the perspectives of clients, these look like a single CA.

Every CA, both cloned and master, can issue certificates and process revocation requests.

The main issue with managing cloned CAs is how to assign serial numbers to the certificates they issue. Different CAs can have different levels of traffic, using serial numbers at different rates, and it is imperative that no CA issue the certificates with the same serial number. These serial number ranges are assigned and managed dynamically by using a shared, replicated entry that defines the ranges for each CA and the next available range to reassign when one CA range runs low.

Cloning for DRMs

Cloned CAs do have limits on what operations they can perform. Most important, cloned CAs cannot generate or publish CRLs. Any CRL requests submitted to a cloned CA are immediately redirected to the master CA. Anything related to generating or caching CRLs is disabled in the CS.cfg file for the clone. Clones can revoke, display, import, and download CRLs previously generated by master CAs, but having them generate new CRLs may cause synchronization problems. Only a single CA should generate CRLs, and this task is always left to the master CA, which also maintains the CRL cache.

Master CAs also manage the relationships and information sharing between the cloned CAs by monitoring replication changes to the internal databases.

6.1.2. Cloning for DRMs

With DRMs, all keys archived in one DRM are replicated to the internal databases of the other DRMs. This allows a key recovery to be initiated on any clone DRM, regardless of which DRM the key was originally archived on.

After a key recovery is processed, the record of the recovery is stored in the internal database of all of the cloned DRMs.

Although key recovery can be initiated on any clone, once the recovery is initiated, it must be completed on the same single DRM. This is because a recovery operation is recorded in the replicated database only after the appropriate number of approvals have been obtained from the DRM agents. Until then, the DRM on which the recovery is initiated is the only one which knows about the recovery operation.

6.1.3. Cloning for Other Subsystems

There is no real operational difference between masters and clones for TKSs; the information created or maintained on one is replicated along the other servers.

For OCSPs, only the master OCSP receives CRL updates, and then the published CRLs are replicated to the clones.

6.1.4. Cloning and Key Stores

Cloning a subsystem creates two server processes performing the same functions: another new instance of the subsystem is created and configured to use the same keys and certificates to perform its operations. Depending on where the keys are stored for the master clone, the method for the clone to access the keys is very different.

If the keys and certificates are stored in the internal software token, then the keys must be exported from the master subsystem when it is first configured. When configuring the master instance, there is an option in the Export Keys and Certificates panel to back up the keys and certificates to a PKCS#12 file. Before the clone instance is configured, the PKCS#12 file is copied to the alias/ directory for the clone instance. Then, the PKCS#12 filename is given in the Restore Keys and Certificates screen during the clone's configuration.

If the keys and certificates are stored on a hardware token, then the keys and certificates can be copied or referenced directly in the token:

• Duplicate all the required keys and certificates, except the SSL server key and certificate to the clone instance. Keep the nicknames for those certificates the same. Additionally, copy all the necessary trusted root certificates from the master instance to the clone instance, such as chains or cross-pair certificates.

Chapter 6. Cloning Subsystems

• If the token is network-based, then the keys and certificates simply need to be available to the token; the keys and certificates do not need to be copied.

• When using a network-based hardware token, make sure the high-availability feature is enabled on the hardware token to avoid single point of failure.

6.1.5. Cloning Considerations

As mentioned in Section 6.1, “About Cloning”, part of the behavior of cloning is to replication information between the master and the clone, so that they work from an identical set of data and records. This means that the LDAP servers for the master and clones need to be able to communicate. If these servers are on different hosts, then make sure that there is appropriate firewall access to allow the Directory Server instances to connect with each other.

6.2. Exporting Keys from a Software Database

Ideally, the keys for the master instance are exported when the instance is first created. If the keys were not exported then or if the backup file is lost, then it is possible to extract the keys from the internal software database for the subsystem instance using the PKCS12Export command. For example:

PKCS12Export -debug -d /var/lib/subsystem_name/alias -w p12pwd.txt -p internal.txt -o master.p12

The PKCS#12 file (in this example, master.p12) can then be copied to the clone instance's alias/ directory and imported during the clone configuration.

