lexma X548, XS548, XS796, X925, XS925 User Manual

Lexmark Multi-Function Pr inters Security Target

Lexmark X548, XS548, X748, X792, XS796,

X925, XS925, X950, X952, X954, XS955 and

6500e Scanner (with T650, T652, or T654

Printer) Multi-Function Printers

Security Target

Version 1.11

September 22, 2014

Lexmark International, Inc.

740 New Circle Road

Lexington, KY 40550

Lexmark Multi-Function Pr inters Security Target

2

Prepared By:

http://www.consulting-cc.com

Prepared For:

http://www.lexmark.com

DOCUMENT INTRODUCTION

Common Criteria Consulting LLC
15804 Laughlin Lane
Silver Spring, MD 20906

Lexmark International, Inc.
740 New Circle Road
Lexington, KY 40550

This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), the
Lexmark X548, XS548, X748, X792, XS796, X925, XS925, X950, X952, X954, XS955 and
6500e Scanner (with T650, T652, or T654 Printer) Multi-Function Printers. This Security Target
(ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the
product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements and the IT
security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements.

Various text from clauses 5, 7-9, and 12 reprinted with permission from IEEE, 445 Hoes Lane,
Piscataway, New Jersey 08855, from IEEE "2600.2™-2009 Standard for a Protection Profile in
Operational Environment B", Copyright © 2009 IEEE. All rights reserved.

REVISION HISTORY

Rev Description

1.0 January 13, 2011, initial release

1.1 January 19, 2011, addressed lab EORs

1.2 January 24, 2011, addressed lab EORs

1.3 May 4, 2011, enabled management via the touch panel and addressed FSP consistency

1.4 October 28, 2011, inserted CAVP certificate numbers, deleted references to Lexlink and

Netware

1.5 December 7, 2011, addressed TVOR comments, updated MFP versions

1.6 December 12, 2011, updated MFP version

1.7 December 14, 2011, updated MFP version for 6500e

1.8 February 23, 2012, Addressed FVOR comments

1.9 March 15, 2012, Code update to address a PJL vulnerability

1.10 July 17, 2012, Added the X748 as an additional MFP model

1.11 September 22, 2014, Assurance Continuity for new code version

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 9

1.1 Security Target Reference .......................................................................................... 9

1.2 TOE Reference ............................................................................................................ 9

1.3 Evaluation Assurance Level ....................................................................................... 9

1.4 Keywords ..................................................................................................................... 9

1.5 TOE Overview ............................................................................................................. 9

1.5.1 Usage and Major Security Features ........................................................................... 9

1.5.2 TOE type .................................................................................................................. 10

1.5.3 Required Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware ................................................. 10

1.6 TOE Description ....................................................................................................... 10

1.6.1 Users ........................................................................................................................ 12

1.6.2 Objects (Assets) ....................................................................................................... 13

1.6.2.1 User Data .............................................................................................................. 13

1.6.2.2 TSF Data ............................................................................................................... 14

1.6.2.3 Functions ............................................................................................................... 14

1.6.3 Operations ................................................................................................................ 15

1.6.4 Channels ................................................................................................................... 15

1.7 Physical Boundary .................................................................................................... 15

1.8 Logical Boundary ...................................................................................................... 15

1.8.1 Audit Generation ...................................................................................................... 15

1.8.2 Identification and Authentication ............................................................................ 15

1.8.3 Access Control ......................................................................................................... 15

1.8.4 Management ............................................................................................................. 16

1.8.5 Operator Panel Lockout ........................................................................................... 16

1.8.6 Fax Separation ......................................................................................................... 16

1.8.7 Hard Disk Encryption .............................................................................................. 16

1.8.8 Disk Wiping ............................................................................................................. 16

1.8.9 Secure Communication ............................................................................................ 16

1.8.10 Self Test ................................................................................................................. 16

1.9 TOE Data ................................................................................................................... 16

1.9.1 TSF Data .................................................................................................................. 16

1.9.2 Authentication Data ................................................................................................. 19

1.9.3 Security Attributes ................................................................................................... 19

1.9.4 User Data ................................................................................................................. 20

1.10 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................ 20

1.11 Rationale for Non-Bypassability and Separation................................................. 22

2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ..................................................................................... 24

2.1 Common Criteria Conformance .............................................................................. 24

2.2 Protection Profile Conformance .............................................................................. 24

2.3 Security Requirement Package Conformance ....................................................... 24

3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................... 25

3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 25

3.2 Assumptions............................................................................................................... 25

3.3 Threats ....................................................................................................................... 25

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3.4 Organisational Security Policies .............................................................................. 26

4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES........................................................................................ 27

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................. 27

4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment .......................................... 27

5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ......................................................... 29

5.1 Extended Security Functional Components ........................................................... 29

5.1.1 FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces ...................... 29

FPT_FDI_EXP.1 ............................................................................................................... 30

5.2 Extended Security Assurance Components ............................................................ 30

6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................ 31

6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ................................................................ 31

6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU) .............................................................................................. 31

6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation .................................................................... 31

6.1.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association ............................................................... 33

6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS) .................................................................................. 33

6.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation ....................................................... 33

6.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction ...................................................... 33

6.1.2.3 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation ................................................................. 33

6.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP) ..................................................................................... 34

6.1.3.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control ..................................................................... 34

6.1.3.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control ........................................ 34

6.1.3.3 FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection ............................................ 37

6.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA) .................................................................. 37

6.1.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling....................................................... 37

6.1.4.2 FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition ................................................................. 37

6.1.4.3 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication................................................................. 37

6.1.4.4 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback ................................................. 38

6.1.4.5 FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification .................................................................... 38

6.1.4.6 FIA_USB.1 User-Subject Binding ....................................................................... 38

6.1.5 Security Management (FMT) .................................................................................. 39

6.1.5.1 FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour .............................. 39

6.1.5.2 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes ............................................... 39

6.1.5.3 FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialisation .......................................................... 39

6.1.5.4 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data .............................................................. 39

6.1.5.5 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ........................................ 41

6.1.5.6 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles ................................................................................ 41

6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) .................................................................................... 43

6.1.6.1 FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces ................ 43

6.1.6.2 FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps ...................................................................... 43

6.1.6.3 FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing ....................................................................................... 43

6.1.7 TOE Access (FTA) .................................................................................................. 43

6.1.7.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-Initiated Termination ................................................................ 43

6.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) ................................................................................... 43

6.1.8.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel ................................................................ 43

6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements ................................................................. 43

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6.3 CC Component Hierarchies and Dependencies ..................................................... 44

7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ....................................................................... 46

7.1 Security Functions .................................................................................................... 46

7.1.1 Audit Generation ...................................................................................................... 46

7.1.2 Identification and Authentication ............................................................................ 47

7.1.2.1 Backup Password .................................................................................................. 48

7.1.3 Access Control ......................................................................................................... 48

7.1.3.1 Internal Account Building Blocks ........................................................................ 52

7.1.3.2 LDAP+GSSAPI and PKI Auth Building Blocks .................................................. 52

7.1.3.3 Common Processing ............................................................................................. 52

7.1.3.4 Function Access Control ....................................................................................... 53

7.1.3.5 Postscript Access Control ..................................................................................... 54

7.1.4 Management ............................................................................................................. 55

7.1.4.1 Reports Menu ........................................................................................................ 55

7.1.4.2 Network/Ports Menu ............................................................................................. 55

7.1.4.3 Security Menu ....................................................................................................... 55

7.1.4.4 Settings Menu ....................................................................................................... 58

7.1.4.5 Security Reset Jumper ........................................................................................... 59

7.1.5 Operator Panel Lockout ........................................................................................... 60

7.1.6 Fax Separation ......................................................................................................... 60

7.1.7 Hard Disk Encryption .............................................................................................. 61

7.1.8 Disk Wiping ............................................................................................................. 61

7.1.9 Secure Communications .......................................................................................... 62

7.1.10 Self Test ................................................................................................................. 62

8. PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS ........................................................................ 63

8.1 TOE Type Consistency ............................................................................................. 63

8.2 Security Problem Definition Consistency ............................................................... 63

8.3 Security Objectives Consistency .............................................................................. 63

8.4 Security Functional Requirements Consistency .................................................... 63

8.5 Security Assurance Requirements Consistency ..................................................... 64

9. RATIONALE .............................................................................................................. 65

9.1 Rationale for IT Security Objectives....................................................................... 65

9.1.1 Rationale Showing Threats to Security Objectives ................................................. 65

9.1.2 Rationale Showing Policies to Security Objectives ................................................. 66

9.1.3 Rationale Showing Assumptions to Environment Security Objectives ................... 67

9.2 Security Requirements Rationale ............................................................................ 68

9.2.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives ................ 68

9.2.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ........................................................... 71

9.3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale .................................................................. 71

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 - TOE Model ................................................................................................... 12

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 - Technical Characteristics of the MFP Models .............................................. 11

Table 2 - Technical Characteristics of the Integrated Printer Models .......................... 11

Table 3 - Notational prefix conventions ....................................................................... 12

Table 4 - Users ............................................................................................................. 13

Table 5 - User Data ...................................................................................................... 13

Table 6 - TSF Data ....................................................................................................... 14

Table 7 - Functions ....................................................................................................... 14

Table 8 - TSF Data ....................................................................................................... 16

Table 9 - Authentication Data ...................................................................................... 19

Table 10 - Security Attributes .................................................................................... 20

Table 11 - User Data .................................................................................................. 20

Table 12 - Source-Destination Combinations ............................................................ 22

Table 13 - Assumptions .............................................................................................. 25

Table 14 - Threats....................................................................................................... 25

Table 15 - Organizational Security Policies for the TOE .......................................... 26

Table 16 - Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................... 27

Table 17 - Security Objectives of the Operational Environment ............................... 27

Table 18 - Audit data requirements ............................................................................ 31

Table 19 - Cryptographic Operations ......................................................................... 33

Table 20 - Common Access Control SFP Rules ........................................................ 35

Table 21 - Management of Security Functions Behaviour......................................... 39

Table 22 - TSF Data ................................................................................................... 40

Table 23 - FMT_SMR.1 Detail .................................................................................. 42

Table 24 - EAL2+ Assurance Requirements .............................................................. 44

Table 25 - TOE SFR Dependency Rationale ............................................................. 44

Table 26 - Access Control Items ................................................................................ 49

Table 27 - TOE Function Access Control SFP Rules ................................................ 53

Table 28 - Network/Ports Menu TSF Data ................................................................ 55

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Table 29 - Security Menu TSF Data .......................................................................... 55

Table 30 - General Settings Menu TSF Data ............................................................. 58

Table 31 - Fax Settings Menu TSF Data .................................................................... 58

Table 32 - Email Settings Menu TSF Data ................................................................ 59

Table 33 - Print Settings/Setup Settings Menu TSF Data .......................................... 59

Table 34 - Threats, Policies and Assumptions to Security Objectives Mapping ....... 65

Table 35 - Threats to Security Objectives Rationale .................................................. 66

Table 36 - Policies to Security Objectives Rationale ................................................. 67

Table 37 - Assumptions to Security Objectives Rationale ......................................... 67

Table 38 - SFRs to Security Objectives Mapping ...................................................... 68

Table 39 - Security Objectives to SFR Rationale....................................................... 69

Table 40 - SFRs to TOE Security Functions Mapping .............................................. 71

Table 41 - SFR to SF Rationale.................................................................................. 72

ACRONYMS LIST

AES ................................................................................. Advanced Encryption Standard

AIO ..................................................................................................................... All In One

BSD .................................................................................. Berkeley Software Distribution

CAC ................................................................................................ Common Access Card

CAVP .................................................... Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program

CC ........................................................................................................... Common Criteria

CM ......................................................................................... Configuration Management

EAL .......................................................................................Evaluation Assurance Level

ESP ................................................................................. Encapsulating Security Payload

FTP ................................................................................................. File Transfer Protocol

GSSAPI ............................... Generic Security Services Application Program Interface

HTTP .................................................................................. HyperText Transfer Protocol

I&A ................................................................................. Identification & Authentication

IPSec ......................................................................................... Internet Protocol Security

IPv4......................................................................................... Internet Protocol version 4

IPv6......................................................................................... Internet Protocol version 6

ISO .......................................................................... International Standards Orgaization

IT ................................................................................................. Information Technology

KDC ............................................................................................. Key Distribution Center

LAN ................................................................................................... Local Area Network

LDAP .................................................................. Lightweight Directory A ccess Proto col

MB ....................................................................................................................... MegaByte

MFD ................................................................................................ Multi-Finction Device

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MFP ............................................................................................... Multi-Function Printer

NTP............................................................................................... Network Time Protocol

OSP ................................................................................... Organizational Security Policy

PIV ..................................................................................... Personal Identity Verification

PJL .................................................................................................. Printer Job Language

PKI ........................................................................................... Public Key Infrastructure

PP ............................................................................................................ Protection Profile

RFC .............................................................................................. Request For Comments

SASL............................................................. Simple Authentication and Security Layer

SFP ............................................................................................. Security Function Policy

SFR .............................................................................. Security Functional Requirement

SMTP .............................................................................Simple Mail Transport Protocol

ST ................................................................................................................Security Target

TFTP ................................................................................. Trivial File Transfer Protocol

TOE ................................................................................................... Target of Evaluation

TSF ............................................................................................... TOE Security Function

UI .................................................................................................................. User Interface

URL ........................................................................................ Uniform Resource Locator

USB .................................................................................................... Universal Serial Bus

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1. Security Target Introduction

This Security Target (ST) describes the objectives, requirements and rationale for the Lexmark
X548, XS548, X748, X792, XS796, X925, XS925, X950, X952, X954, XS955 and 6500e
Scanner (with T650, T652, or T654 Printer) Multi-Function Printers. The language used in this
Security Target is consistent with the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 and all international interpretations through March 17, 2011. As such,
the spelling of terms is presented using the internationally accepted English.

1.1 Security Target Reference

Lexmark X548, XS548, X748, X792, XS796, X925, XS925, X950, X952, X954, XS955 and
6500e Scanner (with T650, T652, or T654 Printer) Multi-Function Printers Security Target,
version 1.11, September 22, 2014.

1.2 TOE Reference

Lexmark X548 (LHS40.VK.P440), XS548 (LHS40.VK.P440), X748 (LHS40.NY.P440), X792
(LHS40.MR.P440), XS796 (LHS40.MR.P440), X925 (LHS40.HK.P440), XS925
(LHS40.HK.P440), X950 (LHS40.TQ.P440), X952 (LHS40.TQ.P440), X954
(LHS40.TQ.P440), XS955 (LHS40.TQ.P440) and 6500e Scanner (LHS40.JR.P440) (with T650
(LHS40.JR.P440), T652 (LHS40.JR.P440), or T654 (LHS40.JR.P440) Printer) Multi-Function
Printers

1.3 Evaluation Assurance Level

Assurance claims conform to EAL2 (Evaluation Assurance Level 2) augmented with
ALC_FLR.2 from the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1.

1.4 Keywords

Hardcopy, Paper, Document, Printer, Scanner, Copier, Facsimile, Fax, Document Server,
Document Storage and Retrieval, Nonvolatile storage, Residual data, Temporary data, Disk
overwrite, Network interface, Shared communications medium, Multifunction Device,
Multifunction Product, All-In-One, MFD, MFP

1.5 TOE Overview

1.5.1 Usage and Major Security Features

The MFPs are multi-functional printer systems with scanning, fax, and networked capabilities. Their
capabilities extend to walk-up scanning and copying, scanning to fax, scanning to email, and
servicing print jobs through the network. The MFPs feature an integrated touch-sensitive operator
panel.

The major security features of the TOE are:

1. All Users are identified and authenticated as well as authorized before being granted

permission to perform any restricted TOE functions.

2. Administrators authorize Users to use the functions of the TOE.

3. User Document Data are protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration.

4. User Function Data are protected from unauthorized alteration.

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5. TSF Data, of which unauthorized disclosure threatens operational security, are protected

from unauthorized disclosure.

6. TSF Data, of which unauthorized alteration threatens operational security, are protected

from unauthorized alteration.

7. Document processing and security-relevant system events are recorded, and such records

are protected from disclosure or alteration by anyone except for authorized personnel.

1.5.2 TOE type

Miscellaneous (Multifunction Hard Copy Device)

1.5.3 Required Non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware

The TOE is a complete MFP, including the firmware and hardware. To be fully operational, any
combination of the following items may be connected to the TOE:

1. A LAN for network connectivity. The TOE supports IPv4 and IPv6.

2. A telephone line for fax capability.

3. IT systems that submit print jobs to the MFP via the network using standard print

protocols.

4. IT systems that send and/or receive faxes via the telephone line.

5. An IT system acting as the remote syslog recipient of audit event records sent from the

TOE.

6. LDAP server to support Identification and Authentication (I&A). This component is

optional depending on the type(s) of I&A mechanisms used.