NOTE

Keys and certificates do not need to be exported from an HSM, so long as the clone instance is installed using the same HSM as the master. If both instances use the same key store, then the keys are naturally available to the clone.

6.3. Cloning a CA

1. Configure the master CA, as described in Section 3.3, “Configuring a CA”, and back up the keys.

2. In the CS.cfg file for the master CA, enable the the master CA to monitor replication database

changes by adding the ca.listenToCloneModifications parameter:

cd /etc/subsystem_name

ca.listenToCloneModifications=true

3. Create the clone subsystem instance.

IMPORTANT

Do not go through the setup wizard for the instance yet.

Cloning a CA

4. Copy the exported PKCS#12 file containing the master instance's keys to the clone's alias/

directory.

The keys for the master instance could have been exported to a .p12 file when the instance was configured. Alternatively, the keys can be exported using the PKCS12Export command, as in

Section 6.2, “Exporting Keys from a Software Database”.

5. Make sure the PKCS#12 file is accessible by the Certificate System user. If necessary, change the

file permissions to pkiuser. For example:

chown pkiuser:pkiuser example.p12

6. Open the setup wizard URL, which was returned when the instance was created. For example:

http://server.example.com:9180/ca/admin/console/config/login?pin=HIsd90RJSioDK==

7. In the Security Domain panel, add the clone to the same security domain to which the master belongs.

8. The Subsystem Type panel sets whether to create a new instance or a clone; select the clone radio button.

9. Give the path and filename of the PKCS #12 backup file which was saved when the master instance was created or that were exported in 4.

If the keys are stored on an HSM that is accessible to the clone, then they are picked up automatically.

Chapter 6. Cloning Subsystems

NOTE

When cloning a CA, the master and clone instances have the same CA signing key.

10. The subsystem information is automatically supplied from the master instance to the clone instance once the keys are successfully restored. Complete the configuration process.

NOTE

By default, the instance configuration wizard uses localhost as the location for the internal LDAP database for a new instance. However, with cloning, the configuration process will spin endlessly and never complete if localhost is used for the internal database location, even if the LDAP database is indeed installed on the localhost.

Use the the fully-qualified domain name for the LDAP database in the Internal Database panel when configuring a clone.

11. Edit the CS.cfg file for the clone. Certain parameters must be added to the clone configuration to disable caching and generating CRLs.

• Disable control of the database maintenance thread:

ca.certStatusUpdateInterval=0

• Disable monitoring database replication changes:

ca.listenToCloneModifications=false

• Disable maintenance of the CRL cache:

ca.crl.IssuingPointId.enableCRLCache=false

• Disable CRL generation:

Cloning OCSP Subsystems

ca.crl.IssuingPointId.enableCRLUpdates=false

• Enable the clone to redirect CRL requests to the master clone:

master.ca.agent.host=master_hostname master.ca.agent.port=master_port

12. Restart the clone instance.

service subsystem_name restart

After configuring the clone, test to make sure that the master-clone relationship is functioning:

1. Request a certificate from the cloned CA.

2. Approve the request.

3. Download the certificate to the browser.

4. Revoke the certificate.

5. Check master CA's CRL for the revoked certificate. In the master Certificate Manager's agent services page, click Update Certificate Revocation List. Find the CRL in the list.

The CRL should show the certificate revoked by the cloned Certificate Manager. If that certificate is not listed, check logs to resolve the problem.

6.4. Cloning OCSP Subsystems

1. Configure the master OCSP, as described in Section 3.5, “Configuring a DRM, OCSP, or TKS”, and back up the keys.

2. In the CS.cfg file for the master OCSP, set the OCSP.Responder.store.defStore.refreshInSec parameter to any non-zero number other than 21600; 21600 is the setting for a clone.

vim /etc/subsystem_name/CS.cfg

OCSP.Responder.store.defStore.refreshInSec=15000

3. Create the clone subsystem instance.

IMPORTANT

Do not go through the setup wizard for the instance yet.