7. Card reader and cards to support PKI authentication using Common Access Card (CAC)

or Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards. This component is optional depending on
the type(s) of I&A mechanisms used. The supported card readers are:

a. Omnikey 5121 SmartCard Reader,
b. Omnikey 5321 SmartCard Reader,
c. Omnikey 5125 SmartCard Reader,
d. Omnikey 3121 SmartCard Reader,
e. Any other Omnikey SmartCard Readers that share the same USB Vendor IDs

and Product IDs with the above readers (example Omnikey 3021),

f. SCM SCR 331.

1.6 TOE Description

The TOE provides the following functions related to MFPs:

1. Printing – producing a hardcopy document from its electronic form

2. Scanning – producing an electronic document from its hardcopy form

3. Copying – duplicating a hardcopy document

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X548

IBM 750CL PowerPC

Color

25

XS548

IBM 750CL PowerPC

Color

25

X748

Freescale 7448 PowerPC

Color

35

X792

Freescale 7448 PowerPC

Color

50

XS796

Freescale 7448 PowerPC

Color

50

X925

Freescale 7448 PowerPC

Color

30

XS925

Freescale 7448 PowerPC

Color

30

X950

IBM 750CL PowerPC

Color

40

X952

IBM 750CL PowerPC

Color

45

X954

IBM 750CL PowerPC

Color

50

XS955

IBM 750CL PowerPC

Color

50

6500e

IBM 750CL PowerPC

Mono

See Table 2 -

T650

500 MHz ARM

45

T652

500 MHz ARM

50

T654

600 MHz ARM

55

4. Faxing – scanning documents in hardcopy form and transmitting them in electronic form

over telephone lines, and receiving documents in electronic form over telephone lines and
printing them in hardcopy form

The Lexmark 6500e Scanner is integrated with a T65x monochrome printer to provide a
complete MFP. The scanner unit provides the touch panel, original document handler, fax
interface, and network interface. The printer unit provides the print engine and its only external
connection is to the scanner unit. The TOE includes the hardware and firmware in both the
scanner and printer units. All of the other models included in the evaluation (X548, XS548,
X748, X792, XS796, X925, XS925, X950, X952, X954, and XS955) are complete MFPs in a
single unit.

All of the MFPs included in this evaluation provide the same security functionality. Their
differences are in the speed of printing and support for color operations. The following tables
summarize the technical characteristics of the models.

Table 1 - Technical Characteristics of the MFP Models

Model Processor Color/Mono Pages Per

Minute

The speed of printing for the 6500e Scanner solution is dependent on the printer model that the
scanner is integrated with. The following table provides this information.

Table 2 - Technical Characteristics of the Integrated Printer Models

Model Processor Pages Per

Minute

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is described using the standard Common Criteria terminology of
Users, Objects, Operations, and Interfaces. Two additional terms are introduced: Channel
describes both data interfaces and hardcopy document input/output mechanisms, and TOE
Owner is a person or organizational entity responsible for protecting TOE assets and establishing
related security policies. In this document, the terms User and Subject are used interchangeably.

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U.

User

D.

Data

F.

Function

T.

Threat

P.

Policy

A.

Assumption

O.

Objective

OE.

Environmental objective

+

Security Attribute

TSF

User

User

TSF

TSF

Fax

Copy

Scan

Print

Shared

Functions

Figure 1 - TOE Model

Input

Channel

User Data

Document

Data

Functions

Common MF P F unctions

Function

Functions

Functions

Protected

Data

Functions

TSF Data

Confidential

Medium

The following prefixes are used to indicate different entity types:

Table 3 - Notational prefix conventions

Prefix Type of entity

Output

Channel

Data

1.6.1 Users

Users are entities that are external to the TOE and which interact with the TOE. There may be
two types of Users: Normal and Administrator.

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U.USER

Any authorized User.

U.NORMAL

A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing

terms identified above are used.

U.ADMINISTRATOR

A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some

used.

D.DOC

User Document Data consists of the information contained in a user’s document. This

5. User data in received faxes

Table 4 - Users

Designation Definition

functions o f the TOE.
In the remainder of this document, the term “Normal User” is used
interchangeably with U.NORMAL.
The TOE provides user-level permissions to access specific document
processing f unc ti o ns ( e.g. print, copy). When i t is necessa ry to distinguish
the specific permission, that in formation is supplied. Otherwise the generic

portion or all of the TOE and whose actio ns may affect the TOE securit y
policy (TSP).
In the remainder of this document, the terms “Administrator” and
“Authorized Administrator” are used interchangeably with
U.ADMINISTRATOR.
The TOE provides user -level permissions to access specific management
functions. When it is necessary to distinguish the specific permission, t hat
information is supplied. Otherwise the generic terms identified above are

1.6.2 Objects (Assets)

Objects are passive entities in the TOE, that contain or receive information, and upon which
Subjects perform Operations. Objects are equivalent to TOE Assets. There are three categories of
Objects: User Data, TSF Data, and Functions.

1.6.2.1 User Data

User Data are data created by and for Users and do not affect the operation of the TOE Security
Functionality (TSF). This type of data is composed of two types of objects: User Document
Data, and User Function Data.

Table 5 - User Data

Designation Definition

includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or electronic form, image data,
or residually-stored data created by the hardcopy device while processing an original
document and printed hardcopy output.
For this TOE, D.DOC includes:

1. User data contained in jobs submitted from the network for printing

2. Scanned data to be printed (copying)

3. Scanned data to be faxed

4. Scanned data to be emailed

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D.FUNC

User Function Data are the information about a user’s document or job to be processed

5. Job information for user data in received faxes

D.PROT

TSF Protected Data are assets for which alteration by a User who is neither an

security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable.

D.CONF

TSF Confidential Data are assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User

operational security of the TOE.

F.PRT

Printing: a function in which electr onic document input is converted to physical
document output

F.SCN

Scanning: a function in which p hysical document input is converted to ele c tr onic
document output

F.CPY

Copying: a function in which physical document input is dup lic a te d to physical
document output

F.FAX

Faxing: a function in which physical document input is converted to a te le phone-based

document facsimile (fax) reception is converted to physical document output

F.SMI

Shared-medium interface: a function that transmits or receives User Data or TSF Data

wired o r wirele ss ne t wor k media and most radio-frequency wireless media

Designation Definition

by the TOE.
For this TOE, D.FUNC includes:

1. Job information for network print jobs

2. Job information for scanned data to be printed (copying)

3. Job information for scanned data to be faxed

4. Job information for scanned data to be emailed

1.6.2.2 TSF Data

TSF Data are data created by and for the TOE and that might affect the operation of the TOE.
This type of data is composed of two types of objects: TSF Protected Data and TSF Confidential
Data.

Table 6 - TSF Data

Designation Definition

Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational

who is neither an Administrator nor the owner o f the data would have an effect on the

1.6.2.3 Functions

Functions perform processing, storage, and transmission of data that may be present in the TOE.
These functions are described in the following table.

Table 7 - Functions

Designation Definition

document facsimile (fax) transmission, and a function in which a telephone-based

over a communications medium which is or can be shared by other users, such as

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1.6.3 Operations

Operations are a specific type of action performed by a Subject on an Object. Five types of
operations are addressed: those that result in disclosure of information (Read), those that result in
alteration of information (Create, Modify, Delete), and those that invoke a function (Execute).

1.6.4 Channels

Channels are the mechanisms through which data can be transferred into and out of the TOE.
Private Medium Interface: mechanism for exchanging information that use (1) wired electronic

methods over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is not accessed by
multiple simultaneous Users; or, (2) Operator Panel and displays that are part of the TOE. It is an
input-output channel. The touch panel and phone line are private medium interfaces.

Shared-medium Interface: mechanism for exchanging information that use wired network
electronic methods over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be
simultaneously accessed by multiple Users. It is an input-output channel. The standard network
interface is a shared-medium interface.

Original Document Handler: mechanism for transferring User Document Data in hardcopy
form into the TOE. It is an input channel. The scanner is an original document handler.

Hardcopy Output Handler: mechanism for transferring User Document Data out of the TOE in
hardcopy form. It is an output channel. The printer is a hardcopy output handler.

1.7 Physical Boundary

This section provides context for the TOE evaluation by describing the physical boundary of the
TOE. The physical boundary of the TOE consists of all of the MFP hardware and firmware.

In the case of a scanner integrated with a printer, the TOE consists of all of the scanner hardware and
firmware, all of the printer hardware and firmware, as well as the cable interconnecting the two units.
The Scanner is connected to an external network (for user access) on its primary network interface,
and the scanner’s secondary network interface is connected to the printer.

1.8 Logical Boundary

The TOE supports the security functions documented in the following sections.

1.8.1 Audit Generation

The TOE generates audit event records for security-relevant events and transmits them to a
remote IT system using the syslog protocol.

1.8.2 Identification and Authentication

The TOE supports I&A with a per-user selection of internal accounts (processed by the TOE) or
integration with an external LDAP server (in the operational environment). PKI authentication
may also be specified for users of the touch panel. A Backup Password mechanism may also be
enabled.

1.8.3 Access Control

Access controls configured for functions (e.g. fax usage) and menu access are enforced by the
TOE.

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Access Control

Access control authorizations specify the restrictions on

accessible), or restricted by a specified security template.

X

Account Status

Login status information is asso c ia te d with all accounts

status.

X

Analog Fax - Cancel
Faxes

Specifies whether pending faxes can be canceled by users.

X

1.8.4 Management

Through web browser sessions, authorized administrators may configure access controls and
perform other TOE management functions.

1.8.5 Operator Panel Lockout

Authorized users may lock and unlock the touch panel. When the touch panel is locked, print
jobs are still accepted but they are queued on the disk drive until the touch panel is unlocked.

1.8.6 Fax Separation

The TOE ensures that only fax traffic is sent or received via the attached phone line. Incoming
traffic is processed as fax data only; no management access or other data access is permitted. In
the evaluated configuration, the only source for outgoing faxes is the scanner.

1.8.7 Hard Disk Encryption

All use data submitted to the TOE and stored on the hard disk is encrypted to protect its
confidentiality in the event the hard drive was to be removed from the TOE.

1.8.8 Disk Wiping

In the evaluated configuration, the TOE automatically overwrites disk blocks used to store user
data as soon as the data is no longer required. The mechanism used to perform the overwrite
complies with NIST SP800-88 (dated September 2006), and the DSS "Clearing and Sanitization
Matrix" (C&SM) available at http://www.sdisac.com/clearing_and_sanitization_matrix.doc
(dated 5 March 2001).

1.8.9 Secure Communication

The TOE protects the confidentiality and integrity of all information exchanged over the attached
network by using IPSec with ESP for all network communication.

1.8.10 Self Test

During initial start-up, the TOE performs self tests on its hardware components and the integrity
of the building blocks and security templates.

1.9 TOE Data

1.9.1 TSF Data
Table 8 - TSF Data

Item Description D.CONF D.PROT

Authorizations

menus or functions. Items may be configured for no
security (accessible to everyone), disabled (not

used to authenticate against a building block. For each
building block and account, the TOE tracks the number of
login failures, time of the earliest login failure, and lock

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Analog Fax - Driver to
fax

Specifies whether driver fax jobs are treated as PS jobs
and printed or sent as faxes.

X

Analog Fax - Enable
Fax Receive

Specifies whether incoming faxes may be received.

X

Analog Fax - Fax
Forwarding

Specifies whether fax forwarding of incomi ng faxes to a
destination ot her than the printer is enabled.

X

Analog Fax - Holding
Faxes

Defines conditions for holding incoming faxes.

X

Date and Time

Controls whether the time is tracked internally or from a

the parameters for communicat io n wit h the se rve r .

X

Disk Encryption

Specifies whether or not files stored on disk are

operation.

X

Disk Wiping ­Automatic Method

Specifies the method used for automatic disk wiping.

X

Disk Wiping - Wiping
Mode

Controls the mode used for disk wiping.

X

E-mail images sent

Specifies whether ima ges forwarded via SMTP are sent as

URL.

X

Enable Audit

Determines if the device records events in the secure audit
log and (if enabled) in the remote syslog.

X

Enable Fax Scans

Specifies whether users can create faxes with the device’s
scanner.

X

Enable FTP/TFTP

Enables FTP/TFTP server on the TOE.

X

Enable HTTP Server

Enables HTTP(S) server on the TOE.

X

Enable Remote Syslog

Determines if the device transmits logged events to a
remote server.

X

Fax Mode

Specifies whether the fax function is operat ing in Analog

a fax server via SMTP).

X
Fax Server - Enable
Analog Receive

This parameter controls whether incoming faxes are
supported when operating in fax server mode

X

Fax Storage Location

Specifies the storage location for faxes. This parameter

accessible to administrators d uring operation.

X
Held Print Job
Expiration Timer

Specifies the amount of time a received print job is saved
for a user to release before it is automatically deleted.

X

Internal Account

The building blocks specify Internal Accounts as the

specify memberships.

X

Internal Account

The set of Internal Account Groups may be used to

authorizations for access controls using Internal Accounts.

X

IPSec Settings

The configuration parameters for IPSec that require IPSec

IPv6) with certificate validation.

X

Internal Accounts

Credentials

Specifies whether Internal Accounts use username and

X

Item Description D.CONF D.PROT

Parameters

as

remote NTP server. If an NTP server is used, it specifies

encrypted. This parameter must be set to “Enable” during
installation and is not accessible to administrators during

an attachment or FTP’d to a file syste m and sent as a

mode or as a Fax Server (outgoing faxes are forwarded to

must be set to “Disk” during installatio n and is not

Building Blocks

Groups

Required User

mechanism to be used for I&A or authorizations and

configure group membership for Internal Accounts and

with ESP for all networ k communication (IPv4 and/or

password or just username for the I&A process.

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Job Waiting

Specifies whether a print job may be placed in the Held

be processed immediately

X

LDAP Certificate

Specifies what verification (if any) should be done on the

proceeds normally.

X

LDAP+GSSAPI –

Specifies whether the default certificate or a specific

LDAP server.

X
LDAP+GSSAPI –
MFP Credentials

Specifies the Username and password to be used when
performing LDAP queries.

X

LDAP+GSSAPI

The building blocks specify LDAP+GSSAPI as the

required object names).

X
LES Applications

Specifies whether enhanced service Java applications may

administrators during operation.

X

Login Restrictions

Determines how many failed authe ntications are allowed

user is logged off automatically.

X

Network Port

Defines the parameters required for the TOE to
communicate via the standard network port

X

PKI Auth Buil ding

The building block specifies PKI as the mechanism to be

Templates.

X

Remote Sysl og
Parameters

Defines the communica tion to the r emote syslog system

X

Item Description D.CONF D.PROT

Jobs queue if the required resources (e.g. paper type) are
not currently availabl e, enabling subsequent print jobs to

Verification

Certificate

Building Blocks

certificate sent by an LDAP server. Demand specifies
that the server certificate is requested; if no certificate is
provided or if a bad certificate is pr ovided, the session is
terminated immediately. Try indicates the server
certificate is requested; if no ce rtificate is provided, the
session proceeds normally. If a bad certificate is provided,
the session is terminated imme diately. Allow indicates
the server certificate is requested; if no certificate is
provided, the session proceeds normally. If a bad
certificate is provided, it will b e ignore d and the session

certificate is required when communicating with an

mechanism to be used for I&A or authorizations and
specify parameters for retrieving information from an
LDAP server (e.g. group names to check, search base,

be executed on the TOE. This parameter must be set to
“Enable” during installation a nd is not a ccessible to

within the “Failure time frame” value before the offending
User Name is prevented from accessing any function
protected with the same building blo ck for the dur ation of
the “Lockout time” value. The “Panel Login Timeout”
determines how long the operator panel can remain idle
on the Home screen before the user is logged off
automatically. The “Remote Login Timeout” determines
how l ong web browser sessions can remain idle before the

Block

used for I&A or authorizations and specifies parameters
for validating the certificate from the card and retrieving
information from Active Directo ry. This building block is
configured during installation. I t c a n’t be viewed or
modified operationally but can be configured in Security

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Security Reset

Specifies the behavior of the TOE when a position change

control to its factory default sec urity level.

X
Security Templates

Security Templates are used to configure access controls

associated function or menu.

X

Simple Kerberos Setup

Defines the KDC Address, KDC Port, and Re alm for

mechanism.

X

SMTP Setup Settings

Define the SMTP server to be used to send email from the
TOE

X

SMTP Setup Settings ­User-Initiated E-mail

Specifies what credentials (if any) are used to authenticate
with an external SMTP server.

X

Touch Panel Menu
Display - FTP

Specifies whether or not the FTP icon should be displayed
on the touch panel menu.

X

Touch Panel Menu

shortcuts

Specifies whether or not the FTP shortcuts icon should be

X
Touch Panel Menu
Display - USB Drive

Specifies whether or not the USB Drive icon should be
displayed on the touch p anel menu.

X
USB Buffer

Disables all activity via the USB device ports.

X

Use Backup Password

Enables access to the Security Menu via the Backup
Password

X

Backup Password

The Backup Password mechanism allows an administrator to access the

configured for it.

Internal Account

Internal Accounts are used in conjunction with the Internal Account

for each defined account are used with Internal Account authentication.