4. Copy the exported PKCS#12 file containing the master instance's keys to the clone's alias/ directory.

Chapter 6. Cloning Subsystems

The keys for the master instance could have been exported to a .p12 file when the instance was configured. Alternatively, the keys can be exported using the PKCS12Export command, as in

Section 6.2, “Exporting Keys from a Software Database”.

5. Make sure the PKCS#12 file is accessible by the Certificate System user. If necessary, change the

file permissions to pkiuser. For example:

chown pkiuser:pkiuser example.p12

6. Open the setup wizard URL, which was returned when the instance was created. For example:

http://server.example.com:11180/ocsp/admin/console/config/login?pin=IOjh7fIOjkld90k

7. In the Security Domain panel, add the clone to the same security domain to which the master belongs.

8. The Subsystem Type panel sets whether to create a new instance or a clone; select the clone radio button.

9. Give the path and filename of the PKCS #12 backup file which was saved when the master instance was created or that were exported in 3.

If the keys are stored on an HSM that is accessible to the clone, then they are picked up automatically.

Cloning OCSP Subsystems

10. The subsystem information is automatically supplied from the master instance to the clone instance once the keys are successfully restored. Complete the configuration process.

NOTE

Use the the fully-qualified domain name for the LDAP database in the Internal Database panel when configuring a clone.

11. Edit the CS.cfg file for the clone. Set the

OCSP.Responder.store.defStore.refreshInSec parameter in the clone instance to

21600.

vim /etc/subsystem_name/CS.cfg

OCSP.Responder.store.defStore.refreshInSec=21600

12. Restart the clone instance.

service subsystem_name start

After configuring the clone, test to make sure that the master-clone relationship is functioning:

1. Set up OCSP publishing in the master CA so that the CRL is published to the master OCSP.

2. Once the CRL is successfully published, check both the master and cloned OCSP's List Certificate Authorities link in the agent pages. The list should be identical.

3. Use the OCSPClient tool to submit OCSP requests to the master and the cloned Online Certificate Status Manager. The tool should receive identical OCSP responses from both managers.

Chapter 6. Cloning Subsystems

6.5. Cloning DRM and TKS Subsystems

1. Configure the master subsystem, as described in Section 3.5, “Configuring a DRM, OCSP, or

TKS”, and back up the keys.

2. Create the clone subsystem instance.

IMPORTANT

Do not go through the setup wizard for the instance yet.

3. Copy the exported PKCS#12 file containing the master instance's keys to the clone's alias/

directory.

The keys for the master instance could have been exported to a .p12 file when the instance was configured. Alternatively, the keys can be exported using the PKCS12Export command, as in

Section 6.2, “Exporting Keys from a Software Database”.

4. Make sure the PKCS#12 file is accessible by the Certificate System user. If necessary, change the

file permissions to pkiuser. For example:

chown pkiuser:pkiuser example.p12

5. Open the setup wizard URL, which was returned when the instance was created. For example:

http://server.example.com:10180/kra/admin/console/config/login?pin=Jhu7HBJiodljnw3oijs

6. In the Security Domain panel, add the clone to the same security domain to which the master belongs.

7. The Subsystem Type panel sets whether to create a new instance or a clone; select the clone radio button.

Cloning DRM and TKS Subsystems

8. Give the path and filename of the PKCS #12 backup file which was saved when the master instance was created or that were exported in 3.

If the keys are stored on an HSM that is accessible to the clone, then they are picked up automatically.

NOTE

When cloning a DRM, the master and clone instances have the same storage and transport keys.

Chapter 6. Cloning Subsystems

9. The subsystem information is automatically supplied from the master instance to the clone instance once the keys are successfully restored. Complete the configuration process.

NOTE

Use the the fully-qualified domain name for the LDAP database in the Internal Database panel when configuring a clone.

10. Restart the clone instance.

service subsystem_name restart

For the DRM clone, test to make sure that the master-clone relationship is functioning:

1. Go to the DRM agent's page.

2. Click List Requests.

3. Select Show all requests for the request type and status.

4. Click Submit.

5. Compare the results from the cloned DRM and the master DRM. The results ought to be identical.

For the TKS, enroll a smart card and then run an ldapsearch to make sure that the same key information is contained in both databases.