Item Description D.CONF D.PROT

Jumper

of the Security Rest Jumper is detected. No Effect
indicates the jumper should be ignored. “No Security”
preserves all of the building blocks and templates that a
user has defined, but resets each access control to its
factory default security level. “Reset to Defaults” deletes
all building blocks and templates and resets each access

for restricted functions and menus. Each security
template specifies 2 building blocks – one for
authentication and one for authorization. The 2 building
blocks may be the same. The security template also
specifies a set of groups that are authorized to access the

communication with the KDC. K DC communication is
required if the TOE is using the LDAP+GSSAPI

Display - FTP

displayed on the touch p anel menu.

1.9.2 Authentication Data

All the items described in the following table are D.CONF.

Table 9 - Authentication Data

Item Description

Security Menu via a web browser session, regardless of the access controls

Usernames and Passwords

authentication and authorization mechanism. The username and pas sword

1.9.3 Security Attributes

All the items described in the following table are D.CONF.

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Group Memberships

The set of group memberships associated with the current session as the
result of successful I&A.

Username

The username specified during a successful I&A interaction.

Copy Job

Data input to the TOE via the scanner and destined for the printer.

Held Faxes

Data received via the fax interface and held until released by an authorized
administrator.

Held Jobs

Data received via the network interface that is destined for the printer and
held until released at the touch panel by the submitter.

Incoming Fax Job

Data received via the fax interface and destined for the printer.

Network Print Job

Data received via the network interface and destined for the printer. All
network print jobs are held until released.

Scanned Job to be
Emailed

Data input to the TOE via the scanner and destined for the SMTP server
specified by an authorized administrator.

Scanned Job to be Faxed

Data input to the TOE via the scanner and queued for transmission as a fax
via the phone line.

Table 10 - Security Attributes

Item Description

1.9.4 User Data

All the items described in the following table have both a D.DOC and D.FUNC component.

Table 11 - User Data

Item Description

1.10 Evaluated Configuration

The following configuration options apply to the evaluated configuration of the TOE:

1. The TOE includes the single Ethernet interface that is part of the standard configuration

of every MFP model. No optional network interfaces are installed.

2. No optional parallel or serial interfaces are installed. These are for legacy connections to

specific IT systems only.

3. All USB ports on the MFPs that perform document processing functions are disabled. In

the operational environments in which the Common Criteria evaluated configuration is of
interest, the users typically require that all USB ports are disabled. If PKI authentication
is used, the card reader is physically connected to a specific USB port during TOE
installation; in the evaluated configuration this USB port is limited in functionality to
acting as the interface to the card reader.

4. Operational management functions are performed via browser sessions to the embedded

web server or via the management menus available through the touch panel.

5. Disk encryption is enabled.

6. Access controls are configured for all TSF data so that only authorized administrators are

permitted to manage those parameters.

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7. All network communication is required to use IPSec with ESP to protect the

confidentiality and integrity of the information exchanged, including management
sessions that exchange D.CONF and D.PROT. Certificates presented by remote IT
systems are validated.

8. Support for AppleTalk is disabled since it does not provide confidentiality and integrity

protection.

9. I&A may use Internal Accounts and/or LDAP+GSSAPI on a per-user basis. The Backup

Password mechanism may be enabled at the discretion of the administrators. PKI
authentication is used for touch panel users. No other I&A mechanisms are included in
the evaluation because they provide significantly lower strength than the supported
mechanisms.

10. LDAP+GSSAPI and PKI authentication require integration with an external LDAP

server such as Active Directory. This communication uses default certificates; the LDAP
server must provide a valid certificate to the TOE. Binds to LDAP servers for
LDAP+GSSAPI use device credentials (not anonymous bind) so that the information
retrieved from Active Directory can be restricted to a specific MFP. Binds to LDAP
servers for PKI authentication use user credentials from the card (not anonymous bind) so
that the information retrieved from Active Directory can be restricted to a specific user.

11. Internal Accounts require User ID and password (rather than just User ID).

12. Audit event records are transmitted to a remote IT system as they are generated using the

syslog protocol.

13. Disk wiping functionality is configured for automatic mode with a multi-pass method.

This approach is the more secure form of disk wiping and is compliant with NIST SP800­88 and the DSS "Clearing and Sanitization Matrix" (C&SM).

14. User data sent by the MFP in email messages is sent as an attachment (not as a web link).

15. No Java applications are loaded into the MFP by Administrators. These applications are

referred to as LES applications in end user documentation. The following LES
applications are installed by Lexmark before the TOE is shipped: “PKI Authentication”,
“PKI Held Jobs”, and “CAC Smartcard Authentication Token”.

16. No option card for downloadable emulators is installed in the TOE.

17. All fax jobs are stored on disk (rather than NAND) to ensure their contents are wiped

upon completion of each job. Incoming faxes are always held until released by an
authorized administrator.

18. Some form of credentials (device or user) is required to authenticate to the SMTP server.

19. Fax forwarding is disabled to limit the destinations for incoming faxes to the local printer

only.

20. NPAP, PJL and Postscript have the ability to modify system settings. The capabilities

specific to modifying system settings via these protocols are disabled.

21. All administrators must be authorized for all of the document processing functions (print,

copy, scan, fax).

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Printer

May Be Disabled Or
Restricted

May Be Disabled Or
Restricted

May Be Disabled Or
Restricted

Outgoing Fax

Disabled

May Be Disabled Or
Restricted

Disabled

Email (via the Network
Interface)

n/a

May Be Disabled Or
Restricted

Disabled

FTP (via the Network
Interface)

n/a

Disabled

Disabled

22. All network print jobs are held until released via the touch panel. Every network print

job must include a PJL SET USERNAME statement to identify the userid of the owner of
the print job. Held print jobs may only be released by an authenticated user with the
same userid as specified in the print job.

23. All incoming fax jobs are held until released via the touch panel. Held print jobs may

only be released by an authenticated user with the U.ADMINISTRATOR role.

24. Administrators are directed (through operational guidance) to specify passwords adhering

to the following composition rules for Internal Accounts and the Backup Password:

• A minimum of 8 characters

• At least one lower case letter, one upper case letter, and one non-alphabetic

character

• No dictionary words or permutations of the user name

25. All unnecessary network ports are disabled.

The following table defines the combinations of possible input sources and destinations that are
included in the evaluated configuration. In the table, the following meanings are used:

Destination

• “May Be Disabled Or Restricted” indicates that the functionality is included in

the evaluation but may be disabled or restricted to an authorized set of users at the
discretion of an administrator

• “Disabled” indicates the functionality exists within the TOE but is always

disabled by an administrator for the evaluated configuration

• “n/a” indicates the functionality does not exist in the TOE

Table 12 - Source-Destination Combinations

Source

Print Protocols (via

Scanner Incoming Fax

the Network

Interface)

1.11 Rationale for Non-Bypassability and Separation

The TOE is a stand-alone system that includes all hardware and software required for operation.
The TOE is not a general-purpose platform; rather it is a specialized platform with strictly
controlled functionality made available to the users. By limiting the functionality, the TSF is
protected from corruption or compromise. The TOE interfaces are separated into 2 categories –
security enforcing and security supporting. Security enforcing interfaces invoke the TSF and

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ensure that all enforcement functions complete successfully before allowing the user invoked
action to proceed. Security supporting interfaces ensure that the TSF cannot be interfered with
via those interfaces (i.e., they are isolated from the TSF). Multiple simultaneous users are
supported, and the TOE enforces separate domains for each process/user to ensure the
appropriate attributes and privileges are associated with each process/user.

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2. Conformance Claims

2.1 Common Criteria Conformance

Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 3
Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant

2.2 Protection Profile Conformance

PP Identification: U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices (IEEE Std.

2600.2™-2009), dated February 26, 2010, version 1.0, including the augmentations specified by
Attachment A of CCEVS Policy Letter #20 dated 15 November 2010.

PP Conformance: “2600.2-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational
Environment B,” “2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational
Environment B,” “2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational
Environment B,” “2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational
Environment B,” “2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational
Environment B,” and “2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium
Interface Functions, Operational Environment B”

This Security Target claims demonstrable conformance to the Security Problem Definition
(APE_SPD), Security Objectives (APE_OBJ), Extended Components Definitions (APE_ECD),
and the Common Security Functional Requirements (APE_REQ) of the referenced PP.

This TOE performs the functions F.PRT, F.SCN, F.CPY, F.FAX, and F.SMI as defined in the
referenced PP and claims demonstrable conformance to the SFR packages defined for each of
these functions.

Rationale for PP conformance is provided in chapter 8.

2.3 Security Requiremen t Pack ag e Con f orman c e

Security assurance requirement package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Security functional requirement package conformance: The SFR packages itemized below from

the referenced PP.

1. Common Security Functional Requirements

2. 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational

Environment B

3. 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational

Environment B

4. 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational

Environment B

5. 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational

Environment B

6. 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions,

Operational Environment B

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A.Type

Description

A.ACCESS.MANAGED

The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides

interfaces of the TOE.

A.ADMIN.TRAINING

Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their

in accordance with those policies and procedures.

A.ADMIN.TRUST

Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious
purposes.

A.USER.TRAINING

TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their

procedures.

T.CONF.ALT

TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

T.CONF.DIS

TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons

T.DOC.ALT

User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

T.DOC.DIS

User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons

T.FUNC.ALT

User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

T.PROT.ALT

TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons

3. Security Problem Definition

3.1 Introduction

This chapter defines the nature and scope of the security needs to be addressed by the TOE.
Specifically this chapter identifies:

A) assumptions about the environment,
B) threats to the assets and
C) organisational security policies.

This chapter identifies assumptions as A.assumption, threats as T.threat and policies as P.policy.

3.2 Assumptions

The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.

Table 13 - Assumptions

protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data

organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s
guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE

organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and

3.3 Threats

The threats identified in the following subsections are addressed by the TOE and the Operational
Environment.

Table 14 - Threats

T.Type TOE Threats

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P.AUDIT.LOGGING

To preserve operational accountability and security,

and will be reviewed by authorized personnel

P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT

To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces

controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.

P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION

To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF,

the TSF.

P.USER.AUTHORIZATION

To preserve operational accountability and security,

permitted by the TOE Owner

3.4 Organisational Security Policies

This section describes the Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) that apply to the TOE. OSPs
are used to provide a basis for security objectives that are commonly desired by TOE Owners in
this operational environment but for which it is not practical to universally define the assets
being protected or the threats to those assets.

Table 15 - Organizational Security Policies for the TOE

Name Definition

records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and
security-relevant eve nt s wil l be created, maintained, and
protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration,

of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be

procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in

Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as

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O.Type

Security Objective

O.AUDIT.LOGGED

The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and s ecurity-relevant
events and p revent its unauthorized disclo s ure or alteration.

O.CONF.NO_ALT

The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized alte ration.

O.CONF.NO_DIS

The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized d isc losure.

O.DOC.NO_ALT

The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized alteration.

O.DOC.NO_DIS

The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized disclosure.

O.FUNC.NO_ALT

The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized alteration.

O.INTERFACE.MA
NAGED

The TOE shal l manage the operation of external interfaces in accordance with
security policies.

O.I&A

The TOE shall provide functionality to identify and authenticate users whose
accounts are defined internal to the TOE.

O.MANAGE

The TOE will provide all the functio ns and facilities necessary to support the

functions and facilities from unauthorized use.

O.PROT.NO_ALT

The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized alteration.

O.SOFTWARE.VER
IFIED

The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF.

O.TIME_STAMP

The TOE will provide reliable time stamps for accountability purpo ses when
internal clocks are configured by an administrator.

O.USER.AUTHORI

The TOE shall require identification and authentication of U se r s, a nd shall

allowing them to use the TOE.

OE.Type

Operational Environment Security Objective

OE.ADMIN.TRAINED

The TOE Owner shall ensure that TOE Administrators are aware of the

accordance with those policies and procedures.

OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED

The TOE Owner shall establish trust that TOE Administrators will not use
their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.

OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED

The TOE Owner shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at appropriate
intervals for security violation s or unusual patterns of activity.

4. Security Objectives

This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the TOE’s Operational
Environment. The security objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE’s
Operational Environment in meeting the security needs. Objectives of the TOE are identified as

O.objective. Objectives that apply to the operational environment are designated as
OE.objective.

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The TOE must satisfy the following objectives.

Table 16 - Security Objectives for the TOE

administrators in their management of the security of the TOE, and restrict these

ZED

ensure that Users are authorized in accordance with security policies before

4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The TOE’s operational environment must satisfy the following objectives.

Table 17 - Security Objectives of the Operational Environment

security policies and procedures of their organization; have the training,
competence, and time to follow the manufacturer’s guidance and
documentation; and correctly configure and operate the TOE in

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OE.Type

Operational Environment Security Objective

OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AU

If audit records generated by the TOE are exported from the TOE to

authorized persons.

OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.P

If audit records are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT product,

unauthorized access, deletion and modifications.

OE.I&A

The operational environment shall provide functionality to identi f y and
authenticate users whose accounts are defined external to the TOE.

OE.INTERFACE.MANA
GED

The IT environment shall provide protection from unmanaged access to
TOE external interfaces.

OE.PHYSICAL.MANAG
ED

The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that provides
protection from unmanaged physical access to the TOE.

OE.TIME_STAMP

The Operational Environment wil l provide reliable time stamps for
accountability purpo s es when NTP is configure d by an administrator.

OE.USER.AUTHORIZED

The TOE Owner shall grant permission to Users to be authorized to use

organization.

OE.USER.TRAINED

The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of the security policies

to follow those policies and procedures.

THORIZED

ROTECTED

another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records
can be accessed in order to detect potential security violations, and only by

the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records are protected from

the TOE according to the security policies and procedures of their

and procedures of their organization and have the training and competence

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FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces

1

5. Extended Components Definition

5.1 Extended Security Functional Components

5.1.1 FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
Family behaviour:

This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from
one external interface to another external interface.

Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform
and process this information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However,
some products may provide the capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate
the security of the TOE or devices that are connected to the TOE’s external interfaces. Therefore,
direct forwarding of unprocessed data between different external interfaces is forbidden unless
explicitly allowed by an authorized administrative role. The family FPT_FDI_EXP has been
defined to specify this kind of functionality.

Component leveling:

FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces provides for the
functionality to require TSF controlled processing of data received over defined external
interfaces before these data are sent out on another external interface. Direct forwarding of data
from one external interface to another one requires explicit allowance by an authorized
administrative role.

Management: FPT_FDI_EXP.1

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

a) Definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management

activities

b) Management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be

allowed by an administrative role

c) Revocation of such an allowance

Audit: FPT_FDI_EXP.1

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is
included in the PP/ST:

There are no auditable events foreseen.

Rationale:

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Quite often, a TOE is supposed to perform specific checks and process data received on one
external interface before such (processed) data are allowed to be transferred to another external
interface. Examples are firewall systems but also other systems that require a specific work flow
for the incoming data before it can be transferred. Direct forwarding of such data (i.e., without
processing the data first) between different external interfaces is therefore a function that—if
allowed at all—can only be allowed by an authorized role.

It has been viewed as useful to have this functionality as a single component that allows
specifying the property to disallow direct forwarding and require that only an authorized role can
allow this. Since this is a function that is quite common for a number of products, it has been
viewed as useful to define an extended component.

The Common Criteria defines attribute-based control of user data flow in its FDP class.
However, in this Protection Profile, the authors needed to express the control of both user data
and TSF data flow using administrative control instead of attribute-based control. It was found
that using FDP_IFF and FDP_IFC for this purpose resulted in SFRs that were either too
implementation-specific for a Protection Profile or too unwieldy for refinement in a Security
Target. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to address this
functionality.

This extended component protects both user data and TSF data, and it could therefore be placed
in either the FDP or the FPT class. Since its purpose is to protect the TOE from misuse, the
authors believed that it was most appropriate to place it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any
of the existing families in either class, and this led the authors to define a new family with just
one member.

FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces

Hierarchical to: No other co mponents

Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1

The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: list of

external interfaces] from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to [assignment:
list of external interfaces].

5.2 Extended Security Assurance Components

No extended security assurance requirements are defined.

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SECURE AUDIT TURNED ON/OFF

FAU_GEN.1

n/a

Setting (ON or OFF)

6. Security Requirements

This section contains the functional requirements that are provided by the TOE. These
requirements consist of functional components from Part 2 of the CC.

The CC defines operations on security requirements. The font conventions listed below state the
conventions used in this ST to identify the operations.

Assignment: indicated in italics
Selection: indicated in underlined text
Assignments within selections: indicated in italics and underlined text
SFR operation completed or partially completed in the PP: Bold

Refinement: indicated with bold text

Iterations of security functional requirements may be included. If so, iterations are specified at
the component level and all elements of the component are repeated. Iterations are identified by
letters in parentheses following the component or element (e.g., FAU_ARP.1(A)).

6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The functional requirements are described in detail in the following subsections. Additionally,
these requirements are derived verbatim from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation with the exception of completed operations.

6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)

6.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation

FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:

a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All Auditable Events as each is defined for its Audit Level (if one is specified) for

the Relevant SFR in Table 18; the additional auditable events specified in Table 18.

FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success

or failure) of the event; and

b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional

components included in the PP/ST, for each Relevant SFR listed in Table 18: (1)

information as defined by its Audit Level (if one is specified), and (2) all
Additional Information (if any is required; the internal event number, ISO 8601

time of the event occurrence, severity, and process.

Auditable event Relevant

Table 18 - Audit data requirements

Audit level Additional

SFR

Information

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Job Completed

FDP_ACF.1

Not specified

Job identifier

Job Canceled

FDP_ACF.1

Not specified

Job identifier

Print Job Flushed (because no userid was
specified)

FDP_ACF.1

Not specified

None

Expired held job deleted (because it was not

FDP_ACF.1

Not specified

Userid specified in

statement

Authoriza t ion Failure

FDP_ACF.1

Not specified

Building block type
and name

Successful A ut ho ri za tio n

FDP_ACF.1

Not specified

Building block type
and name

Authentication Failure

FIA_UAU.1,

Basic

Building block type

user identi ty

Successful A ut he nti ca tion

FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UID.1

Basic

Building block type
and name

Authoriza t ion Failure

FMT_MTD.1

Not specified

Building block type
and name

Successful A ut ho ri za tio n

FMT_MTD.1

Not specified

Building block type
and name

Setting cha nge

FMT_MTD.1

Basic

Parameter identifier
and new value

Authentication/Authorization Settin g
CREATION (FAILURE!)

FMT_MTD.1

Basic

Building block type
and name

Authentication/Authorization Settin g
CREATION (Succ ess)

FMT_MTD.1

Basic

Building block type
and name

Authentication/Authorization Settin g
DELETION (FAILURE!)

FMT_MTD.1

Basic

Building block type
and name

Authentication/Authorization Settin g
DELETION (Success)

FMT_MTD.1

Basic

Building block type
and name

Authentication/Authorization Settin g
MODIFICATION (FAILURE!)

FMT_MTD.1

Basic

Building block type
and name

Authorization Setting MODIFI CATION
(Success)

FMT_MTD.1

Basic

Building block type
and name

Use of the management functions

FMT_SMF.1

Minimum

None

Modifications to the group of users that are part
of a role

FMT_SMR.1

Minimum

None
Time change d

FPT_STM.1

Minimum

None

Time change greater than maximum tolerance

FPT_STM.1

Minimum

None

Time changed due to time source change

FPT_STM.1

Minimum

None

Time changed due to Battery Failure

FPT_STM.1

Minimum

None

User logged out due to timeout

FTA_SSL.3

Minimum

None

Failure of t he trusted channel

FTP_ITC.1

Minimum

None

released)

Auditable event Relevant

SFR

FIA_UID.1

Audit level Additional

Information

the PJL SET
USERNAME

and name, attempted

Application Note: The audit for “Use of the management functions” is addressed by the “Setting change” and

“Authentication/Authorization Setting” audits. It is included in the audit table above for conformance with
the P2600 PP.

Application Note: The audit for “Modifications to the group of users that are part of a role” is addressed by the

“Authentication/Authorization Setting” audits. It is included in the audit table above for conformance with
the P2600 PP.

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DES (CBC mode)

56

FIPS 46-3

Triple-DES (EDE in CBC
mode) (CAVP cert. #1170)

AES (CBC mode) (CAVP cert.
#1815)

160, 224, 256,
384, 512

MD5

128

RFC 1321

HMAC (CAVP cert. #1071)

Message authentication coding

128, 160

FIPS 198

RSA (CAVP cert. #910)

Digital signatures

1024, 2048

PKCS#1

Group 1 (768),

Group 14 (2048)

6.1.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association

FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able
to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

6.1.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

FCS_CKM.1.1(A) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm random number generator and specified cryptographic
key sizes 256 bits that meet the following: X9.31 A.2.4 (AES) (vendor affirmed).

Application Note: This instance of the SFR applies to the AES key used for hard disk encryption.

FCS_CKM.1.1(B) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA and specified cryptographic key sizes 2048 bits that
meet the following: PKCS #1 (vendor affirmed).

Application Note: This instance of the SFR applies to the RSA public-private key pair generated for the default certificate.

6.1.2.2 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroization that meets the following: FIPS 140-2 (vendor
affirmed).

6.1.2.3 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform the operations listed in the table below in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm multiple algorithms described below and cryptographic key
sizes as described below that meet the following: multiple standards as described below.

Application Note: The TOE has not undergone a FIPS 140-2 validation, but the algorithms have been validated by the CAVP

program.

Table 19 - Cryptographic Operations

Algorithm

SHA (CAVP cert. #1592)

Encryption, decryption

Hashing

Operations Key Size in

Bits

168 FIPS 46-3

128, 192, 256 FIPS 197

Standards

FIPS 180-2

Diffie-Hellman Key agreement

Group 2 (1024),
Group 5 (1536),

PKCS #3

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PRNG (CAVP cert. #957)

Random number generation

n/a

ANSI X9.31

Algorithm

Operations Key Size in

Bits

Standards

6.1.3 User Data Protection (FDP)

6.1.3.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control

FDP_ACC.1.1(A) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP on

1. Subjects: Users (U.USER)

2. Objects: Copy Job, Incoming Fax Job, Network Print Job, Scanned Job to be Emailed,

Scanned Job to be Faxed

3. Operations: Create, View, Modify, Release, Delete

Application Note: “Release” refers to releasing held faxes or held jobs to be printed (at which time they can be read). “View”

refers the ability to see that the job exists (D.FUNC), not to view the user data inside the job. No
functionality exists to view the user data inside a job other than printing the document. “Modify” refers to
the ability to change job parameters (e.g. number of copies).

FDP_ACC.1.1(B) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP on

1. Subjects: Users (U.USER)

2. Objects: TOE Functions - F.PRT, F.SCN, F.CPY, F.FAX, F.SMI

3. Operations: Invoke

FDP_ACC.1.1(C) The TSF shall enforce the Touch Panel Access Control SFP on

1. Subjects: Users (U.USER)

2. Objects: Touch Panel

3. Operations: Lock, Unlock, Use

6.1.3.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control

FDP_ACF.1.1(A) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP to objects based on
the following:

1. Subjects: Users (U.USER) – Username, Group memberships

2. Objects: Copy Job, Incoming Fax Job, Network Print Job, Scanned Job to be Emailed,

Scanned Job to be Faxed - owner

FDP_ACF.1.2(A) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: the rules specified in the following table.

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Copy Job

Allowed if the user is a

the touch panel.

Allowed

Not

n/a

Allowed for jobs

Incoming Fax

Allowed if the Fax

Held Faxes access control.

Allowed if

Not

Allowed if the

Allowed if the

Network Print

Allowed if the submitted

Allowed

Allowed

control

Allowed for jobs

Allowed for jobs

Scanned Job to

Allowed if the user is a

parameter is “Fax Server”.

Allowed

Not

n/a

Allowed for jobs

Table 20 - Common Access Control SFP Rules

Operation

Object

Job

Create View Modify Release Delete

member of an authorized
group of the security
template configured for the
Copy Function access
control. The job owner is
the authenticated user of

Function access control is
not “disabled”, and if the
“Enable Fax Receive” or
“Enable Analog Receive”
parameter is “On”. Note
that all incoming faxes are
held in the evaluated
configuration. Incoming
faxes are owned by any
user that is a member of an
authorized group of the
security template
configured for the Release

for jobs
owned by
the user

the user is a
member of
an
authorized
group of
the security
template
configured
for the
Release
Held Faxes
access
control

allowed

allowed

user is a member
of an authorized
group of the
security template
configured for
the Release Held
Faxes access
control

owned by the
user

user is a member
of an authorized
group of the
security template
configured for the
Release Held
Faxes access
control

Job

be Emailed

job includes a userid in a
SET USERNAME PJL
statement and the user is a
member of an authorized
group for the Solution 1
access control. Note that
all incoming network print
jobs are held in the
evaluated configuration.
The job owner is the userid
specified in the PJL SET
USERNAME statement.

member of an authorized
group of the security
template configured for the
Fax Function access
control; the “Enable Fax
Scans” parameter is On;
and the “Fax Mode”

for jobs
owned by
the user

for jobs
owned by
the user

for jobs
owned by
the user if
the user is
a memb er
of an
authorized
group of
the
security
template
configured
for the
Held Jobs
Access
access

Allowed

owned by the
user if the user is
a member of an
authorized group
of the securi ty
template
configured for
the Held Jobs
Access access
control

owned by the
user

owned by the
user

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The job owner is the

touch panel.

Scanned Job to

Allowed if the user is a

touch panel.

Allowed

Not

n/a

Allowed for jobs

Operation

Create View Modify Release Delete

Object

authenticated user of the

be Faxed

member of an authorized
group of the s ecurity
template configured for the
Fax Function access
control; the “Enable Fax
Scans” parameter is On;
and the “Fax Mode”
parameter is “Analog Fax”.
The job owner is the
authenticated user of the

for jobs
owned by
the user

Allowed

owned by the
user

FDP_ACF.1.3(A) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: no rules that explicitly authorise access.

FDP_ACF.1.4(A) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following rules: if a listed access control is “Disabled” access is denied.

FDP_ACF.1.1(B) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP to objects based
on the following:

1. Subjects: Users (U.USER) – Group memberships

2. Objects: TOE Functions (F.PRT, F.SCN, F.CPY, F.FAX, F.SMI) - None

FDP_ACF.1.2(B) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: the user is explicitly authorized by
U.ADMINISTRATOR to use a function.

FDP_ACF.1.3(B) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: no rules that explicitly authorise access.

FDP_ACF.1.4(B) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following rules: if a listed access control is “Disabled” access is denied.

FDP_ACF.1.1(C) The TSF shall enforce the Touch Panel Access Control SFP to objects based
on the following:

1. Subjects: Users (U.USER) – Group memberships

2. Objects: Touch Panel - None

FDP_ACF.1.2(C) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

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1. Lock – A user may lock the Touch Panel if the Operator Panel Lock access control is

restricted and that user is a member of an authorized group.

2. Unlock – A user may unlock the Touch Panel if the Operator Panel Lock access control

is restricted and that user is a member of an authorized group.

3. Use – Any user may use the Touch Panel when it is not locked.

FDP_ACF.1.3(C) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: no rules that explicitly authorise access.

FDP_ACF.1.4(C) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following rules: no rules that explicitly deny access.

6.1.3.3 FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection

FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects: D.DOC.

6.1.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

6.1.4.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling

FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within
the range of 1 to 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to accounts within the
administratively configured failure time frame.

FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or
surpassed, the TSF shall disable the account for the administratively configured lockout time.

6.1.4.2 FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition

FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users:

1. Username

2. Password

3. Associated groups

4. User permissions, as specified by associated groups and security template configurations

5. Number of consecutive authentication failures

6. Time of the earliest authentication failure (since the last successful login if any have

occurred)

7. Account lock status

6.1.4.3 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication

FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow submission of network print jobs, incoming faxes (if
enabled), and usage of the touch panel and browser sessions with the Embedded Web Server to
access menus that have been configured for “no security” on behalf of the user to be performed

before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing

any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

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Application Note: The TOE only perform s the au t hentication for users using Internal A c c ount s or the Backup Password. When

I&A uses LDAP+GSSAPI or PKI, authentication is under the control of the LDAP server (and CAC/PIV) in
the operational environment. For all mechanisms, the TOE restricts access to other functionality until
authentication is successful.

6.1.4.4 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Au th enti cat io n Feedb a ck

FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only asterisks (“*”)or dots (“●”) to the user while the
authentication is in progress.

6.1.4.5 FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification

FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow incoming faxes (if enabled) and usage of the touch panel and
browser sessions with the Embedded Web Server to access menus that have been configured for
“no security” on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Application Note: The TOE only performs the identification for users using Internal Accounts or the Backup Password. When

I&A uses LDAP+GSSAPI or PKI, identification is under the control of the LDAP server (and CAC/PIV) in
the operational environment. For all mechanisms, the TOE restricts access to other functionality until
identification is successful.

6.1.4.6 FIA_USB.1 User-Subject Binding

FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting
on behalf of that user:

1. Username

2. Password

3. Associated groups (for Internal Accounts only)

4. User permissions

5. Building block name used during authentication

FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security
attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users:

1. The username and password are the values supplied by the user.

2. The associated groups are the values configured for the user account.

3. User permissions are determined by the security templates that include groups in the

authorization building blocks that are associated groups of the user.

4. The building block name is specified in the security template of the item with access

control restrictions that required I&A.

FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security
attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: the security attributes do not
change during a session.

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Audit Generation

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Disable, enable

Identification & Authentication

Security Menu at the Device,

Determine t he behaviour of,

behaviour o f

Access Control

Security Menu at the Device,

Determine t he behaviour of,

behaviour o f

Management

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Disable, enable

Operator Panel Lock

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Disable, enable

Fax Separation

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Disable, enable

Security Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Determine t he behaviour of,
modify the behaviour of

Disk Wiping

Security Menu at the Device,

Determine t he behaviour of,

behaviour o f

Secure Communication

Settings Menu at the Device,

Determine t he behaviour of,

behaviour o f

6.1.5 Security Management (FMT)

6.1.5.1 FMT_MOF.1 Management of Security Functions Behaviour

FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to determine the behaviour of, disable, enable,
modify the behaviour of the functions listed in the following table to administrators that pass the
access control check for the authorization item specified for the listed functions.

Table 21 - Management of Security Functions Behaviour

Function Authorization Item Operations

Security Menu Remotely

Security Menu Remotely

Security Menu Remotely

Settings Menu Remotely

disable, enable, modify the

disable, enable, modify the

disable, enable, modify the

disable, enable, modify the

6.1.5.2 FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes

FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP, TOE Function Access
Control SFP and Touch Panel Access Control SFP to restrict the ability to query, modify, delete,
create the security attributes Username, associated groups and user permissions to
administrators authorized for access to the Security Menu.

6.1.5.3 FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialisation

FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP, TOE Function Access
Control SFP and Touch Panel Access Control SFP to provide restrictive default values for

security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the no role to specify alternative initial values to override

the default values when an object or information is created.

6.1.5.4 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF Data

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to query, modify, delete, create the data
identified in the following table to the authorized identified roles except U.NORMAL.

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Access Control
Authorizations

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Analog Fax - Cancel
Faxes

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Analog Fax - Driver to
fax

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Analog Fax - Enab le Fax
Receive

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Analog Fax - Enable
Manual Fax

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Analog Fax - Fax
Forwarding

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Analog Fax - Holding
Faxes

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify, Delete, Create

Backup Password

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Modify, Delete, Create

Date and Time
Parameters

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Disk Wiping - Automatic
Method

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Disk Wiping - Wiping
Mode

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Download Target

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

E-mail images sent
as

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Enable Audit

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Enable Fax Scans

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Enable FTP/TFTP

Network/Ports Menu at the Device,
Network/Ports Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Enable HTTP Server

Network/Ports Menu at the Device,
Network/Ports Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Enable Remote Syslog

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Fax Mode

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Fax Server - Enable
Analog Receive

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Held Print Job Expiration
Timer

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Internal Account Building
Blocks

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify, Delete, Create

Internal Acc ount Groups

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify, Delete, Create

Internal Account
Usernames and Passwords

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify, Delete, Create

Application Note: The user permission for each TSF data item to determine “authorized identified roles” is identified in the

following table.

Table 22 - TSF Data

Item Authorization Menu Item Operations

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Internal Accounts
Required User Credentials

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Job Waiting

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

LDAP Certificate
Verification

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

LDAP+GSSAPI –
Certificate

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

LDAP+GSSAPI – MFP
Credentials

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

LDAP+GSSAPI Building
Blocks

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify, Delete, Create

Login Restrictions

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Network Port

Network/Ports Menu at the Device,
Network/ Ports Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Remote Sysl og
Parameters

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Security Reset
Jumper

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Security Templates

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify, Delete, Create

Simple Kerberos Setup

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

SMTP Setup Settings

Network/Ports Menu at the Device,
Network/Ports Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

SMTP Setup Settings ­User-Initiated E-mail

Network/Ports Menu at the Device,
Network/Ports Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Touch Panel Menu
Display - FTP

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Touch Panel Menu
Display - FTP sho rtcuts

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Touch Panel Menu
Display - USB Drive

Settings Menu at the Device,
Settings Menu Remotely

Query, Modify
USB Buffer

Network/Ports Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Use Backup Password

Security Menu at the Device,
Security Menu Remotely

Query, Modify

Item Authorization Menu Item Operations

6.1.5.5 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

1. User management

2. Access control management

3. Time management

6.1.5.6 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles

FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles defined by the security-relevant permissions in
the following table that can be configured in an operational TOE for users via building blocks in
security templates for the specific permissions.

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Copy Function

Control’s a user’s access to the Copy functionality

No

E-mail Function

Control’s a user’s access to the Email functionality
(scan to email)

No

Fax Function

Control’s a user’ s ability to perform a scan to fax job

credentials.

No

Network/Ports Menu

submenus)

Controls access to the Network/ Ports Menu via the

Yes
Operator Panel Lock

Controls access to the “Lock Device” and “Unlock
Device” buttons

Yes

Release Held Faxes

Controls access to the Held Faxes button and the
Release Held Faxes button on the Home screen

Yes

Reports Menu Remotely

Controls access to the Reports Menu via the

administrators.