6.6. Converting Masters and Clones

There can be any number of clones, but there can only be a single configured master. For DRMs and TKSs, there is no configuration difference between masters and clones, but CAs and OCSPs do have some configuration differences. This means that when a master is taken offline — because of a failure or for maintenance or to change the function of the subsystem in the PKI — then the existing master must be reconfigured to be a clone, and one of the clones promoted to be the master.

6.6.1. Converting CA Clones and Masters

1. Stop the master CA if it is still running.

2. Open the existing master CA configuration directory:

cd /var/lib/pki-ca/conf

3. Edit the CS.cfg file for the master, and change the CRL and maintenance thread settings so that it is set as a clone:

• Disable control of the database maintenance thread:

Redhat CERTIFICATE SYSTEM 8, SYSTEM 8 User Manual

Specifications and Main Features

Frequently Asked Questions

User Manual

Install Guide

About This Guide

1. Examples and Formatting

1.1. Formatting for Examples and Commands

1.2. Tool Locations

1.3. Guide Formatting

2. Additional Reading

3. Giving Feedback

4. Document History

1.1. Subsystems for Managing Certificates

1.1.1. Certificate Manager

1.1.2. Registration Authority

1.1.3. Data Recovery Manager

1.1.4. Online Certificate Status Manager

1.2. Subsystems for Managing Tokens

1.2.1. Token Processing System

1.2.2. Token Key Service

1.2.3. Enterprise Security Client

1.3. Planning the Installation

2.1. Supported Platforms, Hardware, and Programs

2.1.1. Supported Platforms

2.1.2. Supported Web Browsers

2.1.3. Supported Smart Cards

2.1.4. Supported HSM

2.1.5. Supported Charactersets

2.2. Required Programs, Dependencies, and Configuration

2.2.1. Java Development Kit (JDK)

2.2.2. Apache

2.2.3. Red Hat Directory Server

2.2.4. Additional Packages

2.2.5. Firewall Configuration and iptables

2.2.6. SELinux Settings

2.3. Packages Installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux

2.4. Required Information for Subsystem Configuration

2.5.1. Types of Hardware Tokens

2.5.1.1. Internal Tokens

2.5.1.2. External Tokens

2.5.1.3. Hardware Cryptographic Accelerators

2.5.2. Using Hardware Security Modules with Subsystems

2.5.2.1. Adding or Managing the HSM Entry for a Subsystem

2.5.2.2. Using Chrysalis LunaSA HSM

2.5.2.3. Installing External Tokens and Unsupported HSM

2.5.2.4. Setting up SELinux on nCiper netHSM 2000

2.5.3. Viewing Tokens

2.5.4. Detecting Tokens

3.1. Overview of Installation

3.2. Installing the Certificate System Packages

3.2.1. Installing through yum

3.2.2. Installing from an ISO Image

3.3. Configuring a CA

3.4. Configuring an RA

3.5. Configuring a DRM, OCSP, or TKS

3.6. Configuring a TPS

4.2. Installing a CA with ECC Enabled

4.2.1. Loading a Third-Party ECC Module

4.2.2. Loading the Certicom ECC Module

Changing the Hashing Algorithm Used for Subsystem Keys

4.4. Enabling IPv6 for a Subsystem

4.5. Configuring Separate RA Instances

5.1. About pkicreate

5.2. Running pkicreate for a Single SSL Port

5.3. Running pkicreate with Port Separation

6.1. About Cloning

6.1.1. Cloning for CAs

6.1.2. Cloning for DRMs

6.1.3. Cloning for Other Subsystems

6.1.4. Cloning and Key Stores

6.1.5. Cloning Considerations

6.2. Exporting Keys from a Software Database

6.3. Cloning a CA

6.4. Cloning OCSP Subsystems

6.5. Cloning DRM and TKS Subsystems

6.6. Converting Masters and Clones

6.6.1. Converting CA Clones and Masters