Yes

Security Menu Remotely
(and submenus)

Controls access to the Security Menu via the
Administration Menus

Yes

Service Engineer Menu at

submenus)

Controls access to any SE menu accessible from the

Yes
Settings Menu Remotely
(and submenus)

Controls access to the Settings Menu via the
Administration Menus

Yes

Solution 1

In the evaluated configuration, controls which users

the Held Jobs menu.

No

Table 23 - FMT_SMR.1 Detail

Item Description Administrators Only?

When “Disabled”, all analog faxing (scan send,
receive, and driver send) and the fax server are
disabled. The fax icon is removed and the device does
not answer incoming cal ls nor print driver faxes .
However, the panel menus still display fax-related
settings as though fax were enabled.

When protected by a security template, the values of
the “Enable Fax Scan”, “Driver to Fax”, and “Enable
Fax Receive” settings in the “Fax Settings Menu”
determine the behavior of Fax Receive and Driver Fax.
Fax Scan sending is enabled if the user provides valid

Remotely (and

(and submenus)

the device (and

Administration Menus

Administration Menus. This includes information
about user jobs, which can’t be disclosed to non-

panel, including the Network SE menu

are permitted to submit networ k print jobs and access

Application Note: If any permission identified as “Administrators Only” in the table above is associated with a use r acc ount,

then that user account is implicitly an Administrator (U.ADMINISTRATOR). If no pe rm i s s ion i de ntified as
“Administrators Only” in the table above is associated with a user accoun t b ut any pe r m i s s ion not identified
as “Administrator Only” is, then that user account is implic itly a Normal User (U.NORMAL). The role
“Nobody” applies to a defined user that has no permissions identified in the table above .

FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles, except for the role
“Nobody” to which no user shall be associated.

Refinement Rationale: The SFR is reproduced with the refinement included in the P2600.2 Protection profile..

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6.1.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

6.1.6.1 FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on any

external Interface from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to any Shared-
medium Interface.

Application Note: For this TOE, the netwo r k interface is the only shared-medium interface.

6.1.6.2 FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps

FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time-stamps.

Application Note: This SFR only applies when the TOE is configured to use internal timestamps. If the TOE is configured to

obtain timestamps from an external NTP server, this functionality is provided by that external NTP server in
the operational environment.

6.1.6.3 FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing

FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up to demonstrate the
correct operation of the hardware components of the TSF.

FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
the security templates and building blocks.

FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.

6.1.7 TOE Access (FTA)

6.1.7.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-Initiated Termination

FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a period of time configured by
an authorized administrator for touch panel and web browser sessions.

6.1.8 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

6.1.8.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted
IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.

FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for communication
of D.DOC, D.FUNC, D.PROT, and D.CONF over any Shared-medi um In terf ace.

Application Note: For this TOE, the network inter face is t he only shared-medium interface. The TSF requires all IP datagrams

entering or leaving the box to use IPSec with ESP (other than the ISAKMP/IKE datagrams used to set up the
security assoc iat ions). If an incoming IP datagram does not satisfy this rule, the TSF attempts to establish a
security association with the remote IT system that originated the datagram.

6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The TOE meets the assurance requirements for EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2. These
requirements are summarized in the following table.

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Development

ADV_ARC.1

Security architecture description

ADV_FSP.2

Security-enforcing functional
specification

ADV_TDS.1

Basic design

Guidance Documents
AGD_OPE.1

Operatio nal user guidance

AGD_PRE.1

Preparative procedures

Life-Cycle Support

ALC_CMC.2

Use of a CM system

ALC_CMS.2

Parts of the TOE CM coverage

ALC_DEL.1

Delivery procedures

ALC_FLR.2

Flaw reporting procedures

Tests

ATE_COV.1

Evidence of coverage

ATE_FUN.1

Functional testing

ATE_IND.2

Independent testing - sample

Vulnerabi lit y Assessment

AVA_VAN.2

Vulnerabi l ity analysis

FAU_GEN.1

No other components.

FPT_STM.1

Satisfied

FAU_GEN.2

No other components.

FAU_GEN.1,
FIA_UID.1

Satisfied
Satisfied

FCS_CKM.1

No other components.

[FCS_CKM.2

FCS_CKM.4

Satisfied

FCS_CKM.4

No other components.

[FDP_ITC.1 or

FCS_CKM.1]

Satisfied

FCS_COP.1

No other components.

[FDP_ITC.1 or

FCS_CKM.4

Satisfied

FDP_ACC.1

No other components.

FDP_ACF.1

Satisfied

FDP_ACF.1

No other components.

FDP_ACC.1,
FMT_MSA.3

Satisfied
Satisfied

FDP_RIP.1

No other components.

None

n/a

FIA_AFL.1

No other components.

FIA_UAU.1

Satisfied

FIA_ATD.1

No other components.

None

n/a

FIA_UAU.1

No other components.

FIA_UID.1

Satisfied

FIA_UAU.7

No other components.

FIA_UAU.1

Satisfied

FIA_UID.1

No other components.

None

n/a

FIA_USB.1

No other components.

FIA_ATD.1

Satisfied

FMT_MOF.1

No other components.

FMT_SMF.1,

Satisfied

Table 24 - EAL2+ Assurance Requirements

Assurance Class Component ID Component Title

6.3 CC Component Hierarchies and Dependencies

This section of the ST demonstrates that the identified SFRs include the appropriate hierarchy
and dependencies. The following table lists the TOE SFRs and the SFRs each are hierarchical
to, dependent upon and any necessary rationale.

Table 25 - TOE SFR Dependency Rationale

SFR Hierarchical To Dependency Rationale

or
FCS_COP.1],

FDP_ITC.2, or

FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1],

Satisfied

Satisfied

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FMT_SMR.1

Satisfied

FMT_MSA.1

No other components.

[FDP_ACC.1

FMT_SMR.1

Satisfied

Satisfied

FMT_MSA.3

No other components.

FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_SMR.1

Satisfied
Satisfied

FMT_MTD.1

No other components.

FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1

Satisfied
Satisfied

FMT_SMF.1

No other components.

None

n/a

FMT_SMR.1

No other components.

FIA_UID.1

Satisfied

FPT_FDI_EXP.1

No other components.

FMT_SMR.1

Satisfied

FPT_STM.1

No other components.

None

n/a

FPT_TST.1

No other components.

None

n/a

FTA_SSL.3

No other components.

None

n/a

FTP_ITC.1

No other components.

None

n/a

SFR Hierarchical To Dependency Rationale

or FDP_IFC.1],
FMT_SMF.1

Satisfied

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7. TOE Summary Specification

7.1 Security Functions

7.1.1 Audit Generation

The TOE generates audit event records for security-relevant events. A severity level is
associated with each type of auditable event; only events at or below the severity level
configured by an administrator are generated.

Each record format follows the syslog format defined in the Berkeley Software Distribution
(BSD) Syslog Protocol (RFC 3164). The TOE supplies the PRI, HEADER, MSG/TAG, and
MSG/CONTENT fields for all messages. The CONTENT portion may contain the following
fields (in order, separated by commas):

• Event Number

• ISO 8601 time ([YYYY-MM-DD]T[hh:mm:ss])

• Severity

• Process (same as TAG)

• Remote IPv4 address

• Remote IPv6 address

• Remote Hostname

• Remote Port

• Local Port

• Authentication/Authorization method

• Username

• Setting ID

• Setting’s new value

• Event name

• Event data

The time field is supplied by the TOE if internal time is configured by an administrator or by an
NTP server if external time is configured.

Fields in the CONTENT section that are not relevant for specific events are blank. The remote
IPv4 address, remote IPv6 address, remote hostname, remote port, and local port fields are
always blank for events resulting from actions at the MFP (e.g. usage of the touch panel). The
events that cause audit records to be generated are specified in section 6.1.1.1 .

As audit event records are generated, they are forwarded to the remote syslog IT system
configured by an administrator.

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7.1.2 Identification and Authentication

Users are required to successfully complete the I&A process before they are permitted to access
any restricted functionality. The set of restricted user functionality is under the control of the
administrators, with the exception of submission of network print jobs which is always allowed.
Users are permitted to access any TOE functionality that has a corresponding access control (see
section 7.1.3 below) configured for “no security”.

The I&A process is controlled by security templates that are associated with functions and
menus. Each security template specifies two building blocks – one for authentication and the
second for authorization. The security template also includes a list of groups that are authorized
to perform the function or access the menu that the security template is associated with.

When I&A is necessary, the TOE examines the authentication building block in the security
template to determine what authentication mechanism should be used. The general purpose
mechanisms supported in the evaluated configuration are PKI authentication, Internal Accounts
and LDAP+GSSAPI.

For PKI authentication, no functions at the touch panel are allowed until I&A successfully
completes. The touch panel displays a message directing the user to insert a CAC/PIV card into
the attached reader. Once a card is inserted, the user is prompted for a PIN. When the PIN is
entered, only asterisks (“*”) or dots (“●”) are displayed. Once the PIN is collected (indicated by
the user touching the Next button), the TOE passes the PIN to the card for validation. If it is not
valid, a message is displayed on the touch panel and the user is asked to re-enter the PIN. After
the card-configured number of consecutive invalid PINs, the card will lock itself until unlocked
by a card administrator.

Upon successful card validation, the TOE forwards the certificate from the card to the configured
Kerberos Key Distribution Center (Windows Domain Controller) for validation. If the certificate
validation is not successful, an error message is displayed on the touch panel until the current
card is removed from the reader. If the certificate validation is successful, the TOE binds the
username, account name, email address (all obtained from the LDAP server), and name of the
building block used for authentication to the user session for future use. An audit record for the
successful authentication is generated.

For Internal Accounts and LDAP+GSSAPI, the TOE collects a username and password via the
touch panel or via the browser session. When the password is entered, only asterisks (“*”) are
displayed. Once the username and password are collected, the next step in the process depends
on the I&A mechanism being used.

For Internal Accounts, the TOE performs the validation of the username and password against
the set of configured Internal Accounts.

For LDAP+GSSAPI, the TOE forwards the username and password to the configured LDAP
server for validation and waits for the response. If no response is received, the validation is
considered to have failed.

For Internal Accounts and LDAP+GSSAPI, if the validation fails because of an invalid password
(for a valid username), the count of failed authentication attempts is incremented for that
building block and account combination. If the threshold for failed attempts within a time period
is reached, then the account is marked as being locked for the configured amount of time to
mitigate against brute force password attacks. This information is tracked in memory and is not

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maintained across a restart of the TOE. Note that for LDAP+GSSAPI validations, the server
may also be enforcing limits on authentication failures. These mechanisms operate
independently and are not required to be comparably configured.

In the case of failed validations, an error message is displayed via the touch panel or browser
session, and then the display returns to the previous screen for further user action. An audit
record for the failed authentication attempt is generated.

If validation is successful, the TOE binds the username, password, account name, email address,
group memberships (for Internal Accounts only) and name of the building block used for
authentication to the user session for future use (only the username and group memberships are
security attributes). An audit record for the successful authentication is generated.

The user session is considered to be active until the user explicitly logs off, removes the card or
the administrator-configured inactivity timer for sessions expires. If the inactivity timer expires,
an audit record is generated.

If a user locks the touch panel, the user session is terminated immediately. Similarly, after a user
unlocks the touch panel, the user session is terminated immediately.

7.1.2.1 Backup Password

The Backup Password mechanism allows an administrator to access the Security Menu
regardless of the access controls configured for it. When a user attempts to access the Security
Menu, the authentication prompt displays a selection that enables a user to authenticate with the
Backup Password instead of the method that normally secures this menu. This function may be
necessary under unusual circumstances, such as when communication with the LDAP server is
not operational.

If the correct Backup Password is supplied, the administrator is considered to be successfully
authenticated and authorized for access to the Security Menu (only). A “Successful
Authentication” audit record is generated. If an incorrect Backup Password is supplied, an error
message is displayed, an audit record is generated, and then the display is returned to the
previous screen.

If an invalid password is supplied, the count of failed authentication attempts for the Backup
Password is incremented. If the threshold for failed attempts within a time period is reached,
then the Backup Password is marked as being locked for the configured amount of time to
mitigate against brute force password attacks. This information is tracked in memory and is not
maintained across a restart of the TOE.

The Backup Password mechanism may be disabled by an authorized administrator.

7.1.3 Access Control

Access control validates the user access request against the authorizations configured by
administrators for specific functions. On a per-item basis, authorization may be configured as
“disabled” (no access), “no security” (open to all users), or restricted (via security templates)
(some items do not support all three options). Authorization may be configured for the following
items:

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Address Book

Controls access to the Search Address

available from the panel’s Home screen

Any authorization option may be

Cancel Jobs at the device

Controls access to the functionality to
cancel jobs via the touch panel.

Access must be restricted to authorized
users in the evaluated configuration

Change Language

Controls access to the Change Language

the “General Settings Menu”

Any authorization option may be

Color Dropout

Controls a user’s ability to activate the

job

Any authorization option may be

Configurati on Menu (and
submenus)

Controls access to the Configur a tion
Menu via the front panel

Must be disabled in the evaluated
configuration

Copy Color Printing

Controls a user’s ability to copy content
in color

Any authorization option may be
configured

Copy Function

Control’s a user’s access to the Copy

Access must be disabled or restricted to

configuration

Create Bookmarks at the

Controls access to the Delete Bookmark,

search and print bookmarks

Must be disabled in the evaluated

Create Bookmarks

Controls access to the Delete Bookmark,

search and print bookmarks

Must be disabled in the evaluated

Create Profiles

Controls the ability to create scan
profiles from remote systems.

Must be disabled in the evaluated
configuration

E-mail Function

Control’s a user’s access to the Email

Access must be disabled or restricted to

configuration

Solutions Configuration

Controls access to the

all sublinks ) via the Web page

Access must be disabled or restricted to

configuration

Fax Function

Control’s a user’s ability to perform a

(scan send, receive, and driver send) and

Access must be disabled or restricted to

Table 26 - Access Control Items

Item Description Comment

device

Book button that appears as part of the
E-mail, FTP, and Fax functions that are

button on the Home scre en (when
displayed); this button is NOT displayed
by default but a user can activate it via

Color Dropout functionality as part of a
job; if protected and the user fails to
authenticate, then the device DO ES NOT
use the color dropout functionality in the

functionality

Create Bookmark, and Create Folder
buttons from both the bookmark list
screen and from the individual bo okmark
screen; unless di sabled, all users
(regardless of their credentials) can

configured

configured

configured

authorized users in the evaluated

configuration

Remotely

Create Bookmark, and Create Folder
buttons from both the bookmark list
screen and from the individual bo okmark
screen; unless di sabled, all users
(regardless of their credentials) can

functionality (scan to email)

Embedded Solutions link (and

scan to fax job

When “Disabled”, all analog faxing

configuration

authorized users in the evaluated

authorized users in the evaluated

authorized users in the evaluated
configuration

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the fax server are disabled. The fax icon

valid credentials.

Firmware Updates

Controls a user’s ability to update the
device’s firmware code via the network

Must be disabled in the evaluated
configuration

FTP Function

Controls a user’s ability to access the

Settings Menu”

Must be disabled in the evaluated

Held Jobs Access

Controls access to the Held jobs menu if

not installed

Must be disabled in the evaluated
Manage Shortcuts at the
device

Controls access to the Manage Shortcuts
Menu via the Administration M enu s

Access may be configured as restricted or
no security, but not disabled

Manage Shortcuts
Remotely

Controls access to the Manage Shortcuts
Menu via the web

Access may be configured as restricted or
no security, but not disabled

Network/Ports Menu at

submenus)

Controls access to the Network/ Ports

Access must be restricted to authorized

configuration

Network/Ports Menu

Controls access to the Network/ Ports

Access must be restricted to authorized

configuration

New Solutions

Controls access to configuration

added to the device.

Access must be restricted to authorized
Operator Panel Lock

Controls access to the “Lock Device”
and “Unlock Device” buttons

Access may be configured as restricted or
disabled

Option Card

device

Controls a user’s ability to access the

nodes associated with installed DLEs

Access must be restricted to authorized

configuration

Option Card

Remotely

Controls a user’s ability to access the

Access must be restricted to authorized

configuration

Paper Menu at the device
(and submenus)

Controls access to the Paper Menu via
the Adminis tration Me nus

Any authorization option may be
configured

Paper Menu Remotely

Controls access to the Paper Menu via
the web

Any authorization option may be
configured

Item Description Comment

is removed and the device does not
answer incoming calls nor print driver
faxes. Ho we ver, the panel menus still
display fax-related settings as though fax
were enabled.

When protected by a security template,
the values of the “Enable Fax Scan”,
“Driver to Fax”, and “Enable Fax
Receive” settings in the “Fax Settings
Menu” determine the behavior of Fax
Receive and Driver Fax. Fax Scan
sending is enabled if the user provides

the device (and

Remotely

FTP button on the Home Sc reen (whe n
displayed); the FTP button is hidden by
default and does not display unless a
user activates it via the Home Screen
Customization menu in the “General

the “PKI Held Jobs” LES application is

Menu via the Administration M enu s

Menu via the web

parameter s for solutio ns subsequent ly

configuration

configuration

administrators in the evaluate d

administrators in the evaluate d

users in the evaluated configuration

Configurati on at the

Configuration

“Option Card Menu” that displays menu

“Option Card Menu” via the web

administrators in the evaluate d

administrators in the evaluate d

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PictBridge Printing

Controls access to PictBridge printing
functionality.

Must be disabled in the evaluated
configuration

PJL Device Setting
Changes

When “Disabled”, prohibits any changes
to system settings via PJL opera tors

Must be disabled in the evaluated
configuration

Release Held Faxes

Controls access to the Held Faxes button

the Home screen

Access must be restricted to authorized

configuration

Remote Management

Controls whether or not manageme nt

IT systems

Access must be restricted to authorized

configuration

Reports Menu at the

Controls access to the Reports Menu via

administrators.

Access must be restricted to authorized

Reports Menu Remotely

Controls access to the Reports Menu via

Access must be restricted to authorized

configuration

Security Menus at the

Controls access to the Security Menu via

Access must be restricted to authorized

configuration

Security Menu Remotely

Controls access to the Security Menu via

Access must be restricted to authorized

configuration

Service Engineer Menus

Controls access to any SE menu

Access must be restricted to authorized

menus are in use

Service Engineer Menus

Controls access to any SE menu

Access must be restricted to authorized

configuration

Settings Menu at the

Controls access to the Settings Menu via

Access must be restricted to authorized

configuration

Settings Menu Remotely

Controls access to the Settings Menu via

Access must be restricted to a uthor iz e d

configuration

Solution 1

Controls access to the Held Jobs menu if

installed

Access must be restricted to authorized

Solution [x] (where x is

Controls the execution of eSF and LDD

slots

Configuration is unused; the only add-on

configuration use Solution 1.

Supplies Menu at the
device (and submenus)

Controls access to the Supplies Menu via
the Adminis tration Me nus

Any authorization option may be
configured

Supplies Menu Remotely

Controls access to the Supplies Menu via
the web

Any authorization option may be
configured

Use Profiles

Controls a user’s ability to execute a ny
profile

Any authorization option may be
configured

Item Description Comment

device (and submenus)

device (and submenus)

at the device (and
submenus)

and the Release Held Faxes button on

functions may be invoke d from remote

the Administration Menus. This
includes information about user jobs,
which can’t be disclosed to non-

the web

the Adminis tration Me nus

the web

accessible from the panel, including the
Network SE menu

administrators in the evaluate d

administrators in the evaluate d

administrators in the evaluate d
configuration

administrators in the evaluate d

administrators in the evaluated

administrators in the evaluate d

administrators in the evaluate d
configuration
Note that LDAP+GSSAPI and PKI
authentication may not be used with this
access control because the network
interface is not operational when these

Remotely

device (and submenus)

any number other than 1)

accessible from the web

the Adminis tration Me nus

the web

the “PKI Held Jobs” LES applicatio n is

profiles that specify u s ing one of thes e

administrators in the evaluate d

administrators in the evaluate d

administrators in the evaluate d

users in the evaluated configuration

Java applications included in the evaluated

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Web Import/Export

Protects the Import/Export lin k in the

link

Must be disabled in the evaluated

Item Description Comment

Settings

Settings section of the AIO’s Web page
and all links beneath the Import/Export

configuration

Authorization is restricted by associating a security template with an item. The security template
assigned to each item may be the same or different as the security template(s) assigned to other
items. Each security template points to an authentication building block as well as an
authorization building block; the two building blocks may be the same or different.

When the item is a menu, access is also restricted to all submenus (a menu that is normally
reached by navigating through the listed item). This is necessary for instances where a shortcut
could bypass the listed menu. If a shortcut is used to access a sub-menu, the access control
check for the applicable menu item is still performed (as if normal menu traversal was being
performed).

When a function is restricted by a security template, the access control function first determines
if the user has already authenticated against the building block contained in the security template.
If the user authenticated previously (during the current session), the name of the building block
used during that authentication process was cached and can be compared to the name of the
building block for this security template. If they match, the authentication step is skipped.
Otherwise, if an authentication for a different building block was successfully performed during
the current session, the username and password cached from that interaction is re-used for this
authentication process against the authentication building block for this security template. If no
authentication has already been done for this session, the I&A function is performed before
access control continues.

Further access control processing is dependent on the type of authorization building block
contained in the security template.

7.1.3.1 Internal Account Building Blocks

The set of groups configured for the Internal Account (and bound to the session during the I&A
function) is compared to the set of groups included in the security template. If there are any
common groups in those sets, the access control check is satisfied and the user is granted access
to the requested function.

7.1.3.2 LDAP+GSSAPI and PKI Auth Building Blocks

For each group specified in the authorization building block, the LDAP server is queried to
determine if the user is a member of the group. If the user is a member of any of those groups,
the access control check is satisfied and the user is granted access to the requested function.

7.1.3.3 Common Processing

The information in this section applies to all types of building blocks.
If the access control check fails for an operation, a message is displayed then the display is

returned to the previous screen.
An audit record is generated with the result of the access control check.

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F.PRT

Network print jobs can always be submitted

Function access control is not “disabled”.

Allowed

“Enable Analog Receive” parameter is “On”.

F.SCN

Allowed for fax if the user is a member of an

access control

Allowed if the “Enable Fax Scans”

F.CPY

Allowed if the user is a member of an

authorized group

Allowed

F.FAX

Incoming faxes are not subject to access

is a member of an authorized group

Allowed if the “Enable Fax Receive” or

F.SMI

Allowed provided the individual function

Allowed

7.1.3.4 Function Access Control

The following table summarizes the access controls and configuration parameters used by the
TOE to control user access to the MFP functions provided by the TOE. Additional details for
each function are provided in subsequent sections.

Table 27 - TOE Function Access Control SFP Rules

Object Access Control Rules Configuration Parameter Rules

if the submitted print job includes a userid in
a SET USERNAME PJL statement. The job
is held until released by a user who is a
member of an authorized group for the
Solution 1 or Held Jobs Access access
control and has the same userid as was
specified in the SET USERNAME PJL
statement.

Allowed f or incoming faxes if the Fax

authorized group of the security template
configured for the Fax Function access
control

Allowed f or copying if the user is a member
of an authorized group of the security
template configured for the Copy Function
access control

Allowed for emailing if the user is a member
of an authorized group of the security
template configured for the Fax Function

Allowed if the “Enable Fax Receive” or

parameter is On and the “Fax Mode”
parameter is “Analog Fax”

Allowed

Allowed if the “Enable Fax Scans”
parameter is On and the “Fax Mode”
parameter is “Fax Server”

authorized group of the security template
configured for the Copy Function access
control

In addition, color copying is allowed if the
Copy Color Printing access control is “No
security” or if the user is a member of an

control. All incoming faxes are held until
released by a user who is a member of an

authorized group of the security template
configured for the Release Held Faxes access
control

Allowed for outgoing fax if the Fax Function
access control is “No security” or if the user

Allowed

“Enable Analog Receive” parameter is “On”.

Allowed

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access control allowed the function

Object Access Control Rules Configuration Parameter Rules

7.1.3.4.1 Printing

Submission of print jobs from users on the network is always permitted. Jobs that do not contain
a PJL SET USERNAME statement are discarded. Submitted jobs are always held on the TOE
until released or deleted by a user authorized for the appropriate access control and whose userid
matches the username specified when the job was submitted. Users are able to display the queue
of their pending print jobs. When a job is released, the user has the option to change the number
of copies to be printed. If a held job is not released within the configured expiration time, the job
is automatically deleted.

7.1.3.4.2 Scanning (to Fax or Email)

Scanning may be performed as part of a fax or email function. Only authorized users may
perform scans.

The destination of the fax scan is determined by the setting of the “Fax Mode” configuration
parameter. If it is configured for “Analog Fax” then the scanned data is transmitted out the
phone line as a fax. If it is configured for “Fax Server” then the scanned data is forwarded to the
configured email server via SMTP.

Scanning for fax is allowed if the Enable Fax Scans configuration parameter is “On” and the user
is authorized for the Fax Function access control.

Scanning for email is allowed if the user is authorized for the E-mail Function access control.

7.1.3.4.3 Copying

Copying is allowed if the user is authorized for the Copy Function access control. A user may
view or delete their own copy jobs queued for printing.

7.1.3.4.4 Incoming Fax

Incoming faxes are allowed if the “Enable Fax Receive” (for analog fax mode) or “Enable Fax
Receive” (for fax server mode) configuration parameter is “On”.

Incoming faxes are always held in the queue (until released) in the evaluated configuration.
Only users authorized for the Release Held Faxes access control may release or delete the faxes.

7.1.3.4.5 Shared-medium Interface

The TOE supports scanning to an external SMTP server via the network interface. When fax
functionality is enabled and the “Fax Mode” is configured for “Fax Server” outgoing faxes are
converted to a file and attached to outgoing SMTP messages. Administrators require access to
the Security Menu to configure the Fax Function access control and the Settings Menu to
configure the fax server parameters.

7.1.3.5 Postscript Access Control

In the evaluated configuration, the setdevparams, setsysparams and setuserparams Postscript
operators are made non-operational so that the Postscript DataStream can not modify
configuration settings in the TOE.

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Network Port

Defines the para meters required for

standard network port

Required in the evaluated configuration
Enable FTP/TFTP

Enables FTP/TFTP server on the TOE

Must be disabled in the evaluated
configuration

Enable HTTP Server

Enables HTTP(S) server on the TOE

Must be enabled in the evaluated
configuration

USB Buffer

Disables all activity via the USB port

Must be disabled in the evaluated
configuration

SMTP Setup Settings

Define the SMTP server to be used to
send email from the TOE

Required if the TOE supports scan to email
or fax to email

SMTP Setup Settings -

None (*)

Prompt User

Any option other than “None” may be

Edit Backup Password ­Use Backup Password

Enables access to the Security Menu
via the Bac kup Password

Only appears if backup password exists.
Enabling the backup password is optional.

7.1.4 Management

The TOE provides the ability for authorized administrators to manage TSF data from remote IT
systems via a browser session or locally via the touch panel. Authorization is granular, enabling
different administrators to be granted access to different TSF data. When an administrator
modifies TSF data, an audit record is generated.

The following sections describe the management capabilities provided and are organized by the
administrator menu structure available via the touch panel.

7.1.4.1 Reports Menu

The Reports menu provides the ability to print (view) the settings from other menu items as well
as fax job logs (F.FUNC). This information must be restricted to authorized administrators.

7.1.4.2 Network/Ports Menu

The following table describes TSF data available for management under this menu. In the
description field, “(*)” indicates the default setting for an item.

Table 28 - Network/Ports Menu TSF Data

Item Description Comments

the TOE to communicate via the

User-Initiated E-mail

Use Device SMTP Credentials
Use Session User ID & Password
Use Session E-mail & Password

configured in the eval uated configuration

7.1.4.3 Security Menu

The following table describes TSF data available for management under this menu. In the
description field, “(*)” indicates the default setting for an item.

Table 29 - Security Menu TSF Data

Item Description Comments

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Edit Backup Password -

Specifies the Backup Password

The TOE requires passwords to be a

permutations of the username

Edit Building Blocks -

Credentials

User ID and password (*)

“User ID and password” is required in the

Edit Building Blocks -

Defines the groups that may be

templates (using Inter nal Accounts)

Required if Internal Account building

Edit Building Blocks -

Defines the account name, username,

The TOE requires passwords to be a

permutations of the username

Edit Building Blocks -

Defines how to communicate with the

Required if LDAP+GSSAPI or PKI

with the KD C

Edit Building Blocks -

Defines how to communicate with the

the query

Required if LDAP+GSSAPI is be ing used to
Edit Building Blocks -

Certificate

default (*)

The evaluated configuration requires the

the building block.

Edit Building Blocks -

Credentials

Distinguished username and password

queries

Required in the evaluated configuration

Access Control s

Specifies whether access is no

security function for t he list of items)

Refer to the Access Control security

Item Description Comments

Password

Internal Accounts - General
Settings - Required User

Internal Accounts - General
Settings - Groups

Internal Accounts –
Manage Internal Accounts

User ID

associated with users, Internal
Account bui lding blocks , and securi ty

password, email address, and
associated groups for each internal
account

minimum of 8 characters, with no
composition rules. Operational guidance
directs administrators to use the following
composition rules when specifying
passwords: at least one upper case letter,
one lower case letter, and one non­alphabetic character; no dictionary words or

evaluated configuration

blocks are used

minimum of 8 characters, with no
composition rules. Operational guidance
directs administrators to use the following
composition rules when sp ec if yin g
passwords: at least one upper case letter,
one lower case letter, and one non­alphabetic character; no dictionary words or

Simple Kerberos Setup ­KDC Address, KDC Port,
and Realm

LDAP+GSSAPI

LDAP+GSSAPI –

LDAP+GSSAPI – Device

KDC

LDAP server and (optionally) restrict
the groups and users that will match

Certificate

to be used when performing LDAP

security, disabled, or restricted for
each item (see the Access Control

authentication (without PKI-specific
Kerberos parameters in the PKI Auth
building block) is being used since they use
a Kerberos Building Block in order to
define the parameters for communication

define the LDAP server to be used

default certificate if SSL/TLS is selected in

function for requirements on acc ess controls

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Login Restrictions

The “Login failures” value determines

automatically.

Any configuration options may be

Security Reset

No Effect

“No Security” preserves all of the building

default security level.

LDAP Certificate

Demand (*)

Never

“Demand!” must be configured in the

Wiping Mode

Controls the mode used for disk

Manual

“Automatic” must be specified in the
Automatic Method

Specifies the method used for

Multiple pass

“Multiple pass” must be specified in the

Enable Audit

Determines if the device records

No (*)

Any configuration options may be

Enable Remote Syslog

Determines if the device transmits

No (*)

“Yes” must be specified in the evaluated

Remote Syslog parameters

Defines the communication to the
remote syslog system

Must be configured in the evaluated
configuration.

Date and Time parameters

Controls whether the time is tracked

server

Must be configured for either local or

provide timestamps in audit records

Item Description Comments

Jumper

Verification

how many failed authentications (loc a l
OR remote) are allowed within the
“Failure time frame” value before the
offending User Name is prevented
from accessing any function protected
with the same building block (e.g.
LDAP, Kerberos, etc.) for the duration
of the “Lockout time” value.

The value of “Panel Login Timeout”
determines how long the operator
panel can remain idle on the Home
screen before the user is logged off

No Security (*)
Reset to Defaults

Try
Allow

configured. The locko ut function i s always
enabled and any settings within the allowed
range will result in a configuration with
adequate security against brute force
password attacks.

blocks and templates that a user has defined,
but resets each access control to its factory
default security level.

“Reset to Defaults” deletes all build ing
blocks and templates that a user has defined
and resets each access control to its factory

evaluated configuration

wiping
Off (*)
Automatic

automatic disk wiping
Single pass (*)

events via the re mote syslog
Yes

logged events to a remote server
Yes

internally or from a remote NTP

evaluated configuration

evaluated configuration

configured.

configuration

remote operation so that the TOE can

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Held Print Job Expiration

Specifies the maximum amount of

1 week

Any configuration option may be

FTP

Display (*)
Do not display

Must be set to “Do not display” in the
evaluated configuration

FTP shortc ut s

Display (*)
Do not display

Must be set to “Do not display” in the
evaluated configuration

USB Drive

Display (*)
Do not display

Must be set to “Do not display” in the
evaluated configuration

Fax Mode

Analog
Fax Server

Any configuration option may be specified

Cancel Faxes

Allow (*)
Don't Allow

Any configuration option may be specified,
according to local policy concerning faxes.

Enable Fax Scans

On (*)

with the device’s scanner.

Any configuration option may be specified,

Item Description Comments

Timer

time a print job is held while waiting
for a user to release it for printing
Off
1 hour
4 hours
24 hours

configured.

When an Internal Account is defined, initially no groups are associated with it. The TOE limits
the specification of group memberships to defined groups. If a group is associated with any
security templates, the group may not be deleted.

7.1.4.4 Settings Menu

The following table describes TSF data available for management under this menu. In the
description field, “(*)” indicates the default setting for an item.

Table 30 - General Settings Menu TSF Data

Item Description Comments

7.1.4.4.1 Fax Settings Menu

Analog fax mode uses a phone line connected directly to the MFP to send and/or receive faxes.
In fax server mode, scanned documents are forwarded to a fax server via SMTP rather than being
transmitted out the fax interface; a fax line may still be connected to process incoming faxes.
The following table describes TSF data available for management under this menu. In the
description field, “(*)” indicates the default setting for an item.

Item Description Comments

Table 31 - Fax Settings Menu TSF Data

Off
When “On”, user can create faxes

according to local policy concerning scan to
fax usage.

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Driver to fax

Yes (*)

disable “Driver to fax”

“No” must be specified in the evaluated
Enable Fax Receive

Specifies whether incoming faxes ma y

Off

Any configuration option may be specified,

Fax Forwarding

Print (*; fax forwarding off, print all

Forward

”Print” must be configured in the evaluated
Holding Faxes

Defines conditions for holding

In the evaluated configuration, t he

incoming faxes are held.

Enable Analog Receive

Off (*)

operating in fax server mode

Any configuration option may be specified,

E-mail images sent
as

Attachment (*)
Web link

“Attachment” must be specified in the
evaluated configuration

Job Waiting

On
Off (*)

Any configuration option may be specified

Item Description Comments

No
When “No”, driver fax jobs are treated
as PS jobs. This is the only way to

be received
On (*)

received faxes)
Print and Forward

incoming faxes.

On
This parameter controls whether
incoming faxes are supported when

configuration

according to local policy concerning
received faxes.

configuration.

conditions must be configured so that all

according to local policy concerning
incoming faxes.

7.1.4.4.2 Email Settings Menu

The following table describes TSF data available for management under this menu. In the
description field, “(*)” indicates the default setting for an item.

Table 32 - Email Settings Menu TSF Data

Item Description Comments

7.1.4.4.3 Print Settings/Setup Settings Menu

The following table describes TSF data available for management under this menu. In the
description field, “(*)” indicates the default setting for an item.

Table 33 - Print Settings/Setup Settings Menu TSF Data

Item Description Comments

7.1.4.5 Security Reset Jumper

The security reset jumper provides an alternate mechanism to manage some TSF data. The TOE
contains a hardware jumper that can be used to:

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• erase all security templates, building blocks, and access controls that a user has defined

(i.e. the factory default configuration); OR

• force the value of each function access control to “No Security” (all security templates

and building blocks are preserved but not applied to any function).

Administrators can secure the hardware containing the jumper with a Kensington lock. Or, to
completely negate the effects of a jumper reset, an authorized administrator can configure the
TOE to take no action based upon the jumper, effectively disabling this mechanism. Authorized
administrators use the same configuration parameter to determine which of the two actions listed
above is performed (if the mechanism is not disabled).

To perform a jumper reset operation, an administrator:

1. powers the device off;

2. removes the Kensington lock from the card cage;

3. removes the small plastic piece that covers a pair of the jumper’s pins;

4. replaces the plastic piece so that it covers the pins adjacent to its original position;

5. replaces and secures the Kensington lock on the card cage;

6. powers the device on.

The movement of the plastic piece from position A to position B on the jumper triggers the reset,
not the specific positions. When the TOE is powered on, it labels the current position of the
plastic piece as the “home” position. If, at the next power on or reset, the TOE detects that the
plastic piece has moved from its previous “home” position to the “other” position, then it
performs the jumper reset operation. After performing the operation, the TOE also relabels the
“other” position as the “home” position.

7.1.5 Operator Panel Lockout

The Operator Panel Lockout function enables the touch panel to be “locked” to prevent anyone
from using it until it is “unlocked” by an authorized user. This function is enabled when a
security template is associated with the Operator Panel Lock access control described above.
When enabled, an icon is displayed on the Home page to lock the panel.

When that lock icon is touched, the user must authenticate (if not already authenticated). If I&A
is successful, the device is locked and the current session is terminated immediately. When
locked, the only icon appearing on the touch panel is to unlock the MFP.

When the unlock icon is touched, the user must authenticate. If I&A is successful, the touch
panel is unlocked and the Home page is displayed. The current session is immediately
terminated, requiring a user to authenticate again before any controlled function may be
accessed.

7.1.6 Fax Separation

The Fax Separation security function assures that the information on the TOE, and the
information on the network to which the TOE is attached, is not exposed through the phone line
that provides connectivity for the fax function. This function assures that only printable
documents are accepted via incoming fax connections, and that the only thing transmitted over

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an outgoing fax connection (in the evaluated configuration) is a document that was scanned for
faxing.

In the evaluated configuration, the USB ports capable of being used for document input are
disabled and the ability to submit jobs via the network interface to be sent out the fax interface is
disabled. Therefore, the only source for outgoing fax transmissions is the scanner. Control of the
fax functionality is incorporated directly into the TOE’s firmware. The modem chip is in a mode
that is more restrictive than Class 1 mode (the fax modem will not answer a data call), and relies
on the TOE firmware for composition and transmission of fax data. The TOE firmware explicitly
disallows the transmission of frames in data mode and allows for the sending and receiving of
facsimile jobs only. There is no mechanism by which telnet, FTP, or other network protocols can
be used over the analog fax line.

The fax modem is on a separate card from the network adapter to provide separation between the
interfaces and is only capable of sending and receiving fax data. The modem and the network
adapter are incapable of communicating directly with one another. The modem is designed only
for fax communications, thus preventing any type of remote configuration or management of the
TOE over the fax line.

7.1.7 Hard Disk Encryption

All user data saved on the Hard Disk is encrypted using 256-bit AES. The types of data saved on
the Hard Disk (and therefore encrypted) include buffered job data, held jobs, images referenced
by other jobs, and macros. The contents of each file are automatically encrypted as they are
written to the Hard Disk and automatically decrypted when the contents are read. This security
function is intended to protect against data disclosure if a malicious agent is able to gain physical
possession of the Hard Disk. This security function operates transparently to users and is always
enabled in the evaluated configuration.

A common key is used to encrypt all files. The key is generated using the internal random
number generator when this function is enabled during installation. The key is saved in internal
non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM), enabling information on the hard disk to be
decrypted across reboots. The key is zeroized if this function is disabled.

The encryption key is specific to the MFP and hard disk. All user data files on the hard disk will
be lost as a result of the following actions:

1. Disabling the hard disk encryption feature - the encryption key is zeroized.

2. Enabling the hard disk encryption feature when it is already enabled - a new encryption

key is generated; the previous key is zeroized.

7.1.8 Disk Wiping

In the evaluated configuration, the TOE is configured to perform automatic disk wiping with a
multi-pass method. Files containing user data are stored on the internal hard drive until they are
no longer needed. At that time, they are logically deleted and marked as needing to be wiped.
Until the wiping occurs, the disk blocks containing the files are not available for use by any user.
Every 5 seconds, the TOE checks to see if any “deleted” files are present and begins the disk
wiping process.

The TOE overwrites each block associated with each deleted file (including bad and remapped
sectors) three times: first with “0x0F” (i.e. 0000 1111), then with “0xF0” (i.e. 1111 0000), and

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finally with a block of random data (supplied by the internal random number generator). Each
time that the device wipes a different file, it selects a different block of random data. This
method is compliant with NIST SP800-88 and the DSS "Clearing and Sanitization Matrix"
(C&SM).

Once the disk wiping is complete, the disk blocks used for the deleted files are once again
available for use by the system. If the disk wiping process is interrupted by a power cycle or
reset, the status is remembered across the restart and the process resumes when operation
resumes.

If any error occurs during the disk wiping process, an audit record is generated and the file
system is considered to be corrupt and must be re-initialized.

The TOE also overwrites RAM with a fixed pattern upon deallocation of any buffer used to hold
user data.

7.1.9 Secure Communications

IPSec with ESP is required for all network datagram exchanges with remote IT systems. IPSec
provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication of the endpoints. Supported encryption
options for ESP are TDES, AES and DES. Both SHA-1 and MD5 are supported for HMACs.

ISAKMP and IKE are used to establish the Security Association (SA) and session keys for the
IPSec exchanges. Diffie-Hellman is used for key agreement, using Oakley Groups 1, 2, 5 or 14.
During the ISAKMP exchange, the TOE requires the remote IT system to provide a certificate
and the RSA signature for it is validated.

If an incoming IP datagram does not use IPSec with ESP, the datagram is discarded.
If external accounts are defined, LDAP+GSSAPI is used for the exchanges with the LDAP

server. Kerberos v5 with AES encryption is supported for exchanges with the LDAP server.
The TOE zeroizes the session keys when the sessions are terminated.

7.1.10 Self Test

During initial start-up, the TOE performs self tests on the hardware. The integrity of the security
templates and building blocks is verified by ensuring that all the security templates specified in
access controls exist and that all building blocks referenced by security templates exist.

If any problems are detected with the hardware, an appropriate error message is posted on the
touch screen and operation is suspended. If a problem is detected with the integrity of the
security templates or building blocks, the data is reset to the factory default, an audit log record
is generated, an appropriate error message is posted on the touch screen, and further operation is
suspended. In this case, a system restart will result in the system being operational with the
factory default settings for the data.

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8. Protection Profile Claims

This chapter provides detailed information in reference to the Protection Profile conformance
identification that appears in Chapter 2.

8.1 TOE Type Consistency

Both the PP and the TOE describe Hard Copy Devices.

8.2 Security Problem Definition Consistency

This ST claims demonstrable conformance to the referenced PP as augmented by Attachment A
of CCEVS Policy Letter #20 dated 15 November 2010.

All of the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies of the PP are included in the
ST.

8.3 Security Objectives Consistency

This ST claims demonstrable conformance to the referenced PP as augmented by Attachment A
of CCEVS Policy Letter #20 dated 15 November 2010.

All of the security objectives for the TOE and the operational environment (IT and non-IT) of the
PP are included in the ST. The following additional security objectives are included in the ST:

1. O.I&A

2. O.MANAGE

3. O.TIME_STAMP

4. OE.I&A

5. OE.TIME_STAMP

Therefore, the ST is more restrictive than the PP.

8.4 Security Function al Requi rements Con si s tency

This ST claims demonstrable conformance to the referenced PP as augmented by Attachment A
of CCEVS Policy Letter #20 dated 15 November 2010.

All of the SFRs from the claimed SFR packages are included in the ST with any fully or partially
completed operations from the PP. Any remaining operations have been completed. The
following notes apply to conformance of the SFRs in the ST.

1. The auditable events listed in the table with FAU_GEN.1 have been enumerated to match

the specific events generated by the TOE. All of the events required by the PP are
represented along with additional events.

2. SFRs from the FCS class have been added to the ST to address cryptographic

functionality for IPSec and disk encryption, which are additions to the security
functionality required by the PP.

3. FDP_ACC.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1(a) have been integrated with the individual instances of

FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 from the applicable SFR packages of the PP into a single
instance of FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 (still named Common Access Control SFP)
that addresses all of the access control policies.

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4. FDP_ACC.1(c) and FDP_ACF.1(c) have been added to the ST to address an access

control function (touch panel locking) that is an addition to the security functionality
required by the PP.

5. FIA_AFL.1 has been added to the ST to address to address authentication failure

handling, which is an addition to the security functionality required by the PP.

6. FIA_UAU.7 has been added to the ST to address to address protected authentication

feedback, which is an addition to the security functionality required by the PP.

7. FMT_MSA.1(a) and FMT_MSA.1(b) from the PP were combined into a single instance

of FMT_MSA.1 since all the completed operations were identical.

8. FMT_MSA.3(a) and FMT_MSA.3(b) from the PP were combined into a single instance

of FMT_MSA.3 since all the completed operations were identical.

9. FMT_MTD.1(a) and FMT_MTD.1(b) from the PP were combined into a single instance

of FMT_MTD.1. Users (U.NORMAL) do not have any access to TSF data, and it was
necessary to provide permission-level granularity of the administrator role for various
TSF data access. Given these conditions, it was simpler to combine the instances of
FMT_MTD.1 in the ST.

10. For FMT_SMR.1, the TOE provides greater granularity of roles based on individual

permissions that is required by the PP. The permission-based description has been
provided in the ST, and an application note with the SFR defines the relationship between
those permissions and the roles defined by the PP.

11. FMT_MOF.1 has been added to the ST to address administrator privileges for enabling

and disabling security-relevant functionality.

12. The instance of the FAU_GEN.1 in the SMI package has been integrated with the

instance of FAU_GEN.1 in the common requirements.

8.5 Security Assurance Requirements Consistency

The ST assurance claims are identical to the assurance claims of the PP.

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O.AUDIT.LOGGED O.CONF.NO_ALT O.CONF

O.

O.INTERFACE.MANAGED

O.I&A

O.MANAGE O.PROT.NO_ALT O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED O.TIME_STAMP O.USER.AUTHORIZED

OE.ADMIN.TRAINED OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED

OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED

OE

OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED OE.TIME_STAMP OE.USER.AUTHORIZED OE.USER.TRAINED

A.ACCESS.MANAG
ED

A.ADMIN.TRAININ
G

A.ADMIN.TRUST

X

A.USER.TRAINING

X

T.CONF.ALT

X X X X X

T.CONF.DIS

X X X X X

T.DOC.ALT

X X X X X

T.DOC.DIS

X X X X X

T.FUNC.ALT

X X X X X

T.PROT.ALT

X X X X X

P.AUDIT.LOGGING

X X X X X X

P.INTERFACE.MA
NAGEMENT

P.SOFTWARE.VERI
FICATION

P.USER.AUTHORIZ
ATION

9. Rationale

This chapter provides the rationale for the selection of the IT security requirements, objectives,
assumptions and threats. It shows that the IT security requirements are suitable to meet the
security objectives, Security Requirements, and TOE security functional.

9.1 Rationale for IT Security Objectives

This section of the ST demonstrates that the identified security objectives are covering all aspects
of the security needs. This includes showing that each threat, policy and assumption is addressed
by a security objective.

The following table identifies for each threat, policy and assumption, the security objective(s)
that address it.

Table 34 - Threats, Policies and Assumptions to Security Objectives Mapping

.NO_DIS

DOC.NO_ALT O.DOC.NO_DIS O.FUNC.NO_ALT

X
X

X X
X
X X X X X

.I&A

9.1.1 Rationale Showing Threats to Security Objectives

The following table describes the rationale for the threat to security objectives mapping.

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T.CONF.ALT

O.CONF.NO_ALT – The objective addresses the threat by requiring the TOE to

address the threat by requiring authorizations to be specified for users.

T.CONF.DIS

O.CONF.NO_DIS - The objective addresses the threat by requiring the TOE to

address the threat by requiring authorizations to be specified for users.

T.DOC.ALT

O.DOC.NO_ALT - The objective addresses the threat by requiring the TOE to

address the threat by requiring authorizations to be specified for users.

T.DOC.DIS

O.DOC.NO_DIS - The objective addresses the threat by requiring the TOE to

address the threat by requiring authorizations to be specified for users.

T.FUNC.ALT

O.FUNC.NO_ALT - The objective addresses the threat by requiring the TOE to

address the threat by requiring authorizations to be specified for users.

T.PROT.ALT

O.PROT.NO_ALT - The objective addresses the threat by requiring the TOE to

address the threat by requiring authorizations to be specified for users.

Table 35 - Threats to Security Objectives Rationale

T.TYPE Security Objectives Rationale

protect against unauthorized alteration o f TSF Confidential Data.
O.I&A and OE.I&A – The objectives help address the threat by requiring I&A
mechanisms so that appropriate authorizations may be associated with users.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED – The objectives help

protect against unauthorized disclosure of TSF Confidential Data.
O.I&A and OE.I&A – The objectives help address the threat by requiring I&A
mechanisms so that appropriate authorizations may be associated with users.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED – The objectives help

protect against unauthorized alteration of User Document Data.
O.I&A and OE.I&A – The objectives help address the threat by requiring I&A
mechanisms so that appropriate authorizations may be associated with users.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED – The objectives help

protect against unauthorized disclosure of User Document Data.
O.I&A and OE.I&A – The objectives help address the threat by requiring I&A
mechanisms so that appropriate authorizations may be associated with users.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED – The objectives help

protect against unauthorized alte ration of User Function Data.
O.I&A and OE.I&A – The objectives help address the threat by requiring I&A
mechanisms so that appropriate authorizations may be associated with users.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED – The objectives help

protect against unauthorized alteration of TSF Protected Data.
O.I&A and OE.I&A – The objectives help address the threat by requiring I&A
mechanisms so that appropriate authorizations may be associated with users.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED – The objectives help

9.1.2 Rationale Showing Policies to Security Objectives

The following table describes the rationale for the policy to security objectives mapping.

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P.AUDIT.LOGGING

O.AUDIT.LOGGED – The objective addresses the first part o f the policy by

externally.

P.INTERFACE.MA

O.INTERFACE.MANAGED – The objective addresses the policy by requiring

within the operational environment.

P.SOFTWARE.VERI
FICATION

O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED – The objective restates the policy.

P.USER.AUTHORIZ

O.I&A and OE.I&A – The objectives help address the policy by requiring I&A

address the policy by requiring authorizations to be specified for users.

A.ACCESS.MANAGED

OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED – The objective addresses the assumption by
requiring the TOE to be located in an area that restricts physical access.

A.ADMIN.TRAINING

OE.ADMIN.TRAINED – The objective restates the assumption.

A.ADMIN.TRUST

OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED – The objective addresses the assumption by
requiring trust to be established in the administrators.

A.USER.TRAINING

OE.USER.TRAINED – The objective restates the assumption.

Table 36 - Policies to Security Objectives Rationale

P.TYPE Security Objectives Rationale

requiring the TOE to generate audit records for TOE usage and security­relevant events, and to protect these records while they are inside the TSC.
O.TIME_STAMP – The obje ct i ve support s the policy by requiring the TOE to
provide time stamps for the audit records when time is being tracked internally.
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED – The objective addresses the audit review portion of
the policy by requiring timely review of the generated audit records.
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED – The objective supports the policy by
requiring the operational environment to make the audit records available to
authorized personnel only.
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED - The objective supports the policy by
requiring the operational environment to protect the stored audit records from
unauthorized access.
OE.TIME_STAMP - The objective supports the policy by requiring the TOE to
provide time stamps for the audit records when time is being supplied

NAGEMENT

ATION

the TOE to enforce access to and usage of the TOE interfaces within the TSC.
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED – The objective addresses the policy by
requiring the operational envir onment to control access to the TOE interfaces

mechanisms so that user authorizations may be restricted for users.
O.MANAGE – The objective addresses the policy by requiring the TOE to
provide management functions to administrators for configuration of user
authorizations.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED – The objectives help

9.1.3 Rationale Showing Assumptions to Environment Security Objectives

The following table describes the rationale for the assumption to security objectives mapping.

Table 37 - Assumptions to Security Objectives Rationale

A.TYPE Security Objectives Rationale

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O.AUDIT.LOGGED O.CONF.NO_ALT O.CONF.NO_DIS O.

O.

O.

O.INTERFACE.MANAGED O.I&A O.MANAGE O.PROT.NO_ALT O.SOFT

O.TIME_STAMP O.USER.AUTHORIZED

FAU_GEN.1

X X

FAU_GEN.2

X

FCS_CKM.1(A)

X

FCS_CKM.1(B)

X X X X X X

FCS_CKM.4

X X X X X X

FCS_COP.1

X X X X X X

FDP_ACC.1(A)

X X X X X X

FDP_ACC.1(B)

X X X X X

FDP_ACC.1(C)

X X

FDP_ACF.1(A)

X X X X X X

FDP_ACF.1(B)

X X X X X

FDP_ACF.1(C)

X X

FDP_RIP.1

X

FIA_AFL.1

X

FIA_ATD.1

X

FIA_UAU.1

X X

FIA_UAU.7

X

FIA_UID.1

X X

FIA_USB.1

X X

FMT_MOF.1

X X X X

FMT_MSA.1

X X X X

FMT_MSA.3

X

FMT_MTD.1

X X X X

FMT_SMF.1

X

FMT_SMR.1

X

FPT_FDI_EXP.1

X X

FPT_STM.1

X

FPT_TST.1

X

FTA_SSL.3

X

FTP_ITC.1

X X X X X X

9.2 Security Requirements Rationale

9.2.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives

This section provides rationale for the Security Functional Requirements demonstrating that the
SFRs are suitable to address the security objectives.

The following table identifies for each TOE security objective, the SFR(s) that address it.

Table 38 - SFRs to Security Objectives Mapping

WARE.VERIFIED

DOC.NO_ALT

DOC.NO_DIS

FUNC.NO_ALT

The following table provides the detail of TOE security objective(s).

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O.AUDIT.LOGGED

FAU_GEN.1 addresses the objective by requiring the TOE to generate audit

include information associating a user with each event (if applicable).

O.CONF.NO_ALT

FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4 and FCS_COP.1 support the objective by requiring

channels for the exchange of management traffic across the network.

O.CONF.NO_DIS

FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4 and FCS_COP.1 support the objective by requiring

channels for the exchange of management traffic across the network.

O.DOC.NO_ALT

FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4 and FCS_COP.1 support the objective by requiring

channels for the exchange of D.DOC across the network.

O.DOC.NO_DIS

FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4 and FCS_COP.1 support the objective by requiring

FTP_ITC.1 addresses the objective by requiring the TOE to provide trusted

Table 39 - Security Objectives to SFR Rationale

Security

Objective

SFR and Rationale

records for TOE usage and security relevant events.
FAU_GEN.2 helps address the objective by requiring the audit records to

the TOE to provide key management and cryptographic functions to protect
management interactions d uring network t ransmission.
FMT_MOF.1 specifies the rules for managing the behaviour of security­relevant functions, which is done by altering TSF Confidential Data and should
only be accessed by authorized administrators.
FMT_MSA.1 specifies the rules for managing user security attributes used in
user data access control decisions, which is done by altering TSF Confidential
Data and should only be accessed by authorized administrators.
FMT_MTD.1 specifies the rules for altering TSF Confidential Data.
FTP_ITC.1 addresses the objective by requiring the TOE to provide trusted

the TOE to provide key management and cryptographic functions to protect
management intera c tions during network transmission.
FMT_MOF.1 specifies the rules for managing the behaviour of security­relevant functions, which includes displaying TSF Confidential Da ta a nd should
only be accessed by authorized administrators.
FMT_MSA.1 specifies the rules for managing user security attributes used in
user data access control decisions, which includes displaying TSF Confidential
Data and should only be accessed by authorized administrators.
FMT_MTD.1 specifies the rules for displaying TSF Confidential Data.
FTP_ITC.1 addresses the objective by requiring the TOE to provide trusted

the TOE to provide key management and cryptographic functions to protect the
document data while transferred across the network.
FDP_ACC.1(A) and FDP_ACC.1(B) specify the subjects, objects and
operations that are controlled regarding User Document Data that must be
protected for unauthorized alteration.
FDP_ACF.1(A) and FDP_ACF.1(B) sp e c ify the sec urity attributes and rules
used to determine whether access is permitted.
FTP_ITC.1 addresses the objective by requiring the TOE to provide trusted

the TOE to provide key management and cryptographic functions to protect the
document data while transferred across the network or stored on the TOE’s hard
disk.
FDP_ACC.1(A) and FDP_ACC.1(B) specify the subjects, objects and
operations that are controlled regarding User Document Data that must be
protected for unauthorized disclosure.
FDP_ACF.1(A) and FDP_ACF.1(B) sp e c ify the sec urity attributes and rules
used to determine whether access is permitted.
FDP_RIP .1 supports the objective by requiring the TOE to make unavail able
any user document data when a user job completes.

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channels for the exchange of D.DOC across the network.

O.FUNC.NO_ALT

FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4 and FCS_COP.1 support the objective by requiring

channels for the exchange of D.FUNC across the network.

O.INTERFACE.MA

FDP_ACC.1(A), FDP_ACC.1(B) and FDP_ACC.1( C) specify the subjects,

between the network and fax interfa ces.

O.I&A

FIA_AFL.1 supports the objective by requiring the TOE to loc k accounts that

completion of the I&A process.

O.MANAGE

FPT_FDI_EXP.1 requires the TOE to provide management of direct forwarding

access.

O.PROT.NO_ALT

FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4 and FCS_COP.1 support the objective by requiring

FTP_ITC.1 addresses the objective by requiring the TOE to provide trusted

Security

Objective

NAGED

SFR and Rationale

the TOE to provide key management and cryptographic functions to protect the
function data while transferred across the network.
FDP_ACC.1(A) specifies the subjects, objects and operations that are controlled
regarding func t io ns.
FDP_ACF.1(A) specifies the security attributes and rules used to determine
whether access is permitted.
FTP_ITC.1 addresses the objective by requiring the TOE to pro vide trusted

objects and operations that are controlled regarding all TOE interfaces.
FDP_ACF.1(A), FDP_ACF.1(B) and FDP_ACF.1(C) specify the security
attributes and rules used to determine whether access is permitted.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 specifies that the TOE restrict the flow of information

experience an excessive number of failed authentication attempts, thereby
providing protection from brute force password attacks.
FIA_ATD.1 specifies the attributes associated with users, including information
about failed authentication att empts.
FIA_UAU.1 requires the TOE to provide I&A using Internal Accounts and the
Backup Password.
FIA_UAU.7 protects the confidentiality of passwords by specifying that only
asterisks are echoed during password entry.
FIA_UID.1 requires t he TOE to p rovide I&A using Internal Accounts a nd the
Backup Password.
FIA_USB.1 specifies the attributes bound to a session upon successful

from the original document handler input to t he network interface.
FMT_MOF.1 specifies the rules for administrator access to the listed functions.
FMT_MSA.1 specifies the rules for management of the security attributes used
in the access control decisions for user data.
FMT_MSA.3 requires the TOE to impose restrictive default values for security
attributes in all cases.
FMT_MTD.1specifies the rules for management of TSF data.
FMT_SMF.1 specifies the management functions that the TOE provides and
controls access to.
FMT_SMR.1 specifies the two roles supported by the TOE.
FTA_SSL.3 requires the TOE to a utomatically terminate idle sessio ns to
mitigate a gainst users taking advantage of exi s ting sessions to gain unauthorized

the TOE to provide key management and cryptographic functions to protect the
management data while transferred across the network.
FDP_ACC.1(A) and FDP_ACC.1(B) specify the subjects, objects and
operations that are controlled regarding TSF Protected Data that must be
protected for unauthorized alteration.
FDP_ACF.1(A) and FDP_ACF.1(B) sp e c ify the sec urity attributes and rules
used to determine whether access is permitted.

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channels for the exchange of management traffic across the network.

O.SOFTWARE.VER
IFIED

FPT_TST.1 addresses the objective by requiring the TOE to validate the TSF
data for security templates and building blocks.

O.TIME_STAMP

FPT_STM.1 requires the TOE to provide a reliable time source when time is
configured to be supplied internally.

O.USER.AUTHORI

FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires the TOE to successfully complete the

of the authe nticated use r).

Audit

Generation

Touch Panel

Encryption

Secure

FAU_GEN.1

X FAU_GEN.2

X FCS_CKM.1(A)

X

Security

SFR and Rationale

Objective

ZED

I&A process before allowing users to perform anything other than the specified
functions.
FIA_USB.1 specifies the attributes bound to a sessions (and used in access
control decisions) upo n successful I&A.
The security policies defined in FDP_ACC.1(A), FDP_ACC.1(B),
FDP_ACC.1(C), FDP_ACF.1(A), FDP_ACF.1(B), FDP_ACF.1(C),
FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MTD.1 are required to be enforced by
the TOE based on the security attributes bound to the subject (acting on behalf

9.2.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The TOE stresses assurance through vendor actions that are within the bounds of current best
commercial practice. The TOE provides, primarily via review of vendor-supplied evidence,
independent confirmation that these actions have been competently performed.

The general level of assurance for the TOE is:

A) Consistent with current best commercial practice for IT development and provides

a product that is competitive against non-evaluated products with respect to
functionality, performance, cost, and time-to-market.

B) The TOE assurance also meets current constraints on widespread acceptance, by

expressing its claims against EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 from part 3 of
the Common Criteria.

9.3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale

This section demonstrates that the TOE’s Security Functions completely and accurately meet the
TOE SFRs.

The following tables provide a mapping between the TOE’s Security Functions and the SFRs
and the rationale.

Table 40 - SFRs to TOE Security Functions Mapping

I&A

Access Control

Lockout

Management

Hard Disk

Fax Separation

Disk Wiping

Self Test

Communication

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Audit

Generation

Touch Panel

Encryption

Secure

FCS_CKM.1(B)

X FCS_CKM.4

X X FCS_COP.1

X X X FDP_ACC.1(A)

X FDP_ACC.1(B)

X FDP_ACC.1(C)

X FDP_ACF.1(A)

X FDP_ACF.1(B)

X FDP_ACF.1(C)

X FDP_RIP.1

X FIA_AFL.1

X FIA_ATD.1

X

FIA_UAU.1

X FIA_UAU.7

X FIA_UID.1

X FIA_USB.1

X FMT_MOF.1

X X FMT_MSA.1

X X FMT_MSA.3

X FMT_MTD.1

X X FMT_SMF.1

X

FMT_SMR.1

X FPT_FDI_EXP.1

X X X FPT_STM.1

X FPT_TST.1

X FTA_SSL.3

X FTP_ITC.1

X

FAU_GEN.1

Audit Generation addresses the SFR by specifying the audit event records
that are generated and the content of the records.

FAU_GEN.2

Audit Generation addresses the SFR by specifying that the associated
Username (if applicable) is included in audit event records.

FCS_CKM.1(A)

Hard Disk Encryption generates a key used to encrypt the files on the hard
disk when this function is enabled.

FCS_CKM.1(B)

Secure Communications requires generation of a certificate with an RSA
public-private key pair.

FCS_CKM.4

Hard Disk Enc ryption re quires the key used to e ncrypt the files on the hard

DH key agreement to be zeroized when the sessions terminate.

I&A

Lockout

Access Control

Management

Fax Separation

Hard Disk

Disk Wiping

Self Test

Communication

Table 41 - SFR to SF Rationale

SFR SF and Rationale

disk to be zeroized when the function is disabled.
Secure Communication requires zeroization of the session keys obtained by

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FCS_COP.1

Hard Disk Encryption uses the random number generator and AES to

for key agreement, and a pseudo-random number generator.

FDP_ACC.1(A)

Access Control specifies the access controls placed on the user operations
(objects) performed by users to access user data in the TSC.

FDP_ACC.1(B)

Access Control specifies the access controls placed on the user operations
(objects) performed by users to access user data in the TSC.

FDP_ACC.1(C)

Touch Panel Lockout specifies the access controls placed on the users for
locking, unlocking and using the Touch Panel.

FDP_ACF.1(A)

Access Control specifies the access controls placed on the user operations
(objects) performed by users to access user data in the TSC.

FDP_ACF.1(B)

Access Control specifies the access controls placed on the user operations
(objects) performed by users to access user data in the TSC.

FDP_ACF.1(C)

Touch Panel Lockout specifies the access controls placed on the users for
locking, unl ocking and using the Touch Panel .

FDP_RIP.1

Disk Wiping requires the TOE to e rase disk files and RAM buffers upon

jobs.

FIA_AFL.1

Identification and Authentication requires the TOE to track failed login

triggers an account lock is specified via the Login Restrictions TSF data.

FIA_ATD.1

Identification and Authentication requires the TOE to maintain the

attributes for all users.

FIA_UAU.1

Identification and Authentication requires the TOE to prevent access to

Accounts and the Backup Password.

FIA_UAU.7

Identification and Authentication requires the TOE to echo asterisks when a
password is being entered for the I&A process for all mechanisms.

FIA_UID.1

Identification and Authentication requires the TOE to prevent access to

Accounts and the Backup Password.

FIA_USB.1

Identification and Authentication requires the TOE to bind the Username and

building block name used for I&A.

FMT_MOF.1

Management requires the TOE to provide the management capabilities

configuration in the evaluated configuration.

SFR SF and Rationale

generate the key used to encrypt the files on the hard disk, and uses AES to
perform the encryption and decryption.
Disk Wiping uses the random number generato r to obtain random data use d
during disk sanitization.
Secure Communication requires the TOE to support TDES, AES and DES
for encryption, AES and SHA-1 for HMAC, RSA signatures, Diffie Hellman

their release that contain user data fr om incoming p rint, cop y, scan and fax

attempts for all authentication mecha nisms. The limit on failed attempts that

Username, Password, and Associated Groups security attributes for Internal
Accounts and the Backup Password; and the faile d authentication security

restricted functions before the I&A process is successfully completed.
Printing is never a restricted function; other functions may be r e str ic te d
through access controls or enabl ing/disabli ng specific functions such as
incoming faxes. The TOE is solely responsible for I&A for Internal

restricted functions before the I&A process is successfully completed.
Printing is never a restricted functio n; o ther functions may be restricted
through access controls or enabl ing/disabli ng specific functions such as
incoming faxes. The TOE is solely responsible for I&A for Internal

Password supplied during I&A wit h the subject upon successful I&A. The
TOE also binds the list of associate d groups (for Internal Accounts) and the

specified in the table to the administrators that satisfy the access controls
associated with the menus that control those functions.

Access Control specifies that access be restricted and states the required

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FMT_MSA.1

Management requires the TOE to provide the management capabilities for

configuration in the evaluated configuration.

FMT_MSA.3

Management requires t he TOE to initially associate no group memberships
with Internal Accounts.

FMT_MTD.1

Management requires the TOE to provide the management capabilities

configuration in the evaluated configuration.

FMT_SMF.1

Management requires the TOE to provide capabilities to manage the
specified functions.

FMT_SMR.1

Management requires the TOE to maintain the two specified roles.

while normal users are all the other defined users.

FPT_FDI_EXP.1

Access Control requires the TOE to prevent data from being forwarded from

the fax interface and the network port.

FPT_STM.1

Audit Generation requires the TOE to provide time stamps for audit r e c ords
when the TO E is configur ed for internal time.

FPT_TST.1

Self Test requires the TOE to perform tests on the hardware and validate the
security templates and building blocks on each power up and reset.

FTA_SSL.3

Identification and Authentication states that sessions are automatically

configured timeout period.

FTP_ITC.1

Secure Communication requires the TOE to use a trusted channel for
network communication with all r emote IT systems.

SFR SF and Rationale

Usernames and Group memberships to the a dministrators that satisfy the
access controls associated with the menus that control access to the data
items.
Access Control specifies that access be restricted and states the required

specified in the table to the administrators that satisfy the access controls
associated with the menus that control access to the data items.
Access Control specifies that access be restricted and states the required

Administrators are any users authorized access to management functionality,

the original document handler interfaces to the network interface in the
evaluated configuration un;ess a uthor iz e d by an administrator.
Management provides an administrator with the ability to configure the TOE
for operation in this manne r.
Fax Separation requires the TOE to prevent any forwarding of data between

terminated by the TOE when the Home menu is not accessed within the